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Columbia  ®nit)ers;ttp 
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THE  LIBRARIES 


Underwood  &  Underwood 


WOODROW  WILSON 

Twenty-Eighth  President  of  the  United   States 


A  HISTORY 

OF  THE 

GREAT  WAR 


BERTRAM  BENEDICT,  A.  B. 

Editor  in  chief  for 
BUREAU  OF  NATIONAL  LITERATURE,   (INC.) 

Publishers  of 
MESSAGES  AND  PAPERS  OF  THE  PRESIDENTS 


PUBLISHED  BY 

BUREAU  OF  NATIONAL 

LITERATURE.  (Inc.) 

NEW  YORK 


J^ 


Copyright,  1919    *  v 

by  N?   '\ 

BUREAU  OF  NATIONAL  LITERATURE,  (Inc.) 


GIVEN  BY 

CHARLES  DOWNER  HAZSW 

JULY  1937 


V       \ 


PREFACE 


The  Great  War  burst  in  August,  1914  upon  an  American  public 
opinion  helpless,  on  the  whole,  to  form  an  adequate  appreciation  of 
the  War's  inner  significance.  Even  when  our  own  national  honor  be- 
came definitely  involved,  we  were  long  hazy  concerning  the  funda- 
mental issues  which  were  being  decided  in  the  trenches  of  northern 
France  and  Belgium.  At  one  end  of  the  scale,  the  super-patriot  pro- 
claimed that  the  War  traced  back  its  origin  solely  to  the  overweening 
ambitions  of  Kaiser  William  II,  and  at  the  other  end,  the  super- 
Socialist  cried  aloud  that  the  War  was  due  solely  to  the  cold-blooded 
machinations  of  capitalists  bent  upon  profit ;  and  between  these  two 
extremes  there  was  a  general  intellectual  muddle.  International  alli- 
ances and  manoeuvres,  national  jealousies,  colonial  rivalries,  racial 
clashes,  artificial  and  unnatural  political  boundaries,  industrial  expan- 
sions, imperialistic  ambitions,  economic  competitions,  abnormal  national- 
istic psychologies,  these  forces  played  upon  international  relations  in 
a  fashion  alien  to  American  experience.  Of  the  political  alignment 
of  Europe,  most  Americans  knew  little  and  cared  less. 

There  were,  of  course,  explicable  reasons  for  our  general  indiffer- 
ence to  foreign  afifairs.  In  the  first  place,  we  were  geographically  cut 
ofif  from  Europe.  Only  a  fortunate  few  among  us  had  enjoyed  the  op- 
portunity to  visit  foreign  shores.  Whereas  the  great  bulk  of  the 
upper  and  middle  classes  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Belgium,  Holland,  Austria-Hungary,  were  enabled,  if  they  so  desired, 
to  pay  at  least  an  occasional  brief  visit  to  some  foreign  countr}^ — 
where  the  language,  the  political  institutions,  the  social  structure,  the 
economic  status,  the  popular  prejudices,  the  national  outlook,  were 
different  from  their  own.  It  is  as  difficult  'o  be  interested  in  the  affairs 
of  a  land  one  has  never  visited  and  expects  never  to  visit  as  to  be 
uninterested  in  the  aft'airs  of  a  land  one  has  visited. 

In  the  second  place,  as  the  great  majority  of  the  upper  and  middle 
classes  of  the  United  States  had  never  visited  European  countries, 
the  great  majority  of  the  American  working-class  had  no  close  politi- 
cal or  economic   connections   with  their   fellow-workers   of   Europe. 

i 


ii  Preface 

The  American  Federation  of  Labor  was  strictly  a  non-political  organ- 
ization, and  as  such  was  unconnected  with  the  various  political  parties 
of  the  European  workers;  and  other  political  movements  in  America 
based  on  class  interests  had  not  earned  for  themselves  the  right  to  be 
taken  seriously  in  American  political  life. 

In  the  third  place,  there  was  a  large  and  influential  foreign-language 
press  in  the  United  States.  Each  of  these  newspapers  and  magazines 
in  foreign  tongues  naturally  paid  close  attention  to  the  political  de- 
velopments in  the  country  from  which  had  emigrated  that  particular 
foreign  element  to  which  it  catered.  Accordingly,  most  of  even  the 
better-informed  periodicals  printed  in  English  in  the  United  States 
felt  that  there  was  little  demand  for  extensive  treatment  by  them  of 
the  extra-American  problems  which  interested  our  groups  of  foreign 
origin. 

Finally,  and  most  important  of  all  reasons,  the  international  policy 
of  the  United  States  was  one  of  isolation  from  European  political  am- 
bitions. The  Englishman  imderstood  that  his  country  was  allied  with 
France  and  Russia.  He  naturally  experienced  at  least  slight  curiosity 
to  understand  the  reasons  for  such  alliance  and  its  implications.  He 
wanted  to  know  also  the  problems  and  circumstances  of  both  his 
country's  allies  and  its  rivals — Germany,  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy. 
The  German  understood  that  his  country  was  allied  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  Italy  and  Turkey.  He  naturally  experienced  at  least  slight 
curiosity  to  understand  the  reasons  for  such  alliance  and  its  implica- 
tions. He  wanted  to  know  also  the  problems  and  circumstances  of 
both  his  country's  allies  and  its  rivals — Great  Britain,  France  and 
Russia.  But  the  citizen  of  the  United  States  was  ever  confident  that 
the  political  alliances  of  Europe  could  not  touch  his  welfare.  His 
country's  colonial  possessions  were  neither  important  nor  calculated  to 
arouse  strong  national  pride;  his  land  was  almost  entirely  self-de- 
pendent ;  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a  stout  bulwark  between  the 
Old  World  and  the  New.  The  intelligent  European  recognized  that 
any  day  a  quarrel  between  two  insignificant  nations  of  the  Balkans 
might  send  him  to  the  battle-front  within  two  weeks;  in  the  United 
States,  the  future  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Information 
was  by  no  means  alone  in  believing  that  the  Ukraine  was  a  musical 
instrument. 

But  now  the  War  has  changed  all  that.  Indeed,  had  America  but 
recognized  the  fact,  the  first  submarine  ended  the  possibility  of  Amer- 
ican isolation  with  honor  from  a  world-conflict.  At  a  stupefying  cost, 
we  have  learned  our  lesson — the  forces  which  are  most  dominant  in 
the  twentieth  century  arc   forces  of  world-wide  scope ;  and   now  at 


Preface  iii 

last  the  United  States  recognizes  that  occasions  may  again  arise 
which  will  demand  that  the  United  States  appear  again  as  gladiator 
in  the  arena  of  the  world. 

Indeed,  the  accessibility  of  America  to  international  forces  is  due 
not  only  (and  perhaps  not  fundamentally)  to  political  movements,  but 
also  to  economic  and  intellectual  movements.  There  was  hardly  a 
big  business  unit  in  the  United  States  in  1914  whose  roots  had  not 
spread  into  foreign  soil;  and  by  1919,  that  tendency  had  been  accel- 
erated many-fold.  Capital  is  international.  Big  business  is  interna- 
tional. The  mines  of  Chile,  the  quarries  of  South  Africa,  the  looms 
of  England,  the  wheat-fields  of  Argentina,  the  silk-worm  farms  of 
Japan,  the  forests  of  Canada,  the  factories  of  France,  the  ranches  of 
Australia,  from  what  quarter  of  the  globe  will  the  future  American 
search  for  raw  materials  be  absent?  What  large  business  centre  in 
any  of  the  Continents  will  be  untouched  by  agencies  of  American 
banks?  What  large  foreign  loan  will  American  investors  disregard? 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  what  important  event  anywhere  in  the  world  will 
have  no  efifect  upon  American  industry? 

And  if  capital  and  big  business  have  become  international,  how  much 
more  unqualifiedly  international  have  ideas  become !  The  feeling  for 
higher  wage-scales  in  a  single  country  in  Europe  may  upset  American 
industry  and  all  dependent  upon  American  industry.  A  new  idea 
in  the  smelting  of  precious  metals  more  than  a  decade  ago  helps  to 
determine  today  the  cost  of  living  all  over  the  world.  American 
psychologists  sit  at  the  feet  of  an  Austrian  physician,  and  Ameri- 
can novelists  and  playwrights  follow  the  trails  blazed  by  Wells  and 
Bennett  and  Galsworthy  and  Shaw ;  conversely,  the  movement  in 
modern  philosophic  thought  most  stimulating  to  the  entire  philosophic 
world  claims  America  as  its  cradle,  and  the  whole  world  mourned  as 
its  own  loss  the  death  of  Theodore  Roosevelt.  At  the  close  of  the 
actual  hostilities  of  the  War.  two  of  the  greatest  nations  of  modern 
times  and  some  of  their  less  powerful  neighbors  were  in  the  inex- 
orable grip  of  ideas  developed  less  than  seventy-five  years  ago  by 
an  exiled  and  penniless  German  jotirnalist,  and  entrusted  by  him  to 
pages  repugnant  both  in  dogmatism  and  in  obscurity.  In  the  framing 
of  peace,  certain  political  groups  in  Europe,  found  their  creeds  most 
adequately  personified  by  Woodrow  Wilson ;  certain  political  groups 
in  the  United  States  found  their  aspirations  most  satisfactorily  crystal- 
lized in  the  leadership  of  Georges  Clemenceau,  or  of  David 
Lloyd-George,  or  of  the  Russian  cooperatives,  or  of  the  Confederation 
generale  du  travail,  or  of  the  British  Labor  Party.  The  United  States 
may  exclude  persons,  may  reject  institutions,  may  ban  commodities; 


Preface 

but  of  the  making  of  books  there  is  no  end.  No  Great  Wall  of  China 
can  prevent  either  the  emigration  or  the  immigration  of  an  idea; 
and  the  entire  futtire  of  America  may  be  profoundly  affected  by  a  new 
theory  launched  by  an  obscure  thinker  in  an  obscure  land  and  pro- 
mulgated in  an  obscure  way  by  obsctire  followers. 

But  whatever  the  roads  which  the  America  of  the  future  will  travel, 
nothing  is  more  imperative  than  American  understanding  of  the  prob- 
lems she  must  meet  on  the  way.  Those  problems  will  be  the  problems 
bequeathed  by  the  most  stupendous  fact  of  modern  times,  the  Great 
War.  America  will  rise  or  fall  in  the  future  ordeal  of  nations  by  fire 
as  she  is  alive  or  blind  to  the  lessons  of  that  holocaust.  America's  fu- 
ture foreign  policy  will  be  determined  largely  by  America's  future  po- 
litical leaders,  and  those  future  poluical  leaders  will  be  selected  ac- 
cording to  the  convictions  of  the  American  people.  Accordingly,  for 
many  years  nothing  will  aid  America  better  than  a  general  public  ap- 
preciation of  at  least  the  outstanding  features  of  the  experience  through 
u-hich  she  and  the  whole  w-orld  have  just  staggered — the  causes  of 
the  War,  the  conduct  of  the  W^ar,  the  conclusions  of  the  War. 

To  further  such  a  general  public  appreciation,  this  history  has  been 
written.  Its  purpose  is  thus  a  broad  rather  than  a  specialized  appeal. 
I  have  therefore  ranged  far  and  wide  in  the  literature  of  the  sub- 
jects I  have  treated,  relying  in  large  measure  upon  the  investiga- 
tions of  specialists  in  their  respective  fields.  A  bibliography  of  works 
covering  in  greater  detail  the  events  chronicled  in  these  pages  will  be 
found  at  the  end  of  \^olume  II. 

B.   B. 

Nciv  York  City,  April  i,  1919. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS,  VOLUME  I 


.  Page 
Preface  

The  Roots  of  the  War 

The  Congress  of  Vienna ^ 

The  Holy  AUiance 4 

The  Suppression  of  Nationalities ^ 

Belgium    ^ 

Italy   ^ 

Norway    

The  Rise  of  Germany 9 

Alsace-Lorraine    ^ 

Italia  Irredenta 

Ireland   ^ 

Poland    • 

Finland,  Baltic  Provinces  and  Lithuania 23 

24 
Ukraine    

Armenia     

Czecho-Slovakia   ^ 

The  Land  of  the  Magyars ^' 

The  Land  of  the  Roumans ^9 

The  Land  of  the  Bulgars 3° 

/     Jugo-Slavia   ; 

Economic  and  Trade  Rivalries 3o 

The  National  Industrial  Revolution 35 

The   International   Industrial   Revolution 3^> 

The  Suppression  of  Liberalism   and  the  Growth  of  Mili- 

43 

tarism    ^^ 

T        r-                                                                                                       43 

In    Germany 

In  Russia ^^ 

V 


vi  Tabic  of  Contents 

Page 

( ii:RMAN  Diplomatic  Domination',  1870- 191  i 57 

The  Isolation  of  France 57 

The  League  of  the  Three  Emperors 58 

The  Triple  AlHance 59 

The  Machinations  of  Bismarck Oj 

Accession  of  William  II 63 

The  xA.lIiance  between  France  and  Russia 64 

The  Dreyfus  Affair 66 

The  Fashoda   Incident 68 

The  Beginning  of  Anglo-German  Rivalry 69 

The  Berlin-to-Bagdad   Railroad •/2 

The  Entente  Cordiale 75 

The  First  Moroccan  Crisis jy 

The  Triple  Entente   83 

The  Revolution  in  Turkey 85 

Annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria 86 

The  Decline  of  German  Diplomatic  Domination,  1911-1914.  .  90 

The  Second  Moroccan  Crisis 90 

The  Turco-Italian  War 93 

The  Balkan  Question  Again 95 

The  First  Balkan  War 96 

The  Second  Balkan  War 99 

Germany  Prepares  for  War 103 

The  Prelude 103 

The  Pretext 105 

The   Fourteen    Days 108 

Preliminary  Period,  June  28-July  23,   1914 no 

July  27, 114 

July  24 118 

July  25 122 

July  26 1 27 

July  27 1 28 

July  28 132 

July  29 135 

July  30 «40 

July  31  145 

August  I   151 

August  2  158 


Table  of  Contents  vii 

Page 

August  3  ^^^ 

August  4  ^^-^ 

August  5  ^^^ 

The  United  States  and  the  War,  August  i,   1914-ApRiL  6, 

1917    169 

Neutrality  in  Thought  and  Action 169 

Possible  Dangers  to  America i?- 

The  American  Policy  of  Isolation 1/6 

The   Monroe   Doctrine 1/9 

Immigrant   Stocks  in  America I93 

The  Efifect  upon  America  of  the  German  Treatment  of 

Belgium   ^97 

Diplomatic  Negotiations  belween  the  United  States  and  Great 

Britain    200 

Diplomatic  Negotiations  of  the  United  States  with  Germany 

and  Austria ^^ ^ 

Shipments  of  Munitions    211 

German  Plots  in  the  United  States 218 

The  German  Submarine  Warfare 219 

The  "Lusitania"  Case 223 

The  "Arabic"  Case 237 

The  "Ancona"  Case 238 

The  Question  of  Armed  Merchantmen 240 

The  "Sussex"  Case  240 

The  "Deutschland"  and  the  '•U-53" 245 

Peace  Proposals 24? 

The  Diplomatic  Break  with  Germany 260 

Armed  Neutrality   • 265 

The  War  Message • 273 

The  United  States  and  the  War,  April  6,   i9T7-NovEMnER 

II,  1918 282 

Alien  Enemies    ^°" 

The  Selective  Draft   • 296 


viii  Tabic  of  Contents 

Page 

American   Expeditionary   Force 307 

Food  Control * 310 

Early  Activities  of  the  Red  Cross 319 

Flag  Day  Address  of  President  Wilson,   lyij.  .  .  / 331 

Liberty  Loans 2)^^A 

Control  of  Exports,  Prices  and  Fuel ^li'-) 

The  Pope's  Peace  Proposal  and  Its  Reception 34'- 

\\'ar  with  Austria 351 

Government  Control  of  Transportation 33() 

Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act t^~}, 

Alien  Property  Custodian ^^^Ji^ 

The  Espionage  Law^   378 

Conscientious  Objectors   382 

Prayers  for  Victory 386 

Sabbath  Observance  in  the  Army  and  Xavy 387 

The  War  and  Public  Education  389 

Indirect  Peace  Negotiations 391 

Address  of  Premier  Lloyd-George.  January  6.  1918 394 

"The   Fourteen  Points" 402 


ILLUSTRATIONS,  VOLUME  I 


Opposite 
Page 

Woodrow    Wilson    Frontispiece 

King    George — President    Poincare — King    Albert — King    A'ictor 

Emmanuel — Emperor  Yoshihito   i 

Map — Europe  in   1914 .  .  .  .- 16 

Map — Races  in  Europe 28 

Luxury  in  German  Trenches — Captured  German  Tank — Observa- 
tion Post  in  the  Vosges 2,2 

Joffre — Petain — Foch — Diaz — Gouraud 64 

The  Devastation  of  War 80 

Bullard — Bliss — Pershing^ — Liggett — Dickman    96 

Airship  Station  from  Above 112 

Lansing — Clemenceau — Lloyd  George — ^Orlando — \>nizeIos 128 

The  End  of  a  German  Gotha — Anti-Aircraft  Gun  at  the  Front — 

A  Fokker  in  Range 144 

Morgenthau — \Miitlock — Gerard — Page — Sharpe    160 

German  Dead  on  the  Battlefield — Abandoned  Tank — The  Effect 

of  Fire 192 

Booth — Mott — Davison — Mulligan — Cutler    208 

Food  for  the  Guns — Carrier  Pigeons — The  Beginnings  of  a  Camp  224 
Wounded  in  the  Last   Drive — German  Prisoners   Giving  Aid  to 

Wounded  Tommy — Wounded  Anzacs  Treated  at  the  Front ....  256 

Taft — Schwab — Hoover — Creel — Hurley    272 

Troops  at  Camp 288 

Baruch — Palmer — Garfield — Ryan — Hines    320 

A  Fleet  of  Transports  at  Sea — Smoke  Screens 336 

Reconstruction  of  Damaged   Airplanes — Abo\e  the   Clouds   over 

Paris — Tractor    Towing    Airplane 352 

Gompers — Willard — Walsh— Fosdick — McCormick   384 

ix 


DESCRIPTION   OF   PICTURES   ON    REVERSE   SIDE 

I'pper  Left  Hand   Corner — George  V.,   King  of  England,   1910 — . 

Upper    Right   Hand    Corner — Raymond    Poincare,    President   of   the    French 
Republic,  1913—. 

Center — Albert  I.,  King  of  Belgium,   1909 — . 

Lower  Left  Hand  Corner — Victor  Emmanuel  III.,  King  of  Italy,  1900^ — . 

Lower  Right  Hand  Corner — -Yoshihito,  Emperor  of  Japan,   1912 — . 


A  History  of  the  Great  War 


THE  ROOTS  OF  THE  WAR 

For  many  years  after  the  end  of  the  most  stupendous  war  in  the 
history  of  the  modern  world,  no  historian  will  be  able  to  describe  it 
adequately  and  impartially.  Authentic  sources  of  information  were 
barred  not  only  during  the  struggle,  but  also  for  many  years  pre- 
viously to  it ;  and  belligerents  in  the  heat  of  battle  minimize  their  own 
shortcomings  and  magnify  those  of  their  opponents  to  the  point  of 
virtual  falsification.  Clarifying  treaties  and  arrangements  are  kept 
from  the  light  of  public  knowledge,  and  for  many  years  after  the 
signing  of  the  final  terms  of  peace  official  and  unofficial  custodians 
of  the  truth  will  impart  their  information  only  in  the  light  of  the 
interests  of  their  respective  countries.  And,  finally,  no  nation  drawn 
into  the  vortex  of  the  war  will  be  free  from  bias,  while  even  neutral 
lands  will  have  their  prejudices. 

On  the  fundamental  fact  concerning  the  holocaust,  however,  there 
can  be  no  disagreement.  Belligerent  and  neutral,  friend  and  foe,  pro- 
German  and  pro-Ally,  democrat  and  autocrat,  militarist  and  pacifist, 
capitalist  and  Socialist,  nationalist  and  internationalist,  conservative 
and  radical.  Christian  and  agnostic, — all  agree  on  this  one  point: 

The  War  was  no  isolated  phenomenon,  but  had  its  roots  deep  down 
in  the  relations  between  the  countries  of  the  world  as  they  shaped 
themselves  for  m^ny  decades  before  August  i,  1914. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna 

Adequately  to  understand  the  causes  of  the  Great  War,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  go  back  exactly  one  hundred  years  before  1914,  and  to  con- 

I 


2  A  History  of  the  (hrat  War 

sider  ihc  partition  ul"  l£urope  as  arranged  at  the  Congress  of  X'ienna, 
which  met  at  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  in  1814.  In  surpris- 
ingly many  instances,  the  Congress  of  \'ienna  parallels  the  Congress 
of  Paris  in  lyiy.  In  both  conferences,  the  victorious  nations  had 
been  drawn  together  by  the  fear  of  a  coninicjn  foe  and  his  threat  of 
domination — in  1814.  b^rance  under  Xapoleon  and  in  1919,  Germany 
under  Kaiser  William  II.  In  each  case,  the  victorious  nations  were 
aware  oi  a  background  of  unrest  which  at  all  cost  had  to  be  sup- 
pressed— in  1814,  the  democratic  ideas  emanating  from  the  brench 
Revolution  and  in  1919,  the  L)olshevist  ideas  emanating  from  the 
Russian  Revolution.  In  each  case,  the  world  had  given  of  the  best  of 
its  manhood  and  of  its  resources  until  all  civilization  itself  seemed 
to  be  imperilled,  and  in  each  case  there  was  determination  to  decrease 
armaments  and  to  preserve  peace  at  any  cost  for  a  long  time  in  the 
future.  In  each  case,  a  high  principle  of  deliberation  was  asserted — 
in  1814,  Talleyrand's  principle  of  "legitimacy"  and  in  1919,  Wil- 
son's ideal  of  the  self-determination  of  all  nationalities.  In  each 
case,  the  conferees  maintained,  at  least  otificially,  a  resolution  to 
collect  the  nations  of  the  world  into  an  orderly  arrangement — in  1814, 
the  Holy  Alliance  and  in  1919,  the  League  of  Nations.  In  each  case, 
the  final  decisions  of  the  conference  lay  in  the  hands  of  five  great 
Powers — in  1814,  Great  Britain,  Austria,  Russia,  Prussia  and  France, 
the  latter  finally  included  as  an  equal  instead  of  as  a  defeated  foe; 
and  in  1919,  Great  Britain,  France,  Japan,  Italy  and  the  United 
States.  In  each  case,  the  victorious  nations  had  signed  a  preliminary 
agreement  to  fight  as  a  unit  until  their  common  foe  had  been  defeated. 
And  in  each  case,  the  results  of  the  deliberations  would  or  rather 
could  determine  the  destinies  of  practically  the  entire  population  of 
the  earth. 

But  the  Congress  of  Vienna  degenerated  almost  from  its  inception 
into  an  unprincipled  scramble  for  territory,  irrespective  of  nation- 
ality, irrespective  of  ethical  claims,  irrespective  of  treaty  and  high 
purpose.  Each  of  the  great  Powers  asserted  itself  as  its  armed 
strength  permitted,  and  the  resulting  arrangements  were  those  of 
might,  not. right.  The  chief  territorial  re-adjustments  were  as  fol- 
lows : 


The  Roots  of  the  War  3 

About  three-fifths  of  Poland  was  given  to  Russia.  Austria  and 
Prussia  each  obtained  about  one-fifth. 

Belgium  was  given  to  Holland,  and  placed  under  the  rule  of  the 
King  of  Holland. 

About  two-fifths  of  Saxony  was  given  to  Prussia. 

Prussia  was  given  also  large  slices  of  territory  to  the  west  and 
east  of  the  Rhine,  separated  from  Prussia  proper,  however,  by  the 
new  German   Confederation. 

The  new  German  Confederation  was  composed  of  the  thirty-eight 
independent  German  states  which  Napoleon  had  reconstructed  from 
the  hundreds  of  separate  states  which  had  composed  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire. 

Napoleon's  attempt  to  reconstruct  a  unified  Italy,  however,  was 
disregarded,  and  Italy  was  split  up  again  into  separate  principalities. 

Austria  was  given  the  Italian  territory  of  Venice,  Lombardy  and 
Tuscany,  together  with  the  connecting  province  of  IModena.  Austria 
maintained  similarly  her  sovereignty  over  Bohemia  (the  land  of  the 
Czechs)  and  the  lands  of  the  Slavs  to  the  south  and  east  of  the  Mag- 
yar section  of  Hungary. 

Finland  was  handed  over  to  Russia. 

Norway  was  given  to  Sweden. 

Switzerland  was  constituted  a   free  and  independent  country. 

England's  gains  were  colonial,  consisting  of  Ceylon  and  the  land, 
around  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  from  which  spread  her  later  expan- 
sion into  Africa. 

The  problems  of  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  peninsula  were  not  touched. 
Turkey  retaining  control  over  Constantinople  and  Greece  and  over 
the  Slavonic  population  of  what  are  now  Servia.  Bulgaria,  Roumania. 
Montenegro  and  Hungary. 

It  needs  but  a  glance  at  the  arbitrary  disregard  of  the  principles 
of  nationality  represented  in  these  settlements  to  see  how  rigorously 
and  inevitably  they  determined  the  future  enmities  and  alliances  be- 
tween the  great  Powers  of  Europe  from  which  the  Great  War  burst 
forth  on  August  i,  1914. 


4  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

The  Holy  Alliance 

Obviously,  the  ruthless  consolidations  of  territory  perfected  at  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  could  be  maintained  only  by  an  organization  of 
the  great  Powers  for  that  purpose.  Accordingly,  Tsar  Alexander  I 
of  Russia  launched  a  pact  which  Austria  and  Prussia  immediately 
signed,  in  order  to  clarify  the  principles  to  govern  the  new  map  of 
Europe. 

Alexander  was  a  man  of  strong  religious  and  mystical  feeling,  and 
in  theory  the  new  alliance  was  but  an  application  to  international 
problems  of  the  teachings  of  Christianity — hence  its  name.  Under 
the  leadership  of  Metternich,  the  Austrian  premier,  however,  the  Holy 
Alliance  became  in  practise  a  pact  whereby  all  the  great  Powers  agreed 
to  crush  liberalism  and  democratic  ideas  wherever  they  reared  their 
heads.  To  that  end,  Metternich  developed  the  new  doctrine  of  the 
right  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  to  intervene  in  any  country  in  order 
to  prevent  the  spread  of  "impractical"  and  "revolutionary"  teach- 
ings. 

The  Holy  Alliance  was  oflticially  proclaimed  in  1816,  and  France, 
Spain,  Sardinia  and  Naples  soon  also  aligned  themselves  under  it. 
Great  Britain  gave  a  nominal  approval  of  its  principles,  although  she 
soon  came  to  dissent  vigorously  from  the  autocratic  application  of 
those  principles  by  Metternich. 

In  1820,  the  Holy  Alliance  utilized  its  powers  in  Italy  to  crush  the 
revolutions  of  Piedmont  and  Naples.  Three  years  later,  France  under 
the  direction  of  the  Holy  Alliance  restored  absolutism  in  Spain.  But 
when  the  Holy  Alliance  attempted  to  project  itself  into  South  America 
and  suppress  the  movement  for  freedom  in  the  Spanish  colonies  there, 
President  Monroe  of  the  United  States,  su])ported  by  England,  barred 
the  way  with  the  doctrine  which  soon  came  to  be  called  by  his  name. 
The  successful  struggle  of  Greece  for  inde])endence  from  Turkey, 
consummated  by  1827,  also  weakened  the  strength  of  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance, and  the  revolutions  throughout  western  Europe  in  1848  .'^aw  the 
decline  of  its  influence.  Nevertheless,  the  extent  to  M'hich  it  cast  its 
shadow  before  it  into  the  problems  of  a  later  day  may  be  seen  by 
the  fact  that  it  was  under  the  innuence  of  the  j)rinciples  of  the  Holy 


The  Roots  of  the  War  5 

Alliance  that  Russia  intervened  in  1849  to  put  down  a  revolution  of 
Hungary  against  Austria — and  in  the  internal  arrangements  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  with  its  consequent  relations  with  the 
countries  of  the  Balkan  peninsula,  the  seeds  of  the  Great  War  of  1914 
sprouted  most  prolifically. 

So  that  the  result  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  set  into  motion  three 
definite  movements  which  transfixed  and  transfigured  all  world  pol- 
itics for  the  next  hundred  years,  and  reached  their  climax  when 
the  Imperial  German  Government  dispatched  its  troops  through  Bel- 
gium on  August  2,  1914: 

I  — The  Suppression  of  Nationalities. 

II  — Economic  and  Trade  Rivalries. 

Ill — The  Suppression  of  Liberalism  and  the  Growth  of   Militarism. 


I— THE  SUPPRESSION  OF  NATIONALITIES 

A  "nationality"  may  be  defined  as  a  section  of  the  human  race  which 
possesses  a  community  of  language,  a  similarity  of  ethical  and  po- 
litical  standards,  a  joint  body  of  traditions,  a  unity  of  political  aspi- 
rations, and  a  consciousness  of  similarity  among  the  individuals  com- 
prising it.  Nationality  is  thus  determined  neither  by  origin  nor  by  race. 
For  instance,  ethnologically  and  historically  Alsace  and  Lorraiue  are 
more  closely  related  to  Germany  than  to  France ;  but  in  the  decades 
preceding  1870  they  had  become  so  integral  a  part  of  the  IVencli 
nation  that  their  forcible  annexation  by  Germany  in  1870  was  the 
annexation  of  a  land  and  a  people  away  from  the  nationality  of  which 
they  had  become  a  part  to  a  nationality  with  which  they  had  little 
in  common. 

It  was  the  French  Revolution  at  the  very  end  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury which  let  loose  upon  the  western  world  the  consciousness  of  na- 
tionality, ijefore  that  time,  the  allegiance  of  the  individual  citizen 
was  to  his  ruler  as  an  individual,  not  to  his  country  as  a  political 
entity;  and  the  ruler  held  power  only  by  grace  of  God,  and  was 
responsible  only  to  God — the  citizens  of  the  state  recognized  no  au- 
thority of  their  own  over  their  rulers.  The  ideals  pronmlgated  by  the 
French  Revolution,  however,  soon  resolved  themselves  into  ideals  of 
what  is  called  today  i)olitical  democracy.  And,  paradoxically  enough, 
it  was  Napoleon,  the  destroyer  of  the  French  Revolution,  who  uncon- 
sciously spread  the  ideals  of  the  Revolution  throughout  Europe  as  he 
led  his  French  armies  over  the  vast  territory  conquered  by  him. 

In  the  hundred  years  following  the  violation  of  the  principles  of 
nationality  by  the  Congress  of  A'ienna,  the  course  of  national  move- 
ments throughout  Europe  might  be  roughly  summarized  as  follows : 

1)1  western  Europe,  suppressed  iiationalifles  aeJiiez'ed  self-e.vpres- 
sio)i ;  ill  eeutral  and  eastern  Europe,  they  remained  suppressed. 

() 


I'hc  Sitpprcssion  of  Xatioiialitlcs  7 

In  Western  Europk 

Xationalities  Achieving  Self-Expression  Before   1914 

Belgium 

A  glance  at  the  map  of  Europe  will  show  the  strategic  position  of 
both  Holland  and  Belgium.  It  is  through  Holland  that  the  Rhine 
finds  its  way  to  the  sea  and  through  which  accordingly  all  shipping 
on  this  deep  and  navigable  stream  may  be  controlled.  In  addit'on, 
Belgium  enjoys  command  over  the  approach  to  England  by  sea. 

Belgium  chafed  under  the  rule  of  Holland  for  fifteen  years  after 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  but  found  no  opportunity  for  revolt  until 
1830.  In  that  year,  a  revolt  broke  out  in  France  and  crossed  the  bor- 
der into  Belgium,  which  declared  itself  independent  of  Dutch  rule. 
Of  the  five  chief  signatories  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  England  and 
France  came  to  the  rescue  of  Belgium — the  former  because  she  wanted 
a  bufi^er  state  against  threatened  encroachments  of  either  France  or 
Prussia  along  the  English  Channel ;  and  France  because  she  was  anx- 
ious to  assert  her  freedom  from  the  control  of  Prussia,  Austria  and 
Russia.  By  1839,  the  great  Powers,  including  the  signatories  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  had  guaranteed  independence  for  lielgium  and 
agreed  to  respect  her  neutrality. 

Italy 

Well  might  Metternich  call  Italy  after  the  Congress  of  Vienna  a 
mere  "geographical  expression."  To  the  north,  nnich  territorv  was 
in  Austrian  hands.  To  the  south,  the  kingdom  of  Naples  was  in 
Spanish  hands.  And  in  the  center,  stretching  across  the  entire  Italian 
peninsula,  were  the  lands  of  the  Pope. 

In  1848,  the  smouldering  feeling  for  nationality  in  Italy  gave  vent 
to  a  revolution  throughout  almost  the  entire  peninsula,  inspired  by  the 
fall  of  Metternich  as  premier  of  Austria  in  that  year.  However,  the 
revolution  finally  failed  in  Italy  as  in  Austria,  and  Austria  was  suc- 
cessful in  regaining  her  hold  over  the  lands  in  Italy  assigned  her  by 
tbe  Congress  of  Vienna,  except  in  Piedmont,  where  the  king  of  Sar- 
(b'liia  was  able  to  make  a  stand   for  Italy. 


8  A  History  of  I  he  Great  IV  ar 

Several  years  later,  however,  Italian  unity  began  to  assert  itself 
around  this  same  King  of  Sardinia,  Victor  Emmanuel  II.  Assisted 
by  one  of  the  greatest  statesmen  of  all  time.  Cavour,  and  with  the 
support  of  a  strong  Republican  leader,  Mazzini,  an  alliance  was  per- 
fected with  France.  When  Victor  Emmanuel  managed  to  embroil 
himself  in  war  with  Austria  in  1859,  France  came  promptly  to  his 
rescue.  Austria  was  soon  defeated,  and  was  compelled  to  withdraw 
from  all  Italian  territory  except  Venetia.  But  France  insisted  that 
the  war  end  before  Venetia  could  be  concpiered,  as  bVance  did  not 
desire  to  see  Italy  become  too  powerful. 

The  south  of  Italy  was  comprised  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  whose 
king  refused  to  align  himself  with  the  king  of  Sardinia  as  the  latter 
began  to  establish  a  nucleus  around  which  Italian  national  feeling  as- 
serted itself.  Accordingly,  a  bold  leader.  Garibaldi,  gathered  around 
himself  a  band  of  followers  with  which  he  proceeded  in  i860  to 
conquer  Sicily  in  the  name  of  the  king  of  Sardinia,  soon  thereafter 
crossing  over  into  Naples  itself.  The  king  of  Sardinia  utilized  the 
occasion  to  dispatch  an  army  into  the  Papal  States,  annexing  all  of 
them  except  the  country  immediately  surrounding  the  city  of  Rome. 
On  November  7,  i860,  the  king  of  Sardinia  and  Garibaldi  joined 
forces;  and  except  for  Venetia  and  Rome.  Italy  had  become,  one 
nation. 

When  Prussia  attacked  Austria  in  1866,  Italy  came  to  the  assistance 
of  the  former,  and  was  rewarded  by  being  given  all  of  Venetia.  The 
naval  attack  against  Trent  and  Trieste,  however,  failed ;  and  thus 
there  came  into  existence  "Italia  Irredenta"— Italy  L'nredeemed' — 
around  which  much  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Great  War  of  i<)  14-1919 
turned.  In  1871.  the  territory  around  Rome  was  annexed  to  the 
kingdom  of  Italy,  and  the  capital  was  transferred  to  Rome. 

Norway 

After  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  Norway  enjoyed  practical  autonomy 
under  Swedish  rule.  Until  1885,  little  desire  for  separation  mani- 
fested itself.  After  that  year,  however,  a  strong  national  feeling 
broke  out,  to  be  checked  only  when  Russian  aggression  against  Fin- 
land   tlireatened   both   countries   of    tlic    Scandina\ian    peninsula.      In 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  9 

1905,  the  defeat  of  Russia  at  the  hands  of  Japan  seemed  to  remove 
the  menace  of  the  Slav,  and  in  that  year  a  peaceful  separation  be- 
tween Norway  and  Sweden  was  achieved. 

The  Rise  of  Germany 

From  the  chaos  of  the  hundreds  of  little  states  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  Prussia  emerged  as  a  great  Power  under  Frederick  the  Great 
in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  Congress  of  Vienna  left 
Prussia  with  almost  the  same  territory  as  comprised  in  the  Prussia  of 
1914,  with  the  exception  of  the  dividing  wedge  provided  by  the  thirty- 
eight  states  of  the  new  German  Confederation.  The  German  nation- 
ality was  thus  divided  among  three  contiguous  territories — Prussia, 
the  German  Confederation  and  German  Austria,  although  there  were 
also  some  Slavs  comprised  within  the  southern  states  of  the  German 
Confederation. 

The  first  force  to  weld  together  the  German  people  into  a  trenchant 
national  consciousness  was  economic.  In  the  several  decades  after  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  the  Industrial  Revolution  crossed  over  from  Eng- 
land into  Germany;  and  the  era  of  steam  transportation  could  but 
serve  to  bring  into  a  close  geographical  unity  the  separate  countries 
among  which  the  German  people  was  distributed.  It  soon  became 
evident,  however,  that  to  utilize  the  fruits  of  the  Industrial  Revolu- 
tion, the  different  elements  in  Prussia  would  have  to  be  brought  into 
close  economic  unity.  Accordingly,  a  customs  union  ("Zollverein") 
was  organized;  and  from  this  economic  unification  sprang  a  con- 
sciousness of  ethnological  unity  which  soon  gave  birth  to  a  national 
Prussian  spirit.  Having  formed  a  customs  union  within  Prussia,  Prus- 
sia successfully  undertook  to  form  one  within  the  German  Confedera- 
tion ;  and  the  road  for  German  unity  was  thus  paved.  Austria  was 
not  included  in  the  new  Zollverein,  and  her  influence  over  the  Con- 
federation was  thus  appreciably  weakened. 

The  dominating  force  in  the  German  Confederation  was  Austria, 
and  when  William  I  came  to  the  throne  of  Prussia  in  1858,  he  was 
induced  by  his  ministers  to  foresee  the  inevitable  removal  of  Austrian 
influence  before  Prussia  would  be  able  to  proceed  in  the  political  unifica- 
tion of  the  German  people.     He  was  shown  that  war  was  a  matter 


TO  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

of  but  a  few  years,  and  to  that  end  he  developed  to  the  fullest  the 
military  resources  of  his  kingdom.  The  direct  management  of  his 
l)urposes  he  entrusted  to  Otto  \on  Bismarck,  whom  he  called  to  his 
side  as  Prime  Minister  in  1862  and  who  soon  revealed  himself  ihe 
outstanding  statesman  of  his  age.  By  this  time,  the  nationalistic 
spirit  of  Prussia  was  in  full  bloom.  vSome  years  before,  the  country 
had  presented  an  unbroken  intellectual  and  emotional  front  against 
the  purposes  of  hVench  chauvinists  to  annex  Prussian  territory  along 
the  Rhine.  German  philosophers  from  Kant  through  Hegel  were 
in  the  forefront  of  philosophic  thought.  History,  science,  literature, 
music,  art,  all  were  those  of  a  young  giant  just  beginning  to  be  con- 
. scions  of  his  strength.  Prussian  nationalism  \vas  now  an  accomplished 
fact — there  remained  now  only  the  task  of  creating  from  it  as  founda- 
tion a  German  nationalism. 

JVar  z^'ifh  Doiniark^lu  order  to  effect  the  expulsion  of  Austria 
from  the  German  Confederation,  Bismarck  ])icked  a  quarrel  with 
Denmark  concerning  the  Danish  provinces  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein. 
In  this  one  instance,  the  principle  of  nationality  seemed  to  be  on  the 
side  of  Prussia,  for  these  two  provinces  were  populated  almost  entirely 
by  Germans,  although  the  provinces  had  belonged  to  Denmark  for 
centuries  and  although  they  had  enjoyed  practical  autonomy  under 
Danish  rule  until  1863. 

Bismarck  invited  Austria  to  join  with  Prussia  in  establishing  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  as  an  independent  unit  within  the  German  Confedera- 
tion. Denmark  refused  her  assent,  the  two  Powers  declared  war 
against  her,  defeated  her,  and  forced  her  to  surrender  the  provinces 
to  Prussia  and  Austria  jointly,  in  October,  1864. 

IVar  ivith  Austria — The  pretext  for  the  crushing  of  Austria  was 
thus  aiTorded.  Bismarck  proposing  a  plan  whereby  the  t\vo  provinces 
should  be  virtually  placed  under  Prussian  domination  and  Austria 
refusing  sanction  to  such  a  plan,  a  temporary  arrangement  was  patched 
up  whereby  Schleswig  was  placed  under  Prussia  and  Holstein  under 
Austria. 

Bismarck  then  secretly  made  arrangements  with  France  to  remain 
neutral  in  case  of  an  Austrian-Prussian  war  and  with  Italy  to  join 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  ii 

forces  against  Austria  in  order  to  free  Venetia  from  Austrian  rule 
and  to  incorporate  it  in  the  rapidly-forming  Italian  nation.  Russian 
neutrality  was  bought  by  promise  of  Prussian  assistance  in  quelling 
Polish  revolt  against  Russian  domination.  Then,  by  various  pretexts 
centering  around  the  disposition  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein,  Austria 
was  led  to  get  the  German  Confederation  to  declare  war  against 
Prussia  in  June,   1866. 

Prussia  immediately  countered  by  declaring  that  this  act  absolved 
Prussia  from  her  membership  in  the  Confederation  and  formally  with- 
drew from  it ;  and  practically  all  the  states  of  the  German  Confedera- 
tion joined  Austria  when  war  was  formally  declared  between  Prussia 
and  Austria  on  June  14,  1866.  Prussia  came  into  the  field  with  a 
proposal  for  the  reformation  of  the  territory  inhabited  by  Germans 
and  demanded  first  that  the  North  German  states  accept  that  pro- 
posal. On  their  refusal,  Prussia  occupied  them,  crushed  all  resist- 
ance, then  utilized  her  magnificent  military  organization  under  von 
Moltke  to  defeat  Austria  so  decisively  at  the  battle  of  Sadowa  (  July  3) 
that  the  war  was  practically  ended  there,  and  with  it  was  ended  Aus- 
tria's influence  in  the  German  Confederation.  Prussia  immediately 
added  to  her  own  territory  by  annexing  land  from  the  North  German 
states,  and  from  the  remainder  created  the  North  German  Federation, 
of  which  Prussia  became  the  President  and  with  which  she  united 
into  something  of  a  federal  empire  with  more  or  less  autonomous 
states. 

The  four  large  South  German  states  then  voluntarily  and  for  their 
self-protection  formed  themselves  into  the  South  German  Federation. 
They  were  supported  by  France,  now  thoroughly  alarmed  by  the  men- 
ace of  the  consolidation  of  the  German  nationality  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Prussia ;  and  thus  the  opposition  between  France  and  Prussia 
came  into  the  open. 

This  opposition  between  France  and  Prussia  influenced  Bismarck 
to  refrain  from  a  policy  of  humiliation  of  Austria  after  her  defeat 
at  his  hands.  He  foresaw  that  the  day  would  come  when  an  alliance 
between  Austria  and  Prussia  would  become  imperative.  Moreover, 
he  never  forgot  that  at  that  time  (as  in  1919)  the  eastern  territory 
comprised   within  Austria   was   inhabited  largelv  bv   Germans.     Aus- 


12  A  History  of  flic  Great  War 

tria  was  punished  but  little,  aside  from  being  jjarred  from  the  new- 
German  Confederation  and  aside  from  the  incorporation  of  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  within  Prussia.  'l"he  latter  arrangement  gave  I  'rus^ia 
the  important  harbor  of  Kiel,  through  which  a  canal  could  be  con- 
structed to  unite  the  Baltic  and  North  Seas. 

The  Franco-Prussian  JJ'ar— The  overwhelming  success  of  Prussia 
against  Austria  in  1866  was  as  unpalatable  to  France  as  it  was  unex- 
pected. The  rise  of  another  Power  in  Europe  with  claims  to  be 
recognized  as  one  of  the  great  Powers  would  not  only  deprive  France 
of  the  position  of  dictation  in  European  affairs  opened  to  her  by 
the  defeat  of  Austria,  but  might  also  put  an  end  to  future  acquisi- 
tion of  territory  by  France  on  the  Continent. 

In  addition,  Napoleon  III  of  France  had  personal  reasons  for  de- 
siring a  French  triumph  over  Prussia.  Republican  feeling  was  grow- 
ing in  France,  and  he  could  foresee  the  day  when  the  monarchy  in 
France  might  again  be  disestablished,  unless  he  could  rally  his  peo- 
ple behind  him  in  some  popular  and  successful  cause.  His  attempt 
to  force  a  French  prince  upon  Mexico  had  ended  in  disaster,  and 
had  seriously  diminished  his  prestige  as  a  diplomat.  Moreover,  lUs- 
marck  had  thwarted  Napoleon's  attempt  to  buy  the  duchy  of  Luxem- 
burg from  Holland,  and  throughout  Europe  Prussia  was  being  looked 
upon  as  the  diplomatic  conqueror  of  France. 

On  their  side,  Bismarck  and  Prussia  had  everything  to  gain  from 
war.  The  defeat  of  a  different  and  rival  nationality  would  weld  to- 
gether the  German  people  into  a  cohesion  possible  through  no  other 
event  and  thus  dissipate  the  last  barriers  to  the  political  union  of  the 
entire  German  nationality.  Bismarck  knew  that  the  strength  of  the 
French  army  existed  only  on  pajjer,  and  that  actually  it  was  in  a 
deplorable  state  of  unpreparedness ;  whereas  the  military  prepara- 
tions of  Prussia  were  well-nigh  as  perfect  as  they  could  be  made  b\- 
mortal  hands  and  brains.  Prussian  agents  were  secretly  mapping 
French  topography  and  investigating  French  resources,  and  before 
long  French  military  conditions  were  better  known  to  I'russia  than 
to  France  itself.  In  both  France  and  Prussia,  therefore,  popular  war 
enthusiasm  did  not  arise  spontaneously,  but  was  manufactured  by 
the  machinations  of  the  leaders  of  the  respective  countries, 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  13 

France  opened  the  diplomatic  struggle  by  attempts  to  acquire  Ger- 
man territory  along  the  Rhine,  only  to  be  thwarted  by  Bismarck. 
Napoleon  III  then  made  definite  plans  to  invade  and  annex  Belgium — 
plans  which  Bismarck  made  public  at  a  strategic  moment  to  direct 
European  public  opinion  against  France  in  favor  of  Prussia.  But 
the  direct  pretext  for  war  arose  in  Spain. 

Queen  Isabella  of  Spain  was  forced  from  her  throne  in  1868,  and 
the  Spanish  national  assembly,  possibly  through  the  plotting  of  Bis- 
marck, offered  the  vacant  throne  to  a  distant  relative  of  the  king  of 
Prussia.  This  offer  fanned  the  war  fever  in  France,  and  France 
officially  protested,  with  the  result  that  the  king  of  Prussia  consented 
to  his  relative's  refusal  to  accept  the  Spanish  offer.  France  declined 
to  be  satisfied,  however,  and  went  to  the  length  of  demanding  that 
the  candidacy  should  never  be  re-opened. 

To  this  last  demand,  William  of  Prussia  naturally  wouLd  not  yield, 
although  he  put  his  refusal  so  politely  to  the  French  ambassador  that 
a  correct  account  of  the  procedure  would  have  caused  no  interna- 
tional complication.  This  was  no  part  of  Bismarck's  plans,  however, 
so  the  Prussian  prime  minister  deliberately  set  about  to  edit  the  ac- 
count of  the  meeting  so  as  to  suggest  that  the  French  ambassador 
had  been  directly  insulted  by  the  Prussian  king.  This  was  too  much 
for  the  French  people,  under  the  leadership  of  militarists.  Paris  re- 
sounded with  cries  of  "To  Berlin !"  and  "Revenge  for  Sadowa !"  and 
on  July  19,  1870,  France  declared  war  on  Prussia. 

Bismarck's  diplomacy  had  completely  isolated  France.  Italy  would 
use  war  to  attack  France's  ally,  the  Pope ;  friendship  with  Russia  had 
been  sedulously  cultivated ;  Austria  had  been  mollified ;  England  was 
concerned  only  with  seeing  that  Belgian  neutrality  was  observed.  If 
Napoleon  III  had  counted  on  the  support  of  the  South  German  Con- 
federation, he  soon  found  that  by  1870  the  principle  of  nationality 
had  gained  too  strong  a  hold  upon  Europe  for  one  group  of  Germans 
to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  French  against  a  group  of  their  fellow-Ger- 
mans, especially  since  from  the  first  day  of  the  war  the  magnificent 
Prussian  army  carried  all  before  it.  One  French  army  was  shut  up 
in  Metz.  The  second  great  French  army  was  utterly  bewildered  by 
German  strategy,  was  surrounded,  was  defeated  and  forced  to  capitu- 


14  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

late  completely  at  Sedan  (  September  3  ),  and  with  it  Napoleon  himself 
was  taken  j)risoner.  Two  months  later  the  strongly-fortified  Metz 
and  Strassburg  were  also  in  German  possession.  The  remaining 
l'"renoh  troops  were  driven  into  Paris,  the  city  was  surroundetl  and 
bonil)arded,  and  after  127  days  of  terrible  stiffering,  Paris  was  star\ed 
into  surrender  on  January  2d>,  1871. 

Put  Bismarck  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  not  being  content  witli  the 
formal  humiliation  'and  defeat  of  France.  Even  the  deposition  of 
Xapoleon  111  after  Sedan  and  the  re-establishment  of  a  republic  in 
France  was  not  enough  for  Prussia ;  nor  was  Bismarck  satisfied  by 
the  indemnity  of  5,000,000,000  francs  exacted  from  France,  which 
he  hoped  would  cripple  her  for  a  long  time  but  which  the  thrifty 
French  peasants  soon  collected  in  order  to  rid  French  soil  of  the 
hated  Prussian  army.  Tempted  by  the  mineral  resources  of  .Vlsace 
and  Lorraine,  by  their  strategic  geographical  position,  and  by  the 
economic  injury  to  l*" ranee  inherent  in  cutting  her  otf  from  access  to 
the  Rhine,  Prussia  seized  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  part  of  the  spoils 
of  war.  The  principle  of  nationality  was  thus  violated  so  as  to  in- 
clude within  Germany  an  alien  element. 

With  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  the  coherence  of  the  German  nation 
was  definitely  achieved.  The  South  German  Federation  had  joined 
the  North  German  Federation  during  the  war,  and  therefore  naturally 
formally  annexed  itself  to  the  league  of  which  Prussia  was  the 
leader  when  victory  was  assured.  On  January  18,  187 1,  while  Paris 
was  still  besieged  and  in  Versailles  itself,  the  historic  abode  of  the 
kings  of  France,  the  formal  union  of  all  the  German  states  was  an- 
nounced; the  name  of  the  federation  was  changed  from  the  "North 
( lerman  Federation"  to  the  "German  Empire,"  of  which  Prussia  re- 
mained the  corner-stone ;  and  surrounded  by  the  leaders  of  all  the 
German  states,  the  King  of  Prussia  was  proclaimed  the  German  Em- 
peror. Close  political  union  with  Austria  meant  close  political  union 
with  that  section  of  the  German  nationality  within  Austria.  Com- 
plete political  unity  of  the  German  nationality  had  been  achieved ;  the 
whole  world  was  now  its  arena. 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  15 

Nationalities  Not  xVchieving  Self-Expression  Before  1914 

Alsace-Lorraine 

It  is  impossible  to  forecast  to  what  extent  fair  treatment  would 
have  succeeded  in  welding  Alsace-Lorraine  into  unity  with  the  new 
German  Empire.  Switzerland  is  but  one  example  of  a  country  in 
which  different  nationalities  live  together  in  concord  while  there  is 
no  attempt  at  political  and  economic  suppression  one  of  the  other. 
Indeed,  as  has  been  seen,  the  inhabitants  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were 
originally  of  Germanic  stock,  and  had  been  drawn  within  the  circle 
of  French  culture  only  by  the  freedom  which  they  enjoyed  under 
French  rule. 

Bismarck,  however,  set  about  to  Germanize  Alsace  and  Lorraine  by 
the  policy  of  "blood  and  iron."  Soon  after  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort 
which  closed  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  thousands  of  inhabitants  of 
the  new  German  territory  were  compelled  to  emigrate  to  France  be- 
cause they  chose  to  retain  French  rather  than  German  cit'zenship. 
For  a  long  time,  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were  under  stringent  political 
disabilities,  and  even  when,  in  the  twentieth  century,  a  form  of  au- 
tonomous constitutional  government  was  presented  them,  it  proved 
to  be  shadowy  rather  than  real ;  and  for  practical  purposes,  when  the 
Great  War  broke  out  the  2,000.000  people  of  xA.lsace-Lorraine  were 
subjects  rather  than  citizens  of  the  German  Empire. 

Perhaps  the  chief  source  of  irritation  was  the  suppression  of  the 
French  language,  its  use  being  forbidden  in  official  assemblies,  in  the 
schools,  and  even  on  tombstones !  Radical  and  even  liberal  newspapers 
were  also  suppressed.  The  young  men  were  forced  to  become  part  of 
the  German  army  which  had  just  conquered  their  land,  by  being  driven 
under  the  yoke  of  the  German  system  of  universal  military  training. 
In  the  meantime.  Germany  endeavored  to  neutralize  the  hostility  of 
the  population  by  extensive  colonization  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  by 
German  settlers ;  and  the  vast  mineral  resources  of  the  new  colonies 
were  developed  by  German  industrial  efficiency  until  the  iron  fields 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  became  the  most  productive  :n  the  world,  and 
their  coal  fields  among  the  most  productive. 

But   all    in    \'ain.      Alsace-Lorraine   would   2.0   to   all   lengths  to   ffct 


i6  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

freedom  from  German  oppression,  although  there  is  evidence  to  show- 
that  before  1914  complete  autonomy  was  desired  above  even  re-annexa- 
tion to  France.  With  the  actual  invasion  of  France  by  German  armies 
in  1914,  however,  Alsace-Lorraine  regarded  itself  as  a  part  of  the 
invaded  nation.  France,  on  her  side,  never  forgave  the  rape  of  her 
fair  Rhine  provinces,  and  thus  from  1870  to  1914  there  smouldered 
between  France  and  Germany  a  popular  and  fundamental  resentment 
on  which  the  movement  for  war  throve  and  grew  fat. 

"Italia  Irredenta" 

"Italy  Unredeemed"  signifies  today  two  sections  of  western  Hun- 
gary which  are  inhabited  by  people  of  Italian  descent  and  of  Italian 
tongue.  These  are  (i)  the  Trentino  and  (2)  Trieste  with  a  strip  of 
coast  along  the  Adriatic  south  of  Trieste. 

The  Trentino  is  the  southwestern  projection  of  Hungary  into  the 
Italian  peninsula,  including  the  city  of  Trent.  It  stretches  north 
of  Lake  Garda  and  would  comprise  roughly  that  portion  of  Hungary 
enclosed  between  the  frontier  in  1914  and  a  line  drawn  between  Mount 
Marmolate  on  the  east  and  Mount  Ortler  on  the  west.  It  would  cover 
between  2,500  and  3,000  square  miles. 

Trieste  derives  its  importance  from  its  excellent  harbor,  which  is 
the  only  one  along  the  east  coast  of  the  Adriatic  with  natural  facilities 
of  the  first  order.  Its  position  has  made  it  the  chief  seaport  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and  its  value  to  the  two  countries  which  claim  it  can 
accordingly  hardly  be  overestimated.  Although  about  three- fourths 
of  its  population  is  Italian,  the  Istrian  peninsula,  of  wliich  it  is  at  the 
head,  has  a  population  only  about  one-third  Italian.  Indeed,  only  the 
cities  and  towns  along  the  west  shore  of  the  Istrian  peninsula  have  a 
predominantly  Italian  population,  the  country  back  of  the  Adriatic 
(the  "Hinterland"'),  including  the  city  of  Fiume,  being  chiefly  Slavic, 
both  by  origin  and  by  colonization. 

The  struggle  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  for  the  Trentino 
and  especially  for  Trieste  has  been  a  point  around  which  turned  many 
of  the  international  alliances  preceding  and  accompanying  the  Great 
War.  It  was  undoubtedly  with  the  hope  of  acquiring  them  that  Italy 
finally  threw  in  her  lot  with   the  Fntente  Allies,  and  dispatched  her 


30°  25'  20°  15'  10'  5  0°  5°  10'  15' 


^snd.  SlcNsllj  i  Co.'sGn 


lcl.uolOo„.,j.r:ii.li,  Map  of  Europe. 


25°  30°  35°  10 


CoMtighl   by  50°Kaiia.  McNally  i  Co. 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  17 

troops  against  Austria  through  "ItaHa  Irredenta."  And  it  was  Italian 
claim  to  and  occupancy  of  territory  along  the  Adriatic  beyond  the  sea- 
coast  strip  inhabited  by  Italians  which  caused  that  friction  between  the 
South  Slavs  and  Italy  which  determined  many  of  the  peace  negotiations 
of  the  Great  War  of  1914-19. 

Ireland 

In  many  respects,  the  most  flagrant  example  of  a  suppressed  nation- 
ality in  western  Europe  cannot  be  laid  at  the  doors  of  the  Congress 
of  Vienna.  For  centuries,  the  "Irish  Question"  has  troubfed  the  well- 
be'ng  of  England,  and  the  Napoleonic  Wars  neither  aggravated  nor 
diminished  the  seriousness  of  the  quarrel  between  the  two  countries. 

The  Irish  are  Celts — indeed,  one  of  the  significant  features  of  the 
contemporaneous  movement  for  Irish  freedom  has  been  the  revival 
of  the  Celtic  language,  not  only  in  literary  usage,  but  also  in  popular 
and  legislative  assemblies.  In  addition,  except  for  Ulster,  Ireland 
is  Catholic  and  agricultural,  in  contrast  with  Protestant  and  industrial 
England.  The  constant  friction  between  the  two  nations  is  thus  by 
no  means  fortuitous. 

A  vital  issue  in  the  Irish  problem  was  long  the  ownership  of  the 
land  of  Ireland.  From  the  invasion  of  Ireland  by  a  band  of  Normans 
in  1 169  down  to  the  nineteenth  century,  more  and  more  of  the  land 
was  confiscated  by  England ;  until  Ireland  came  into  the  nineteenth 
century  with  a  population  mostly  of  tenant  farmers,  living  on  soil 
owned  b}^  men  of  English  descent,  mercilessly  exploited  by  the  agents 
who  managed  the  farms  for  the  owners  (many  of  them,  absentee 
landlords),  under  limitations  which  made  the  Irish  practically  agri- 
cultural serfs,  dispossessed  on  the  slightest  pretext,  and  existing  from 
day  to  day  and  from  year  to  year  in  the  midst  of  poverty  which  beg- 
gars description.  It  is  estimated,  for  instance,  that  between  1845  ^"d 
1847  the  failure  of  the  potato  crop  caused  the  death  of  almost  100,000 
people  literally  by  starvation,  while  hundreds  of  thousands  were  kept 
alive  only  by  some  form  of  public  or  private  charity ;  and  the  wretch- 
edness of  their  lot  drove  about  one-fifth  of  the  population  to  emigrate 
to  America  in  the  five  years  following  1845.    ^^  ^^^  agricultural  distress 


i8  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

of  the  country  was  added  general  economic  prostration  due  to  the 
imposition  of  restrictive  economic  measures.  It  is  beheved  that  Ire- 
land came  into  the  nineteenth  century  with  a  population  of  some  8,000,- 
000;  today  it  is  less  than  4,000,000. 

Marked  alleviation  of  the  misery  of  Ireland  had  to  wait  for  1881 
and  Gladstone.  In  that  year,  the  celebrated  English  statesman  secured 
the  passage  of  measures  providing  some  definite  im])rovement  in  con- 
ditions ;  and  later  acts  of  1885,  1888.  1891  and  1903  gradually  paved 
the  way  for  the  transfer  of  the  soil  of  Ireland  from  wealthy  owners 
to  the  hard-driven  Irish  peasantry.  Even  today,  however,  much  Irish 
soil  is  in  the  hands  of  the  English  and  Irish  nobility  and  of  the  up])er 
classes;  and  accordingly  much  of  the  difficulty  of  handling  the  "Irish 
Question"  is  still  economic. 

The  second  great  issue  between  Ireland  and  England  is  that  of 
religion.  Again  Ireland  came  into  the  nineteenth  century  with  a  pop- 
ulation forced  to  submit  to  a  state  church  toward  which  it  felt  little 
but  horror  and  hatred,  and  even  to  pay  tithes  to  support  it;  while  the 
Catholic  allegiance  of  the  poverty-stricken  Irish  peasant  was  the  source 
of  stringent  political  restrictions  upon  h'ni.  It  was  not  until  T829 
that  the  English  Parliament,  with  violent  opposition  from  the  estab- 
lished Anglican  Church  in  both  England  and  Ireland,  removed  from 
Catholics  the  ban  on  holding  jiolitical  office.  It  was  not  until  1867 
that  the  working  classes  were  definitclv  enfranchised,  and  it  was 
not  until  two  years  later  that  the  Ant^bcan  Church  in  Ireland  was 
disendowed  and  disestablished.  Ily  this  linic.  more  than  half  of  the 
population  of  Ireland  had  enn'gratcd  t(i  the  Cnited  States. 

Today,  however,  the  most  pressing  rispcHi  of  ihe  Irish  ([uestion  is 
the  political. 

The  x\ct  of  Union  between  Ireland  and  I'Jigland  dates  from  180T. 
It  abrogated  the  Irish  Parliament  which  had  existed  before  that  time, 
although  with  few  real  powers;  and  so  hitler  was  the  opjjosition  to 
the  Act  in  Ireland  that  votes  of  Irish  legislators  necessary  to  ratification 
were  secured  only  by  wide-spread  bribery. 

Even  before  1801,  however,  riots  and  uprisings  in  Ireland  had  oc- 
curred periodically.  These  man'festations  of  Irish  feeling  through- 
out   the    eiHiteenth    ccntiu'x-    down    to    the    American    Revolution    had 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalilies  19 

represented  little  more  than  despair  and  hatred  at  oppression.  But  the 
lesson  taught  by  the  success  of  the  American  colonies  in  escaping 
from  a  foreign  rule  was  not  lost  upon  Ireland,  and  many  secret  so- 
cieties began  to   function   for  political  independence. 

The  French  Revolution  also  impregnated  Ireland  with  conscious- 
ness of  nationality  and  with  longings  for  political  freedom,  with  the 
result  that  a  violent  and  sanguinary  revolut:on  broke  out  again  in 
1798. 

After  the  Act  of  Union,  the  movement  for  political  freedom  was 
abortive  until  it  came  definitely  under  the  leadership  of  Daniel  O'Con- 
nell  in  1829;  and  ])y  1S34  the  sentiment  for  Home  Rule  had  become 
strong.  By  1848,  a  somewhat  better  organization  was  perfected,  with 
facilities  for  propaganda.  Ten  years  later,  Irish  immigrants  in  the 
United  States,  who  had  lost  none  of  their  bitterness  toward  England, 
began  to  organize  as  Fenians  in  societies  aiming  at  freedom  by  violence 
if  necessary,  and  the  resulting  violence  and  even  international  com- 
pl'cations  were  serious. 

In  1870,  the  political  party  of  the  Irish  Nationalists  was  formed 
to  achieve  Home  Rule.  It  soon  fell  under  the  able  and  persistent 
leadership  of  Charles  Stewart  Parnell,  who  also  organized  five  years 
later  the  powerful  Land  League.  The  murder  in  1882  of  Lord  Caven-' 
dish.  Lieutenant  Governor  of  Ireland,  in  I'hoenix  Park,  Dublin, 
although  it  served  to  stir  up  enmity  toward  the  Home  Rulers,  also 
brought  a  realization  of  the  seriousness  of  the  Irish  Question.  (Glad- 
stone soon  became  converted  to  the  principles  of  Home  Rule,  and 
in  1886,  when  an  almost  evenly-divided  Parliament  gave  the  National- 
ists the  balance  of  power,  brought  in  a  Ilome  Rule  Bill,  onlv  to  see 
it  defeated  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  a  small  majority. 

In  1893,  Gladstone  again  brought  in  a  Home  Rule  Bill,  and  steered 
it  successfully  through  the  House  of  Commons,  only  to  see  it  slaugh- 
tered in  the  House  of  Lords. 

In  the  twentieth  century,  the  Liberal  ministry  of  Mr.  Asquith  again 
saw  the  Nationalists  holding  the  balance  of  power,  with  the  result 
that  the  third  Home  Rule  Bill  was  introduced  in  191 2.  It  was  again 
thrown  out  by  the  House  of  Lords,  but  now  Asquith  enjoyed  an  ad- 
vantage over  Gladstone.     For  l)y  1912,  the  House  of  Lords  had  been 


20  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

deprived  of  its  absolute  veto  power,  and  when  the  Bill  passed  the 
House  of  Commons  for  the  third  time  on  May  5,  1914,  it  automatically 
became  the  law  of  the  land. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  opposition  within  Ireland  to  Home  Rule  is 
centred  arotmd  the  provinces  comprising  Ulster,  within  which  is  in- 
chuled  the  city  of  Belfast,  and  representing  the  problem  of  a  recal- 
citrant minority  which  has  always  plagued  the  development  of  dem- 
ocratic procedure.  Although  the  religious  question  and  Ulster's  de- 
fiance of  "Rome  Rule"  are  much  in  the  foreground,  the  dominant 
point  of  dispute  is  economic.  Indeed,  only  about  60  per  cent  of  Ulster 
is  Protestant.  Ulster  is  industrial  and  wealthy,  and  fears  over-heavy 
taxation  to  remedy  the  ills  of  agricultural  Ireland.  Ulster  claims  that 
the  Home  Rule  bill  does  not  guarantee  it  against  exploitation  by  the  re- 
mainder of  Ireland,  and  that  the  recent  reforms  in  Ireland  without 
Home  Rule  have  been  serviceable  and  cumtilative.  When  it  became 
apparent  that  Home  Rule  would  pass  the  English  Parliament,  Prot- 
estant Ulster,  under  the  leadership  of  Sir  Edward  Carson^  openly 
proclaimed  its  intention  to  resist  the  law.  Arms  were  brotight  in  and 
Ulster  armies  trained  in  public  defiance  of  England;  and  even  in  the 
English  army  in  Ireland  a  powerful  group  of  officers  officially  pro- 
claimed that  they  would  refuse  to  obey  orders  "to  coerce  Ulster." 

So  serious  was  the  situation  that  the  English  government  introduced 
into  Parliament  an  amendment  to  the  Home  Rule  Act  to  exclude  auto- 
matically from,  its  operations  for  six  yeaj^s  those  cotmties  in  Ulster 
which  so  expressed  a  desire  by  referendum.  This  attempt  at  com- 
promise, however,  merely  added  fuel  to  the  flames.  The  Ulster  vol- 
unteer army  became  more  open  in  its  threats  of  rebellion;  and  the 
Irish  Catholics,  fearing  that  at  least  a  large  section  of  the  British 
army  would  side  with  Ulster  in  case  the  dispute  came  to  civil  war, 
took  steps  to  form  their  own  volunteer  army.  A  section  of  the  Brit- 
ish army  in  Dublin,  in  attempting  to  prevent  a  consignment  of  arms 
from  reaching  the  Nationalist  volunteers,  found  it  necessary  to  fire  on 
a  mob  in  the  streets,  killing  several  and  wounding  scores ;  and  the 
Nationalists  swore  revenge. 

By  the  summer  of  1914,  accordingly,  civil  war  in  Great  Britain  to 
many  observers  was  at  least  a  possibility,  a  possibility  which  might 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  21 

render  England  powerless  to  function  in  any  international  dispute 
between  the  great  Po-^ers  of  Europe.  And  it  was  in  the  summer  of 
1914  that  Austria,  supported  by  Germany,  dispatched  to  Servia  the 
ultimatum  which  .was  the  spark  to  set  off  the  whole  European  powder- 
box. 


Suppressed  Nationalities  in  Central  and 
South  Central  Europe 

Poland 

In  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  Poland  was 
one  of  the  largest  countries  of  the  world,  although  much  of  its  territory 
was  Polish  only  through  nominal  allegiance  of  minor  rulers.  Stretching 
from  the  Baltic  Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Riga  to  the  southern  border  of 
what  was  in  1914  Galicia  (in  Austria),  and  from  the  Dnieper  River 
in  Russia  to  and  including  East  Prussia,  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century  it  covered  almost  400,000  square  miles  and  was  inhabited  by 
some  15,000,000  people. 

In  the  eighteenth  century,  however,  Poland  fell  under  the  power 
of  Russia,  and  by  the  first  partition  of  Poland  in  1772  Russia,  Austria 
and  Prussia  absorbed  large  portions  of  Poland  contiguous  to  them. 
In  1793  occurred  the  second  partition  of  Poland,  between  Prussia  and 
Russia;  and  in  1795  the  rest  of  what  had  been  Poland  was  divided 
among  Russia,  Austria  and  Prussia.  As  has  been  seen,  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  confirmed  the  dissemination  of  this  great  people  among 
three  alien  peoples ;  and  when  the  Great  War  broke  out  in  1914,  about 
three-fifths  of  what  had  been  Poland,  containing  almost  four-fifths  of 
the  Polish  race,  was  incorporated  in  Russia,  while  Austria  and  Prussia 
shared  about  equally  in  the  remainder. 

The  Poles  are  a  Slavic  race,  with  a  high  degree  of  culture  and  a 
history  of  material  and  artistic  achievements  which  has  helped  to  pre- 
serve the  feeling  for  Polish  nationality  unweakened  after  more  than 
a  century  of  partition  and  repression.  Indeed,  their  history  under 
Russian  rule  has  been  an  almost  unbroken  record  of  revolt  for  inde- 
pendence and  re-union.     Russia  treated  the  Poles  with  tolerance  for 


22  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

fifteen  years  after  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  but  in  1830  undertook  a 
policy  of  Russification.  The  Polish  language -was  banned,  in  school 
and  church  as  well  as  in  law-court ;  the  (ireek  Catholic  Church  of  Rus- 
sia employed  every  possible  method  to  starve  out  the  Roman  Catholic 
religion  of  the  Poles;  thousands  of  Polish  families  were  deported;  ex- 
tensive colonization  of  Poland  by  Russian  peasants  was  introduced ; 
and  with  dull  regularity  the  Polish  leaders  w^ere  executed  or  exiled. 

Nevertheless,  by  1861  Poland  experienced  a  recrudescence  of  national 
consciousness  which  has  continued  to  the  present  day,  making  inevit- 
able as  one  of  the  settlements  of  the  Great  W'ar  the  resurrection  of 
a  Polish  state;  but  which  resulted  in  1863  only  in  a  new  campaign  of 
Russification  and  in  the  complete  political  amalgamation  of  Poland 
in  Russia  with  Russia  in  1868.  The  Polish  nationalistic  spirit  flour- 
ished especially  among  the  nobility  and  the  clergy,  because  these  classes 
were  best  able  to  appreciate  the  services  rendered  to  civilization  by 
the  Poles  in  the  past ;  and  Russia  in  retaliation  punished  the  upper 
classes  by  distributing  their  lands  generally  among  the  Polish  peasants. 
I5y  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  the  Polish  peasant  was  accordingly 
in  a  somewhat  better  economic  condition  than  his  Russian  brother ; 
and  hence  in  the  tv.-entieth  century  before  the  (ireat  War  the  spirit 
of  Polish  nationalism  often  took  the  form  of  a  longing  for  mere 
autonomy   under   Russia. 

This  longing  was  intensified  In-  the  repression  of  the  Poles  in  Prus- 
sia, where  they  inhabited  Posen  and  other  parts  of  E^st  Prussia.  Prus- 
sian repression  of  the  Polish  nationalistic  spirit  became  more  Ijrutal 
than  even  the  Russian,  as  it  not  only  was  more  cold-bloodedly  efficient, 
but  also  because  it  included  practically  dispossession  and  confiscation 
of  the  land  and  other  property  owned  by  the  Poles.  This  harsh  treat- 
ment of  the  Poles  in  Germany  was  the  occasion  of  the  first  vote  of 
lack  of  confidence  in  the  Imperial  Government  ever  passed  by  the 
(ierman  Reichstag.  This  achievement  occurred  on  January  30,  1913. 
and  was  effected  by  a  combination  of  Polish  delegates  with  Catholic 
(Centrum)  and  Socialists  (Social  Democrats). 

On  the  other  hand,  Austria  needed  the  support  of  the  Polish  political 
group  in  .\ustria  against  the  opposition  of  other  nationalities  included 


Tlic  Su/'prcssioii  of  Xatio)ialitlcs  23 

within  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  and  treated  the  Poles  of 
GaHcia  with  comparative  generosity.  Nevertheless,  the  Austrian  Poles 
kept  alive  their  dreams  of  another  Polish  state,  and  joined  with  their 
fellows  in  Prussia  and  Russia  in  the  realization  of  that  dream  after 
the  Great  War.  Indeed,  among  some  Poles  the  aspirations  for  the  new 
Poland  included  all  the  territory  covered  by  Poland  before  the^first 
partition  in  1772,  when  Poland  had  within  her  confines  millions  of 
Great  Russians,  White  Russians,  Prussians,  Ukrainians,  and  Letts, 
and  was  itself  repressive  of  these  alien  nationalities  under  its  rule. 

Finland,   Baltic  Provinces  and  Lithuania 

Finland  comprises  the  large  stretch  of  land  north  of  the  Gulf  of 
Finland  to  the  Arctic  Ocean,  and  divides  the  peoples  of  the  Scandi- 
navian peninsula  from  the  Slavs  of  Russia.  P"or  the  Finns  are  not 
an  Indo-European  race,  although  they  have  achieved  a  culture  and  a 
religion  through  Sweden.  Indeed,  they  possess  a  high  degree  of  culti- 
vation, and  have  no  points  of  cultural  contact  with  the  Russians.  Fin- 
land has  a  territory  of  about  150,000  square  miles,  but  a  population  of 
only  3,000,000. 

Finland  was  annexed  from  Sweden  to  Russia  in  1809,  and  the 
annexation-  was  confirmed  by  the  Congress  of  X'ienna.  Plowever, 
under  Russian  rule  Finland  enjoyed  absolute  freedom  of  national 
and  even  of  economic  and  cultural  life  until  1899.  In  that  year,  the 
Tsar  of  Russia  launched  upon  Finland  a  violent  campaign  of  Russi- 
fication,  which  continued  until  the  1905  revolution  in  Russia  was  sup- 
ported by  a  similar  revolution,  together  with  a  powerful  general  strike, 
in  Finland;  and  the  Finns  once  more  won  autonomy.  In  1909,  how- 
ever, another  period  of  suppression  by  Russian  rulers  began  in  Finland, 
and  191 1  saw  the  beginning  of  a  program  of  partition  of  the  province 
and  of  amalgamation  with  Russia  proper. 

A  thin  strip  of  Norway  cuts  off  Finland  from  both  the  Arctic  and 
the  Atlantic  Oceans.  However,  a  cornerstone  in  the  recent  foreign 
policy  of  Russia  has  been  the  acquisition  of  a  Norwegian  port  on  the 
open  Atlantic,  and  the  strategic  importance  of  Finland's  geographical 


24  -Tf  llisiury  of  the  Great  War 

position  consists  in  tiie  fact  that  tlie  railroad  from  Russia  to  such  a 
port  would  pass  through  Finland.  As  it  has  been  the  policy  of  Eng- 
land and  the  Scandinavian  countries  to  prevent  Russia  from  realiz- 
ing her  dream  of  an  Atlantic  port,  those  countries  have  supported 
Finland  as  best  they  might  against  Russian  aggression. 

The  Baltic  Provinces  are  Courland,  Livonia  and  Esthonia,  lying 
along  the  east  coast  of  the  Baltic  Sea  south  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland. 
The  native  inhabitants  are  Letts  and  Esths,  the  former  a  Lithuanian 
and  the  latter  a  Finnish  nationality.  The  upper  classes,  who  dominated 
the  coiuitry  until  1914,  however,  are  Germans.  There  are  few  Rus- 
sians, and  the  bulk  of  the  people  are  Protestants. 

The  Baltic  Provinces  were  originally  conquered  by  Teutonic  in- 
vaders, but  finally  they  fell  into  other  hands.  Courland  was  under 
i'olish  sway  w^ell  into  the  eighteenth  century,  and  Esthonia  and  Livonia 
had  become  parts  of  Sweden.  Toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  the  Baltic  provinces  were  conquered  by  Russia,  and  were  in- 
corporated within  the  Russian  Empire.  A  definite  campaign  of  sup- 
pression of  nationalistic  feeling  and  of  Russification  was  launched 
upon  the  Baltic  Provinces  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Lithuania  stretches  from  Courland  to  Poland  and  Ukraine.  The 
land  is  for  the  greater  part  covered  with  swamps .  and  forests,  and 
although  the  inhabitants,  with  the  Letts,  have  kept  alive  their  national 
feeling,  they  are  not  in  a  high  state  of  culture.  For  several  centuries 
before  Lithuania  was  incorporated  within  Russia  toward  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  it  was  under  Polish  domination ;  but  its  in- 
habitants possess  a  language  and  racial  characteristics  differentiating 
them  from  the  Poles  and  forming  them  with  the  Letts  into  a  distinct 
nationality.  The  Letts  extend  also  into  East  Prussia  and  Russian 
Poland. 

Ukraine 

Ukraine  (literally,  "Borderland")  constitutes  the  entire  southern 
part  of  European  Russia  from  Poland  to  the  Don  River,  including 
most  of  the  north  coast  of  the  Black  Sea.  It  is  thus  one  and  one-half 
times  as  large  as  the  Germany  of  1914.    Ukrainians  (Little  Russians) 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  25 

live  also  in  the  Austrian  province  of  Galicia,  vv^here  they  are  known 
as  Ruthenians;  and  the  total  number  of  Ukrainians  is  close  to 
25,0(X),C)0O.  By  extent  of  territory,  by  number  of  inhabitants,  by 
fertility  of  soil,  by  vastness  of  natural  resources,  and  by  geographical 
position  the  problem  of  Ukraine  is  accordingly  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant and  urgent  problems  arising  out  of  the  cjuestion  of  nationality. 

The  Ukrainian  national  consciousness  in  Russia  represents  one  kept 
alive  chiefly  by  outside  pressure  rather  than  by  inner  aspirations.  For 
the  Ukrainians  differ  from  the  Great  Russians,  who  comprise  the  bulk 
of  European  Russia,  chiefly  in  language,  Ukrainian  being  a  tongue 
varying  markedly  in  many  respects  from  Russia.  In  religion,  the 
Ukrainians  and  the  Great  Russians  are  one,  the  ethnological  dift'erences 
between  them  are  more  theoretical  than  real,  and  their  economic 
interests  are  largely  identical. 

Centuries  ago  there  blossomed  in  Ukraine  a  rich  and  extensive 
culture  of  which  the  memory  has  been  kept  alive  among  Ukrainians. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  mediaeval  days  Ukraine  and  its  capital,  Kiev, 
were  the  centre  of  the  political  and  religious  forces  of  the  territory 
which  later  became  Russia.  But  the  country  was  overrun  and  con- 
quered by  Tartars  and  later  by  Poles,  from  whom  Russia  proceeded 
to  annex  Ukraine  at  the  partitions  of  Poland. 

From  that  day  to  1917,  the  Russian  government  proceeded  to  repress 
and  Russify  the  Ukrainians.  The  Ukrainian  language  and  the  Ukrai- 
nian literature  were  proscribed ;  attempts  were  made  to  stamp  out  the 
native  Ukrainian  culture ;  there  was  colonization  in  Ukraine  by  Rus- 
sian families ;  the  Ukrainian  peasants  were  placed  under  economic  and 
political  restrictions ;  and  the  Ukrainian  national  leaders  were  exiled. 
This  policy  embittered  the  Ukrainians  all  the  more  as  the  Ukrainians 
under  Austrian  rule,  although  hardly  enjoying  complete  freedom, 
nevertheless  were  not  subjected  to  so  ruthless  a  program  of  denation- 
alization. Accordingly,  the  feeling  for  Ukrainian  unity  began  to  take 
definite  shape  and  organization  shortly  after  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
.teenth  century. 

It  was  the  Great  War,  however,  which  made  Ukrainian  nationalism 
a  movement  of  definite  strength  and  solidarity.  For  the  tactics  of 
the  Tsars  had   finallv  rendered  the  l^krainians  anti-Russian  and  thus 


20  .i   Ilisloiy  of  the  Crcut   ll-'ar 

thov  l)t'caiiie  to  a  great  extent  pru-(  ieniian.  l'\irthennore.  the  pro- 
gram of  the  Entente  Allies  contained  a  plank  for  the  restoration  of 
Poland,  and  the  western  rkrainians  were  therefore  afraid  that  they 
would  be  placed  under  the  yoke  of  their  hereditary  Polish  oppressors 
if  the  Central  Powers  should  be  defeated.  However,  with  the  first 
Russian  Revolution  of  March,  1917,  the  exploited  Ukrainian  peasant 
was  able  to  possess  himself  of  the  lands  of  the  nobility,  and  thereby  to 
lose  much  of  his  grievance  against  Russia ;  and  the  autocratic  treat- 
ment of  Ukraine  by  Germany  in  1917  caused  great  bitterness  against 
the  Central  Powers.  Ukraine  had  constituted  itself  an  independent 
state  soon  after  the  Revolution  of  March.  1917,  but  political  and 
economic  differences  of  I'kraine  with  (he  Russian  Government  under 
Bolshevist  regime  manifested  themselves  in  1918  and  1919. 

A  nil  01  in 

Although  the  Armenians  are  a  sui)pressed  race  of  Asia  rather  than 
of  Europe,  they  may  be  considered  at  this  point  as  their  problem  is 
inextricably  a  ])art  of  the  larger  European  problem  of  nationalities. 
For  tlie  Armenians  are  a  race  of  Indo-European  (  Aryan  )  stock  :  their 
language  is  one  of  the  Indo-luiropean  group;  and  they  are  Christians, 
although  Christians  unconnected  with  any  other  organized  Christian 
church.  In  fact,  the  .Armenian  Church  was  the  earliest  national 
Christian  church  to  be  established.  These  facts,  together  with  the 
isolation  of  the  .\rmenians  among  .\siatic  surroundings,  have  served 
to  weld  the  Armenians  into  a  nationality  of  very  strong  racial,  religious 
and  social  solidarity. 

.\rmenia  is  in  the  northwestern  corner  u\  .\sia  Minor,  between  the 
I'.lack  and  the  Caspian  Seas  and  southwest  of  tlie  Caucasus  Mountain^. 
It  is  di\ided  among  Russia,  Persia  and  Turkey,  although  the  Armenian 
problem  has  been  concerned  chiefly  with  the  treatment  of  the  Arme- 
nians by  the  Turks.  For  through  religious  fanaticism  and  especially 
through  jealousy  of  the  economic  prowess  of  the  Armenians,  tlie  last 
three  decades  have  witnessed  a  series  of  .\rmenian  massacres  at  the 
hands  of  Turks  which  have  occurred  with  the  connivance  if  not  at  the 
instigation  of  the  Turkish  Government  :  which  have  been  imsurpassed 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  27 

and  well-nigh  iincqualed  in  savagery  and  bestiality  ;  and  which  by  the 
end  of  the  Great  War  had  literally  wiped  out  about  one-half  of  the 
2,000,000  Armenians. 

Turkey  was  in  a  most  advantageous  position  for  playing  off  one 
group  of  Powers  against  the  other  group,  nor  was  Russia  anxious  to 
see  the  establishment  of  a  free  and  united  Armenia;  and  all  that  could 
be  accomplished  for  the  Armenians  was  some  protection  by  France  to 
the  few  affiliated  with  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  and  by  Russia  to  the 
few  under  Creek  Catholic  protection.  Because  of  the  religious  nature 
of  the  persecution,  it  has  strongly  attracted  the  popular  sympathies 
of  the  peoples  of  the  West,  and  much  of  the  moral  stigma  attached  to 
the  cause  of  the  Central  Powers  in  the  Great  War  was  due  to  the  in- 
clusion within  the  Quadru])le  Alliance  of  the  perpetrator  of  the 
Anuenian  massacres. 

Czechoslovakia 

The  Czechs  are  the  native  Slavic  inhabitants  of  Bohemia.  Together 
with  the  Slovaks,  a  neighboring  related  race,  they  represent  a  race 
of  about  8,000,000  li\ing  in  the  north  of  the  Austria-Hungary  of  1914. 
Besides  Bohemia,  where  there  is  also  a  large  German  population,  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  are  found  in  Moravia,  Prussian  and  Austrian  Silesia, 
in  Lower  Austria,  in  Volhynia  (in  Russia  of  1914),  and  in  other  sec- 
tions of  northern  Hungary. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  mediaeval  period.  Bohemia  was  an  important 
kingdom  of  luirope,  with  notable  national  achievements  to  its  credit  : 
and  the  re-birth  of  the  Bohemian  nationalistic  spirit  in  the  nineteenth 
century  was  endowed  wnth  a  past  of  significance  from  which  to  draw 
inspiration. 

The  Germans  and  the  Czechs  in  Bohemia  have  always  been  at  logger- 
heads, for  the  ascendance  of  the  one  inevitably  signified  the  repression 
of  the  other.  As  the  Austro-Hungarian  government  throughout  the 
nineteenth  century  was  under  the  domination  of  the  German  element 
and  its  ally,  the  Magyars,  the  recent  history  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks  is 
an  unbroken  tale  of  persecution  tempered  by  violent  revolts.  P)y  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  centurv.  the  nationalistic  feeling  in  Bohemia 


28  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ'ar 

look  on  delinitc  shape,  and  even  the  upper  classes  began  to  discard  the 
German  language  in  favor  of  the  native  Czech.  The  Czechs  played 
their  part  in  the  general  European  revolt  of  1848,  but  nationalistic 
rivalries  divided  the  ranks  of  the  revolutionists,  and  resulted  in  their 
defeat.  ()f  this  revival  of  Czech  culture,  the  native  university  at 
Prague,  the  capital  of  Bohemia,  has  been  the  centre. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  nationalistic  im- 
pulses of  the  Czecho-Slovaks  became  involved  with  movements  for 
political  freedom  and  reform,  and  from  1879  to  1891  the  Czechs  in 
Bohemia  were  in  the  ascendancy  over  the  German  influence  there. 
But  in  the  twentieth  century,  repression  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks  again 
caused  serious  riots;  and  despite  considerable  political  reforms  in  1907, 
martial  law  had  to  be  proclaimed  throughout  Bohemia  in  the  year 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War.  The  settlement  of  the  problem 
of  a  Czecho-Slovak  state  therefore  is  largely  wrapped  up  in  the  treat- 
ment of  the  German  minority  in  that  land. 

The  Laud  of  the  Magyars 

The  Magyars  (Hungarians)  are  the  dominant  race  of  Hungary, 
although  they  are  slightly  outnumbered  by  the  wSlavic.  Rouman  and 
other  nationalities  of  Hungary.  There  are  today  in  Hungary  some 
10,000,000  persons  speaking  the  Magyar  language,  but  the  total  number 
of  native  Magyars  is  probably  not  above  8,000,000. 

The  Magyar  nationality  is  one  utterly  unlike  other  European 
nationalities,  except  the  Finns,  to  whom  by  their  joint  non-Indo- 
European  origins  and  non-Indo-European  languages  the  Magyars  are 
closely  allied. 

After  many  centuries  under  the  yoke  of  Turkey,  Hungary  fell  under 
Austrian  rule  in  the  eighteenth  century;  and  after  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  in  181 5,  the  national  consciousness  of  the  Magyars  became 
acute.  It  was  accompanied  not  only  by  vigorous  movements  for 
political  reforms,  but  also  by  a  literary  output  of  value.  Nowhere  did 
the  revolutionary  spirit  of  1848  find  more  fertile  soil  than  in  Hungary ; 
and  under  the  leadership  of  Kossuth,  independence  for  Hungary  was 
in  sight  in  that  year.     But  antagonism  between  the  Magyars  and  the 


The  Suppression  of  Nationalities  29 

Slavs  in  Hungary  was  too  intense  to  permit  them  to  join  forces,  and 
tiiis  division  of  strength  made  it  possible  for  Hungary  to  be  re-con- 
quered in  1849  t>y  Austria,  supported,  as  we  have  seen,  by  Prussia 
and  Russia  under  the  terms  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 

The  defeat  of  Austria  at  the  hands  of  Prussia  in  1866,  however, 
paved  the  way  for  Hungarian  freedom;  and  in  1867  Hungary  was 
united  with  Austria  in  the  Dual  Monarchy,  in  which  each  half  enjoyed 
complete  independence  and  autonomy. 

The  fruition  of  the  Magyar  political  desires  led  to  an  intensification 
of  their  nationalistic  activities ;  and  to  preserve  the  Magyar  ascendancy 
in  Hungary,  the  other  races  of  that  country  were  subjected  to  ruth- 
less repression.  Magyar  was  made  the  only  language  permissible  in 
the  schools  and  in  official  assemblies.  Slavic  and  Roumanian  journals 
and  educational  institutions  were  suppressed.  Economic  and  industrial 
success  was  made  possible  only  by  cooperation  with  Magyar  nation- 
alism. Suffrage  was  not  granted  on  terms  of  equality  to  Hungarian 
Slavs  and  Roumans ;  and  by  other  public  and  private  methods  of 
violence,  the  policy  of  repression  by  the  Magyar  minority  in  Hungary 
became  more  brutal  than  even  the  policy  of  repression  by  the  German 
majority  in  Austria. 

Naturally,  the  progress  of  Magyarization  in  Hungary  was  met  by 
a  program  of  Pan-Slavism,  supported  by  Russia,  the  centre  of  the 
Slavic  race.  Accordingly,  when  the  Great  War  became  imminent, 
the  Hungarian  government,  in  Magyar  hands,  rallied  whole-heartedly 
to  the  support  of  Austria,  as  the  victory  of  Russia  would  mean  the 
ascendancy  of  the  Slavs  in  Hungary  and  the  downfall  of  the  Magyars. 

The  Land  of  the  Roumans 

Only  about  one-half  of  the  Roumanian  race  lived  in  Roumania  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War.  The  other  half  lived  chiefly  in  eastern 
Hungary  (especially  Transylvania),  in  Bessarabia  (a  strip  of  land 
along  the  Black  Sea  forming  the  extreme  southwestern  tip  of  Russia 
in  Europe),  in  Servia  and  in  Bulgaria.  "Roumania  Irredenta"  accord- 
ingly lay  in  the  hands  of  both  Central  Powers  and  Entente  Allies  in 
1914. 


30  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Rouniania  was  settled  soon  after  the  Christian  era  as  a  Roman 
province,  and  today  the  Roumanian  language  is  a  Latin  tongue.  How- 
ever, long  centuries  of  Slavic  infiltration  have  made  the  Roumanians 
ethnologically  a  mixed  nationality.  They  are  members  of  the  Greek 
Catholic  Church.  Suffrage  is  restricted  to  a  very  small  class;  the 
country  is  very  backward  economically;  and  there  is  general  exploita- 
tion of  the  peasants  by  the  land-owners. 

Until  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Roumania.  then  composed 
of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  and  known  as  the  "Danubian  i^rovinces,'" 
was  a  part  of  the  Turkish  realm.  Russia  began  to  covet  it.  however; 
and  between  the  upper  and  nether  millstones  of  Turkey  and  Russia, 
after  the  Congress  of  Vienna  Roumania  began  to  develop  a  national 
consciousness,  and  after  1848  a  native  literature  of  some  note.  Wy 
i860,  the  Danubian  Provinces  achieved  autonomy  under  Turkey  and 
in  1866  chose  a  German  prince  as  their  ruler.  In  1877,  they  joined 
Russia  in  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  and  were  rewarded  by  a  grant  of 
independence  from  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  the  following  year. 
They  were  given  as  part  of  their  country  the  province  of  Dobruja. 
but  Russia  kept  P.essarabia.  The  status  of  Roumania  in  European 
politics  was  profoundly  affected  by  the  First  and  I^econd  Balkan  Wars. 

The  Land  of  the  Biilgars 

The  Bulgars  are  of  the  South  .^hiv  family,  but  l)v  development. 
language,  and  political  outlook  they  have  come  to  constitute  a  sei)arate 
nationality  in  the  Balkans.  .About  5,000,000  in  number,  they  ha\e 
their  own  Orthodox  Bulgarian  Church,  although  several  hundred 
thousand  of  them  are  Mohammedans.  Only  slightly  more  than  half 
of  the  Bulgars  dwell  within  the  confines  of  Bulgaria  as  it  existed 
in  1914,  the  remainder  being  under  Roumanian,  Russian.  Turkish  and 
Hungarian  rule;  and  the  consequent  rivalries  with  her  fellow- Balkan 
states,  together  with  attempts  of  Russia  to  keep  Bulgaria  from  be- 
coming too  powerful,  were  responsible  for  Bulgaria's  allegiance  to  the 
Central  Powers  when  the  Great  War  broke. 

Bulgaria  was  under  Turkey  from  the  fourteenth  to  the  nineteenth 
century,  not  achieving  complete  independence  until    lyot;.     The  vivid 


TJic  Suppression  of  Nationalities  31 

consciousness  of  Bulgarian  nationality,  however,  dates  from  the  period 
around  1885,  when  Bulgaria  achieved  autonomy  under  Turkish 
suzerainty.  Bulgaria  has  made  remarkable  economic  and  educational 
[progress,  and  shows  a  far  higher  degree  of  civilization  than  most  other 
regions  of  the  Balkan  peninsula,  or  the  Near  East,  as  it  is  often  called. 

J  iigo-Slavia 

The  South  (Jugo)  Slavs  may  be  considered  as  divided  into  two 
groups — Serbo-Croats  and  Slovenes.     They  number  about  10,000,000. 

The  Serbs  form  the  bulk  of  the  population  of  Servia  and  Alon- 
tenegro,  whereas  the  Croats  are  located  chiefly  in  the  territory  which 
before  1919  was  the  Hungarian  provinces  of  Bosnia  (including  Herze- 
govina j,  Croatia,  Slavonia  and  Dalmatia.  The  Croats  are  chiefly 
Roman  Catholics  and  the  Serbs  are  chiefly  Greek  Catholics,  but  in 
origin,  language,  culture  and  political  aspirations  their  interests  are 
largely  identical.  The  land  of  the  Slovenes  is  the  northwestern  tip  of 
the  old  Hungary,  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic;  and  although  their 
language  is  dift'erent  from  that  of  the  Serbo-Croats,  they  amalgamated 
with  them  as  one  body  in  the  nationalistic  struggles  of  the  South  Slavs 
down  to  and  through  the  Great  War. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  mediaeval  period,  Servia  was  a  strong  power, 
but  it  fell  under  the  sway  of  the  Turks,  who  kept  their  hold  upon 
large  numbers  of  the  South  Slavs  into  the  twentieth  century.  In  the 
sixteenth  century,  Austria  wrested  some  of  the  western  South  Slavs 
from  the  Turks,  but  most  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  was  under  Turkish 
rule  until  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

The  South  Slavs  became  race-conscious  in  the  nineteenth  century; 
and  as  they  were  Slavs  like  the  Russians,  it  was  natural  that  a  strong 
feeling  of  racial  unity  should  arise  between  the  Slavic  peoples  of  the 
Balkans  and  of  Russia.  When  Russia  began  her  campaign  looking 
toward  territorial  extension  taking  in  Constantinople,  her  interests  con- 
flicted with  those  of  Turkey;  and  it  was  chiefly  as  a  result  of  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  in  1877  that  the  South  Slavs  under  Turkish  rule 
in  the  Balkans  were  able  to  assert  their  autonomy.  They  were  thus 
not  only  closely  related  but  also  deeply  indebted  to  the  Russians. 


^2  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

ihe  nationalistic  affiliation  of  the  Souili  Slavs  with  Russia  was 
intensified  by  the  process  of  Magyarization  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  inflicted  upon  the  South  Slavs  in  Hungary.  For  a  time,  Hungary 
gave  fair  treatment  to  the  South  Slavs  in  Croatia  and  Slavonia,  largely 
because  the  important  port  of  Fiume  was  located  in  that  territory; 
but  the  economic  exploitation  was  intense  and  the  Croatian  and  Slavo- 
nian Slavs  in  the  twentieth  century  felt  themselves  oppressed  along  with 
their  brothers  under  Hungarian  rule  in  other  sections. 

Russia's  interests  in  the  Balkans,  moreover,  conflicted  also  with  the 
economic  interests  of  Austria-Hungary.  Austria-Hungary  was  bent 
on  expanding  southward  along  the  Adriatic  and  eastward  to  the 
Aegean.  Germany's  imperialistic  aims  were  also  identified  chiefly 
with  expansion  toward  the  East  through  Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkan 
l^eninsula  and  Turkey.  A  Pan-Slavic  territory  in  the  Balkans  would 
bar  the  road  to  both  Austria  and  Germany,  and  open  the  way  to 
Russia's  economic  supremacy  in  this  "cock-pit  of  Europe."  By  the 
twentieth  century,  Servia  was  free  and  was  not  only  supported  by 
Russia  in  blocking  the  aims  of  Austria-Hungary,  but  also  was  itself 
supporting  the  South  Slavs  in  Hungary  in  their  struggles  against 
Austro-Hungarian  rule.  Expansion  to  the  Adriatic  was  necessary  to 
Servia's  economic  development,  but  that  would  check  Austria's  and 
Italy's  hopes  in  that  direction.  The  intensity  of  the  struggle  and  its 
consequent  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe  was  realized  by  the  great 
Powers,  and  temporary  working  agreements  were  patched  up  between 
Russia  and  Austria  in  1897  ^^^  ^^  1903-  Nevertheless,  the  feeling 
for  nationalism  among  the  South  Slavs  was  made  all  the  stronger  by 
the  political  rivalries  between  Pan-Germanism  and  Pan-Slavism. 

Austria-Hungary  made  the  Balkan  situation  more  serious  than  ever 
by  annexing  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  inhabited  by  South  Slavs,  from 
Turkey  in  1908.  Austria-Hungary's  action  was  inspired  by  the  suc- 
cessful revolution  of  the  Young  Turks  in  Turkey  in  that  year,  which 
seemed  to  give  promise  of  strengthening  the  Turkish  government 
and  hence  of  weakening  Austria's  influence  upon  the  Turkish  prov- 
inces in  the  Balkans.  Austria's  action  was  taken  without  previous 
understanding  with  the  great  Powers,  although  in  1871  all  the  great 
Powers  had  pledged  themselves  to  enter  upon  no  new  important  pro- 
cedure of  this  nature  before  reaching  an  agreement  with  one  another. 


Photos   by  International  Film   Service 


LUXURY  IN  GERMAN  TRENCHES 

In  the  upper  panel  is  given  a  striking  realization  of  the  pains  to  which 
the  German  officers  went  to  enjoy  their  enforced  stay  in  the  trenches.  The 
trench  villa  in  the  picture  was  called  by  the  Germans  The  Golden  Sun  of 
Evening,  and  some  German  officers  were  in  the  foreground  of  the  scene  as 
it  was  photographed  by  a  German  camera. 


CAPTURED   GERMAN   TANK 

The  tank  shown  in  the  central  panel  was  captured  by  the  French,  in  a 
sortie  near  Villers-Brettoneaux.  It  had  been  damaged  by  fire,  but  was  re- 
paired by  its  captors,  and  was  afterwards  put  into  service. 


AN    OBSERVATION    POST    IN    THE    VOSGES 

In  the  lower  panel  is  shown  an  observation  post,  well-manned,  on  the  sum- 
mit  of  one  of  the   highest  of  the  Vosges   Mountains. 


Tlic  Suppression  of  Nationalities  33 

As  long  as  'lurkey  retained  territory  on  the  Balkan  peninsula, 
Russia  and  /Vustria  could  stand  together  at  least  in  their  opposition 
to  the  Turks  ;  but  with  the  expulsion  of  Turkey  from  all  Europe  ex- 
cept a  small  section  around  Constantinople  as  a  result  of  the  First 
Balkan  War  of  igi2.  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  turned  their  un- 
(li\i(led  attention  in  the  Balkans  to  each  other.  Austria-Hungarv 
used  e\er\'  possible  method  to  disru])t  the  South  Slavic  national  unity, 
such  as  diverting  railroads,  stirring  U[)  religious  strife,  imposing  in- 
ternal tariff  duties  and  making  travel  difficult.  In  fact,  in  the  decade 
before  the  Great  War  it  was  a  commonplace  among  well-informed 
students  of  European  affairs  that  the  rivalry  of  ^Austria  and  Russia  in 
the  Balkans  could  finally  result  only  in  a  general  European  conflagra- 
tion;  and  it  was  with  extreme  difficulty  that  the  JJalkan  Wars  of  1912 
and  191 3  were  localized  and  remained  Balkan  Wars. 


In  formulating  precepts  for  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Alliance, 
Metternich  had  maintained : — 

"The  world  desires  to  be  governed  by  facts  and  according  to  justice, 
not  by  phrases  and  theories ;  the  first  need  of  society  is  to  be  main- 
tained by  strong  authority The  first  and  greatest  concern  for 

the  immense  majority  of  every  nation  is  the  stability  of  the  laws  and 
their  uninterrupted  action — never  their  change 

"Let  the  governments  announce  this  determination  to  their  people 
and  demonstrate  it  by  facts.  Let  them  reduce  the  doctrinaires  to 
silence  within  their  states,  and  show  their  contempt  for  them  abroad. 
....  Let  them  not  allow  it  to  be  believed  that  experience  has  lost 
all  its  rights  to  make  way  for  experiments  which  at  the  least  are  danger- 
ous. Let  them  ....  not  seek  by  concessions  to  gain  over  those  parties 
who  aim  at  the  destruction  of  all  power  but  their  own,  whom  con- 
cessions ....  will  only  further  embolden  in  their  pretensions  to 
power. 

"Let  them  in  these  troublous  times  be  more  than  usually  cautious 
in  attempting  real  ameliorations 

"Let  them  maintain  religious  principles  in  all  their  purity,  and  not 
allow  the  faith  to  be  attacked  and  morality  interpreted  according  to 
the  Social  Contract  or  the  visions  of  foolish  sectarians 


34  ^"^   History  of  ihc  Great   War 

"The  most  profound  and  salutary  peace  which  the  history  of  any 
time  can  show  will  (thus)  have  been  affected.  This  peace  will  not 
be  \vithout  a  \exy  decided  influence  on  the  fate  of  those  states  threat- 
ened with  destruction,  and  will  even  assist  the  restoration  of  those 
which  have  already  passed  under  the  scourge  of  revolution." 

And  these  were  the  principles  largely  followed  by  the  great  flowers 
in  their  international  afihliations  in  the  hundred  years  from  1814  \o 
1 914.    The  result  was  the  Great  War. 


II— ECONOMIC  AND  TRADE  RIVALRIES 

The  National  Industrial  Revolution 

In  this  day  and  generation,  it  is  well-nigh  impossible!  to  conceive 
of  a  Europe  or  an  America  without  machines,  without  factories,  with- 
out large  towns ;  but  consisting  almost  entirely  of  an  agricultural  popu- 
lation scattered  throughout  the  country-side  in  little  communities,  and 
producing  within  the  home  by  means  of  rude  hand  tools  most  of  the 
necessities  of  life  outside  of  those  raised  from  the  soil.  Yet  that  was 
the  situation  which  obtained  in  England  150  years  ago.  in  other 
European  countries  and  in  the  United  States  100  years  ago,  and  in 
many  countries  of  the  world  less  than  100  years  ago  ; — before  the 
latter  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  there  were  practically  no  steam 
engines,  no  factories,  no  factory  towns,  no  capitalist  class  outside  of 
land-owners  and  no  laboring  class  outside  of  farmers  and  farm  ten- 
ants and  handcraft  workers  in  small  shops,  no  women  in  industi-y 
outside  the  home,  no  mechanical  media  of  transportation  and  integra- 
tion, no  considerable  quantity  of  iron  or  of  steel  in  use,  and  even  no 
internal  trade  worth  mentioning  beyond  the  confines  of  local  markets 
and  neighborhoods. 

In  1767.  llargreaves  invented  the  "spinning  jenny,"  which  allowed 
one  man  to  operate  eight  spindles  at  once  instead  of  one  at  a  time. 
Before  that  invention,  all  spinning  and  weaving  had  to  be  done  by  hand, 
with  the  distaff,  card,  hand  spindle,  spinning  wheel  and  hand  loom, 
which  were  not  much  of  an  advance  over  the  methods  used  many  cen- 
turies before  Christ.  In  1768.  Arkwright  began  to  set  up  spinning- 
machinery  in  factories,  and  in  1787  Cartwright  perfected  a  power  loom. 
In  the  United  States,  the  cotton  gin  of  Eli  Whitney  (1792)  trans- 
formed the  entire  world  of  commerce  by  cheapening  cotton ;  but  the 
greatest  of  the  inventions  which  were  to  give  birth  to  an  industrial 
revolution  was  the  steam  engine  of  James  Watt.     By  the  beginning 

35 


36  A  History  of  the  Great  H'ar 

of  the  nineteenth  centun .  not  only  were  steam  engines  and  power- 
ntihzing  factories  common  in  l-'ngland.  but  also  iron  had  been  made 
more  generally  available  In-  inn)ro\cnicnt  in  methods  of  smelting. 

The  effect  of  all  these  revolutionizing  changes  was  to  establish  large 
manufacturing  centres,  drawing  inevitably  unto  themselves  large  popu- 
lations of  wage-workers.  Specialization  in  industry  was  made  possible, 
and  production  per  laborer  was  thus  increased  many-fold.  ^lachines 
in  many -instances  ttuMied  out  products  by  the  thousands  which  under 
the  domestic  system  could  l)e  turned  out  only  by  the  tens;  and  the  total 
(juantity  of  all  goods  produced  increased  by  leaps  and  botmds.  \  illages 
became  great  cities  or  else  disai)peared  altogether  as  great  masses 
turned  from  agricultural  to  industrial  life.  And.  most  significant  of 
all  changes  for  future  years,  there  arose  a  capitalist  class  which  owned 
the  machines  and  employed  the  men  who  worked  at  them,  while  b\- 
their  side  arose  a  working  class  not  owning  the  implements  with  which 
it  toiled  but  selling  its  labor  to  the  owning  class. 

Although  the  National  Industrial  Revolution  thus  swept  first  over 
England,  by  its  ver}^  nature  it  brushed  aside  obstacles  of  space,  and 
eventtially  spread  to  every  civilized  land.  And  not  the  least  stupendous 
of  its  inBuences  was  its  obliteration  of  geographical  and  commercial 
barriers  within  nations,  thus  not  only  l)inding  them  together  as  homo- 
geneous economic  units,  but  also,  as  we  have  seen,  in  some  cases 
creating  for  the  first  time  among  their  inhabitants  the  consciousness  of 
unified  nationality. 

The  Intern.\tion.\l  Industrial  Revolution 

Before  the  National  Industrial  Revolution  around  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century  and  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth,  production  of 
material  goods  had  been  far  too  scant  to  meet  even  the  modest  demands 
of  economically  undeveloped  nations.  The  social  value  of  the  National 
Industrial  Revolution  lay  thus  in  its  increased  production  of  goods  at 
lower  cost  and  hence  at  lower  prices.  Moreover,  the  very  cheapness 
and  prevalence  of  many  articles  increased  the  demand  for  them.  So 
that  the  laws  of  supply  and  demand  worked  upon  the  National  In- 
dustrial Revolution  in  a  circle — better  methods  of  production  created 


Economic  and  Trade  Rivalries  37 

a  supply  of  goods  for  the  first  time  adequately  meeting  the  demand 
for  them,  and  in  turn  demand  for  goods  was  heightened  by  the  very 
possibility  of  meeting  it  with  a  supply. 

Improvement  in  the  methods  of  production,  however,  did  not  cease 
as  the  supply  of  goods  began  to  square  with  even  the  heightened  de- 
mands for  them.  The  epoch-making  and  epoch-marking  discoveries 
in  the  material  sciences,  especially  in  physics  and  chemistry,  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  were  carried  over  into  the  industrial 
world  so  as  to  make  profitable  the  erection  of  industrial  plants  of  a 
size  and  output  hitherto  undreamed  of.  Corporations  were  organized 
to  perfonii  tasks  impossible  for  individual  owners.  The  result  was 
inevitable — production  began  to  outrun  the  ability  of  the  home  country 
to  absorb  it. 

The  situation  with  respect  to  material  goods  was  paralleled  in  the 
field  of  capital.  The  huge  business  successes  had  multiplied  the 
amount  of  capital  available  and  eager  for  investment  until  there  was 
no  longer  field  within  its  home  country  for  its  employment  at  as 
profitable   rates   as    it   had   been   enjoying. 

There  was  but  one  recourse  open  to  the  manufacturing  and  bank- 
ing classes.  It  was  necessary  for  them  to  broaden  their  markets  so 
as  to  take  in  other  countries.  For  the  consummation  of  this  achieve- 
ment they  needed  the  political  or  even  the  financial  support  of  their  own 
governments;  and  hence  naturally  and  legitimately  arose  that  partner- 
ship between  governments  and  business  interests  which  made  the  im- 
perialism in  which  were  sunk  the  roots  of  the  war  an  economic  rather 
than  a  mere  geographical  imperialism. 

Revolutionary  improvements  in  obliterating  the  obstacles  of  space 
aided  this  trend  toward  the  internationalization  of  large  business  under- 
takings and  investments.  Steel  replaced  iron  in  ship-building  and  huge 
ocean  greyhounds  crossed  the  Atlantic  in  five  or  six  days.  Cables  were 
extended  over  the  entire  globe,  and  the  invention  and  perfection  of  the 
wireless  telegraph  obliterated  space  and  time.  Railroad  locomotives 
were  built  of  tremendous  power  and  speed,  and  railroad  trunk  lines 
were  functioning  across  Asia  and  from  top  to  bottom  of  Africa  no  less 
than  across  the  United  States  and  Canada ;  while  explorers  and  mis- 
sionaries were  opening  up  regions  of  the  earth  about  which  little  had 


^8  A  History  of  the  (ircat   War 

been  known.  As  the  industrial  rt.\ulution  at  the  end  of  tlie  eighteenth 
century  was  national,  that  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  became  inter- 
national. 

Hut  the  great  nations  of  the  world  were  in  no  niocjd  to  jjcrniit  foreign 
iiianufacturt-rs  and  bankers  [a  cajjiure  their  niarkel> — native  markets 
were  needed  for  native  manufacturers  and  native  bankers,  burther- 
more,  countries  inadequately  supplied  by  their  own  industries  coukl 
readily  foresee  the  day  when  they,  too,  could  no  longer  absorb  their 
own  production,  and  would  also  have  to  search  for  foreign  markets. 
Protective  tariffs  and  subsidies  were  utilized  to  prevent  native  markets 
from  being  exploited  by  foreign  sources.  It  is  true  that  England  by 
her  geographical  position  was  compelled  to  stick  to  free  trade,  but  in 
practice  she  maintained  systems  of  preferential  tariffs  and  concessions 
in  her  colonies,  so  as  to  keep  in  British  hands  the  markets  of  the  vast 
British  Empire. 

Balked  thus  in  the  effort  to  hnd  new  markets  among  the  civilized 
nations,  manufacturers  and  bankers  could  turn  to  but  one  other  field — 
the  great  undeveloped  regions  of  the  earth.  Again,  and  even  to  a  greater 
extent,  the  protection  of  the  home  governments  was  needed ;  and  hence 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  through  the  twentieth, 
the  great  Powers  entered  into  a  race  for  colonial  expansion  which  sur- 
j)assed  in  eagerness  and  absorption  even  the  race  for  colonial  expansion 
in  the  several  centuries  following  the  discovery  of  the  New  World. 
Indeed,  through  most  of  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  inter- 
est in  colonies  had  been  decidedly  on  the  wane. 

The  great  business  interests  needed  not  only  new  markets ;  they 
needed  also  new  sources  for  raw  materials.  As  production  increased, 
raw  materials  in  their  home  countries  were  becoming  either  exhausted 
or  else  expensive;  and  many  of  the  undeveloped  regions  of  the  earth 
were  rolling  in  natural  wealth  and  resources  to  be  had  almost  for  the 
asking.  And  only  Russia  and  the  United  States  could  call  themselves 
independent  of  foreign  raw  materials. 

Finally,  labor  was  cheap  in  the  undeveloped  regions  of  the  earth,  was 
unorganized,  and  was  unprotected  by  labor  legislation  ;  and  the  process 
of  producing  in  those  regions  w^as  hence  economical  as  long  as  protec- 
tion was  assured  l)v  the  home  govermnents. 


Ecoitoiiiic  and  Trade  Rivalries  39 

To  achieve  these  results,  it  was  not  always  necessary  for  a  Power 
actually  to  annex  the  territory  to  be  developed.  Protectorates  might 
be  established,  as  in  Morocco  and  Korea ;  or  there  might  be  mere 
"spheres  of  influence,"  as  in  Persia  ;  or  wide  "concessions,"  that  is. 
monopolies,  nn'ght  be  sufficient.  Trade  routes,  however,  were  all- 
important. 

In  the  National  Industrial  Revolution,  the  leading  industry  had  been 
the  textile.  In  the  International  Industrial  Revolution,  the  leading  in- 
dustry was  the  iron  and  steel.  For  the  sale  of  textiles  in  backward 
regions,  little  was  needed  beyond  trading  skill ;  and  there  was  no  reason 
why  one  country  should  not  permit  traders  of  another  country  to  conduct 
business  to  some  extent  in  the  colonies  of  the  first.  But  the  sale  of  iron 
and  steel  in  backward  regions  must  be  on  a  large  scale  to  be  profitable. 
Primitive  natives  cannot  buy  railroads,  nor  can  one  country  well  allow 
so  powerful  a  civilizing  force  as  a  railroad  to  be  built  in  one  of  its 
colonies  by  the  citizens  of  another  country.  Railroads,  moreover,  have 
a  distinct  military  value.  So  that  the  development  of  undeveloped  ter- 
ritory in  recent  years  has  been  confined  largely  to  the  business  interests 
of  the  particular  country  controlling  that  territory ;  and.  conversely,  the 
business  interests  of  any  one  country  would  l)e  unable  satisfactorily  to 
develop  undeveloped  territory  unless  their  home  government  inaugu- 
rated and  maintained  political  control  over  such  territory. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  National  Industrial  Revolution  occurred  first 
in  England  ;  and  Engliand's  position  was  such  that  the  International 
Industrial  Revolution  appeared  first  in  England.  From  1882  to  1893. 
the  foreign  investments  of  England  increased  on  the  average  of  75 
per  cent  each  year  and  in  1915  the  interest  alone  on  English  capital 
invested  abroad  equalled  almost  10  per  cent  of  the  total  national  income 
of  England.  England,  however,  was  the  most  favored  of  all  lands  in 
colonial  possessions,  and  had  developed  a  technique  of  governing  an 
empire  on  which  the  sun  never  set  so  as  to  hold  the  allegiance  of  those 
elements  such  as  Canada,  New  Zealand  and  Australia,  which  were 
notoriously  adept  in  governing  themselves. 

Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  was.  as  we  have  seen,  the  most  back- 
ward of  all  the  great  Powers  in  rising  to  a  consciousness  of  national 
unity;  and  by  the  time  German  internal  unity  was  perfected  and  Ger- 


40  A  History  of  the  Great  IV or 

many  could  turn  her  attention  to  world  politics,  the  colonial  field  had 
hecn  largely  pre-eniptedt-Her  colonial  longings  first  became  articulate 
at  the  time  of  the  accession  of  William  II  in  i888[r  P>y  this  time, 
Africa  was  the  one  continent  lart^cly  undeveloped.  Ilul  I'.ngland  had 
undisj)uted  sway  over  the  south  of  it.  The  north  of  Africa  was  largely 
in  the  hands  of  Turkey  and  Italy,  and  as  these  countries  had  become 
partners  of  Germany  in  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  Germany  could  not 
intrude  there.  Only  central  portions  of  Africa  were  open  to  her,  and 
the  central  portions  of  Africa  could  hardly  be  considered  desirable 
colonial  territory. 

Moreover,  as  industrial  development  occurred  in  Germany  later  than 
in  any  of  the  other  great  Powers,  it  proceeded  in  Germany  more  rapidly 
than  in  any  of  them.  In  1870,  the  population  of  Germany  was  40,000,- 
000;  in  1900,  it  was  65,000,000.  In  1870,  less  than  one-fourth  of  the 
German  people  lived  in  cities  or  towns;  in  1900,  almost  one-half  were 
urban  dwellers,  and  in  1914,  almost  three-fourths.  In  those  years,  the 
German  foreign  trade  increased  1,000  per  cent.  In  the  ten  years  after 
1870,  the  capital  alone  of  the  national  Deutsches  Bank  of  Germany 
increased  almost  500  per  cent,  and  in  the  twenty  years  following  1870 
the  volume  of  business  done  by  the  Deutsches  Bank  increased  more 
than  10,000  per  cent.  From  1872  to  1906,  the  production  of  coal  in 
the  German  Empire  increased  some  400  per  cent — in  Prussia.  rx)0  per 
cent ;  and  the  production  of  pig  iron  in  those  years  increased  500  per 
cent.  And  in  the  production  of  steel — the  true  barometer  of  industrial 
development —  the  increase  of  production  from  1870  to  1907  was 
almost  2.500  per  cent. 

By  the  twentieth  century,  Germany  had  supplanted  England  as  the 
country  in  which  movements  of  international  scope  were  apt  first  to 
appear.  The  vast  territory  of  the  United  States  was  not  settled  to 
the  point  of  profitable  saturation  by  that  time,  so  that  by  economic 
position  as  well  as  by  tradition  and  inclination,  the  United  States  was 
not  a  rival  in  the  race  for  economic  imperialism  through  colonial  ]k)s- 
sessions.  Accordingly,  the  hope  of  Germany  to  become  the  dominating 
power  of  the  world  resolved  itself  largely  into  a  campaign  for  colonial 
territory  as  opposed  to  the  colonial  interests  of  England  and  iMance 
in  Africa;  of  Russia  in  the  Near  East;  of  England  and  Russia  in  Per- 


licoiiDiiiic  and  Trade  Rii'alrics  41 

sia  and  Arabia;  (jf  (ireal  Britain,  Russia  and  especially  oi  Japan  in 
the  Far  East;  and  of  all  the  great  Powers  in  regions  such  as  Mexico 
and  South  America  where  competition  for  the  fruits  of  colonial  exploi- 
tation was  more  or  less  free. 

These  rivalries  for  economic  and  trade  advantages  determined  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  (/ovcnniieiits  of  the  world  for  power,  as  national- 
istic feelings  and  antipathies  were  the  bases  of  the  popular  support 
vouchsafed  those  governments  in  international  world  affairs  by  their 
peoples. 

Germany,  however,  not  only  entered  the  lists  as  a  seeker  for  colonial 
territory  later  than  the  other  great  Powers — she  pursued  methods 
other  than  those  which  had  been  tacitly  agreed  tipon  in  international 
bargaining  and  manoeuvering  as  legitimate.  Not  that  the  accepted 
methods  were  ethical  or  straightforward  or  guileless  or  uncorrupt  or 
public  or  free  from  sordidness  and  treachery.  Indeed,  the  j^retexts  for 
occupation, — whether  found  to  hand  or  manufactured  by  either  the 
business  interests  or  the  governments  interested — ranged  from  protec- 
tion of  citizens,  insult  to  the  Hag,  avenging  murders,  and  maintaining 
law  and  order  to  guaranteeing  loans  and  hastening  the  development 
of  backward  races  (the  "White  Man's  Burden"). 

But  the  great  Powers,  outside  of  Germany,  were  anxious  to  avert 
a  world-war.  They  were  in  bitter  competition  with  one  another;  they 
played  off  one  against  the  other ;  they  intrigued  one  against  the  other ; 
but  they  used  only  the  methods  which  all  used,  and  when  they  were 
fairly  beaten  in  the  game  of  international  politics,  they  retired  and  pre- 
pared for  the  next  bout.  They  would  even  not  hesitate  to  tise  their 
superior  force  against  a  weaker  nation.  But  when  it  came  deliberately 
and  carelessly  to  provoking  enmity  to  the  point  of  danger  among 
Powers  of  equal  greatness,  equal  dignity  and  eqtial  strength,  they 
showed  a  willingness  to  withdraw  before  the  point  of  an  actual  general 
European  War  was  reached. 

On  the  other  hand,  Germany  in  the  twentieth  century  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  "rattle  her  sabre"  or  "to  appear  as  a  knight  in  glittering  armor." 
The  force  constantly  threatened  by  Germany  was  physical  force,  and 
there  was  increasing  evidence  that  she  considered  her  interests  worth 
even  a  world-war.    And  for  the  secret  of  the  especially  belligerent  atti- 


,,  .]    Hislorx  of  the   Crcai    War 

lude  of  the  Imperial  German  Governmenl  m  international  affau^  of 
recent  years,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  the  type  of  civilization 
bred  in  Germany  since  the  days  of  her  consolidation  into  a  cohesive 
nationality. 


Ill— THE  SUPPRESSION  OF  LIBERALISM  AND  THE 
GROWTH  OF  MILITARISM 

By  1914,  most  of  the  great  nations  of  the  West  had  achieved  an 
appreciable  program  of  poHtical  democracy  with  two  exceptions — 
Russia  and  Germany.  Not  that  the  poHtical  democracy  of  the  other 
great  nations  was  complete  or  even  approaching  the  point  of  comple- 
tion. Almost  the  entire  female  sex  was  still  disenfranchised.  In  cer- 
tain countries,  abnormal  conditions  kept  the  right  to  vote  from  certain 
racial  elements.  In  other  countries,  property  qualifications  for  the 
franchise  right  existed,  and  multiple  voting  was  still  not  altogether 
abolished.  Minorities  constantly  received  parliamentary  representation 
far  below  their  voting  strength,  and  even  in  the  most  democratic  coun- 
tries it  was  possible  for  the  highest  officials  to  be  selected  without  a 
majority  of  votes.  But,  except  in  Russia  and  Germany,  at  least  the 
principle  of  political  democracy — parliamentary  government  elected  by 
and  responsible  to  the  people — was  accepted,  and,  on  the  whole,  the 
trend  of  political  de\elopment  was  constantly  toward  the  elaboration 
and  fuller  realization  of  that  principle. 

In  Germany 

It  is  impossible  to  understand  the  Germany  of  1914  without  making 
two  vital  distinctions — one  between  the  entire  German  Empire  and 
Prussia ;  and  the  other  between  Germany  in  the  first  seventy-five  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  before  the  advent  of  the  International 
Indtistrial  Revolution  in  Germany,  and  Germany  in  the  last  three  or 
four  decades. 

After  the  Franco- Prussian  War,  Prussia  remained  the  cornerstone 
of  the  (German  Empire.  Manx-  of  the  twenty-four  other  States  within 
the  German  Empire  were  themselves  politically  organized  along  demo- 
crafic  lines,  but  their  influence  was  com|)letely  overshadoAved  by  that 

43 


44  ^  History  of  the  Great  JJ^ar 

of  Prussia,  whose  political  structure  was  more  autocratic  than  even 
that  of  the  German  Empire.  The  philosophy  which  of  recent  years 
came  both  to  influence  and  also  to  mirror  the  German  people  sprang 
chiefly  from  Prussia;  but  again  Prussia's  position  as  dictator  of  the 
German  Empire  transformed  that  philosophy  from  a  Prussian  into  a 
German  philosophy.  In  fact,  in  Germany  outside  of  Prussia  there  has 
been  since  1871  a  strong  antipathy  to  Prussian  and  especially  to  Ber- 
lin influences,  but  the  organization  of  the  German  Empire  was  such  as 
to  render  that  antipathy  powerless. 

'J"he  influential  governing  body  in  the  German  Empire  was  the  Bund- 
esrat,  composed  of  61  members,  appointed  by,  responsible  only  to,  and 
directed  in  its  actions  by  the  rulers  of  the  various  kingdoms  within  the 
Empire.  As  the  Bundesrat  had  veto  power  over  practically  all  legis- 
lation of  importance,  as  14  votes  in  the  Bundesrat  could  prevent  any 
change  in  the  Imperial  Constitution,  and  as  Prussia  had  17  representa- 
tives in  the  Bundesrat,  it  will  be  readily  realized  that  the  powers  of  the 
Reichstag,  the  popular  assembly,  were  chiefly  those  of  debate  and 
criticism.  The  Reichstag  itself  in  1914  was  elected  according  to  the 
apportionment  of  1871,  before  the  migration  from  the  farms  to  the 
cities  had  got  completely  under  way.  Accordingly,  the  rural  districts, 
the  stronghold  of  the  conservative  classes,  enjoyed  a  representation  in 
the  Reichstag  beyond  their  numerical  deserts;  and  the  urban  districts, 
the  stronghold  of  the  liberal  forces,  were  grievously  under-represented. 
For  instance,  in  191 2  a  popular  vote  of  some  2,000,000  gave  the  Con- 
servative Party  74  Reichstag  representatives  and  a  popular  vote  of 
some  4,250,000  gave  the  Social  Democratic  Party  only  no  representa- 
tives. The  entire  city  of  Berlin,  with  more  than  2,000,000  inhabitants, 
elected  6  representatives,  whereas  the  rin-al  region  of  East  Prussia, 
with  a  population  of  about  the  same  number,  elected  17. 

The  King  of  Prussia  was  ipso  facto  the  German  Emperor  or  Kaiser, 
and  the  monarchy  of  Prussia  was  hereditary  in  the  I  louse  of  Hohen- 
zollem.  The  Kaiser  was  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy,  which  in  (Germany  was  so  completely  the  hub  arcnmd  which  the 
Empire  turned  that  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy 
was  inevitably  the  virtual  dictator  of  Germany.  The  Kaiser  himself 
could  proclaim  a  defensive  war,  and  needed  only  the  assent  of  the 


Siipprcssicm  of  Liberalism  (uul  Growth  of  Militarism  45 

Bundesrat  to  proclaim  an  offensive  war.  The  chancellor  and  the  high 
officials  of  the  Empire  were  appointed  by  the  Kaiser  and  were  respon- 
sible only  to  him.  As  King  of  Prussia,  the  Kaiser  enjoyed  within  Prus- 
sia even  more  absolute  powers  than  as  Emperor  of  Germany,  and  the 
Prussian  Assembly  was  elected  by  even  less  democratic  methods  than 
the  German  Reichstag ;  so  that  in  foreign  no  less  than  in  domestic 
affairs.  Germany  was  compelled  to  follow  where  Prussia  led.  The 
Kaiser  was  responsible  for  his  actions  only  to  himself  and  to  God, — 
there  was  no  pretense  of  allegiance  even  to  the  principles  of  political 
democracy. 

Before  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  German  thought  and 
philosophy  were  diametrically  the  antitheses  of  the  German  thought 
and  philosophy  of  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  most 
notable  contributions  to  modern  philosophy  have  come  from  the  Ger- 
man Kant,  Hegel  and  their  followers ;  and,  weird  as  the  statement  may 
seem  to  the  generation  which  passed  through  the  horrors  of  the  Great 
War,  the  Kantian-Hegelian  philosophy  was  fundamentally  idealistic. 
Wagner,  Bach,  Mozart,  Beethoven;  Goethe,  Schiller,  Heine,  Lessing; 
Ranke,  Alommsen,  Grimm ;  these  are  names  among  the  brightest  in  all 
the  world  in  music,  literature  and  philology  and  history,  while  the  name 
of  the  brilliant  scientists  of  the  nineteenth  century  who  have  been  Ger- 
mans is  literally  legion.  It  was  this  Germany,  gloriously  adding  to  the 
achievements  of  mankind  and  yet  with  ambitions  confined  to  its  own 
borders,  from  which  sailed  the  bulk  of  the  German  immigrants  to  the 
United  States,  and  which  presented  itself  to  their  minds  when  the  name 
of  Germany  came  before  them  in  later  years.  Only  those  few  who 
had  returned  later  to  visit  the  Fatherland  could  realize  that  the  Ger- 
many which  they  had  known  was  no  more  and  that  the  Germany  of 
1910  was  as  different  froni  the  Germany  of  1850  as  black  from  white. 

The  transformation  from  an  idealistic  and  self-sufficient  Germany  to 
a  materialistic  and  over-ambitious  Germany  was  due  chiefly  to  the 
great  industrial  revolution  which  has  been  mentioned,  and  primarily  to 
the  fact  that  in  Germany  the  industrial  revolution  occurred  with  even 
greater  rapidity  and  intensity  than  in  other  countries.  The  outstanding 
feature  of  modern  life  for  most  men  and  women  in  industrial  countries 
is  its  intensity  as  compared  with  the  comparative  calm  of  an  earlier  age; 


46  A   History  of  the  Great   Jl'ar 

l)ut  tlie  intensity  of  (lerman  life  was  deeper  than  even  the  intensity  of 
life  in  other  lands.  The  psychology  of  the  ( ierman  ])eople  became 
largely  a  mob-psychology  arising  from  a  state  of  over-nervotis  excite- 
ment. 

l'erhai)s  the  experiences  of  the  War  have  made  it  j)Ossible  fur  other 
countries  to  understand  the  German  i)sychology.  For  during  the  war 
those  countries  were  living  in  a  high  state  of  nervous  tension  which 
was  reflected  in  their  reactions  to  the  problems  of  their  every-day 
existence.  During  the  war,  these  countries  found  it  necessary  to 
acquiesce  in  procedure  which  under  normal  conditions  would  have  been 
repugnant  to  them — censorship  of  speech  and  press;  organized  propa- 
ganda from  Government  sources ;  investigation  of  the  private  activities 
of  individual  citizens;  concealment  of  the  truth;  secrecy  about  impor- 
tant activities ;  interference  with  individual  freedom  and  conscription 
of  the  indi\idual  for  purposes  of  state;  rigorous  subordination  of  pri- 
\ate  desires  to  the  needs  of  the  state.  "And  the  normal  German  state 
of  mind  may  best  be  explained  in  those  terms — the  rapiditv  of  the 
German  development  and  the  German's  brooding  hallucination  that 
Germany  was  pitted  against  the  world  and  the  world  was  pitted  against 
Germany  rendered  the  German  utind  in  time  of  peace  coin  parable  to 
the  state  of  mind  of  other  countries  in  time  of  war. '' 

The  German  in  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  could  look 
back  upon  German  history,  and  see  that  Germany  had  been  made 
great  chiefiy  by  its  army.  Prtissia  had  emerged  into  prominence  from 
a  congeries  of  unimportant  principalities  in  the  eighteenth  century 
because  Frederick  the  Great  and  his  successors  had  devoted  their 
efiforts  primarily  to  the  organization  of  an  efficient  army.  Napoleon 
had  trampled  Prussian  pride  in  the  dust  because  his  armies  had  been 
better  trained  than  those  of  Prussia;  and  conversely  Prussia  had  tri- 
umphed with  almost  ludicrous  ease  over  the  great  armies  of  Atistria 
and  France  because  in  the  meantime  Prussian  armies  had  been  care- 
fully trained,  because  every  new  development  of  business  organization 
and  scientific  research  had  been  utilized  in  the  Prussian  war  machine, 
and  because  the  Prussian  military  methods  had  represented  the  last 
word  in  thoroughness. 

The  principle  of  conscription  of  the  individual  for  the  military  serv- 


Snl>prcssio)i  of  Liberalism  and  Grozvtli  of  Militarism  47 

ice  of  the  state  had  been  adopted  by  Prussia  during  the  end  of  the 
Xapoleonic  Wars  and  had  helped  to  raise  the  Prussian  armies  to  a 
higher  level  of  efificiency  which  had  spelled  misfortune  for  Napoleon. 
The  principle  of  conscription,  however,  had  been  allowed  to  fall  into 
disuse  after  1815,  but  in  1861  William  I  determined  to  apply  the  prin- 
ciple in  times  of  peace  so  as  to  provide  for  a  large  body  of  citizens 
with  military  training  as  a  reserve  army.  Under  Bismarck,  the  prac- 
tise of  military  training  in  times  of  peace  in  preparation  for  times  of 
war  was  nursed  into  fruition;  and  after  its  successes  in  1866  and 
1870,  the  German  nation  became  whole-hearted  advocates  of  that  sys- 
tem. And  Germany's  success  compelled  other  nations  in  Europe  to 
enter  upon  the  same  procedure,  except  England,  whose  defence  lay 
in  her  fleet. 

Under  the  German  system  of  military  training,  as  it  was  carried 
forward  into  the  twentieth  century,  the  German  youth  was  called  at 
the  age  of  twenty  to  two  years  of  military  training,  during  which  he 
was  completely  isolated  from  the  influences  of  civil  life.  During  the 
next  five  years,  he  was  still  called  upon  for  military  drills,  and  until 
the  age  of  thirty-nine  was  kept  in  the  reserve,  while  his  final  release 
from  liability  for  call  to  the  colors  did  not  cease  until  forty-five. 

A  trend  toward  unquestioning  obedience  to  authority  is  the  inevi- 
table concomitant  of  military  training,  and  the  more  thorough  the  mili- 
tary training,  the  more  deeply-rooted  is  the  habit  of  implicit  obedience. 
Accordingly,  the  German  people  at  the  time  of  the  Great  War  had 
developed  or  had  had  developed  in  them  a  habit  of  mind  which  obeyed 
the  rulers  of  Germany  and  the  ruling  ideas  of  Germany  with  little  or 
no  doubt  but  with  almost  slavish  adoration. 

The  efifect  of  military  training  and  absorption  was  no  less  marked 
upon  the  national  life  of  Germany  than  upon  the  individual  lives  of 
Germans.  As  the  Kaiser  was  the  dominating  force  over  the  army,  so 
the  army  became  the  dominating  force  over  the  national  life  of  Ger- 
many. The  army  was  considered  to  be  not  only  outside  of  but  even 
above  civil  law.  Social  life  was  arranged  according  to  military  stand- 
ing, and  a  social  caste  system  arose  in  Germany  in  which  the  highest 
stratum  was  the  military.  The  people's  representatives  in  the  Reich- 
stag possessed  scant  authority  over  the  army  which  was  supported  by 


48  ^1  llislury  of  the  Crcat   Jl'ar 

heavy  taxation  upon  the  people.  In  a  word,  to  follow  the  analogy 
presented  above,  the  German  people  in  peace  took  the  same  pride  in 
their  army  that  any  other  nation  would  be  apt  to  take  only  in  war;  and 
similarly  the  pinnacle  of  achievement  for  a  ( ierman  was  success  in 
army  life.  The  army  was  viewed,  not  as  a  necessary  evil,  ])ut  as  the 
highest  development  of  modern  civilization  ;  not  as  a  means  to  an  end. 
but  as  an  end  in  itself. 

Along  with  this  practical  reverence  of  physical  force,  and  i)ossibly 
as  a  result  of  it,  came  a  theoretical  laudation  of  physical  force.  There 
arose  toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  in  ( iermany  a  school 
in  history  and  philosophy  which  glorified  might  and  power  as  the 
final  source  of  all  values.  The  leaders  of  German  thought  delved  into 
history  to  prove  that  the  destinies  of  mankind  were  determined  well 
or  ill  as  force  was  applied,  and  the  worth  assigned  by  these  thinkers  to 
other  nations  and  to  world  movements  was  in  accordance  with  the 
amount  of  force  represented  by  those  nations  and  movements. 

Among  the  leaders  of  thought  who  idealized  the  use  of  force  none 
was  more  influential  in  molding  (ierman  "Kultur"'  than  Treitschke. 
Treitschke  taught  that  the  ultimate  ideal  in  life  was  the  welfare  of  the 
state ;  and  that  as  nothing  was  higher  than  the  state,  the  state  could 
recognize  no  limitations  of  any  other  authority  upon  the  realization  of 
its  ends.  vSince  the  welfare  of  the  state  was  the  ultimate  goal  of  ex- 
istence, any  methods  used  by  the  state  in  attaining  its  destiny  were 
righteous  and  any  hindrances  upon  the  state's- self-attainment  were 
\icious.  Ethical  principles,  international  agreements,  res])ects  for  the 
rights  of  other  units  in  society,  all  must  be  and  even  should  be  disre- 
garded if  they  stand  in  the  way  of  the  state;  and  power  alone  can  be 
the  final  refuge  of  a  state  as  it  struggles  upward  and  onward.  The 
l)olitical  sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost,  declared  Treitschke,  is  feebleness 
of  the  state.  Treitschke's  principles  were  carried  into  military  philos- 
ojjhy  by  General  von  P.ernhardi.  who  insisted  that  war  was  good  in 
itself,  as  it  presented  necessary  measures  for  the  develojjment  of  the 
state  and  of  the  individuals  who  comprise  the  state,  and  that  therefore 
a  state  was  negligent  which  did  not  seize  the  opportunity  to  wage 
successful  war. 

These  i)riiuMi)les  were  crystallized  by  Xietsche.     Xiet.sche  deliberately 


Suppression  of  Liberalism  and  Growth  of  Militarism  49 

reversed  the  Christian  principles  to  which  modern  society  pays  at 
least  theoretical  homage,  and  maintained  that  charity,  tolerance,  mercy, 
the  rights  of  the  weak,  all  were  vicious  principles.  Nietsche  struck 
boldly  at  the  entire  conception  of  democracy,  declaring  that  the  guiding 
rule  for  existence  was  not  the  greatest  happiness  for  the  greatest  num- 
ber, but  the  development  of  the  strongest  and  best-equipped  of  the 
human  race  at  the  expense  of  the  weaker  members.  In  other  words, 
Nietsche  aimed  at  the  improvement  of  the  world  by  the  improvement 
of  the  race  so  as  to  encourage  the  powerful  and  to  discourage 
the  weak  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Every  feeling  and  every  action 
which  kept  the  strong  from  utilizing  their  strength  and  protected  the 
weak  from  the  elimination  due  to  their  weakness  was  hence  holding 
back  mankind.  Nietsche's  ideal  was  thus  the  Superman.  And  given 
a  race  which  was  a  Super-race,  that  race  was  under  every  obligation 
to  develop  according  to  its  strength,  to  crush  every  other  race  which 
stood  in  its  way  and  to  use  every  method  available  to  it  in  its  progress 
toward  self-realization. 

It  would  be  easy  to  exaggerate  the  influence  of  these  thinkers  and 
their  followers  upon  the  great  mass  of  the  German  people.  Despite 
the  comparatively  high  degree  of  education  among  the  German  people, 
they  were  probably  no  better  informed  upon  the  creeds  of  their  erudite 
philosophers  than  the  great  mass  of  the  people  in  any  other  country 
upon  the  creeds  of  their  erudite  philosophers.  But  the  creeds  of  Treit- 
schke,  von  Bernhardi,  Nietsche  and  their  followers  and  elaborators 
found  fertile  soil  among  the  German  upper  class  and  especially  among 
the  German  academic  and  intellectual  classes ;  and  the  creeds  which 
have  been  outlined  above  were  the  prevalent  creeds  among  the  leaders 
of  Germany  at  the  time  of  the  Great  War.  In  other  lands,  the  leaders 
of  thought  would  have  found  it  difficult  to  convert  the  great  mass  of 
the  people  to  such  a  philosophy.  But,  as  has  been  suggested,  the  mass 
of  the  German  people  had  developed  to  an  unusual  degree  a  spirit  of 
obedience  and  docility  toward  those  in  authority  over  them,  whether  in 
political  and  military  'realms  or  in  the  realm  of  thought.  Germany 
had  organized  a  strict  system  of  Government  supervision  over  the 
doctrines  taught  in  the  schools  and  universities,  and  the  creed  of  power 
and  might  was  inculcated  in  the  German  school-children  with  insistent 


50  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

vehemence.  Accordingly,  although  the  creed  of  German  "Kultur" 
might  well  have  been  the  creed  of  only  the  German  social  and  intellec- 
tual aristocracy,  for  practical  purposes  it  had  the  effect  of  a  creed  for 
the  whole  German  people. 

The  comparative  materialism  of  the  German  mind  was  demonstrated 
excellently  by  the  backwardness  of  the  woman's  movement  in  Ger- 
many, and  in  the  comparatively  low  status  of  the  (German  woman,  as 
contrasted  with  the  vigorous  movement  for  woman's  economic  and 
political  equality  in  Anglo-Saxon  lands,  and  the  high  social  influence  of 
the  French  woman.  Again,  when  troops  of  all  the  great  Powers 
joined  in  putting  down  the  Boxer  Rebellion  in,  China  in  1900,  the 
German  army  surpassed  all  its  associates  in  the  brutality  of  its  looting, 
thievery  and  rape.  Indeed,  the  Kaiser  had  instructed  his  army  to  be- 
have like  the  Huns  of  old. 

As  a  corollary  of  this  creed  of  Power  above  Everything,  there  was 
developed  in  Germany  a  violent  and  unchallenged  belief  in  the  creed  of 
Germany  above  Everything  ("Deutschland  iiber  Alles'').  It  had  been 
one  of  Hegel's  teachings  that  the  history  of  mankind  revealed  that  in 
each  era  there  was  one  race  destined  to  rule  the  world  as  the  most 
potent  of  all  the  races,  and  German  thinkers  by  the  twentieth  century 
had  applied  that  principle  to  the  German  race.  Stress  was  laid  upon 
the  doctrine  that  the  Germans  were  a  pure  race,  although  there  is  little 
proof  that  they  are  not  as  mixed  as  other  races.  Much  evidence  was 
produced  to  prove  that  other  races,  especially  the  English  and  the 
French,  had  already  enjoyed  their  periods  of  ascendancy  and  were 
already  decadent.  Similar  evidence  was  produced  to  prove  that  in 
well-nigh  every  field  of  human  endeavor  German  achievements  under 
conditions  of  equal  competition  were  superior  to  the'  achievements  of 
other  lands.  With  unswerving  faith,  (Germany  believed  that  the  Cier- 
man  army  was  the  best  army ;  that  German  industry  was  the  best 
industry  ;  that  the  German  financier  was  the  best  financier  ;  that  the 
German  scientist  was  the  best  scientist ;  that  the  German  rulers  were 
the  best  rulers;  that  the  German  polilical  and  social  administrators 
were  the  best  social  and  political  administrators ;  that  German  art. 
literature   and   music   were   the   best   art,   literature   and    music;   that 


Suppression  of  Libcralisiit  and  GroK'th  of  Mdiiarisni  51 

German  scliolarship  was  the  best  scholarship ;  in  a  word,  that  Cierman 
civihzation  was  the  best,  if  not  the  only  civilization. 

Given  these  premises,  the  conclusion  was  inevitable — it  was  not  only 
Germany's  manifest  destiny,  but  also  its  duty,  to  rule  the  world;  it 
was  to  the  best  interests  of  the  world  itself  to  Ije  ruled  by  (iermany ; 
and  any  and  all  methods  to  realize  this  end  were  legitimate  and  binding. 

It  cannot  be  overemphasized  that  the  hold  of  this  creed  of  blood  and 
iron  upon  the  German  people  rendered  them  by  the  time  of  the  Great 
War  a  nation  with  criteria  of  conduct  altogether  opposed  to  the  criteria 
of  conduct  of  the  other  great  nations  of  the  world.  German  Kultur 
did  not  regard  the  atrocities  performed  by  its  armies  in  Belgitmi  as 
morally  inexcusable  but  authorized  them  nevertheless — German  Kul- 
tur conceived  the  Belgian  atrocities  as  morally  legitimate.  German 
Kultur  did  not  refuse  mercy  to  the  passengers  of  the  Lusitanio  be- 
cause of  sheer  callousness — (German  Kul'an-  regarded  feelings  of  mercy 
as  anti-social.  German  Kultur  had  no  feeling  of  guilt  when  British 
towns  were  bombed  by  air-raids — to  German  Kultur,  the  ends  justified 
the  means.  German  Kultur  did  not  knowingly  commit  treachery  when 
it  rescinded  its  faithful  pledges  concerning  the  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
submarine  warfare  against  neutral  vessels  and  the  treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  with  Russia — German  Kultur  recognized  as  binding  no  barrier 
of  any  kind  wdiich  stood  in  the  way  of  the  realization  of  German 
Kultur's  manifold  destiny  to  rule  the  world. 

Germany  was  as  fanatically  imswerving  in  its  course  as  the  Spain 
which  conducted  the  Inquisition — the  Inquisition  tortured  and  slew 
unbelievers,  not  for.  the  torture  and  the  slaughter,  but  for  the  greater 
glory  of  God;  German  Kultur  let  loose  and  fought  through  the  war 
which  crucified  civilization,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  crucifixion  but  for 
the  greater  glory  of  God  through  the  enhancement  of  the  ends  of  the 
German  nation. 

The  German  people  rallied  behind  their  leaders  in  peace  as  well  as 
in  war  all  the  more  enthusiastically  because  the  leaders  were  ever 
solicitous  for  the  welfare  of  the  people.  Unlike  the  rulers  of  Ger- 
many's neighbor,  Russia,  the  German  rulers  were  ambitious  for  the 
well-being  of  no  single  stratum  of  their  society,  but  of  all  the  strata 
which  comprised   Germany.     More   frankly  than  in  any  other  great 


:^2  A  History  of  the  Great   War 

country,  the  Llovernnient  recognized  its  responsibility  lor  the  happiness 
of  its  people.  Indeed,  with  tlie  rulers'  faith  in  the  destiny  of  Germany, 
they  could  not  do  otherwise  than  promote  the  welfare  of  the  masses ; 
for  a  Germany  in  which  a  large  section  of  the  population  was  ineffec- 
tive would  be  an  ineft'ective  Germany. 

jMoreover,  the  Socialist  movement  was  strong  in  Germany  as  early 
as  1880,  and  Bismarck  was  acute  enough  to  realize  that  its  strides 
could  be  shortened  only  by  preventing  the  misery  and  ex})loitation  on 
which  Socialism  thrives.  In  1883,  the  Imperial  Government  provided 
for  a  national  plan  to  insure  its  workers  against  the  distresses  incident 
upon  illness  and  disability.  In  the  next  year,  the  Government  enacted 
measures  similarly  protecting  the  working-class  against  dependency 
because  of  accidents.  And  in  1889,  a  comprehensive  law  was  passed 
providing  pensions  for  old  age  and  invalidity.  Protection  under  these 
measures  was  compulsory  for  all  workers  receiving  wages  below  a 
stipulated  amount ;  and  so  thorough  and  beneficent  was  this  legislation 
that  when  other  great  nations  years  later  began  to  follow  in  ( iermany's 
footsteps  in  the  field  of  social  legislation,  their  laws  were  based  largely 
upon  the  German  models. 

In  every  other  field,  the  Government  prosecuted  its  measures  of 
benevolent  paternalism.  Education  was  made  accessible  to  all,  and 
illiteracy  became  practically  non-existent.  The  slums  which  disgrace 
great  cities  of  other  lands  were  unknown  in  Germany.  The  Govern- 
ment recognized  also  its  duties  in  providing  recreation,  in  controlHng 
the  distribution  of  the  necessities  of  life,  and  in  making  possible  all 
manner  of  activities  which  would  accrue  to  the  advantage  of  the  people 
and  hence  of  the  German  Empire. 

In  industry,  especially,  the  Government  of  Germany  maintained  a 
position  of  control.  The  rapidity  of  the  industrial  growth  of  Germany 
let  Germany  escape  from  the  principles  of  the  laissez-faire  creed  which 
the  other  great  nations  took  many  years  to  abandon.  The  leaders  of 
Germany  recognized  the  existence  within  the  state  of  conflicting  in- 
terests between  classes  rather  than  between  indi\'iduals,  and  the  Govern- 
ment's endeavor  was  to  preserve  a  balance  of  power  between  classes 
rather  than  between  individuals,  and  to  prevent  class-exploitation  rather 
than  individual  exploitation.    Accordingly,  the  Government  made  itself 


Suppression  of  Liberalism  and  Groivth  of  Militarisin  53 

directly  responsible  for  the  welfare  of  German  business  conditions  and 
enterprises,  and  each  German  industry  had  its  place  in  the  general 
scheme  of  business  enterprise  as  conceived  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment. Where  certain  commodities  were  needed,  the  Government  saw 
that  they  were  produced.  When  shipping  was  needed  for  German 
trade,  the  German  Government  developed  an  extensive  German  mer- 
chant marine.  Where  certain  firms  could  not  compete  satisfactorily 
with  foreign  firms,  they  were  subsidized  by  the  Government.  Where 
farm  land  was  poor,  the  Government  made  possible  the  application  of 
scientific  intensive  farming.  Where  over-production  threatened  to  glut 
the  market,  it  was  checked  by  the  Government ;  and  where  under-pro- 
duction threatened  depression,  it  was  stimulated  by  the  Government. 
Especially  did  the  Government  encourage  research  in  all  fields  where 
such  research  could  be  utilized  in  the  discovery  of  new  methods  which 
would  enrich  the  German  Empire  as  a  whole. 

The  characteristic  German  utilization  of  new  methods  was  again  due 
to  the  newness  of  the  German  nationalistic  consummation.  Germany 
was  the  youngest  of  the  nations,  and  she  displayed  the  salient  charac- 
teristics of  youth — contempt  for  tradition  and  attraction  toward  novel 
procedure.  Much  of  the  success  of  the  German  merchant  and  trader 
in  competition  with  foreign  merchants  in  undeveloped  territory  was 
due  to  the  conservatism  bred  by  custom  in  the  countries  which  were 
Germany's  rivals.  And  the  very  lateness  and  rapidity  of  Germany's 
industrial  development  allowed  her  to  predict  its  successive  stages 
and  to  plan  them  scientifically,  instead  of  proceeding  according  to  the 
necessarily  less  scientific  individualism  of  other  lands. 

These  conditions,  then,  help  to  explain  the  tolerance  of  the  German 
people  for  the  essentially  autocratic,  outworn  and  even  ridiculous 
political  system  of  Germany.  In  the  first  place,  the  rulers  would  brook 
no  decrease  of  or  check  upon  their  power.  In  the  second  place,  the 
vast  German  army  was  always  available  to  repress  the  slightest  ten- 
dency toward  revolt ;  and  the  German  army  was  untinctured  with 
any  feeling  for  democracy.  In  the  third  place,  material  conditions 
were  satisfactory  for  the  masses,  and  especially  were  they  freed  from 
the  gnawing  fear  of  the  future  which  dominates  the  lives  of  most 
insecure  wage-earners.     And  finally,  the  political  creed  of  the  masses 


54  -i   History  of  the  Great  War 

was  Socialism;  and  as  the  middle  class  was  uncomj)romisinj,d)-  opposed 
to  the  Socialist  program,  there  did  not  arise  in  Germany  that  combina- 
tion between  the  middle  and  lower  classes  by  which  political  democracy- 
had  been  secured  in  other  lands. 

The  paternalism  of  the  Government  had  inspired  e\en  the  Socialists 
with  strong  patriotic  consciousness,  as  the  (jreat  War  showed.  Most 
Socialists  are  internationalists,  but  the  German  Socialists  were  pre- 
dominantly nationalistic.  Even  though  the  Gennan  Socialists  had 
opposed  Germany's  prosecution  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  even 
though  they  had  violently  agitated  for  peace  during  both  Moroccan 
''affairs"  and  even  in  the  days  immediately  preceding  August  i,  1914. 
yet  they  would  not  join  their  fellow-Socialists  in  other  lands  in  agree- 
ing to  oppose  all  wars  by  an  international  general  strike.  Only  the 
opposition  of  the  German  Socialists  prevented  the  International  Social- 
ist Congress  of  1907  from  binding  Socialists  everywhere  to  refuse 
participation  in  world  war;  and  if  the  (ierman  Socialists  had  been 
pledged  to  a  general  industrial  and  military  strike  after  war  had  been 
declared  by  the  Imperial  German  Government,  and  had  been  faithful 
to  that  pledge,  Germany's  plans  in  August.  1914  would  have  been 
completely  demolished.  Accordingly,  the  German  people  in  the  years 
preceding  the  Great  War  were  laboring  under  a  psychology  which 
supported  with  utmost  seriousness  and  enthusiasm  programs  and  state- 
ments which  other  peoples  would  have  received  with  indignation  or 
amusement.  Germans  were  seldom  unconscious  of  the  relation  of 
each  of  their  actions,  even  of  their  thoughts,  to  the  furtherance  of  their 
nation,  the  chosen  of  (iod.  Thev  were  in  a  i)artnership  with  their 
rulers,  and  both  parties  must  under  all  conditions  fulfill  their  share  of 
the  agreement.  The  people  were  to  carry  forward  the  program  of  the 
(ierman  Empire;  the  rulers  of  the  Empire  were  to  safeguard  the 
people's  welfare.  In  a  word,  the  difference  between  the  German  and 
the  Anglo-Saxon  ])olitical  ])hil()sophv  which  was  the  fundamental  issue 
of  the  Great  W'ar  might  be  thus  summarized — the  Anglo-Saxon  creed 
was  that  the  state  existed  to  subserve  the  interests  of  the  individual,  the 
German  creed  was  that  the  individual  existed  to  subserve  the  interests 
of  the  state;  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  creed  was  that  the  nation  existed 


Siif^f^rcssioii  of  Liberal  ism  and  Ciroa^ih  of  Miliransin  ^'-^ 

lu  subserve  ihe  interests  of  mankind,  whereas  the  German  creed  was 
that  mankind  existed  to  subserve  the  interests  of  the  dominant  nation. 

In  Russia 

The  Congress  of  \'ienna  pkiced  Russia  in  closer  touch  with  the  main 
currents  of  European  hfe  than  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  gave  her 
a  position  of  increased  prestige  and  power.  In  extent  of  territory, 
Imperial  Russia  was  the  greatest  of  the  world's  nations.  In  the  land 
of  the  Tsar,  however,  the  hands  of  the  clock  had  been  violently  turned 
backward  and  Imperial  Russia  of  the  twentieth  century  was  less  demo- 
cratic politically,  although  perhaps  more  democratic  economically,  than 
Imperial  Russia  of  the  first  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

In  the  early  days  of  his  reign,  Alexander  I  had  been  distinctly  a 
liberal  ruler  and  had  even  sympathized  to  an  extent  with  the  ideals  of 
the  French  Revolution.  However,  immediately  after  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  he  fell  under  the  influence  of  Metternich  and  the  Holy 
Alliance;  and  from  1815  the  Government  in  Russia  prevented  not  only 
the  organization  of  new  liberalizing  bodies  but  even  the  mere  dissemi- 
nation of  new  ideas,  whether  in  the  field  of  politics  or  in  the  field  of 
religion  and  science.  The  reformers  were  hence  driven  to  function 
through  secret  societies.  These  secret  societies  stimulated  in  1825  and 
1830  revolutions  which  were  put  down  ruthlessly  and  which  served 
only  to  increase  the  rigor  of  autocratic  administration  in  Russia. 

Up  to  1861,  the  peasants  of  Russia  existed  as  mere  serfs  upon  the 
land ;  but  in  that  year  the  Tsar,  fearful  of  further  disturbances,  freed 
them  from  serfdom,  although  with  so  many  burdensome  details  and 
restrictions  that  the  position  of  the  peasant  was  hardly  improved  by 
his  theoretical  emancipation.  The  brutal  methods  of  the  government 
against  all  forces  of  light  in  that  land  of  darkness  thereafter  became 
intensified.  The  reformers  finally  responded  with  a  policy  of  terrorism, 
including  political  assassinations,  which,  however,  was  similarly  ineffec- 
tive; and  by  the  last  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century  most  of  the 
revolutionary  spirits  of  Russia  had  been  either  executed  or  exiled  or 
had  removed  to  foreign  lands  as  the  centres  for  their  revolutionary 
propaganda. 


56  ./   flislory  of  the  Great  JJ^ar 

During  the  last  years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  liowever,  ihe  In- 
dustrial Revolution  spread  to  Russia,  and  its  results  were  soon  appar- 
ent in  the  political  life  of  the  Russian  people.  The  reaction  against 
deprivation  of  education,  against  censorship  of  the  press  and  of  public 
assemblies,  against  government  guidance  of  the  teaching  in  the  schools 
and  universities,  against  restrictions  upon  travel,  against  espionage 
on  even  private  personages,  against  exile  for  political  activities,  against 
over-burdensome  taxation,  against  secret  trials  without  juries,  against 
the  virtual  encouragement  of  illiteracy,  the  reaction  against  the  entire 
Tsarist  regime  was  heightened  when  the  new  industrial  demands 
brought  together  into  industrial  centres  large  bodies  of  worker^  wlio 
had  formerly  lived  in  scattered  rural  communities.  The  feeling  for 
revolution  grew  apace;  it  was  met  by  a  tightening  of  the  fetters  upon 
the  Russian  people. 

Early  in  1904  war  was  declared  between  Russia  and  Japan,  and 
Russian  defeats  at  the  hands  of  Japan  brought  the  crisis  to  a  head  in 
the  following  year.  A  violent  revolution  broke  out  which  was  finally 
quelled  only  with  great  difficulty  and  after  the  Government  had 
promised  to  call  a  parliament  (Duma)  and  to  institute  other  reforms. 
But  with  the  support  of  her  fellow-autocracy  in  Germany  and  even 
of  imperialist  forces  in  Russia's  political  ally,  France,  the  Tsar  suc- 
ceeded in  averting  the  day  of  fundamental  reforms.  Russia  accord- 
ingly came  into  the  Great  War  a  nation  as  backward  as  the  great 
nations  of  the  earth  in  the  Dark  Ages  a  thousand  years  previously; 
and  even  the  most  superficial  observer  of  Russian  conditions  could 
predict  the  speedy  arrival  of  an  upheaval  in  Russia  which  in  violence, 
power,  thoroughness,  intensity,  scope  and  appeal  would  eclipse  even  the 
French  Revolution. 


GERMAN  DIPLOMATIC  DOMINATION,  1870-1911 

The  Isolation  of  France 

After  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  the  mightiest  power  in  interna- 
tional affairs  had  been  Austria  under  Metternich.  Great  Britain  had 
kept  aloof  from  European  diplomatic  manoeuvres  except  when  her 
own  welfare  was  directly  concerned,  as  her  interests  were  chiefly 
colonial.  I'rance,  it  is  true,  had  rallied  splendidly  in  the  years  after 
Waterloo,  had  challenged  Austrian  domination  after  1848,  and  after 
the  humiliating  defeat  of  Austria  in  1866  could  lay  claims  to  the  diplo- 
matic dictatorship  of  Europe.  But  after  1870,  the  diplomatic  dictator- 
ship of  Europe  was  no  longer  a  matter  for  dispute — supremacy  in  in- 
ternational affairs  belonged  to  Germany  under  Bismarck,  and  none 
there  was  to  say  him  nay.  Eight  years  later,  the  great  Powers  of 
Europe,  assembled  in  conclave  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  accepted  the 
law  as  it  was  laid  down  to  them  by  Germany ;  and  even  in  the  personal 
relations  between  the  distinguished  emissaries,  Bismarck  gave  orders 
as  a  master  gives  orders  to  subordinates. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  had  formulated  the  principle  of  the  Bal- 
ance of  Power  among  the  nations,  and  even  after  the  Treaty  of  Frank- 
fort between  France  and  Germany  in  1871  the  conception  of  the  Bal- 
ance of  Power  was  retained  by  the  great  Powers.  The  rise  of  two  new 
nations,  Germany  and  Italy,  the  former  now  the  most  powerful  of 
all  the  great  Powers,  merely  made  necessary  a  new  application  of  the 
theory  of  the  Balance  of  Power.  There  was  no  attempt  at  union  or 
cooperation  among  the  nations — each  jockied  constantly  for  position 
in  the  international  competition. 

The  military  importance  and  mineral  wealth  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine 
had  proved  irresistible  to  Bismarck,  but  he  was  under  no  illusions  as 
to  the  effect  which  their  annexation  to  Germany  would  have  upon 
l-" ranee  and  hence  upon  the  entire  future  international  situation.    France 

57 


58  -i   History  of  the  Great   War 

would  neither  forget  nor  forgive,  and  Bismarck's  task  was  clear — he 
must  isolate  France  and  protect  Germany  against  any  possible  alliance 
which  France  might  endeavor  to  form  against  her.  In  view  of  the 
universal  fear  which  Germany's  successes  had  inspired  against  her. 
Bismarck's  road  was  inevitably  a  rocky  one,  but  he  was  the  adroitest 
statesman  of  modern  times,  and  he  knew  no  scruples. 

By  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  German  troops  were  to 
occupy  French  soil  until  F"rance  paid  the  enormous  indemnity  of 
5.000,000,000  francs  which  Bismarck  had  levied  upon  her.  It  was  a 
bitter  disappointment  to  the  German  Chancellor  that  France  paid  the 
indemnity  within  several  years,  the  French  peasants  making  j)athelic 
sacrifices  to  rid  their  soil  of  the  hated  Prussians;  and  Germany  could 
not  hold  France  in  material  subjection  as  Bismarck  had  wished.  More- 
over, Bismarck  was  in  no  mood  for  immediate  future  wars — Germany 
needed  peace  to  consolidate  her  newly-won  national  unity.  The  indus- 
trial revolution  was  in  the  height  of  its  activity  in  Germany,  and  peace 
was  needed  also  for  German  industrial  development. 

The  League  of  the  Three  Emperors 

The  fruits  of  Bismarck's  generosity  toward  Austria  after  the  latter's 
defeat  in  1866  were  now  ripe.  The  Austrian  prime  minister  was  hostile 
to  Bismarck,  but  Bismarck,  by  skilful  manipulation  of  Austria's  inter- 
nal political  situation,  unseated  his  enemy.  Austria  was  fearsome  of 
further  revolutions,  and  the  establishment  of  the  international  .Socialist 
organization  in  1864  had  not  served  to  allay  her  fears:  so  that  Ger- 
many's agreement  to  assist  in  putting  down  revolutionary  movements 
in  Austria  in  case  of  an  Austro-German  treaty  was  very  welcome  to 
the  Hapsburg  monarchy.  Austria  was  anxious  also  for  support  against 
Russia  in  the  Balkans. 

The  rivalry  between  Austria  and  Russia  might  have  proved  to  any 
one  except  Bismarck  an  insuperable  barrier  to  an  alliance  with  both 
of  them.  But  Russia  and  Germany  were  traditional  friends  :  the  Rus- 
sian Tsar  was  the  nephew  of  the  German  Emperor,  and  a  warm  per- 
sonal devotion  existed  between  them ;  in  1863  Germany  had  been 
benevolently  neutral  when  the  Polc<  had  risen  in  revolt  against  Russian 


German  DlpJomalic  Domination,   i8/o-iprr  59 

rule ;  both  Germany  and  Russia  were  political  autocracies,  with  a  com- 
mon foe  in  all  democratic  ideas;  Bismarck  himself  had  been  ambassa- 
dor to  Russia,  and  had  inspired  friendly  regard  in  the  court  of  the 
Tsar;  and  in  1870  Germany  had  sanctioned  a  change  in  the  Treaty  of 
Paris  which  enabled  Russia  to  send  her  warships  into  the  Black  Sea. 
Hismarck  comjiromised  the  conflicting  ambitions  of  the  two  countries 
in  the  Balkans  by  inducing  Austria  to  withdraw  her  support  from  the 
Poles  agitating  against  Russia,  and  Russia  to  withdraw  her  support 
from  the  Slavs  agitating  against  Austria.  Accordingly,  in  1872  there 
was  consummated  the  so-called  "League  of  the  Three  Emperors," 
between  Germany,  Austria  and  Russia. 

If  Bismarck,  however,  had  visions  of  a  new  Holy  Alliance  arising 
from  the  League  of  the  Three  Emperors,  with  himself  playing  the 
part  of  a  second  Metternich,  he  was  doomed  to  disappointment. 
Neither  Russia  nor  Austria  had  thrown  herself  whole-heartedly  into 
the  League,  but  had  joined  chiefly  to  assure  a  period  of  external  repose 
in  order  to  settle  internal  troubles. 

The  inefflcacy  of  Bismarck's  arrangement  was  proved  in  1875.  He 
had  determined  to  take  further  steps  to  crush  an  attempt  of  France  to 
rise  above  a  position  of  subjection  to  Germany,  but  Germany's  own 
ally,  Russia,  supported  by  England,  forbade  Germany  to  go  ahead  with 
another  attack  upon  France ;  and  by  that  time  Austria  and  Russia  were 
again  quarreling  openly  in  the  Balkans.  It  was  evident  that  the 
League  could  not  be  used  offensively  against  France.  Bismarck  re- 
alized that  he  would  be  compelled  to  enter  into  direct  alliances  for  the 
protection  of  Germany  and  the  isolation  of  France ;  and  as  betw^een 
Austria  and  Russia,  he  determined  to  hold  on  to  Austria.  However, 
he  used  every  resource  of  his  fertile  mind  to  maintain  relations  of 
friendliness  with  Russia,  and  to  prevent  a  Franco-Russian  alliance. 

The  Triple  Alliance 

In  1876,  Turkey  was  responsible  for  a  particularly  nauseating  series 
of  atrocities  against  the  Bulgarians,  owing  to  a  revolt  in  the  Balkans 
against  Turkish  rule  and  to  the  massacre  of  some  Turkish  ofificials. 
The  Christians  in  the  Balkans  appealed  frantically  to  the  great  Powers 


6o  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

of  western  Europe  for  help  and  protection  against  "the  unspeakable 
Turk,"  but  among  the  great  Powers  only  Russia  was  anxious  to  act 
In  1877,  Russia  determined  to  waste  no  more  time  in  negotiating  with 
Turkey  concerning  the  situation  of  Russia's  fellow-Slavs  in  the  Bal- 
kans, and  the  Tsar  declared  war  on  the  Sultan. 

In  those  days,  the  Turkish  army  was  held  in  high  repute,  and  the 
great  Powers  ardently  hoped  that  Russia  would  be  defeated.  P)Ui, 
aided  by  the  Roumanians,  Russia  managed  to  upset  the  forecasts  and 
to  vanquish  the  Turkish  forces.  Ihe  expulsion  of  Turkey  from  Eu- 
rope and  the  formation  of  independent  nations  in  the  Palkans  then 
seemed  to  be  impending;  but  such  a  settlement  of  the  Balkan  Question 
was  no  part  of  the  plan  of  England,  and  the  other  great  Powers  sup- 
ported England  when  she  demanded  that  the  results  of  the  Russo- 
Turkish  war  be  settled  by  a  great  international  conference.  Russia 
was  in  no  position  to  oppose  the  remainder  of  Europe,  and  in  1878  the 
great  Powers  met  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  to  deprive  Russia  of  the 
fruits  of  her  victory  and  to  maintain  the  Balance  of  Power  unaltered. 

England  especially,  under  the  premiership  of  Lord  Beaconstield  (Dis- 
raeli), was  determined  to  permit  no  great  increase  in  the  power  of  her 
great  rival,  Russia.  England  feared  that  if  the  Balkan  states  were  to 
be  entirely  freed  from  Turkish  rule,  they  would  fall  under  Russian 
influence.  Russia  would  thus  obtain  her  long-coveted  outlet  upon  the 
Mediterranean.  The  Suez  Canal  had  just  been  completed,  and  Eng- 
land desired  to  see  no  Russian  influence  in  eastern  waters.  England, 
moreover,  had  obtained  from  l\irkey  control  over  the  island  of  Cyj)rus 
in  return  for  support  of  Turkey  at  the  Congress  of  lUrlin  ;  so  that 
Russia  was  not  only  shorn  of  the  fruits  of  her  \'ictory,  l)Ut  much  terri- 
tory in  the  I'alkans  was  retained  under  Turkish  control. 

At  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  (iermany's  support  of  Austria  as  against 
Russia  came  delinitely  into  the  open.  1\irkey  was  given  back  most  of 
the  territory  in  the  Balkans  won  from  her  by  Russia,  and  Austria  was 
given  the  government  of  the  Turkish  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. And  it  was  therefore  no  surprise  to  Europe  when  in  1879  an 
alliance  between  Germany  and  Austria  was  consummated.  France 
would  get  no  assistance  from  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

Foiled  in  the  attempt  to  make  the  Eeague  of  the  Three  Emperors 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  i8yo-ipii  6i 

effective  and  to  get  active  Russian  support  against  France,  Bismarck 
turned  to  Italy.  Here  again  the  consummation  of  an  alliance  would 
have  seemed  impossible  to  any  but  a  Bismarck.  Italy's  ancient  oppres- 
sor and  hereditary  foe  was  the  very  ally  of  Germany,  Austria;  and  it 
had  been  Austria  from  whom  Italian  independence  and  unified  nation- 
ality had  been  achieved.  The  problem  of  Italia  Irredenta  was  a  burning 
one.  France  had  come  to  Italy's  assistance  against  Austria  and  French 
help  had  been  largely  responsible  for  the  defeats  of  Austria  at  the  hands 
of  Italy.  Austria  was  the  stronghold  of  the  political  power  of  the 
Pope,  and  Papal  interests  and  Italian  national  interests  were  in  oppo- 
sition. Finally,  it  had  been  only  an  Austrian  defeat  in  1866  which 
gave  Italy  the  opportunity  to  wring  Venetia  from  Austria. 

On  the  other  hand,  although  Napoleon  III  had  helped  Italy  against 
Austria,  he  had  withdrawn  his  support  at  the  very  moment  when  Italy 
was  prepared  to  conquer  Venetia  from  the  Plapsburgs,  lest  Italy  be- 
come too  powerful.  France  likewise  was  a  Catholic  state,  and  the 
Pope  had  received  active  support  from  France,  so  that  it  had  not  been 
until  the  Franco-Prussian  War  that  Italy  felt  able  to  annex  all  the 
Papal  lands  and  to  fix  the  Italian  capital  at  Rome.  Italy  was  friendly 
to  England,  and  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War  English  feeling  had 
been  pro-German  and  anti-French. 

But  another  element  in  the  situation  was  still  necessary  to  throw 
Italy  into  Germany's  arms,  and  it  was  found  in  Africa.  After  1870, 
Bismarck  had  left  no  stone  unturned  to  turn  France's  ambitions  into 
colonial  channels.  As  far  as  it  was  humanly  possible,  he  hoped  to  see 
France  forget  Alsace-Lorraine  in  pride  at  the  acquisition  of  new  ter- 
ritory outside  of  Europe.  Italy,  however,  had  ambitions  in  the  very 
locality  in  northern  Africa  where  France's  ambitions  were  centered. 
Bismarck  was  too  shrewd  to  inveigle  Italy  into  an  open  alliance 
against  France  by  direct  assistance  to  Italy  in  Africa ;  he  preferred 
indirect  methods,  and  he  was  anxious  to  conciliate  France  to  the 
utmost.  Indeed,  it  was  with  Bismarck's  promise  of  support  and  with 
Bismarck's  advice  that  in  1881  France  dispatched  from  Algeria,  which 
for  some  decades  had  belonged  to  France,  a  force  of  French  troops  to 
occupy  Tunis. 

As  Bismarck  well  knew,  it  was  Tunis  which  Italy  likewise  coveted. 


C)2  A   History  of  the  iJrcat   War 

Indeed,  there  were  many  Italian  colonists  in  Tunis,  and  Italy  felt  that 
Italian  expansion  in  Tunis  was  fore-ordained.  France's  action  there- 
fore enfuriated  Italy  against  France,  and  removed  the  last  barriers  in 
the  way  of  an  Italian-German  understanding.  In  1882,  Italy  formally 
allied  herself  with  (ierniany  and  Austria,  and  the  Triple  Alliance  was 
thus  formed.     l^>ance  would  get  no  help  from  Italy. 

The  Machinations  of  Blsmarck 

Bismarck,  however,  was  not  yet  satisfied.  He  appeased  Spain  and 
kept  on  the  friendliest  terms  with  her,  while  he  deliberately  encouraged 
France  to  compete  with  England  in  tire  colonial  field,  and  France  once 
more  played  Germany's  game  as  she  had  done  in  Tunis.  Neither  from 
England  nor  from  Spain  would  France  derive  assistance. 

A  retaliatory  alliance  between  France  and  Russia  would  then  have 
seemed  inevitable  by  the  logic  of  the  international  situation.  Germany 
had  pledged  herself  to  support  Austria  against  Russia  in  the  Balkans, 
and  to  assist  Austria  to  quell  the  Slavs,  whose  ethnological  mother  was 
Russia.  Geographically,  Germany  lay  between  Russia  and  France, 
and  could  be  attacked  in  the  rear  by  either  did  she  try  to  make  war 
upon  the  other;  so  that  a  Franco-Russian  alliance  would  compel  Ger- 
many to  divide  her  military  strength,  as  it  compelled  her  in  1914. 

Nevertheless.  Bismarck  sta\ed  off  an  alliance  l)etween  the  two  great 
continetital  countries  outside  the  sphere  of  German  control.  Even  to- 
day the  methods  he  used  in  this  almost  unbelievable  achievement  remain 
largely  unknown,  and  in  his  entire  career  he  accomplished  no  success 
under  conditions  more  difficult  than  those  which  accompanied  his  j)re- 
vention  of  a  formal  alliance  between  France  and  Russia.  Russia  was 
|)lanning  expansion  in  Asia  toward  India,  expansion  which  brought  on 
strained  feelings  between  England  and  Russia  ;  and  Bismarck  was  adroit 
enough  to  encourage  Russia  in  her  ])lans  w-ithout  arousing  k'nglish 
enmity  against  Germany.  Russian  fear  of  English  interference  with 
these  plans  was  fertile  soil  for  Bismarck's  seductions :  France  was 
actively  sympathetic  toward  Polish  independence ;  doubtless  Bismarck 
played  on  the  fear  in  autocratic  Russia  of  the  "radical"  ideas  of  re- 
publican France:  \\'i]liam  T  of  Germany  was  |)opular  and  influential  at 


German   Diploiiialic  Doiiii)ialio)i,    i8jo-J(jt  i  63 

the  Russian  court ;  and  in  1884  ^'i^  again  in  1887  Germany  and  Russia 
actually  signed  in  good  faith  treaties  which  bound  them  to  remain  neu- 
tral in  case  either  should  be  attacked  by  a  third  power.  And  all  this 
time  Austria  and  Germany  were  in  an  alliance  to  protect  each  other 
against  Russia !  Bismarck's  policy  of  protection  for  Germany  and  iso- 
lation of  France  was  complete ;  France  would  get  no  help  from  Russia. 
During  the  Great  War  it  was  customary  to  charge  that  Germany 
was  trying  to  gain  a  position  of  world-dominance;  it  would  have  been 
more  exact  to  charge  that  she  was  trying  to  re-gain  her  position  of 
world-dominance. 

Accession  of  William  II 

In  1888,  the  aged  Emperor  William  I  died  and  in  the  same  year  Wil- 
liam II,  the  Kaiser  under  whom  the  German  Empire  was  to  wage  the 
Great  War,  ascended  the  throne  of  his  ancestors.  He  was  then  but 
twenty-nine  years  of  age,  but  of  a  highly  energetic  character,  with  tre- 
mendous powers  of  leadership  and  organization.  xA.s  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  has  been  the  tragedy  of  Germany — indeed,  the  tragedy  of  the  entire 
world — that  the  later  Hohenzollern  rulers  have  been  capable  men — 
one  Hohenzollern  king  of  recent  generations  like  George  HI  of  England 
would  have  done  much  to  shear  the  power  of  the  rulers  of  Prussia  and 
Germany. 

On  one  point,  the  new  Emperor  was  firm — he  intended  to  govern  his 
empire  himself.  The  old  William  I  had  been  content  to  give  Bismarck 
a  free  hand,  as  well  he  might;  but  William  II  was  no  man  to  play  the 
subordinate  to  his  own  chancellor.  On  March  8,  1890,  the  Emperor 
"dropped  the  pilot"  altogether  from  the  ship  of  state,  and  Bismarck 
retired  to  private  life. 

The  diplomatic  heritage  which  William  II  thus  assumed  was  no 
bed  of  roses.  As  we  have  seen,  Germany's  alHances  were  forced 
rather  than  natural  in  at  least  two  cases,  the  treaties  with  Italy  and 
Russia.  Italian  animosity  at  her  formal  ally,  Austria,  concerning  their 
joint  aspirations  along  the  Adriatic  was  by  no  means  vanishing;  and 
France  moreover  was  soon  to  disestablish  Church  and  State  and  to 
renounce  her  support  of  the  Papacy.     Again,  the  Triple  Alliance  in- 


(>4  A   Ilislory  of  I  lie  Crcal   ]J\ir 

xolvt'd  t'xk'iisivc  and  hence  e\i)ensive  niililary  i)re])arations  oti  the 
part  of  its  members,  and  Italy  was  poor  and  already  groaning  under 
taxation.  And  finally,  Germany  and  Turkey  were  soon  to  become  allies, 
and  Italian  colonial  aspirations  in  Africa  were  now  centered  upon 
I  ripiili,  the-  territory  of  Turkey. 

riic  underslandint^  with  Kussia  was  e\'en  harder  lo  inainlain.  I  he 
Russian  statesmen  could  not  remain  blind  forever  t(j  the  wiles  practiced 
upon  them  l)y  Bismarck — probably  h'rench  statesmen  helped  lo  -en- 
lighten tiie  i<.ussian.  The  official  terms  of  the  Dual  Alliance  between 
Austria  and  Germany  were  published  in  1888,  and  if  Russia  had  not 
known  them  already,  she  now  saw  how  unreservedly  (iermany  was  sup- 
porting Austria  in  the  rivalry  between  Russia  and  Austria.  And 
a  financial  factor  of  vital  importance  entered  into  the  situation. 

Despite  the  huge  indemnity  paid  Prussia  as  a  result  of  the  hVanco- 
Prussian  War,  France  was  a  rich  country.  Not  only  were  her  people 
frugal  and  addicted  to  saving;  but  also  her  program  for  paying  ofi:' 
the  indemnity  to  Germany  had  occasioned  a  partnership  between  French 
bankers  and  the  French  government  which,  however  illegitimate  it 
might  seem  to  twentieth  century  eyes,  left  the  French  linancial  interests 
in  a  powerful  position.  Now,  for  many  years  Russia,  always  in  need 
of  money,  had  been  financed  by  Berlin  bankers.  But  in  1888,  Paris 
banking  houses  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  subscriptions  to  new  Rus- 
sian loans,  made  especially  necessary  by  the  inauguration  of  work  on 
the  Trans-Siberian  Railroad.  These  loans  were  liberally  subscribed 
to  by  the  French  people,  and  in  the  years  following  the  ascension  of 
William  II  Russia  saw  herself  indebted  to  the  French  people  instead  of 
only  to  German  bankers.  In  passing,  it  might  be  noted  that  France 
continued  to  finance  Russia  as  late  as  1917,  and  that  the  attitude  of 
France  toward  Russia  during  and  after  the  Great  War  may  thus  to  a 
great  extent  be  explained. 

The  Arj.iANCK  Between  France  and  Russia 

It  is  doubtful  if  even  Bismarck  could  have  succeeded  in  holding 
France  and  Russia  apart  much  longer.  That  is,  it  is  doubtful  if  he 
could  have  succeeded  without  war.     Indeed,  so  clearly  had  he  antici- 


(c)    Uniierwood   &   Underwood 


IJESCRIPTION   OF  PICTURES  ON  REVERSE  SIDE 

Upper  Left  Hand  Corner— Marshal  Joseph  Jacques  Cesaire  Joffre,  Chief 
of  the  French  General  Staff,  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French  Armies, 
1911-December  12,  1916;  Military  Adviser  to  the  French  Government.  Decem- 
ber 12,  1916—. 

Upper  Right  Hand  Corner — Marshal  Henri  Philippe  Petain,  French  Gen- 
eral Commanding  Sixth  Division,  1914;  Commander,  Thirty-Third  Army 
Corps,  1915;  Commander-in-Chief,  Armies  of  Verdun,  1916;  Commander-in- 
Chief,  French  Armies,  May  15,  1917 — . 

Center — Marshal  Ferdinand  Foch,  Commander,  Seventh  French  Army,  Battle 
of  the  Marne,  1914;  Chief  of  Staff,  May  15,  1917;  Member,  Supreme  War 
Coimcil  of  Versailles,  1917;  Supreme  Commander-in-Chief,  Armies  of  the  En- 
tente Allies,   March  29,   1918—. 

Lower  Left  Hand  Corner — General  Armando  Diaz,  Commander,  Twenty- 
Third  Italian  Army  Corps,  1917;  and  Commander-in-Chief,  Italian  Armies, 
November  9,  1917 — . 

Lower  Right  Hand  Corner — General  H.  J.  E.  Gouraud,  French  Commander, 
Moroccan  Expeditionary  Force  in  France,  1915;  Commander-in-Chief,  French 
.Armies  at  Gallipoli,    1915;   Commander,   French   Armies  around   Rheims,    1918. 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  iS/o-ipii^  65 

pated  a  Franco-Kussiau  "rapprochement"  that  in  1888  he  had  in  un- 
mistakahle  language  warned  P"" ranee  and  Russia  that  an  alhance  between 
them  would  be  regarded  by  Germany  as  an  unfriendly  procedure  and 
that  Germany  would  act  accordingly.  Possibly  Bismarck  would  merely 
have  threatened  war,  if  he  had  remained  in  control  of  the  German 
Empire;  possibly  he  would  actually  have  precipitated  another  Euro- 
pean conflict. 

At  all  events,  w^hen  it  was  definitely  announced  in  1891  that  a  treaty 
had  been  signed  between  France  and  Russia,  William  II  kept  the  peace. 
His  fanatical  obsession  that  he  had  been  entrusted  with  the  destinies 
of  Germany  directly  by  God  dotibtless  persuaded  his  mystical  mind  at 
that  time  that  his  mission  on  earth  was  to  maintain  peace.  Certainly, 
Germany  had  everything  to  hope  and  nothing  to  fear  from  war,  every- 
thing to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose,  and  the  German  jingoes  clamored 
for  war;  but  the  sword  was  not  drawn  and  Bismarck's  system  had  lost 
one  brick  in  its  foundation.  France  no  longer  was  completely  isolated — 
she  could  now  assert  herself  more  confidently  in  European  affairs  with 
the  consciousness  of  at  least  a  nominal  ally.  Even  though  the  treaty 
was  defensive  only  (its  text  had  not  been  published  up  to  1919),  France 
could  look  to  Russia  for  help. 

From  his  retirement.  Prince  Otto  von  Bismarck  launched  biting 
comments  upon  the  diplomatic  abilities  of  the  new  German  Emperor. 
But  William  II  had  his  own  program  for  the  retention  of  German 
dominance  in  Europe,  and  he  proceeded  to  put  it  into  successful  effect. 
Great  Britain  was  still  friendly  to  Germany,  and  the  Kaiser  sedulously 
cultivated  that  friendship  by  encouraging  France  and  Russia  to  con- 
tinue their  colonial  programs  so  as  to  come  into  conflict  with  British 
colonial  interests.  And  France  and  Russia  played  the  Kaiser's  game  no 
less  satisfactorily  than  they  had  played  Bismarck's.  In  Indo-China, 
in  Egypt,  in  Madagascar,  in  Zanzibar,  French  expansion  proved  a  con- 
stant irritation  to  the  British  Empire.  And  Russia  not  only  still  planned 
and  plotted  with  an  eye  on  the  road  to  India,  but  also  began  to  "stake 
out  pegs"  in  Manchuria,  where  again  she  competed  with  British  inter- 
ests and  where  later  a  conflict  with  the  rising  nation  of  the  Far 
East  was  to  give  birth  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 


66  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Tiii-:  DiuiVFUs  AirAiR 

France's  power  in  international  bargaining  at  this  time  was  sadly 
weakened  also  by  a  domestic  dispute  which  finally  split  the  entire 
country  into  factions  and  for  more  than  seven  years  shattered  the  unity 
of  the  French  people.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  pleasing  to  the 
German  Empire  than  the  effect  upon  France  of  the  trial  of  Captain 
Alfred  Dreyfus. 

Alfred  Dreyfus,  before  1894  an  insignificant  officer  of  the  French 
Army,  was  of  a  Jewish  family  which  had  immigrated  to  France  from 
Alsace  after  1871.  In  1894,  at  a  secret  court-martial,  he  was  convicted 
of  having  sold  military  secrets  to  the  enemies  of  France,  and  was  pub- 
licly disgraced  and  sentenced  to  imprisonment  at  hard  labor  for  life.  In 
1896,  however,  another  French  officer,  Colonel  Picquart,  chief  of  the 
Intelligence  Bureau,  became  convinced  that  Dreyfus  had  been  innocent, 
that  a  Major  Esterhazy  was  the  true  culprit  and  that  Dreyfus  had  been 
the  victim  of  an  Army  conspiracy.  Colonel  Picquart  was  transferred, 
public  interest  in  'i'aft'aire  Dreyfus''  became  intense,  and  all  France 
soon  became  partisans  either  as  Dreyfusards  or  anti-Dreyfusards. 

The  issue  at  stake  soon  passed  beyond  the  confines  of  a  personal 
dispute,  and  shook  France  to  her  very  foundations.  In  the  first  place, 
the  rape  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  consequent  spirit  of  revenge 
had  rendered  the  Army  very  popular  in  France  after  1870,  and  public 
feeling  therefore  ran  abnormally  high  against  any  French  officer  con- 
victed of  treason.  In  the  second  place,  there  was  flourishing  at  this 
time  a  vigorous  anti-Semitic  campaign  in  France,  owing  chiefly  to  the 
fact  that  international  finance  was  controlled  largely  by  Jewish  bank- 
ers and  to  the  French  belief  that  international  finance  was  supporting 
the  interests  of  Germany  against  the  interests  of  France.  In  the  third 
place,  there  was  in  France  a  large  Royalist  faction  opposed  to  the 
Republic  which  had  been  re-established  in  France  in  1870  and  this  fac- 
tion took  advantage  of  the  current  prejudices  against  Dreyfus  to 
develop  a  new  political  party  around  their  creed.  In  the  fourth  place, 
the  religious  nature  of  the  affiliations  for  or  against  Dreyfus  involved 
the  status  of  the  state  (Catholic)  Church  of  France,  and  anti-Catholics 
rallied  to  the  defense  of  the  convicted  captain.     This  last  factor  of  the 


Gcnnan  Diplouiafic  Dojuination,   i8jo-i()i[  67 

quarrel  also  lined  up  the  conservative  elements  in  France  against 
Dreyfus,  and  the  more  radical  elements,  including  the  "intellectuals" 
and  the  Socialists,  in  support  of  him. 

The  constant  and  efficient  agitation  of  the  Dreyfusards  resulted 
finally  in  the  trial  of  Esterhazy,  but  Esterhazy  was  tinanimously  and 
joyously  acquitted.  Picquart  was  then  himself  tried;  and  although 
he  was  also  acquitted,  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  formally  con- 
demned the  Dreyfusards.  Early  in  1898,  however,  Emile  Zola  pub- 
lished his  famous  "J'accuse"  letter  on  the  Dreyfus  case,  which  made 
new  accusations  and  submitted  new  evidence  in  defense  of  Dreyfus. 
Zola  was  also  haled  before  a  law-court  and  was  sentenced  to  imprison- 
ment for  one  year ;  but  his  charges  finally  did  much  to  turn  the  tide 
in  favor  of  Dreyfus.  An  evidence  of  the  transcendent  importance  of 
the  dispute  by  this  time  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  elections  to  the 
French  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  1898  turned  largely  on  the  Dreyfus 
case;  and  evidence  of  the  state  of  the  French  mind,  in  the  fact  that 
not  one  professed  supporter  of  Dreyfus  was  elected. 

Picquart,  however,  had  a  burning  and  fighting  zeal  for  justice.  He 
came  forward  with  new  charges  which  caused  the  suicide  of  his  suc- 
cessor in  the  Intelligence  Bureau,  after  a  confession  of  having  forged 
certain  documents  in  the  interests  of  Dreyfus's  accusers.  Esterhazy 
soon  afterwards  fled  the  country  after  having  also  confessed  forgery 
against  Dreyfus.  In  1899,  Dreyfus  was  again  brought  before  a  jury 
and  again  found  guilty,  but  his  sentence  was  reduced  and  soon  after- 
ward he  was  pardoned.  He  was  determined  to  get  complete  exonera- 
tion, however,  and  in  1906  he  was  declared  innocent  by  an  unbiased 
investigation  and  was  restored  to  the  army  and  promoted  in  rank. 

The  deep-lying  result  of  the  entire  twelve  years'  struggle,  accordingly, 
was  the  subordination  of  the  military  power  in  the  Republic  to  the  civil ; 
the  triumph  of  the  liberal  over  the  reactionary  forces  in  the  leadership 
of  France:  and,  in  1905.  the  complete  separation  of  Church  and  State 
in  France.  But  during  most  of  this  period  of  internal  readjustmenlj 
France  was  in  no  position  to  present  an  unbroken  front  to  the  other 
Powers.  Other  countries  w^ere  hardly  disposed  to  look  favorably  upon 
an  alliance  with  France ;  even  Russia  must  have  doubted  the  strength 
of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance;  and  Germany  still  ruled  with  unvitiated 


68  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

power  in  European  affairs.  Indeed,  so  successful  did  W  illiam's  policy 
of  conciliating  France  appear  in  contrast  with  Bismarck's  policy  of 
intimidating  her  that  in  1895  ^  French  fleet  as  well  as  a  Russian  was 
present  at  the  opening  of  the  Kiel  Canal. 

The  Fashoda  Incfdent 

h\  1876,  the  inability  of  the  Egyptian  goxcrnmcnt  to  pay  its  debts 
led  to  the  assumption  of  joint  control  by  France  and  England  over 
Egypt.  The  natives,  however,  asserted  their  right  to  independence 
and  self-determination  and  revolted  against  foreign  rule.  The  revolt 
demanded  armed  intervention  by  both  the  nations  which  had  assumed 
control  of  Egypt,  but  France  was  still  afraid  of  attack  from  Germany, 
and  allowed  England  to  pacify  Egypt  alone.  The  result  was  that, 
although  -England  officially  disclaimed  any  intention  of  making  Eg}'pt 
an  English  protectorate,  yet  for  practical  purposes  Egypt  became  a 
part  of  the  British  Empire  and  was  so  regarded  by  the  great  Powers. 

France,  however,  still  considered  northern  Africa  the  legitimate  field 
for  the  colonial  expansion  which,  as  we  have  seen,  she  entered  U])on  a 
few  years  after  the  Franco-Prussian  War ;  and  toward  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  bitterness  between  France  and  England  with 
respect  to  colonial  ambitions  became  acute  in  Eg^-pt.  In  1898,  a  French 
expeditionary  force  set  out  from  France's  possessions  in  Central  Africa 
to  occupy  the  Sudan,  the  vast  region  to  the  south  of  what  was  then 
considered  Egypt  proper.  England  promptly  dispatched  a  force  from 
Egypt  to  bar  the  French  advance  and  the  two  armies  met  at  Fashoda, 
where  the  French  had  encamped  and  had  planted  the  French  flag.  The 
seriousness  of  the  situation  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  shortly  before 
England  had  declared  that  intervention  in  the  Sudan  by  any  other 
nation  would  be  considered  by  England  a  hostile  act  on  the  part  of 
that  nation. 

War  appeared  on  the  horizon.  The  French  commanding  officer  de- 
clared that  he  had  occupied  the  Sudan  first,  and  that  his  rights  were 
unquestioned.  The  British  commander,  on  the  other  hand,  was  under 
strict  orders  from  his  home  government,  had  the  superior  force,  and 
was  not  to  be  deterred  and  before  his  doggedness  and  inflexibility,  the 


Grniiaii  Diploiiialic  Doiuinalion,    T8/0-ipii  69 

French  were  tinally  compelled  to  withdraw  from  the  Sudan,  barely 
averting  an  armed  clash.  The  name  of  the  British  commander  was 
Kitchener. 

The  Beginning  of  Anglo-German   Rivalry 

At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  however,  the  period  of 
German  internal  industrial  development  was  nearing  an  end;  her  in- 
dustries were  preparing  to  expand  over  the  entire  world.  Germany 
was  no  longer  content  to  dominate  Europe ;  she  was  seeking  the  larger 
arena,  and  saw  the  way  open  to  dominate  the  world.  And  although 
Germany  could  disregard  England  in  European  politics,  she  could  not 
disregard  England  in  the  politics  of  the  world  outside  of  Europe. 

England's  position  had  long  been  one  of  "splendid  isolation."  She 
was  surrounded  by  water  and  had  no  fear  of  a  land  invasion  as  long 
as  she  could  keep  the  control  of  the  sea.  She  was  not  economically 
self-supporting,  drawing  upon  the  entire  world  for  the  supplies  neces- 
sary to  her  great  factories ;  but  as  long  as  her  fleet  was  greater  than 
that  of  any  other  two  countries  combined,  and  as  long  as  she  adhered 
to  her  policy  of  free  trade,  neither  British  subjects  nor  British  indus- 
try could  be  starved.  Her  vast  empire  spread  over  the  entire  world, 
but  it  was  vulnerable  to  attack  by  the  great  Povvers  of  Europe  chiefly 
from  the  sea ;  and  we  have  seen  how  jealously  England  protected  her 
colonies  when  Russia  endeavored  to  approach  them  in  Asia  and  France 
in  Africa. 

England  therefore  naturally  looked  askance  when  the  merchants  of 
a  nation  with  whom  she  was  on  most  friendly  terms  began  to  appear 
in  the  great  trading  ports  outside  of  Europe  and  to  compete  with  Eng- 
lish merchants.  The  thoroughness  and  the  attention  to  details  of  Ger- 
man industry  soon  proved  formidable,  and  bit  by  bit  the  Germans 
began  to  overcome  the  handicap  of  England's  earlier  start  and  occu- 
pancy of  the  field.  Moreover,  the  great  German  business  enterprises 
were  virtually  a  part  of  the  German  government,  and  could  rely  upon 
their  government  for  advantages  and  subsidies  which  English  firms 
did  not  enjoy.  It  is  difftcult  for  individuals  to  engage  in  economic 
rivalry  without  developing  a  feeling  of  antagonism  in  other  fields ;  and 


JO  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

the  spirit  of  at  least  the  intiuential  group  of  EngHsh  capitahsts  and 
financiers  became  appreciably  less  friendly  to  Germany. 

Coolness  between  the  leaders  of  the  business  world,  however,  did 
not  necessarily  imply  coolness  between  the  great  masses  of  the  people 
of  the  German  and  British  empires.  But  there  was  already  existent 
a  cause  of  deep  resentment  against  Germany  on  the  part  of  the  British 
people.  In  1896,  the  Kaiser  revealed  the  true  attitude  of  his  govern- 
ment toward  England  by  an  act  as  unexpected  and  startling  as  it  was 
provocative  and  impolitic.  \n  that  year,  the  Boers  in  South  Africa 
repulsed  a  raid  of  English  under  Jameson  upon  the  Transvaal ;  where- 
upon the  Emperor  of  Germany  proceeded  gratuitously  to  dispatch  a 
telegram  of  congratulation  to  the  Boers.  England  at  that  time  was 
smarting  under  the  defeat  of  English  citizens  at  the  hands  of  the 
South  African  farmers,  and  the  Kaiser's  attitude  caused  an  outbreak 
of  anti-German  feeling  within  the  British  Isles. 

In  1899.  war  was  declared  between  the  Boers  and  the  British  Empire. 
It  could  hardly  be  said  that  the  English  people  supported  the  war 
without  division.  Indeed,  no  less  a  personage  than  David  Lloyd-George 
attacked  it  during  actual  hostilities  with  an  uncompromising  intensity 
which  in  the  Great  W  ar  fifteen  years  later  would  have  earned  him  the 
epithets  of  "pacifist"  and  "'conscientious  objector"  in  England,  and  in 
America  would  have  subjected  him  to  the  penalties  of  the  Espionage 
Act;  and  a  large  and  influential  section  of  British  public  opinion  v.-as 
with  Mr.  Lloyd-George.  However,  the  stubbornness  of  the  Boers'  re- 
sistance enraged  the  bulk  of  the  English  people,  and  inspired  them  with 
a  determination  to  "see  the  war  through"'  until  victory  should  perch 
upon  British  arms. 

The  Kaiser's  telegram  at  the  time  of  the  Jameson  raid  and  other 
indisputable  evidence  convinced  England  that  Germany  was  pro-Boer. 
This  feeling  was  heightened  by  information  that  Germany  was  selling 
munitions  to  the  Boers ;  and  Germany's  action  in  supplying  England's 
enemies  with  fire-arms  caused  indignation  in  England  at  that  time,  as 
America's  action  in  supplying  England  with  fire-arms  fifteen  years 
later  caused  anger  in  Germany.  And  the  attitude  of  Germany  could  be 
explained  only  by  her  determination  definitely  to  attack  England's  hold 
upon  Africa. 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  iS/o-ipii  71 

The  Kaiser  had  been  too  practical  to  imagine  that  Germany,  despite 
her  more  efficient  business  methods,  could  continue  for  any  length  of 
time  to  capture  trade  away  from  British  merchants  in  colonial  terri- 
tory controlled  by  the  British.  Before  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, as  we  have  seen,  Germany  also  entered  the  race  for  colonies ; 
and  England  no  longer  experienced  that  attachment  to  Germany  due 
to  Germany's  aloofness  from  the  colonial  competition  in  which  England 
was  trying  to  hold  her  own  against  France  and  Russia. 

And  the  Kaiser  had  been  too  practical  also  to  imagine  that  he  could 
either  acquire  or  maintain  colonies  against  England's  interests  while 
England  held  undisputed  sway  of  the  seas.  For  some  time,  Germany 
had  been  quietly  paying  careful  attention  to  her  navy.  The  German 
merchant  marine  had  been  nursed  until  it  was  in  fair  shape  to  compete 
with  show  of  success  against  the  English.  The  Kiel  Canal  had  been 
completed,  so  that  German  warships  were  available  for  service  in  either 
the  Baltic  Sea  or  the  North  Sea ;  and  the  island  of  Helgoland  had 
been  made  a  great  naval  base.  And  in  1900  Germany  capped  the  climax 
by  adopting  the  first  of  her  "Great  Navy  Bills,"  which  definitely  chal- 
lenged England's  control  of  the  sea,  and  threw  down  the  gauge  of  battle 
to  English  shipbuilding. 

No  further  action  was  needed  to  reveal  Germany's  intentions  to 
England.  With  Germany  in  control  of  the  sea,  Germany  would  con- 
trol the  world,  and  England  would  be  relegated  to  a  secondary  posi- 
tion. Nay,  more,  a  blockaded  England  could  oppose  Germany  even  with 
less  chance  of  success  than  France  or  Russia;  and  with  Germany  in 
control  of  the  sea.  England  would  become  practically  a  German  vas- 
sal. The  cornerstone  of  English  naval  policy  had  been  to  maintain 
a  fleet  so  large  that  even  a  combination  of  the  second  and  the  third 
naval  powers  of  the  world  would  still  find  the  English  Navy  unrivalled. 
With  the  thrill  of  battle.  England  therefore  accepted  Germany's  chal- 
lenge ;  and  from  that  time  until  1918,  the  two  nations  engaged  in  a 
heartbreaking  naval  rivalry.  The  resources  of  each  were  taxed  to 
the  utmost  as  Germany  rose  to  the  position  of  -the  world's  second 
naval  power  and  England  kept  undiminished  the  ratio  of  her  naval 
strength  to  Germany's  naval  strength.  In  1906,  England  launched 
the  Dreadnaught,  and  thereafter  the  major  battleships  constructed  by 


/^ 


A  History  of  the  Great   War 


the  great  Powers  were  of  the  great  size,  power  and  exi)ense  of  ihe 
Dreadnaught  type.  So  burdensome  in  fact  was  the  taxation  made 
necessary  by  these  huge  naval  armaments  that  ILngland  on  several 
occasions  proposed  to  Germany  "a  naval  holiday,"  but  Germany  was 
obdurate  and  the  naval  competition  continued  unassuaged. 

England  w^as  now  beginning  to  realize  that  German  amljitions  com- 
pelled her  to  revise  her  policy  of  isolation  in  European  politics.  Eng- 
land had  no  illusion  as  to  the  strength  of  the  German  army;  and  if 
war  should  actually  break  out,  why  should  Germany's  enemies  be 
divided,  so  that  they  might  be  crushed  one  by  one?  Why  should  not 
England  call  in  the  assistance  of  Germany's  other  (lii)lomatic  com- 
petitors, France  and  Russia ;  and  in  return  offer  them  assistance  against 
Germany's  aggression? 

After  the  defeat  of  French  diplomacy  in  the  Fashoda  affair,  the 
French  Foreign  Of^ce  had  been  filled  by  Theophile  Delcasse.  Delcasse 
was  an  implacable  foe  of  Gennany,  and  refused  to  allow  France  to  be 
dtiped  by  Germany  any  longer  into  rivalry  with  England.  He  left  no 
stone  unturned  to  end  the  enmity  between  France  and  England,  and  to 
create  an  Anglo-French  understanding.  He  yielded  to  British  claims 
in  Egypt  and  the  Sudan.  He  conciliated  Spain  and  England  in 
Morocco.  In  England,  Queen  Victoria,  friendly  to  the  Germans  and 
unfriendly  to  the  French,  died  in  1901,  and  was  succeeded  by  the  astute 
Edward  VII.  A  dispute  concerning  customs  with  England's  diplomatic 
friend,  Italy,  w-as  amicably  settled,  and  despite  Italy's  membership  in 
the  Triple  Alliance,  a  Franco-Italian  understanding  with  regard  to 
points  of  difference  was  consummated  in  1902.  And  the  Berlin-to- 
Bagdad  Railroad  project  of  Germany  removed  the  last  valid  reason 
for  England's  policy  of  isolation. 

The  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad 

With  most  of  the  great  foreign  fields  for  economic  exploitation 
preempted  by  the  time  of  the  International  Industrial  Revolution  in 
Germany,  it  seemed  to  German  business  interests  that  at  least  one  rich 
section  of  undeveloped  territory  might  be  legitimately  claimed  as  field 
for   German    foreign   development.      This   was   Asia   Minor.      It  was 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  liS/o-ipii  73 

Turkish  soil,  but  Turkey  was  totally  unable  to  develop  it  industrially, 
nor  was  she  unwilling  to  grant  concessions  looking  toward  that  end 
to  a  foreign  Power.  None  of  the  other  great  Powers  of  Europe  had 
laid  claim  to  exclusive  economic  interests  in  either  Turkey  in  Europe 
or  in  Turkey  in  Asia ;  and  Germany  could  well  claim  that  she  was  but 
following  in  the  footsteps  of  the  other  great  Powers  without  treading 
on  the  toes  of  any  of  them  if  she  arrogated  to  herself  the  right  to 
economic  exploitation  of  Turkey  and  Asia  Minor.  There  were  vast 
economic  possibilities  not  only  in  Turkey,  but  also  in  Mesopotamia, 
Persia  and  Arabia ;  and  Germany  laid  her  plans  with  high  expectations 
of  rich  reward. 

Germany's  program  was  concerned  chiefly  with  a  railroad  from  Con- 
stantinople through  Bagdad  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  with  branch  lines 
through  Dainascus  stretching  along  both  sides  of  the  Red  Sea.  A  tun- 
nel would  be  constructed  under  the  Bosphorus,  so  that  the  traffic  might 
be  uninterrupted  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  From 
Austria-Hungary,  the  European  sections  of  the  railroad  would  pass 
through  the  Balkan  states,  so  that  Germany's  interest  in  maintaining 
Austrian  supremacy  in  the  Balkans  against  Russian  interests  became 
more  vital  than  ever.  The  railroad  would  open  to  German  business 
lands  which  had  hitherto  been  largely  inaccessible  for  extensive  trade, 
investment  and  raw  materials ;  and  Germany  took  deep  interest  and 
pride  in  her  new  project.  Of  course,  the  German  government  was 
by  no  means  blind  to  the  political  and  military  possibilities  also  in  a 
railroad  over  which  troops  could  be  transported  as  readily  as  freight. 
And  the  railroad  would  cut  off  Russia  from  the  Mediterranean  in  the 
Balkans  and  at  Constantinople. 

Turkey  had  not  forgotten  that  Germany  had  been  among  the  Pow- 
ers to  protect  Turkish  interests  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin;  and  from 
that  time  Germany  had  sedulously  cultivated  the  friendship  of  the 
Sultan's  government.  Soon  after  his  accession,  William  II  had  for- 
mally paid  a  visit  of  friendship  to  the  Sultan.  Germany  dispatched 
as  ambassador  to  Turkey  the  ablest  German  diplomat  of  that  and  even 
of  a  later  time,  von  Bieberstein ;  and  she  had  no  trouble  in  getting  the 
concessions  she  desired  from  the  Sultan  for  the  "Bagdadbahn.'" 

In    1896,  a  section  of  the  proposed  road,   from  the   Bosphorus  to 


74  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Konia,  in  Anatolia,  had  been  completed  with  the  support  of  both  Ger- 
man and  British  capitalists;  and  in  1899  and  again  in  1902  the  Kaiser 
obtained  from  Turkey  the  concessions  he  needed  to  extend  that  road 
to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Indeed,  it  was  not  until  1899  that  the  full  scope 
of  the  German  plan  was  made  plain  to  other  countries,  including 
England. 

England  became  at  once  thoroughly  alarmed  by  and  antagonistic  to 
the  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad.  German  exploitation  of  Turkey  in 
Europe  was  of  little  concern  to  England,  but  nothing  could  have  altected 
English  interests  more  profoundly  than  a  great  German  port  on  the 
Persian  Gulf  pointed  directly  at  India,  with  a  similar  port  pointing  at 
Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal ;  and  both  ports  with  direct  rail  connection 
with  Berlin.  Egypt  was  by  no  means  tranquil  under  English  rule ;  and 
then,  as  earlier  in  the  Sepoy  rebellion  in  1857  ^^^^  even  as  later  during 
the  Great  War,  nationalistic  feeling  was  strong  in  India.  England  saw 
in  the  proposed  railroad  another  carefully  prepared  German  plan  to 
undermine  the  British  Empire,  and  by  1900  England  had  learned  not  to 
trust  Germany.  She  determined  to  thwart  Germany's  intentions  at 
all  costs. 

The  only  section  of  coast  along  the  Persian  Gulf  where  Germany 
could  find  a  harbor  adequate  to  be  the  terminus  of  the  "Bagdadbahn" 
was  in  the  province  called  Koweit.  England  proceeded  to  resurrect 
a  shadowy  claim  over  Koweit,  and  established  a  protectorate  over 
it.  The  German  threat  at  India  now  seemed  more  serious  to  England 
than  the  Russian,  and  England  came  to  an  understanding  with  Russia, 
now  occupied  chiefly  with  Manchurian  troubles,  concerning  their  long 
dispute  about  Asia;  with  the  result  that  the  land  of  Persia  was  divided 
between  them — the  northern  part  of  Persia  becoming  a  Russian  sphere 
of  influence,  the  southern  part  (contiguous  to  India)  becoming  an 
English  sphere  of  influence,  and  the  two  countries  guaranteeing  to  keep 
the  central  part  of  Persia  a  neutral  zone  to  be  free  of  all  foreign  ag- 
grandisement. The  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad  would  have  to  locate  its 
eastern  terminus  somewhere  in  the  sands  of  the  Arabian  desert. 

German  rage  at  the  frustration  of  the  Kaiser's  cherished  scheme 
knew  no  bounds.  Germany  indulged  unrestrainedly  in  accusations  that 
England  not  only  wanted  to  keep  her  own  position  of  vantage  in  the 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  iSyo-igii  75 

world,  but  also  was  straining  every  nerve  to  prevent  Germany  from 
obtaining  a  similar  position,  to  which  Germany's  great  achievements 
entitled  her.  To  German  eyes,  England  was  trying  to  keep  Germany 
from  "a  place  in  the  sun."  New  weight  was  given  the  utterances  of 
those  German  thinkers  who  insisted  that  England  was  the  inevitable 
enemy  of  the  "Deutschtum"  and  that  war  between  them  was  inevitable. 
The  people  of  the  two  countries  conceived  a  deep  and  bitter  hatred 
of  each  other  which  did  not  lessen  as  the  years  rolled  on. 

German  popular  animosity  against  England  was  now  even  more 
intense  than  English  popular  animosity  against  Germany.  England's 
next  step  in  international  affairs  was  now  inevitable.  She  must  aban- 
don her  position  of  splendid  isolation,  and  join  the  alliance  against 
Germany. 

The  Entente  Cordiale 

On  April  8,  1904,  England  and  France  signed  an  agreement  estab- 
lishing an  "Entente  Cordiale,"  a  cordial  understanding,  between  them. 
The  issue  on  which  the  agreement  turned  was  Morocco.  France  con- 
sidered Morocco  pre-destined  to  join  French  colonial  territory  in  north 
Africa,  but  England  had  certain  colonial  claims  in  Morocco,  so  that 
an  agreement  between  the  two  countries  was  necessary.  By  the  terms 
of  the  understanding,  England  agreed  to  give  France  free  rein  in 
Morocco  and  in  return  France  agreed  not  to  thwart  England's  aspira- 
tions in  Egypt. 

But  more  was  contained  in  the  understanding  between  England  and 
France  than  this  compromise  regarding  Egypt  and  Morocco.  There 
were  secret  clauses  in  the  treaty  which  were  not  published  until  some 
years  afterwards.  All  Europe  was  intensely  interested  in  knowing 
the  content  of  those  secret  clauses ;  Germany  was  especially  interested. 

So  that  neither  France  nor  England  was  isolated  any  longer.  France 
had  two  powerful  supporters  in  England  and  Russia ;  she  had  regained 
much  of  the  position  she  had  lost  in  1870;  no  longer  would  it  be  neces- 
sary for  her  to  submit  to  German  domination  without  struggle. 

Nor  did  England  come  unsupported  into  the  Entente  Cordiale.  Some 
years  previously,  England  had  determined  to  oppose  Russian  advance 


yd  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

in  the  Far  East,  and  being  at  that  time  occupied  with  the  difficult 
problem  of  defeating  the  Boers,  she  had  turned  for  help  to  Japan. 
Japan  had  not  swung  into  the  orbit  of  Western  ideas  until  Commodore 
Perry's  visit  in  1853  ;  but  she  had  proved  an  apt  pupil  of  Western  civili- 
zation and  England  knew  how  ably  prepared  for  conflict  were  the 
Japanese  army  and  navy.  Japan  also  was  anxious  to  dominate  the  Far 
East,  and  Russia's  Far  Eastern  activities  were  opposing  Japan's ;  so 
that  an  alliance  between  Japan  and  England  had  been  consummated 
in  1902. 

Moreover,  Italy  was  but  a  lukewarm  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
with  Germany  and  Austria.  Delcasse  had  soothed  Italy's  wrath  at  the 
French  occupation  of  Tunis  by  promising  Italy  a  free  hand  in  Tripoli, 
and  Tripoli  belonged  to  Germany's  friend.  Turkey.  A  bitter  tariff 
war  between  France  and  Italy,  begun  in  1885,  had  well-nigh  disrupted 
Italian  industries,  but  Delcasse  had  been  astute  enough  to  put  an  end 
to  the  Franco-Italian  commercial  warfare  in  1898:  and  had  thereby 
earned  the  deep  gratitude  of  Italy.  Again,  Italy's  claims  for  the  Irre- 
denta and  for  land  along  the  Adriatic  were  still  conflicting  with  those 
of  Austria ;  and  in  case  of  a  general  European  war,  Italy's  interests 
would  best  be  served  by  the  defeat  of  Austria.  Italy's  membership 
in  the  Triple  Alliance  involved  also  extensive  military  preparations  on 
an  extremely  expensive  scale,  and  Italy  was  notoriously  a  poor  country. 
Moreover,  it  was  by  this  time  evident  that  the  later  developments  of  the 
Dreyfus  scandal  in  France  had  turned  the  tide  in  France  against  the 
Catholic  party  there  and  accordingly  against  the  French  support  of 
the  Papal  interests.  It  was  therefore  natural  that  when  in  1902  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  renewed,  the  Italian  foreign  minister  should 
publicly  announce  that  its  terms  contained  no  clause  providing  for 
Italian  aggression  against  France. 

In  fact,  the  neutrality  of  Italy  in  the  flrst  months  of  the  Great 
War  later  proved  how  insecure  was  the  hold  of  the  Triple  Alliance  upon 
Italy.  Germany  must  have  known  that  Italy  was  using  her  position 
largely  for  purposes  of  international  bargaining  and  that  in  the  event 
of  war  German  armies  would  get  little  help  from  Italy;  and  therefore 
German  anger  at  Italy's  final  decision  to  join  the  Entente  during  the 


German  Diplomat ic  Pomiuatioti,   iS/O-ipir  jj 

Great  War  was  not  so  violent  as  would  have  been  the  case  if  Germany 
had  definitely  counted  upon  Italian  support. 

Accordingly,  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  were  organized  by  1904 
into  two  armed  camps — Germany  actively  supported  by  Austria  and 
nominally  supported  by  Italy  in  the  Triple  Alliance,  with  a  friend  in 
Turkey;  France  actively  supported  by  Russia  and  England  in  the  En- 
tente Cordiale,  with  Japan  friendly  and  Spain  not  unfriendly. 

The  First  Moroccan  Crisis 

It  was  now  Germany's  turn  to  fear.  Manifestly,  something  had  hap- 
pened not  in  accord  with  her  destiny  to  dominate  Europe.  Bismarck 
had  ordered  and  Europe  had  obeyed — now  the  enemy  whom  Germany 
had  thought  humiliated  for  all  time  was  again  in  condition  to  oiTer 
battle.  Bismarck  had  arranged  Europe  as  German  interests  dictated — 
now  Germany  was  not  even  consulted,  much  less  listened  to,  in  the  dis- 
position of  Morocco.  Where  were  German  prestige,  German  leader- 
ship, German  diplomacy,  even  German  assurance  against  defeat? 
Especially,  where  was  the  Germany  army?  The  Junkers  and  the  capi- 
talist interests  of  Germany  echoed  the  cry — Where  was  the  German 
army?  Bismarck  would  have  used  it  rather  than  suffer  humiliation 
such  as  this  combination  of  Franco-Russian,  Franco-Italian  and  now 
Franco-English  ententes,  the  German  Kaiser  was  told.  And  when  the 
Kaiser  still  remained  obdurate,  he  was  promptly  and  roundly  denounced 
by  the  Junkers  and  by  the  capitalist  interests  throughout  Germany  as 
a  traitor  to  the  Fatherland. 

But  the  Kaiser  had  no  intention  of  submitting  without  a  contest. 
He  was  merely  biding  a  more  opportune  occasion. 

In  the  meantime,  France  thrilled  at  the  contemplation  of  her  achieve- 
ment. Morocco  was  a  flaming  feather  in  her  bonnet.  Morocco  was 
rich  in  mineral  wealth,  especially  iron.  It  had  good  harbors  on  both 
the  ocean  and  the  Mediterranean.  It  was  across  from  Gibraltar,  and 
thus  enjoyed  no  mean  strategic  position.  It  was  easily  accessible  to 
France  and  its  pleasant  climate  might  later  induce  extensive  French 
colonization.  It  was  contiguous  to  the  other  French  colonial  territory 
in  Africa.     And,  most  important  of  all  considerations,  Morocco  enor- 


78  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

niously  enhanced  French  prestige  and  by  the  same  token  seriously 
diminished  German  prestige  throughout  the  world ;  and  for  the  first 
time  patriotic  Frenchmen  could  feel  that  the  degradation  of  1870  was 
on  the  fair  road  to  being  avenged.  Only  the  French  Socialists,  under 
the  leadership  of  the  far-seeing  Jean  Jaures,  objected  to  French  colo- 
nial expansion,  and  discerned  war  in  the  future  as  the  result  of 
Delcasse's  strategy. 

For  many  months,  the  Kaiser  dodged  the  issue.  Publicly,  he  pre- 
tended to  disregard  the  Moroccan  situation  as  unimportant  and  as  not 
afifecting  any  vital  interests  of  Germany.  Officially,  he  was  as  cordial 
as  ever  to  France  and  England,  even  to  M.  Delcasse.  And  then  the 
situation  for  which  he  had  been  patiently  waiting  presented  itself. 

TJie  Russo-Japanese  War — In  1894,  Japan  had  asserted  her  inten- 
tion to  dominate  the  Far  East,  and  at  the  same  time  had  revealed  the 
efficiency  of  her  army,  by  vanquishing  China  with  dispatch,  ease  and 
thoroughness.  According  to  the  terms  of  peace,  Japan  was  to  receive 
Formosa  and  the  Liao-Tung  peninsula  (adjoining  Korea),  rich  com- 
mercial concessions  were  to  be  granted  Japan  by  China,  China  was  to 
pay  a  considerable  indemnity  and  Korea  was  to  recognize  the  suzerainty 
of  Japan. 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  by  this  time  the  Russian  plans  for  expansion 
in  the  Far  East  were  fully  under  way,  and  Japan's  success  threatened 
to  thwart  Russia's  program.  Russia  was  especially  anxious  to  capture 
a  port  on  the  Pacific  far  enough  to  the  south  to  be  free  from  ice- 
blockades,  and  in  the  territory  demanded  by  Japan  from  China  was 
situated  Port  Arthur,  the  logical  port  for  Russia's  plans  and  for  the 
southern  terminus  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railroad.  Russia  accord- 
ingly proceeded  to  arrange  an  alliance  between  herself,  France  and  Ger- 
many, ostensibly  to  maintain  the  territorial  integrity  of  China,  and 
then  the  coalition  of  the  western  Powers  demanded  that  Japan  sur- 
render most  of  her  territorial  acquisitions  resulting  from  the  war  with 
China;  and  although  Japan  consented,  she  consented  only  with  an  ill- 
grace,  only  because  she  was  unable  to  resist  the  demands  inspired  by 
Russia,  and  only  with  determination  to  be  avenged  on  Russia. 

In    passing,    it    might    be    noted    that    the    Eui^opean    powers    then 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  i8/0-i^ii  79 

themselves  proceeded  to  dismember  China,  Germany  seizing  the  import- 
ant harbor  of  Kiao-Chau,  France  and  England  also  acquiring  additions 
to  their  territory  at  the  expense  of  China,  and  Russia  seizing  Manchuria 
and  the  Liao-Tung  peninsula.  Russia  then  took  steps  to  colonize  her 
Far  Eastern  territory  on  a  large  scale  with  Russian  citizens. 

Japan  immediately  realized  that  sooner  or  later  she  would  come  into 
armed  conflict  with  Russia  in  the  Far  East,  and  from  1896  carefully 
prepared  her  army  and  navy  for  war.  In  1903,  Japan  asserted  herself, 
after  having  made  all  the  arrangements  necessary  to  guard  against 
support  to  Russia  from  any  great  Power.  Russia  was  occupying  Man- 
churia only  under  promise  made  years  previously  to  withdraw  as  soon 
as  possible  from  Manchurian  soil,  and  Japan  insisted  in  1903  that  the 
time  had  arrived  for  that  promise  to  be  redeemed.  Moreover,  again  con- 
trary to  treaties,  Russia  had  begun  to  penetrate  Korea  to  develop  valu- 
able lumber  concessions  which  she  had  wrung  from  the  Korean  Gov- 
ernment ;  and  Japan  insisted  that  Russia  make  clear  also  her  intentions 
regarding  Korea.  But  even  members  of  the  royal  family  of  Russia 
were  financially  interested  in  the  Korean  lumber  concessions,  and 
Russia  temporized.  On  February  5,  1904,  Japan  declared  war  against 
Russia. 

The  Entente  Cordiale  between  England  and  France  was  not  signed 
until  April  8,  1904.  This,  then,  was  the  cause  of  the  Kaiser's  inaction 
in  the  face  of  the  "rapprochement"  between  France  and  England — 
he  was  waiting  to  see  what  Japan  would  do  to  France's  ally.  There 
hasn't  been  a  period  in  the  last  fifty  years  when  Germany  has  not 
been  fully  informed  by  her  secret  agents  of  the  military  condition  of 
the  other  great  Powers,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  Kaiser  realized  how 
strong  was  the  little  nation  of  the  Pacific  and  how  weak  was  the  largest 
nation  of  Europe.  No  other  nation  watched  the  developments  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  with  greater  interest  than  Germany. 

Both  on  land  and  on  sea,  Japan  began  to  win  a  series  of  smashing 
and  devastating  victories.  A  victory  ofif  Port  Arthur  in  February, 
1904,  and  another  ofi  Vladivostock  in  May  assured  Japan  complete  con- 
trol of  the  sea  in  the  Far  East.  Port  Arthur  was  surrounded,  besieged 
and  captured  on  the  first  day  of  1905.  The  Russian  land  forces  were 
divided  and  their  only  line  of  communication  with  the  base  of  supplies 


8o  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

thousands  of  miles  away  was  the  single-track  and  over-crowded  Trans- 
Siberian  Railroad.  In  a  word,  the  Russians  were  employing  military 
methods  of  the  nineteenth  century  while  the  Japanese  were  employing 
military  methods  of  the  twentieth  century ;  and  the  war  was  an  almost 
unbroken  series  of  Japanese  victories.  But  the  Kaiser  was  still  waiting 
for  a  final  and  decisive  Russian  defeat,  which  occurred  in  the  long  and 
terrific  battle  of  Mukden. 

The  battle  of  Mukden  was  concluded  on  the  ninth  day  of  March. 
1905.  And  on  the  last  day  of  that  month,  the  Kaiser's  yacht  dropped 
anchor  in  the  harbor  of  Tangier,  in  Morocco.  The  Kaiser  went  ashore, 
visited  the  Sultan  of  Morocco  officially,  and  with  the  whole  world  for 
an  audience  delivered  a  speech  to  the  Moorish  leader  which  every  well- 
informed  student  of  foreign  afifairs  in  Europe  was  reading  within  two 
hours  with  the  fear  of  war  in  his  breast. 

In  his  speech,  the  Kaiser  addressed  the  Sultan  as  an  independent 
ruler.  Morocco  should  always  be  independent  and  free  of  foreign 
domination ;  and  Germany  was  prepared  to  come  to  Morocco's  assist- 
ance, if  need  be,  to  achieve  that  end.  All  nations  must  share  on  terms 
of  equality  in  the  trade  of  independent  Morocco.  The  Moors  were 
Mohammedans,  and  the  Kaiser  was  well-known  as  the  defender  of 
the  Mohammedans. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  Germany  was  not  without  just  cause  for 
complaint  at  the  Anglo-French  disposition  of  Morocco.  A  treaty  of 
the  great  Powers  in  1880  had  guaranteed  all  nations  equal  rights  in  the 
development  of  Morocco ;  and  although  there  was  tacit  agreement 
among  the  great  Powers  that  treaties  which  were  not  renewed  were 
hardly  to  be  regarded  as  effective  after  several  decades,  yet  Germany 
could  well  insist  that  she  should  have  been  at  least  consulted  before 
the  treaty  was  annulled.  Accordingly,  it  was  rather  the  defiant  manner 
of  the  German  protest  which  caused  alarm  and  anger  in  Europe.  In- 
deed, Germany  has  always  revealed  an  irritating  disregard  of  interna- 
tional etiquette,  delighting  in  asserting  her  point  with  unnecessary  rude- 
ness; and  to  a  considerable  extent  the  deep  antagonisms  among  the 
countries  of  Europe  in  the  twentieth  century  may  be  laid  at  the  door  of 
the  crude  and  insulting  methods  of  German  diplomacy. 


Photos   Supplied    by    International  Film    Service 


THE  DEVASTATION  OF  WAR 

The  upper  panel  shows  the  appearance  of  Ypres  today.  In  1914,  Ypres 
was  one  of  the  most  prosperous  towns  in  Belgium,  with  a  population  of  some 
20,000. 

The  upper  central  panel  to  the  left  shows  the  result  of  five  minutes'  bom- 
bardment by  American  aviators  at  Ostend,  during  the  German  occupation 
of  that  town. 

The  upper  central  panel  to  the  right  shows  the  top  of  the  ruined  tower  of 
the  Cloth  Hall  at  Ypres.  The  Cloth  Hall,  one  of  the  famous  sights  of 
interest  in  Europe,  was  begun  in  1201  and  finished  in  1342. 

The  lower  central  panel  to  the  left  shows  all  that  was  left  of  the  Cloth 
Hall   at   Xieuport,   France,  after  the  bombardment  of  the  town. 

The  lower  central  panel  to  the  right  shows  the  ruins  of  a  spinning  room 
in  a  weaving  factory  along  the  Oise. 

The  lower  panel  shows  the  appearance  of  an  individual  dwelling  after 
shell-fire.  This  particular  house  was  once  the  abode  of  a  well-to-do  French 
family  near  the   Aisne. 


German  Diplomatic  Doiiiiiiafioii,   i8yo-ii)ii  8i 

At  all  events,  the  decision  now  lay  in  the  hands  of  France — was  it 
to  be  peace  or  war  ?  When  France  surveyed  the  situation,  she  sadly 
confessed  that  it  would  have  to  be  peace.  The  scars  of  the  Dreyfus 
case,  with  the  accompanying  religious  and  political  quarrels,  were  still 
by  no  means  healed.  Both  France  and  Germany  knew  that  the  French 
army  was  ill-prepared  and  that  the  German  war  machine,  as  always, 
represented  the  last  word  in  military  preparedness.  England,  it  is  true, 
could  be  counted  upon  for  support,  but  the  Entente  was  still  new,  there 
was  an  old  tradition  in  England  of  enmity  between  France  and  Eng- 
land, and  it  was  extremely  doubtful  if  the  English  people  would  be 
over-enthusiastic  about  another  war  so  soon  after  the  Boer  War.  Rus- 
sia not  only  had  been  pio^trated  abroad  but  was  convulsed  at  home. 
So  France  consented  to  modify  the  Moroccan  agreement,  and  the 
Kaiser's  popularity  increased  in  Germany. 

But  Germany  was  not  yet  satisfied.  The  Moroccan  arrangement 
had  touched  not  only  her  material  interests — it  had  threatened  German 
prestige.  The  diplomatic  attack  had  been  public  and  arrogant,  the 
diplomatic  victory  must  be  public  and  humiliating.  Furthermore,  it 
had  been  due  chiefly  to  one  man's  abilities  that  France  had  been  able 
of  late  to  assert  herself,  and  Germany  discerned  the  opportunity  to 
kill  two  birds  with  one  stone — she  demanded  that  Theophile  Delcasse 
resign  as  minister  for  foreign  affairs  of  France. 

It  was  a  demand  no  less  humiliating  than  that  which  nine  years  later 
Austria  was  to  make  of  Servia,  and  which  Servia  declared  was  too 
humiliating  to  be  accepted.  But  France  was  powerless.  Delcasse 
resigned. 

Still  Germany  was  not  content.  She  demanded  that  a  great  inter- 
national conference  be  held  to  settle  the  Moroccan  dispute.  The  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  that  demand,  its  reception  by  the  other  great 
Powers,  the  reasons  behind  it,  the  results  which  attended  it,  all  are 
still  shrouded  in  mystery  so  far  as  general  public  knowledge  is  con- 
cerned. But  one  fact  about  the  conference,  which  was  held  in  Alge- 
ciras,  Spain,  in  1906.  is  clear — Germany  suffered  a  decisive  diplomatic 
defeat.  Of  the  thirteen  great  Powers  represented  at  Algeciras,  includ- 
ing the  United  States,  only  Austria  and  Morocco  voted  with  Germany 
on  the  important  issues.     Especially  implicit  was  England's  support  of 


8,2  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

France — England  had  not  entered  lightly  into  the  Entente  Cordiale. 
Belgium  also  threw  in  her  lot  with  the  Entente  against  Germany.  The 
Conference  decided  against  the  German  claim  of  absolute  independence 
for  ^Morocco,  and,  although  theoretically  safeguarding  German  com- 
mercial interests  there  and  refusing  to  recognize  France's  right  to  a 
protectorate  over  the  country,  nevertheless  assigned  to  France  and 
Spain  significant  police  powers  in  the  ttirbulent  Moorish  state. 

United  States  at  the  Algeciras  Conference.  The  true  reasons  why 
the  United  States  departed  from  her  traditional  policy  of  non-interfer- 
ence in  European  politics  in  order  to  participate  in  the  Algeciras 
Conference  are  not  clear.  The  pretext  evidently  lay  in  the  capture  in 
1904  of  a  naturalized  z^merican  citizen,  Perdicaris,  by  a  Moroccan 
bandit,  Raisuli,  who  used  his  capture  for  his  own  political  ends  under 
the  guise  of  holding  Perdicaris  for  a  ransom.  It  is  hardly  probable 
that  this  country  entered  the  diplomatic  lists  against  Germany  as  a 
result  of  attempted  German  interference  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
Venezuela  in  1903,  when  strong  and  even  threatening  representations 
by  President  Roosevelt  had  been  necessary  to  bring  Germany  to  terms. 
(Germany  had  yielded  to  arbitration  only  after  President  Roosevelt 
had  assured  the  German  ambassador  that  Admiral  Dew^ey  would  pro- 
ceed with  a  fleet  to  A^enezuela  within  four  days,  but  had  promised  to 
allow  the  Kaiser  to  arrogate  to  himself  the  credit  for  arbitrating  the 
difficulty  in  case  Germany  yielded.)  The  United  States  could  claim 
other  interests  also  in  the  Algeciras  Conference,  for  it  had  participated 
in  the  European  conference  in  1880  regarding  Morocco  and  again  in 
1885  in  another  conference  regarding  territorial  adjudications  in  Africa. 
If  participation  in  the  Algeciras  Conference  w^as  intended  by  President 
Roosevelt  as  an  entering  wedge  for  a  more  influential  position  for  the 
United  States  in  world  politics,  he  did  not  see  his  w^ay  clear  to  taking 
the  country  into  his  confidence. 

At  all  events,  this  country  signed  the  Algeciras  pact  only  with  the 
reservation  of  committing  itself  to  no  guarantee  to  take  measures  to 
enforce  it ;  and  later  when  Germany  called  to  our  attention  the  fact 
that  the  Algeciras  pact   was  being  violated.   President   Taft   insisted 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  iSjo-ipn  83 

that  the  obhgations  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  restrained  us  from  partici- 
pation in  European  poHtical  affairs. 

Nevertheless,  our  participation  in  the  international  conference  in 
1906  was  a  striking  forerunner  of  our  participation  in  the  great  inter- 
national conference  at  Paris  in  1919.  For  in  both  conferences  the 
United  States  was  associated  with  the  great  Powers  of  the  world  in 
maintaining  world  order.  In  both  conferences  the  United  States  played 
a  leading  part.  In  both  conferences,  the  United  States  supported 
the  interests  of  France  and  England  against  those  of  Germany.  And 
our  representative  at  the  Algeciras  Conference  was  Henry  White, 
one  of  our  five  representatives  to  the  Paris  Conference  thirteen  years 
later. 

The  Triple  Entente 

In  the  combination  of  Powers  against  the  Triple  Alliance  (Germany, 
Italy,  Austria),  a  striking  anomaly  existed.  Russia  was  allied  with 
France,  England  was  allied  with  France,  but  there  was  not  even  friend- 
ship, much  less  an  alliance,  between  Russia  and  England.  For  decades 
England  had  been  opposing  the  Russian  advance  toward  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  toward  the  East.  In  1827,  England  had  helped  Greece  to 
independence  against  Turkey  in  order  to  prevent  Russia  from  reaping 
the  benefits  of  the  Ottoman  defeat.  In  1854  the  two  countries  had 
actually  waged  war  in  the  Crimean  and  in  1878  England  had  been  a 
large  factor  in  depriving  Russia  of  the  fruits  of  the  Russian  victory 
over  Turkey  in  the  previous  year.  In  Afghanistan,  in  Tibet,  in  Persia, 
the  two  nations  were  at  loggerheads ;  and  before  the  twentieth  century, 
nine  of  every  ten  Englishmen  would  have  called  Russia  rather  than 
Germany  the  hereditary  foe  of  England.  In  the  Far  East,  also,  Rus- 
sia was  endeavoring  to  advance  from  her  territory  to  the  north  upon 
the  British  territory  to  the  south ;  and  it  has  already  been  seen  how 
England  allied  herself  with  Japan  against  Russia's  Far  Eastern  projects. 
In  1904,  England  and  Russia  had  again  come  almost  to  war  when  a 
Russian  battle-fleet  fired  by  mistake  upon  Englisii  fishing  vessels  in  the 
North  Sea.    England  had  been  sincerely  anti-Russian  during  the  Russo- 


.94  A  History  of  the  Great   War 

Japanese  War;  and  the  liberty-loving  English  detested  the  autocracy 
which  controlled  Russia. 

So  that  France  had  no  easy  task  in  persuading  her  two  chief  allies 
to  reach  an  "entente."  But  we  have  already  seen  how  England  was 
now  discerning  her  real  enemy  in  Germany,  and  how  she  had  already 
come  to  an  agreement  with  Russia  in  Persia  in  order  to  thwart  the 
full  development  of  the  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad.  In  addition,  Rus- 
sian and  English  business  interests  had  become  greatly  dependent  upon 
each  other.  Russia's  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Japan  in  1905  had  removed 
much  of  the  threat  of  Russian  domination  in  the  Pacific ;  and  England 
was  not  anxious  to  see  Russia  too  weak  in  the  Far  East  lest  Japan  be 
able  to  assume  domination  there  to  the  detriment  of  English  interests. 
England's  Far  Eastern  policy  had  been  one  of  supporting  Japan  against 
Russia ;  it  was  now  one  of  supporting  Russia  against  Japan.  More- 
over, in  the  First  Moroccan  Dispute  much  of  the  German  victory  had 
been  due  to  Russia's  weakness,  and  a  weak  Russia  would  still  further 
aid  Germany  in  the  future  Anglo-German  rivalry.  On  her  side,  Russia 
was  coming  around  to  place  the  chief  emphasis  in  her  policy  upon  the 
Balkan  situation,  and  for  some  years  England  had  realized  that  German 
domination  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Asia  Minor  was  less  desirable  than 
even  Russian  domination  in  these  disputed  regions. 

Accordingly,  in  1907,  France's  efforts  to  make  the  Entente  a  Triple 
instead  of  a  Double  Entente  were  successful.  On  August  31  of  that 
year,  a  definite  understanding  was  signed  between  Russia  and  England. 
They  came  to  an  agreement  concerning  their  colonial  aspirations — if 
there  were  also  secret  clauses  in  the  agreement  they  i)robably  assured 
Russia  support  in  the  Balkan  peninsula  and  in  her  campaign  for  the 
acquisition  of  Constantinople. 

In  the  same  year,  Japan,  also,  reached  an  understanding  with  Russia 
and  France.  Russia's  allies  immediately  planned  a  comprehensive  re- 
construction and  enlargement  of  the  Russian  army,  and  British  and 
French  officers  began  to  assist  the  Russian  military  command.  Ger- 
many was  being  encircled — the  balance  of  power  was  becoming  sus- 
ceptible to  very  slight  weights,  so  closely  were  the  lines  in  Europe  being 
drawn. 


German  Diplomatic  Domimition,   jS/o-ic^ii  85 

The  Renoi.ution  in  Turkey 

In  the  year  after  his  accession  in  1888,  the  Kaiser  had  paid  a  formal 
visit  of  friendship  to  the  Sultan  of  Turkey,  and  since  that  time  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries  had  been  very  cordial.  Germany 
needed  Turkish  control  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Asia  Minor  to  keep 
open  Germany's  connections  with  the  East,  just  as  Germany  needed 
Austrian  control  of  the  Balkans.  A  weak  and  unsupported  Turkey 
would  mean  Russian  control  of  Constantinople,  just  as  a  weak  and 
unsupported  Austria  would  mean  Russian  control  of  the  Balkans ;  and 
in  either  contingency,  the  "Pan-German''  hope  of  a  German  "Middle 
Europe''  (Mitteleuropa),  stretching  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Persian  Gulf, 
would  be  shattered.  So  the  Kaiser  had  proclaimed  himself  the  de- 
fender of  Islam,  and  for  years  the  Turkish  army  had  been  trained  and 
officered  by  Germans ;  while  von  Bieberstein  had  been  kept  at  Con- 
stantinople to  outgeneral  the  other  ambassadors  there. 

But  in  1908  a  successful  revolt  broke  out  against  the  venal  and  shift- 
less Turkish  government,  and  resulted  in  its  overthrow  at  the  hands 
of  the  "Young  Turks."  The  very  venality  and  shiftlessness  of  the  old 
regime  of  "The  Sick  Man  of  Europe"  had  aided  Germany  to  develop 
her  plans  in  Turkish  territory  almost  at  will,  so  that  the  revolt  was 
another  blow  at  the  strength  of  Germany's  position. 

The  Young  Turks  were  a  secret  organization  which  had  been  plan- 
ning a  "coup  d'etat"  for  a  long  time,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  the  revolu- 
tion could  have  been  successful  without  secret  support  from  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Triple  Entente.  But  Germany  was  still  mistress  of  Europe. 
She  knew  that  her  domination  was  sharply  challenged  by  the  revolution 
of  the  Young  Turks;  she  accepted  the  challenge;  von  Bieberstein  sum- 
moned to  his  aid  all  his  finesse ;  Russia  was  still  the  natural  foe  to 
Turkish  interests ;  and  Germany  regained  the  upper  hand  in  Turkish 
affairs. 

Turkey  by  this  time  had  also  developed  a  consciousness  of  nation- 
ality, and  the  Young  Turks  were  the  embodiment  of  the  new  Turkish 
nationalistic  ambitions.  They  were  ostensibly  reformers  and  liberals, 
but  their  political  and  social  creed  was  overshadowed  by  their  nation- 
alism.    Like  the   Magyars,   they  soon   developed   into  an  oppressing 


86  A   History  of  the  Great   War 

nationalistic  group,  persecuting  the  alien  nationalities  within  the  Turk- 
ish Empire  with  no  less  zeal  than  had  the  Sultan  whom  they  had  de- 
posed;  the  alien  nationalities  fought  their  oppressors;  and  once  more 
reaction  reigned  in  Turkey. 

_A\.\'i:x.\Ti()X  OF  Bosnia  and  HiiRZE(;oviXA  r.v  Austria 

After  the  Algeciras  Conference,  both  the  Triple  Entente  and  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  (  for  Turkey  was  now  completely  under  German 
control)  sought  every  available  opportunity  to  strengthen  themselves 
and  to  weaken  their  opponents.  In  theor}\  and  for  public  consump- 
tion, they  insisted  that  they  were  anxious  merely  to  preserve  the  world's 
peace  by  maintaining  the  Balance  of  Power  unaltered  from  its  previous 
state  (the  status  quo  ante)  ;  but  in  reality  each  group  was  anxious  to 
disturb  the  Balance  of  Power  if  it  could  but  weight  down  the  Balance 
of  Power  on  its  own  side.  The  Entente  strengthened  its  hold  upon 
Persia,  and  France  succeeded  in  seducing  Italy  even  farther  from  tlie 
Quadruple  Alliance,  while  the  reconstruction  of  the  Russian  army 
j)roceeded  apace.  On  her  side,  Germany  was  busy  in  intrigues  with 
Russia  and  in  the  Balkans ;  and  the  secret  manoeuvres  of  this  period 
can  not  yet  be  fully  understood.  In  so  delicate  a  situation,  little  was 
recjuired  to  give  birth  to  another  international  crisis ;  and  it  came  in 
iyo8,  immediately  after,  and  as  a  result  of,  the  Young  Turks' 
Revolution. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878  Austria- 
Hungary  had  been  assigned  the  government  of  two  Turkish  provinces 
in  the  Balkans.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  two  provinces  were  of 
considerable  extent,  being  almost  as  large  as  Servia  itself ;  and  their 
geographical  position  was  important  in  that  they  lay  between  Austria 
and  Serv'ia  and  between  Servia  and  the  Adriatic.  They  were  peopled 
by  South  Slavs,  of  the  same  race  as  the  inhabitants  of  Servia;  and 
all  Servia's  aspirations  toward  the  .Adriatic  lay  in  the  direction  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

Since  1878.  .Austria  had  treated  the  two  provinces,  nominally  part 
of  Turkey,  as  though  they  were  in  fact  part  of  the  Hapsburg  dominions. 
The  Turkish  Government  was  too  weak  to  resist  the  Austrian  "peace- 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,   i8/0-ipii  8y 

ful  penetration"'  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  as  long  as  they  were 
parts  of  Austria  de  facto,  the  Dual  Monarchy  cared  little  to  whom 
they  belonged  dc  jure. 

But  the  Young  Turks  seemed  to  be  of  different  calibre  from  the 
Sultan  whom  they  had  deposed.  They  at  least  threatened  to  reform 
and  even  to  liberalize  the  Turkish  government,  and  Austria  knew  that 
they  were  intensely  patriotic  and  zealous  to  assert  the  claims  of  Turkish 
nationalism.  It  was  inconceivable  that  the  Young  Turks  would 
acquiesce  in  the  hold  Austria  had  taken  upon  two  important  provinces 
which  belonged  to  Turkey,  and  Austria  therefore  determined  to  fore- 
stall any  move  of  the  new  Turkish  government  in  that  direction.  (3n 
October  3,  1908,  Austria  announced  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, 

Austria's  action  was  a  direct  repudiation  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin ; 
and  naturally  was  not  taken  without  the  advice,  if  it  was  taken  with- 
out the  instigation,  of  Gennany.  But  Austria's  action  was  much  more 
than  a  mere  repudiation  of  a  solemn  obligation — it  was  a  defiant 
taunt  at  the  Triple  Entente.  It  was  more  insulting  than  the  Anglo- 
French  agreement  concerning  Morocco  had  been  to  Germany,  for  Ger- 
man interests  in  Morocco  were  hardly  to  be  considered  vital,  whereas 
the  interests  of  the  Entente,  and  especially  of  Russia,  in  the  Balkans 
went  deep  down  to  the  very  national  existence  of  great  nations.  Again, 
the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  an  annexation  of  new 
bodies  of  Slavs  to  be  placed  under  Magyar  repression;  and  Magyar 
repression  of  Slavs  was  already  causing  profound  disturbance^ to  the 
peace  of  Europe.  Austria's  action  gave  almost  a  death-blow  to  the 
dream  of  a  greater  Servia,  or,  to  use  contemporaneous  nomenclature, 
of  a  united  Jugo-Slavia;  and  it  dragged  Russian  pride  down  into  the 
dust.  Finally,  the  action  of  Austria  was  taken  without  warning  or 
hint — she  repudiated  a  treaty  without  disclosing  her  intention  in  ad- 
vance to  all  the  other  signatories ;  it  was  another  attempt  to  assert  the 
leadership  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  and  the  subjection  of  the  Triple 
Entente. 

Russia  immediately  protested,  using  restrained  language  and  argu- 
ments, setting  forth  plainly  the  issues  involved,  and  requesting  an  inter- 
national conference.     England  and   France   supported  the  protest  of 


88  ^   Ifislory  of  the   Great   Ji'ar 

tneir  all}.  But  Austria  refused  to  consider  the  question  of  a  confer- 
ence— or  rather,  she  would  consent  to  the  caUing  of  a  conference  if 
it  were  agreed  a  priori  that  the  conference  would  not  be  empowered 
to  object  to  Austria's  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The 
Entente  renewed  its  protests,  in  firmer  language;  and  all  eyes  turned 
to  Berlin.  Berlin's  answer  was  to  the  point — she  would  support  Austria 
to  the  uttermost.  Germany  announced  also  that  unless  Servia  ceased 
her  preparations  for  war,  and  unless  Russia  consented  to  Austria's 
action,  an  Austrian  army  would  invade  Servia.  Austria  even  began 
mobilization.  Again  the  decision  lay  in  the  hands  of  the  Entente — 
was  it  to  be  peace  or  war? 

Again  the  Entente  hesitated..  Russia  was  in  no  shape  to  endure  a 
severe  military  struggle — she  had  not  yet  recovered  from  either  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  or  the  Revolution  of  1905 ;  nor  had  the  recon- 
struction of  her  anny  advanced  far.  Moreover,  the  great  mass  of  the 
English  and  French  people  were  not  interested  in  the  Balkan  Question, 
nor  could  they  be  made  to  see  that  a  great  moral  issue  had  been  raised — 
such  an  issue,  for  instance,  as  the  invasion  of  Belgium  in  1914.  The 
English  and  the  French  people  would  understand  only  that  they  were 
fighting  for  Russia;  and  about  this  time  new  revelations  of  the  utter 
brutality  of  the  Tsar's  regime  had  made  Russia  more  repugnant  than 
ever  to  the  democratic  sensibilities  of  the  Western  democracies.  In 
both  England  and  France,  the  pacifists  and  the  anti-Russians  would 
be  many ;  and  the  Socialists  in  France  had  become  powerful  and  would 
take  an  anti-war  stand,  under  the  magnificent  leadership  of  Jaures. 
Why  not  wait  before  joining  issue  with  Germany  until  Russia  was 
in  better  shape  to  give  material  assistance  ?  Again  the  Entente  yielded 
and  chose  peace.  Again  Germany  had  imposed  her  will  upon  Europe. 
Again  Germany  gloried  in  her  triumph  and  repeated  the  set  phrases 
about  the  super-race,  the  people  of  destiny,  and  the  degeneracy  of  other 
nations.  Again  the  Kaiser  was  feted,  and  Bismarck  was  no  longer 
mourned. 

The  triumph  seemed  to  be  conclusive.  Turkey  did  not  dare  to  hold 
aloof,  and  remained  within  the  fold  of  the  Quadruple  AlHance.  And  in 
1910,  the  Kaiser  actually  induced  Russia  to  reach  an  accord  witli 
Germany  which  withdrew  Russian  opposition  from,  and  even  promised 


German  Diplomatic  Domination,  iS/o-ic^ii  .         89 

Russian  support  to,  the  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad.  Germany  con- 
tinued the  development  of  the  "Bagdadbahn ;"  and  England's  attempt 
to  render  it  futile  had  largely  failed.  It  was  the  high-water  mark  of 
German  success ;  never  again  was  the  German  star  to  set  so  high  in 
the  ascendant. 


THE  DECLINE  OF  GERMAN  DIPLOMATIC 
DOMINATION,   1911-1914 

The  Second  Moroccan  Crisis 

The  Act  of  Algeciras  had  been  of  Httle  value  in  solving  the  problem 
concerning  Morocco  itself.  Revolts  broke  out  constantly  against  the 
authority  of  the  Sultan  of  Morocco.  \'iolence  became  more  and 
more  common.  Foreigners  and  foreign  property  were  attacked  and  a 
virtual  condition  of  anarchy  threatened  to  reign  in  the  land  of  the 
Moors.  As  France  used  the  various  developments  of  this  chaotic 
situation  to  exercise  more  and  more  the  police  authority  granted  her 
under  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  and  to  place  the  Moroccan  Government 
under  deeper  financial  obligations  to  France,  it  was  generally  believed 
that  France  was  bent  on  extending  her  control  over  Morocco  beyond 
the  limits  set  by  the  agreement  of  1906. 

In  1908,  a  conflict  between  the  German  consul  at  Casablanca. 
Morocco,  and  some  French  seamen,  concerning  fugitives  from  the 
French  army  who  had  taken  refuge  in  Morocco,  again  threatened 
an  international  crisis,  b^or  a  period,  international  feeling  ran  high 
and  there  were  many  negotiations  between  the  foreign  offices  of  the 
great  Powers,  with  the  result  that  Germany  finally  agreed  to  submit  her 
demand  for  an  apology  to  the  Hague  Tribunal.  The  Hague  award 
was  made  in  terms  which  conciliated  both  parties  to  the  dispute, 
although  sustaining  the  French  position  ;  and  again  the  war  cloud  passed 
over. 

But  the  power  of  Morocco  to  cause  trouble  between  France  and  Ger- 
many had  thus  again  been  recognized ;  and  in  1909,  the  two  countries 
came  to  a  formal  agreement  concerning  their  interests  in  Morocco. 
The  diplomatic  negotiations  of  this  period  have  been  religiously  kept 
from  public  knowledge,  so  that  it  is  difficult  to  appreciate  their  true 
significance.      The   French   government  agreed  to   safeguard   German 

90 


The  Decline  of  German  Diplomatic  Domination,  ipii-ipi^j.       91 

economic  interests  in  Morocco,  and  the  German  government  agreed  to 
recognize  the  potency  of  the  poHtical  claims  of  France  there.  France 
also  agreed  to  make  the  first  terminus  of  a  railroad  she  was  construct- 
ing in  Morocco  at  an  "open"  seaport,  where  German  trade  would  have 
equal  rights,  instead  of  at  an  interior  town  where  German  trade  would 
be  discriminated  against. 

The  whole  world,  accordingly,  was  dismayed  when  in  July,  191 1,  the 
German  Government  informed  the  great  Powers  that  a  German  gun- 
boat had  been  dispatched  to  the  "open"  Moroccan  port  of  Agadir. 
The  reason  assigned  by  Germany  was  the  protection  of  German  inter- 
ests and  trade  in  Agadir;  but  when  the  great  Powers  investigated 
Agadir,  they  discovered  that  it  was  a  town  of  only  several  hundred 
inhabitants,  with  no  important  economic  interests  of  any  kind.  Ger- 
many then  came  into  the  open  with  a  project  which  amounted  virtually 
to  a  partition  of  Morocco  between  France,  Spain,  and  Germany.  Three 
months  before,  Delcasse  had  been  recalled  to  the  French  Cabinet, 
and  Germany  scented  another  revolt  against  her  will.  The  Kaiser, 
emboldened  by  his  domination  of  Europe  in  1908  and  determined  to 
solidify  the  German  diplomatic  domination,  was  but  rattling  his  sword 
once  more. 

Again  it  was  the  manner  of  rather  than  the  reason  for  the  action  of 
Germany  which  caused  alarm  and  indignation.  Germany  might  well 
claim  a  right  to  protest  about  Morocco  itself.  France  had  not  lived 
up  to  the  agreement  of  1909  regarding  the  railroad  in  Morocco,  and 
was  building  sections  of  the  line  through  the  interior  before  she  com- 
pleted the  sections  which  would  terminate  at  an  open  port.  It  was  an 
illuminating  example  of  the  economic  causes  of  war.  In  April,  191 1, 
a  serious  revolt  had  broken  out  in  Fez,  which  may  or  may  not  have 
been  instigated  by  France ;  and  France  had  dispatched  an  army  of 
considerable  size  to  put  it  down.  Throughout  Europe,  France's  action 
had  been  regarded  as  the  final  step  in  establishing  a  French  protecto- 
rate over  Morocco  ;  and  Germany  had  officially  warned  France  that 
France  must  respect  the  Act  of  Algeciras  and  the  1909  agreement  by 
withdrawing  the  French  troops  after  the  troubles  in  Fez  had  been 
quieted,  without  seizing  the  political  control  of  the  country.  But  the 
French  army  definitely  located  itself  in  Morocco  with  Fez  as  head- 


92  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

quarters;  and  began  to  extend  in  all  directions  from  Fez  into  ^Moroccan 
territory. 

The  moment  was  well-chosen  for  another  assertion  of  the  inter- 
national power  of  Germany,  In  France,  a  huge  railroad  strike  had 
just  been  put  down  only  by  the  use  of  the  army,  and  French  politics 
were  chaotic,  with  a  change  of  ministry  a  few  days  previously  in  a 
fashion  which  made  improbable  the  formulation  of  a  definite  French 
foreign  policy.  The  new  premier  was  Caillaux,  believed  to  favor  a 
Franco-German  "rapprochement."  In  Fngland,  the  Asquith  ministry 
was  engaged  in  its  bitter  struggle,  under  the  leadership  of  Lloyd- 
George,  to  curtail  the  power  of  the  House  of  Lords,  and  England  also 
was  rent  with  political  dissensions.  Moreo\er,  Ireland  was  again  seeth- 
ing with  discontent,  and  strikes  in  England  as  well  as  in  France  had 
been  serious.  And  probably  Germany  wanted  definite  and  exact 
information  as  to  the  amount  of  support  which  England  would  give 
brance  in  case  hostilities  leading  to  the  first  great  European  war  in 
forty  years  should  actually  begin. 

But  on  this  occasion  Germany  overstepped  the  mark.  The  degrada- 
tion experienced  by  the  Entente  in  1908  had  left  a  deep  scar;  and  both 
England  and  France  had  resolved  that  submission  to  Germany  a  second 
time  was  impossible.  In  the  face  of  German  aggression,  French 
patriotism  brought  unity  into  France.  The  British  government  allowed 
Mr.  Lloyd-George,  ■  chancellor  of  the  exchequer,  and  the  notorious 
pacifist  of  the  Boer  War,  to  state  the  position  of  the  Asquith  ministry 
in  a  speech  at  the  Mansion  House  on  July  21.  Mr.  Lloyd-George's 
statements  were  guarded  but  definite — England  w'ould  support  France 
unreservedly,  even  to  the  point  of  war.  And  Mr.  Balfour,  leader  of 
the  Opposition,  gave  public  announcement  that  in  case  of  danger 
abroad,  there  would  be  unity  at  home,  and  the  Opposition  would  cease 
functioning  as  an  Opposition.  France  stood  firm — she  would  consult, 
she  would  reason,  she  would  confer,  she  would  arbitrate,  but  to  any 
check  upon  her  political  domination  of  Morocco  she  would  not  consent. 
The  Entente  had  made  its  choice — as  between  war  and  further  degrada- 
tion, it  chose  war..  The  burden  of  the  ultimate  decision  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Imperial  German  Government. 

While  the  Imperial  Gernian  Government  was  deciding  whether  to 


The  Decline  of  Gcruian  Diploinatic  Doininatiuti,  i<^ii-ii)i^       93 

provoke  the  general  European  conflagration  in  191 1,  or  to  wait  for 
another  occasion,  France  struck  swiftly  and  surely  at  one  of  the  most 
vital  sources  of  the  strength  of  the  German  Government.  Ever  since 
1875,  French  finance  had  been  supremely  powerful.  In  all  quarters 
of  the  globe  French  banks  had  sunk  their  roots  deep,  and  German 
banking  institutions  of  all  kinds  were  supported  largely  by  money 
from  France  or  by  funds  under  the  control  of  French  interests.  And 
immediately  after  the  Moroccan  crisis  became  acute,  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  upon  German  banks  from  many  different  sources.  Sud- 
denly, the  Berlin  Bourse  became  weak  and  a  panic  threatened  Germany. 

After  some  weeks,  Germany  decided  to  submit,  to  swallow  her 
humiliation  and  to  cover  the  blow  at  her  prestige  as  best  she  might. 
France  proved  not  unwilling  to  make  concessions  which  might  save 
Gemiany's  honor  in  the  eyes  of  all  except  the  most  discerning ;  and  on 
November  4,  191 1,  a  final  pact  was  signed  regarding  Morocco.  France 
was  to  establish  a  protectorate  over  Morocco  and  in  return  ceded  Ger- 
many sections  of  the  French  Congo.  The  new  German  acquisition 
looked  large  on  the  maps ;  only  those  familiar  with  the  territory  knew 
that  it  consisted  for  the  greater  part  of  swamps  and  marshes. 

Until  years  later,  when  all  the  circumstances  regarding  these  negotia- 
tions are  made  public,  only  one  answer  will  be  available  to  the  question 
as  to  why  Germany  did  not  choose  war  in  191 1  rather  than  in  1914 — 
she  must  have  hoped  that  in  later  years  she  would  be  able  to  retrieve 
her  diplomatic  defeat  as  she  had  more  than  retrieved  in  1908  her  defeat 
in  1906.  The  Balkans  were  becoming  more  and  more  troubfesome, 
and  they  were  ever  fertile  soil  for  diplomatic  machinations.  But  instead 
of  strengthening  German  prestige,  later  international  developments  were 
to  weaken  it  even  further. 

The  Turco-Italian  War 

Before  the  second  Moroccan  crisis  had  been  definitely  adjudicated, 
the  weakness  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  was  revealed  in  a  new  quarter — 
one  of  its  members  opened  war  upon  another.  Despite  Germany's 
pleas  and  threats,  Italy  determined  to  wait  no  longer  to  annex  Tripoli, 
and  to  that  end  declared  war  on  Turkey  on  September  27,  191 1. 


94  -^  History  of  the  Great   War 

As  has  been  seen,  Italy  had  been  forestalled  by  France  in  the  annexa- 
tion of  Tunis  in  1881.  In  the  race  among  the  great  Powers  for  colonies 
in  Africa,  Italy  then  resorted  to  the  extreme  east  of  the  Dark  Conti- 
nent, and  annexed  Eritrea,  along  the  Red  Sea,  and  Italian  Somaliland, 
along  the  Indian  Ocean.  Between  them  lay  Abyssinia,  to  which  Italy 
next  turned ;  but  the  Abyssinians  proved  such  formidable  antagonists 
that  in  i8cj6  Italy  was  compelled  to  recognize  Abyssinia  as  independent. 
Italy  then  looked  once  more  toward  northern  Africa,  and  set  her  heart 
upon  Tripoli,  under  Turkish  rule.  In  1901,  France  recognized  Italian 
claims  in  Tripoli  in  return  for  Italian  recognition  of  France's  rights 
in  Morocco;  and  by  the  time  of  the  Conference  of  Algeciras  Italy's 
claims  to  Tripoli  were  generally  recognized. 

Italy  proceeded  to  colonize  Tripoli,  maintaining  some  semblance  of 
law  and  order,  settling  many  Italian  families  there  and  developing  the 
economic  resources  of  the  country.  Plans  for  railroads  were  carefully 
and  extensively  drawn.  But  the  Young  Turks'  Revolution  in  1908 
rudely  shattered  Italian  hopes  for  Tripoli,  just  as  it  menaced  Aus- 
trian hopes  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  Turks  proceeded  to 
assert  themselves  in  Tripoli,  and  even  to  suppress  and  repress  the 
Italians  there.  Italy  accordingly  made  plans  to  assert  her  sovereignty 
over  Tripoli  by  force  as  soon  as  the  occasion  presented  itself,  in  the 
meantime  organizing  a  campaign  of  propaganda  along  that  line  in  the 
Italian  press.  The  diplomatic  defeat  of  Germany  in  191 1  gave  Italy 
the  opportunity  which  she  had  been  awaiting,  and  when  she  declared 
war  on  Turkey  and  occupied  Tripoli  with  an  Italian  army,  the  Social- 
ists were  the  only  influential  section  of  the  Italian  nation  not  to  sup- 
port the  war. 

The  Tripolitan  sea-coast  was  soon  captured  by  Italy,  but  Turkey 
nevertheless  would  not  cede  her  province.  Early  in  1912,  therefore, 
Italy  proceeded  to  move  her  troops  inland.  But  in  this  campaign 
she  met  with  bitter  and  efifective  guerilla  warfare  from  the  Arab 
natives,  who  were  Alohammedans  and  desired  to  remain  under  Mo- 
hammedan rather  than  submit  to  Christian  rule.  Turkey  made  little 
military  efifort  to  resist  the  Italian  military  penetration,  but  it  soon 
became  evident  that  the  resistance  of  the  natives  might  continue  for 
years.     So  in  April,   1912,  Italy  launched  a  direct  attack  against  the 


The  Decline  of  German  Diplojnatic  Domination^  ipii-ipi^       95 

Dardanelles.  But  the  Dardanelles  proved  to  be  well-nigh  impregnable, 
as  they  proved  several  years  later;  and  Italy  would  have  been  baf- 
fled again  had  not  Turkey  met  with  attack  in  another  quarter.  At 
this  time  the  Albanians  began  a  revolt  which  was  suspiciously  timely 
for  Italy  and  which  occupied  Turkey's  resources  to  the  utmost,  and 
the  signs  were  multiplying  that  the  Balkan  nations  were  preparing 
a  campaign  to  drive  Turkey  completely  out  of  Europe.  In  October, 
^lontenegro,  Servia,  Bulgaria  and  Greece  were  at  war  with  the  Sul- 
tan, and  Italy  threatened  to  join  them  in  case  Turkey  did  not  formally 
surrender  Tripoli.  Turkey  accordingly  yielded,  although  in  terms 
which  concealed  her  cession ;  and  Italy  incorporated  Tripoli  as  a 
part  of  the  kingdom  of  \'ictor  Emmanuel. 

The  Balkan  Question  Again 

The  Balkan  Peninsula  has  long  been  the  battleground  of  all  three 
fundamental  causes  of  the  Great  War — the  conflict  of  nationalities, 
the  conflict  of  economic  interests  and  the  conflict  of  political  ambi- 
tions. In  the  twentieth  century  these  conflicts  raged  with  renewed 
fury  in  the  '"cock-pit  of  Europe."  Repression  of  the  Slavs  con- 
tinued with  accelerated  intensity.  The  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad ; 
the  quest  of  Russia  for  a  port  free  from  ice-blockades ;  the  insistence 
of  Austria  upon  control  of  the  Danube;  the  hope  of  Servia  for  ac- 
cess to  the  sea ;  tariff  and  trade  discriminations,  all  used  the  Balkan 
states  as  pawns  on  their  chess-board  of  the  Western  world.  And 
in  the  Balkans  the  Quadruple  Alliance  sought  its  field  for  repairing 
its  political  power  and  diplomatic  reputation. 

So  conflicting  were  the  interests  of  the  Balkan  states  and  so  variant 
their  stages  of  culture  that  it  was  believed  until  1912  that  unified 
political  action  through  a  Balkan  League  was  chimerical.  But  on  one 
issue,  at  least,  the  Balkan  states  could  agree;  and  by  1912  that  issue 
stood  out  so  transcendant  that  for  the  first  time  it  stimulated  an  ef- 
fective alliance  between  them.  Servia,  Montenegro,  Roumania, 
Greece  and  Bulgaria  could  agree  together  that  the  "unspeakable  Turk" 
must  be  pried  from  his  hold  upon  the  Balkan  peoples. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in   1878  had  protected 


i)6  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

the  Turkish  hold  upon  the  Christian  peoples  of  the  Balkans,  so  thai 
as  late  as  1912  a  broad  belt  of  Balkan  territory,  including  Albania, 
Macedonia  and  Thrace,  was  still  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire.  In 
those  days,  the  Turkish  army  was  rated  high — it  was  a  product  of 
German  military  training  and  tactics — and  the  Balkan  states  had  found 
it  necessary  to  await  a  favorable  opportunity  before  breaking  a  lance 
against  the  Sultan.  Indeed,  in  1897,  Greece  had  gone  to  war  with 
Turkey  in  the  attempt  to  free  Crete  from  Turkish  rule,  and  Greece 
had  been  decisively  defeated.  (The  great  Powers,  however,  had  de- 
clared Crete  autonomous  under  Turkey  as  a  result  of  the  war,  and  had 
guaranteed  her  neutralit}-.) 

The  First  Balkan  War 

The  revolution  of  the  Young  Turks,  however,  had  greatly  stimu- 
lated feeling  for  joint  action  of  the  Balkan  states  against  Turkey;  for 
the  Revolution  not  only  weakened  the  political  power  of  the  Porte, 
but  also  re-awakened  the  ever-restless  Turkish  nationalistic  program 
of  attacking  the  alien  races  under  Turkish  rule.  Evidence  was  piling 
up  that  Turkey  was  preparing  to  re-conquer  Crete ;  and  from  1908  to 
1912  the  Slavs  in  Macedonia — a  large  section  of  the  Bulgarian  na- 
tionality— were  subjected  to  a  series  of  merciless  massacres  and  out- 
rages. Indeed,  the  whole  Bulgarian  nation  was  maddened  by  the 
plight  of  its  brothers  in  Macedonia ;  and  for  once  the  demand  for 
war  in  the  Balkans  arose  from  the  people  over  the  opposition  of  the 
government.  And  the  Italian  attack  on  Turkey  in  1911-12  brought 
the  situation  to  a  head.  Largely  through  the  diplomatic  sagacity  of 
Venizelos,  the  Greek  premier,  the  Balkan  states,  except  Roumania. 
united  in  a  declaration  of  war  against  Turkey  in  October,  1912.  War 
in  the  Balkans  was  no  part  of  the  program  of  the  great  Powers,  as  it 
threatened  to  upset  the  Balance  of  Power;  but  the  great  Powers  were 
divided  into  two  camps,  and  the  Balkan  states  were  one  in  purpose, 
so  that  the  very  division  in  the  Concert  of  Europe  rendered  the  great 
Powers  helpless  to  restrain  the  Balkans  from  their  plan. 

A  long  and  wearing  war  had  been  foreseen — especially  since  Turkey 
and  Italy  patched  up  peace  at  that  time — and  the  Balkan  states  laid 


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DESCRIPTION   OF   PICTURES   ON   REVERSE   SIDE 

Upper  Left  Hand  Corner — Lieutenant  General  Robert  Lee  Eullard,  Com- 
mander, First  Division,  American  Expeditionary  Force,  January,  1918,  and 
Commander,  Second  American  Army,  A.  E.  F.,  October  9,   1918 — . 

Upper  Right  Hand  Corner — General  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  Assistant  Chief  of 
Staff,  United  States  Army,  February  15,  1915,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  September 
22,  1917-March  1,  1918;  Member,  Supreme  War  Council  in  France,  1918, 
and  United  States  Delegate,  Paris  Peace  Conference,  1919. 

Center — General  John  Joseph  Pershing,  Commander-in-Chief,  American 
Military  Expedition  into  Mexico,  March,  1916,  and  Commander-in-Chief, 
American  Expeditionary  Force  in  Europe,  May,  19i7 — . 

Lower  Left  Hand  Corner — Lieutenant  General  Hunter  Liggett,  Commander, 
Western  Department,  United  States  Army,  1917,  and  Commander,  First  Ameri- 
can Army,  A.  E.  F.,  October  9,  1918—. 

Lower  Right  Hand  Corner — Major  General  Joseph  T.  Dicknian,  Com- 
mander, Camp  Custer,  Michigan,  1917,  and  Commander,  Third  American 
Army,  A.  E.  F.  C.^rmy  of  Occupation),  November  18,  1918 — . 


The  Decline  of  Gcruion  Diplomatic  Domination,  ipii-ipi^       97 

their  military  plans  very  carefully.  Greece  was  the  only  one  of  the 
combination  with  a  strong  navy,  and  Greece  had  been  admitted  into 
the  league  largely  in  order  that  she  might  retain  control  of  the  sea  and 
prevent  Turkey  from  dispatching  troops  and  supplies  by  water  to  Turk- 
ish forces  in  Albania  and  Macedonia.  The  Bulgars  were  to  attack 
through  Thrace  and  to  direct  their  army  toward  Constantinople  itself. 
Greece  was  to  send  her  army  northward  into  southern  Macedonia. 
Servia  was  to  dispatch  one  army  southward  into  northern  Macedonia 
and  another,  in  co-operation  with  the  Montenegrins,  was  to  invade  Al- 
bania. The  great  Powers,  helpless  to  interfere,  bent  every  effort  (under 
the  leadership  of  Sir  Edward  Grey)  to  prevent  the  conflagration  from 
spreading  to  Europe  outside  the  Balkans  and  secretly  hoped  that 
Turkey  would  be  able  to  resist  sufficiently  to  create  a  deadlock  that 
might  preserve  the  status  quo  ante  bellum. 

But  to  the  accompaniment  of  universal  amazement,  the  Balkan 
states  required  only  a  few  months  to  bring  Turkey  to  her  knees.  In 
Thrace,  Adrianople  was  surrounded ;  and  after  tremendous  Bulgarian 
victories  at  Kirk  Kilisse  and  Lule  Burgas,  the  Turks  fled  to  the  de- 
fences of  Constantinople  itself.  The  Grecian  forces  carried  all  before 
them,  and  by  November  9  captured  Saloniki.  Monastir  also  soon  fell 
before  the  Serbian  attack;  and  on  December  3,  1912,  Turkey  signed 
an  armistice.  In  the  next  month,  however,  another  revolution  in 
Turkey  brought  in  a  new  Turkish  government,  which  repudiated  the 
armistice,  with  the  result  that  hostilities  re-commenced.  Adrianople 
and  other  fortresses  then  fell  before  the  Balkan  attack ;  and  on  April 
20,  191 3.  the  war  officially  ended  with  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
London. 

The  agreements  entered  into  by  the  Balkan  allies  before  the  war 
had  provided  for  a  definite  disposition  of  the  land  wrung  from  Turkey. 
Servia  was  to  realize  her  dreams  for  access  to  the  sea  through  Al- 
bania, and  Montenegro  was  also  to  acquire  a  section  of  the  strip  of 
Turkish  soil  (Novi  Bazar)  which  had  separated  her  from  Servia. 
Bulgaria  was  to  obtain  territory  in  Macedonia  inhabited  by  Bulgars, 
and  Greece  was  also  to  be  recompensed  in  Crete  and  probably  in 
Macedonia.     Greece  (probably)  and  Bulgaria  were  to  gain  in  Thrace. 


98  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ'ar 

A  portion  of  Macedonia  claimed  by  both  Bulgaria  and  Servia  was  to 
be  awarded  according  to  the  arbitrament  of  the  Tsar  of  Russia. 

But  such  an  arrangement  was  no  part  of  the  plans  of  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance.  It  would  injure  tl'ie  interests  of  every  member.  Tur- 
key, obviously,  lost  everything  and  gained  nothing.  Serbian  posses- 
sion of  Albania  would  end  Italy's  ambitions  to  expand  along  Lhe 
Adriatic.  Serbian  possession  of  Albania  would  end  also  Austria's 
Adriatic  ambitions,  and  in  addition  would  create  a  Servia  stroiig 
both  in  economic  and  military  positions  and  hence  would  still  further 
cause  disaffection  among  the  Slavs  in  the  Dual  Monarchy.  And 
finally,  a  strong  Balkan  Federation  would  oppose  a  barrier  to  Ger- 
many's urge  toward  the  East  ("Drang  nach  Osten"),  would  endanger 
the  fullest  development  of  the  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad,  and  would 
cut  off  Germany  from  her  ally  in  the  East  who  had  been  so  over- 
whelmingly defeated. 

Accordingly,  Austria-Hungary,  the  prime  oppressor  of  nationali- 
ties, suddenly  developed  a  passion  for  protecting  the  natives  of  Al- 
bania from  the  oppression  of  Servia.  Albania  is  a  wnld,  barren  and 
thinly-populated  section  of  the  Adriatic  sea-coast  between  Greece  and 
Montenegro.  Its  inhabitants  are  still  in  a  nomadic  state  of  culture, 
with  tribal  government,  and  united  by  no  recognition  of  national  unity. 
The  Albanians  are  chiefly  Mohammedans,  although  there  are  also  many 
Albanian  Greek  and  Roman  Catholics.  They  are  unconnected  with 
the  other  Balkan  states  by  either  origin  or  language.  Many  of  them 
represent  a  high  type  of  cultivation,  but  for  the  greater  part  their  state 
is  one  approaching  the  semi-barbarous.  There  was  little  evidence  that 
Albania  was  ready  for  self-government. 

Austria's  claim,  however,  was  supported  by  Italy,  and  for  the  same 
reason  which  had  in  reality  actuated  Austria — the  necessity  for  keep- 
ing Servia  from  the  sea.  Austria  mobilized  her  army  against  Servia 
and  Montenegro ;  Italy  supported  Austria ;  Germany  again  rattled 
her  sword.  The  Entente  Allies,  on  the  other  hand,  still  worked  for 
peace,  and  were  loth  to  precipitate  a  general  Euroj>ean*  conflict  be- 
cause of  squabbles  in  the  Balkans.  Servia  and  Montenegro  were  en- 
furiated  by  Austria's  action,  and,  it  is  rumored,  went  even  so  far  as 
to  obtain  a  promise  from  Bulgaria  to  support  them  against  Austria  ; 


The  Decline  of  Geniian  Diplomatic  Domination,  J(^ii-ji^i  f       99 

but  finally  yielded,  and  reluctantly  withdrew  their  troops  from  Al- 
bania. The  true  reasons  which  dictated  this  action  are  still  not  mat- 
ters of  public  information — only  the  fact  can  be  recorded.  The  great 
Powers  then  constituted  Albania  an  autonomous  state  under  William 
of  Wied,  a  German  prince. 

The  Second  Balkan  War 

Servia  was  thus  balked  of  ail  the  fruits  wdiich  were  to  fall  to  her  as 
a  result  of  the  victory  over  Turkey.  It  was  accordingly  inevitable 
that  she  should  demand  a  modification  in  the  agreements  concerning 
the  territory  wrested  from  Turkey  so  as  to  afford  her  some  recom- 
pense for  having  been  driven  out  of  Albania.  Servia  laid  claim  to 
certain  sections  of  Macedonia  which  had  been  assigned  to  Bulgaria, 
but  which  had  been  captured  by  a  Serbian  and  Grecian  army  during 
the  hostilities  against  Turkey  and  which  were  still  occtipied  by  the 
Serbian-Grecian  forces. 

The  various  intricate  developments  which  then  arose  are  again  not 
matters  of  general  knowledge.  Some  facts,  however,  seeni  to  be 
indisputable.  Bulgaria  refused  to  yield  to  the  demand  of  Servia. 
Macedonia  was  inhabited  by  Bulgars  ;  Bulgaria  had  the  better  ethno- 
logical claim  to  it.  Servia  and  Greece  then  refused  to  withdraw  their 
armies ;  they  proposed  that  the  question  be  left  to  Russia  for  arbi- 
tration. 

Bulgaria  and  Russia,  however,  were  diplomatic  foes,  and  their  in- 
terests conflicted  sharply.  Bulgaria  was  the  most  civilized  nation  in 
the  Balkans,  with  a  high  degree  of  education,  with  general  well-be- 
ing of  the  masses,  with  little  dire  poverty,  and  with  a  democratic  po- 
litical organization  which  represented  a  far  higher  state  of  culture 
than  that  of  Russia  itself.  Russia  had  long  feared  that  Bulgaria 
might  become  so  strong  as  to  block  Russia's  expansion  to  the  Medi- 
terranean and  to  the  Dardanelles,  and  had  used  every  opportunity  to 
check  the  progress  of  the  Bulgarian  nation.  For  the  same  reason, 
Austria  had  supported  Bulgaria  against  Russia.  So  that  naturally 
Bulgaria  refused  to  submit  her  dispute  with  Servia  and  Greece  to 
Russia. 


loo  A  History  of  the  Great  ll'ar 

In  this  question,  Austria  supported  Bulgaria.  The  Bulgarian  army 
had  proved  to  be  magnificent  in  the  war  against  Turkey,  and  Austria 
was  confident  that  it  would  defeat  Servia  and  Greece  in  case  of  war. 
It  is  probable  that  Austria  secretly  urged  Bulgaria  to  war ;  at  all  events, 
Bulgaria  suddenly  opened  hostilities  against  Servia  on  June  29,  1913. 

15ut  again  the  Quadruple  .Alliance  had  blundered.  Servia  and  Greece, 
with  the  diplomatic  support  of  Russia,  launched  successful  counter- 
attacks; and  the  Bulgar  armies  were  forced  to  retreat.  At  the  end 
of  July,  however,  the  Bulgarians  prepared  to  make  a  stand  against 
the  Greek  army,  when  they  were  unexpectedly  attacked  in  the  rear 
by  a  new  opponent. 

Roumania  had  always  been  considered  friendly  to  the  Quadruple 
Alliance ;  but  the  Triple  Entente  had  not  been  inactive  while  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  had  been  pursuing  its  machinations  in  the  Balkans, 
and  the  Entente  had  utilized  the  new  turn  of  afi^airs  to  detach  Rou- 
mania from  her  previous  afifiliation.  Roumania  suspected  that  the 
\ictory  of  Bulgaria  would  entail  the  pre-eminence  of  Bulgaria  in  the 
Balkans  and  her  own  subordination.  By  remaining  aloof  from  the 
First  Balkan  War,  Roumania  had  acquired  none  of  the  territory  lost 
by  Turkey.  Furthermore,  Roumania  had  asked  for  the  cession  of  a 
strip  of  land  from  Bulgaria  to  strengthen  the  southern  Roumanian 
frontier;  but  Bulgaria  had  refused  the  request.  On  July  10,  then,  Rou- 
mania suddenly  declared  war  on  Bulgaria,  and  immediately  advanced 
upon  the  Bulgarian  capital.  At  this  time,  Turkey  discerned  the  oppor- 
tunity to  profit  by  the  dissensions  among  her  opponents,  and  also 
opened  an  attack  upon  Bulgaria,  in  Thrace. 

Against  such  a  coalition,  Bulgaria  was  helpless.  She  surrendered 
on  July  30;  and  the  terms  of  peace  were  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest,  signed  on  August  10,  191 3. 

The  treaty  of  Bucharest  naturally  despoiled  Bulgaria  of  most  of 
her  acquisitions  from  the  First  Balkan  War.  Greece  extended  her 
territory  far  up  into  what  had  been  Macedonia  and  Thrace,  including 
both  Saloniki  and  Kavala,  the  latter  a  port  on  the  Aegean  of  vital  im- 
portance to  the  economic  development  of  Bulgaria.  Crete  also  was 
given  to  Greece.  The  new  Greece  thus  became  about  half  as  large 
again  as  the  old. 


The  Decline  of  German  Diplomatic  Domination,  ipii-ic)i^     loi 

Servia  extended  her  land  down  into  what  had  been  Macedonia,  ex- 
tending through  Monastir,  thus  increasing  her  territory  almost  one 
hundred  per  cent.    Montenegro  also  made  extensions  to  her  boundaries. 

Roumania  acquired  that  section  of  Bulgaria  proper  which  had  been 
the  direct  casus  belli  between  them,  although  it  was  ethnologically  an 
integral  part  of  Bulgaria.  And  Turkey  held  the  land  she  had  occupied 
toward  the  end  of  the  Second  Balkan  War,  including  Adrianople. 

Bulgaria  itself  was  left  with  only  a  strip  of  land  from  what  had 
been  Thrace  and  a  small  section  of  territory  along  the  Black  Sea  as 
her  gains  from  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey. 

The  Treaty  of  Bucharest  accordingly  added  to  the  nationalistic 
quarrels  of  the  Balkans  by  retaining  a  large  section  of  the  Bulgar 
nationality  under  non-Bulgar  rule.  It  must  be  confessed  that  Greece, 
Roumania  and  Servia  began  to  oppress  the  Bulgars  in  their  dominions 
with  hardly  less  severity  than  the  Turks  had  employed,  and  all  hopes 
of  a  strong  Balkan  Federation,  with  a  consequent  lessening  of  the 
diplomatic  tension  throughout  Europe,  vanished  into  thin  air.  Servia 
nourished  bitter  resentment  against  Austria  and  Italy  for  the  establish- 
ment of  an  autonomous  Albania  which  still  cut  off  Servia  from  the 
sea;  and  she  organized  her  campaign  for  the  liberation  and  support  of 
the  Slavs  within  Hungary  with  renewed  zeal  and  bitterness.  A  Serb- 
ian secret  society,  the  Narodna  Odhrana,  was  most  successful  in 
nationalistic  agitation  among  the  Hungarian  Slavs ;  and  revolution 
on  a  large  scale  in  Hungary  became  more  and  more  threatening. 

Effect  of  the  Balkan  JVars  on  the  Diplomatic  Situation  in  Europe 

Once  more,  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  had 
suffered  a  terrible  blow.  Not  since  1866  had  Germany  sunk  so  low 
in  the  scale  of  international  power.  Indeed,  as  the  rulers  of  Germany 
surveyed  the  situation  among  the  great  Powers  of  Europe,  well  might 
they  conclude  that  the  ways  of  peace  had  failed  and  that  Germany  must 
declare  war  in  order  to  implant  German  rule  upon  the  world.  Their 
only  gain  from  the  Balkan  Wars  was  the  creation  of  an  independent 
Albania  between  Servia  and  the  sea;  but  with  both  Austria  and  Italy 
coveting  Albania,  that  settlement  could  hardly  be  considered  a  promis- 
ing or  a  lasting  one. 


102  A  History  of  the  Great   JJ'ar 

On  the  other  hand,  even  German  mihtary  prestige,  never  before 
questioned  since  the  days  when  Bismarck  had  held  the  hehn  of  the 
German  Empire,  had  been  sadly  weakened.  The  Turkish  army  had 
been  trained  for  years  by  Germany,  only  to  be  routed  by  the  armies 
of  the  Balkan  states. 

The  Alliance  had  supported  Bulgaria,  and  Bulgaria  had  been  weak- 
ened and  defeated.  As  a  result,  the  Alliance  had  lost  its  hold  upon 
Roumania,  which  might  now  be  expected,  if  left  unchecked,  to  turn 
to  the  Entente. 

Servia,  although  barred  from  the  Adriatic,  had  increased  her  terri- 
tory to  twice  its  previous  size,  and  was  all  the  better  prepared  for  her 
competition  with  Austria.  And  the  stronger  Servia  became,  the 
stronger  became  the  aspirations  of  the  Serbs  under  Austro-Hungarian 
rule  to  break  from  their  oppressors  and  to  join  their  own  kinsmen. 

Turkey  itself  had  found  disaster  in  her  affiliation  with  Germany  and 
.Austria,  and  even  a  von  Bieberstein  might  not  be  able  much  longer 
to  restrain  the  Turkish  government  from  going  over  to  the  Entente. 

The  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Railroad  and  German  economic  interests  in 
the  East  were  definitely  weakened. 

And  as  the  hold  of  Germany  and  Austria  upon  the  Balkans  grew 
weaker,  the  hold  of  Russia  automatically  became  stronger. 


GERMANY  PREPARES  FOR  WAR 

The  Prelude 

Germany's  intentions  in  this  crisis  were  openly  proclaimed  to  the 
world  on  June  30,  19 13.  On  that  day,  the  German  Government  suc- 
ceeded in  forcing  through  the  Reichstag  a  bill  providing  for  gigantic  in- 
creases in  the  Germany  army.  The  peace  footing  of  the  German  forces 
was  strengthened  by  almost  twenty  per  cent.  The  increases  provided 
by  the  bill  covered  a  period  of  several  years ;  but  the  money  to  cover  the 
cost  was  to  be  collected  at  once.  The  purpose  was  obvious — Germany 
was  planning  to  lay  up  huge  stores  and  supplies  to  Ije  available  at  the 
very  moment  when  the  first  shot  should  be  fired.  Moreover,  Germany 
hastened  and  amplified  the  construction  of  her  elaborate  net-work  of 
railroads  leading  up  to  the  Belgian  border,  with  intent  no  less  obvious 
than  in  the  case  of  the  huge  army  bill. 

The  response  of  the  Entente  was  an  immediate  acceptance  of  the 
challenge.  Russia  feverishly  accelerated  the  re-organization  of  her 
army.  The  period  of  service  in  the  Russian  army  was  increased  from 
three  to  three  and  one-quarter  years.  General  Joffre,  the  French  com- 
mander-in-chief, was  called  into  lengthy  consultation  on  the  Russian 
military  preparations.  Increased  military  credits  were  voted.  And 
Russia  likewise  prepared  to  lay  down  a  great  network  of  railroads 
leading  to  the  border  of  her  enemy,  Germany,  so  that  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion against  Germany  might  be  hardly  less  rapid  than  German  mobiliza- 
tion against  Russia. 

Great  Britain  increased  her  naval  preparations,  and  placed  her  navy 
in  immediate  readiness  for  conflict. 

Belgium  met  the  construction  of  German  railroads  up  to  the  Belgian 
frontier  by  adopting  for  the  first  time  the  plan  of  universal  military 

103 


I04  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

training,  and  by  preparing  to  increase  her  army  to  twice  its  previous 
size. 

But  the  most  striking  answer  came  from  France.  Five  weeks  after 
the  Reichstag  passed  the  new  German  army  bill,  the  French  Chamber 
of  Deputies  passed  a  bill  providing  for  an  increase  of  the  period  of 
French  military  training  from  two  to  three  years.  It  would  not  be 
long  before  the  peace  footing  of  the  French  army  would  be  almost  equal 
to  the  peace  footing  of  the  German  .army. 

Germany's  allies  also  met  the  challenge.  Italy  planned  new  and 
important  reforms  in  her  army.  Austria-Hungary  prepared  to  increase 
her  peace  footing  by  one-quarter  and  her  artillery  by  more  than  one- 
half.  Even  the  Balkan  states  and  the  neutal  countries  increased  their 
military  preparations — it  was  evident  to  the  most  superficial  observer 
that  the  rivalry  between  the  Entente  and  the  Alliance  had  been  strained 
to  the  breaking  point ;  it  could  not  survive  another  crisis. 

As  the  world  moved  into  the  year  1914,  the  national  recriminations 
inevitably  bred  by  these  military  preparations  came  into  the  open.  In 
both  Germany  and  France,  speakers  in  public  and  private  assemblies 
pointed  to  the  militarism  of  their  enemy  across  the  Vosges ;  ridiculed 
their  civilization;  scorned  their  pretensions;  feared,  threatened  and 
warned.  Never  had  the  German  people  been  so  roused  to  anger  at  the 
autocracy  of  Rusaia ;  never  had  the  English  been  so  roused  to  anger 
at  the  autocracy  of  Germany.  The  German  press,  pulpit  and  platform 
denounced  English  commercialism  and  imperialism ;  the  British  press, 
pulpit  and  platform  denounced  German  militarism  and  materialism. 
In  the  spring,  the  German  and  Austrian  newspapers,  always  subserv- 
ient to  the  German  and  Austrian  Governments,  published  a  series  of 
articles  revealing  the  overwhelming  proportions  which  the  Russian 
army  would  reach  in  a  few  years,  and  German  leaders  openly  urged 
action  before  it  was  too  late.  And  on  June  28.  1914.  the  pan-Slav 
agitation  in  Servia  came  to  fruition  with  the  murder  in  Sarajevo,  the 
capital  of  Bosnia,  of  a  distinguished  visitor  from  Austria,  with  the 
murder  by  pistol-shot  in  the  streets  of  Sarajevo  of  Franz  Ferdinand, 
Archduke  of  Austria-Hungary,  nephew  of  the  Em])eror  Franz  Josef, 
and  heir  apparent  to  the  Austrian  imperial  crown. 


Germany  Prepares  for  War  105 

The  Pretext 

During  all  the  time  from  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  to  the  sign- 
ing of  the  final  terms  of  peace,  no  evidence  was  brought  forward  to 
prove  that  the  murder  of  the  Austrian  Crown  Prince  was  actually  and 
directly  inspired  by  German  militarists.  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand 
was  known  both  as  an  able  administrator  and  as  a  sympathizer  with  the 
plight  of  the  oppressed  Slavs  within  the  empire  over  which  he  was 
expected  soon  to  rule.  In  both  capacities,  his  accession  to  the  throne 
was  feared  by  the  pan-Serbian  nationalists,  for  a  slackening  of  the 
•oppression  of  the  Slavs  in  Hungary  and  a  vigorous  and  liberal  admin- 
istration  of  Austria-Hungary  would  conceivably  lessen  the  longings  of 
the  Hungarian  Slavs  for  annexation  to  Servia.  Austria  produced  much 
incriminating  evidence  to  prove  that  the  murderers  of  tlie  Archduke 
had  received  assistance  in  their  act  from  officials  of  the  Serbian  govern- 
ment, although  Servia  countered  with  charges  that  the  Magyars  within 
Hungary  instigated  the  murder  of  Sarajevo  because  they  feared  a 
diminution  in  their  special  privileges  when  he  should  be  called  to  the 
throne. 

At  all  events,  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  came  at  a  most  propitious 
time  for  Germany.  From  the  German  Reichstag  itself  and  during  the 
war,  arose  a  voice,  that  of  the  Socialist  leader,  Karl  Liebknecht,  pro- 
claiming to  the  world  that  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  had  been  hailed  with 
the  deepest  satisfaction  in  high  official  circles  in  Germany. 

In  Russia,  the  program  of  reconstructing  the  Russian  army  had  not 
yet  reached  a  stage  where  the  Tsar's  troops  could  be  said  to  have  been 
welded  together  into  an  efficient  military  body.  On  the  other  hand, 
Russia  was  making  great  progress  toward  that  end,  and  within  a  few 
years  at  the  utmost  Russia  might  well  be  the  most  dangerous  antagonist 
in  Europe.  If  Germany  was  to  strike,  she  must  strike  now — a  few- 
years  later,  and  it  would  be  too  late.  Moreover,  Russian  mobilization 
depended  upon  the  inadequate  railroad  facilities  of  that  vast  land,  and 
strikes  by  Russian  workers  on  the  railroads  had  increased  even  the 
normal  inadequacy  of  the  Russian  railroad  service.  At  that  very 
moment,  Petrograd  itself  was  in  the  throes  of  a  serious  labor  struggle. 


[o6  A  History  of  the  Great  U^ar 

and  Russia's  effectiveness  abroad  would  be  sadly  hindered  by  her 
troubles  at  home. 

In  France,  the  new  law  providing  for  three  years  of  military  service 
in  place  of  two  had  not  yet  had  an  opportunity  to  function  for  any 
considerable  period  of  time.  But  after  it  should  have  functioned  for 
several  years  longer,  the  French  army  and  reserves  would  be  hardly 
inferior  in  numbers  to  the  German  army  and  reserves.  Moreover, 
France  was  convulsed  by  the  scandal  concerning  the  murder  of  M. 
Calmette  by  Madame  Caillaux,  and  the  political  prominence  of  the 
principals  threatened  to  turn  the  Caillaux-Calmette  case  into  another 
Dreyfus  scandal,  with  the  consequent  damage  to  French  unity.  When 
the  period  for  the  actual  decision  respecting  war  arrived,  the  French 
premier  and  president  were  on  the  high  seas,  returning  from  a  visit 
to  Russia ;  and  France  could  determine  upon  no  decisive  course  of 
action  until  they  landed.  Finally,  France  also  had  just  come  through 
a  period  of  stringent  labor  troubles,  which  had  almost  convulsed  the 
country.  At  least  until  actual  hostilities  should  commence,  the  French 
Socialists  could  be  counted  upon  to  oppose  war;  and  their  leader  was 
Jean  Jaures,  in  many  respects  the  ablest  political  leader  in  all  Europe. 

In  England,  as  has  been  seen,  the  Irish  Question  had  reached  the 
point  where  actual  civil  war  was  threatened.  Even  if  the  Irish  situa- 
tion did  not  deter  England  from  a  course  which  would  lead  to  war, 
at  least  it  could  be  expected  to  hinder  her  effectiveness  on  land  and  on 
sea. 

Among  the  members  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  the  hold  of  Germany 
and  Austria  upon  Italy  had  already  been  loosened.  A  few  more  years 
might  actually  find  Italy  not  merely  neutral,  but  a  member  of  the 
Entente. 

In  Austria,  there  would  be  unflinching  support  of  Germany  be- 
cause the  quarrel  was  in  essence  an  Austrian  quarrel.  There  was  evi- 
dence that  nationalistic  feeling  in  Austria  was  beginning  to  resent  the 
complete  subordination  of  Austria  to  Germany;  and  Austrian  sui)port 
might  not  be  whole-hearted  in  case  Germany  should  wait  until  the 
quarrel  leading  to  war  was  in  essence  a  German  quarrel.  Moreover, 
the  aged  Franz  Josef  was  rapidly  nearing  his  end.  and  a  platitude  in 
Euroj>ean  political  discussions   for  the  past  few  years  had  been  the 


Germany  Prepares  for  War  107 

statement  that  the  death  of  Franz  Josef  would  see  the  dissolution  of 
the  Hapsburg  dominions.  A  few  more  years,  then,  and  little  help  might 
be  expected  from  Austria. 

And  within  Germany  itself  the  political  situation  was  such  that  the 
German  Government  might  find  itself  a  few  years  later  literally  help- 
less to  force  a  war.  In  the  elections  of  191 2,  the  Socialists  had  polled 
a  larger  vote  than  any  other  one  political  party.  They  had  twenty- 
eight  per  cent  of  the  members  of  the  Reichstag  and  a  strictly  propor- 
tional system  of  representation  would  have  given  them  thirty-five  per 
cent.  And  from  1912  the  Socialists  had  been  growing  in  strength  from 
even  those  figures.  In  the  spring  of  that  very  year,  1914,  they  had 
conducted  throughout  the  Empire  a  campaign  for  membership  which 
had  increased  their  ranks  by  about  fifteen  per  cent.  If  the  next 
elections  should  give  the  Socialists  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Reich- 
stag, the  political  structure  of  the  Empire  would  be  reformed,  and 
with  a  politically  democratic  Germany,  the  power  of  the  German 
militarists  would  be  sadly  curtailed. 

Moreover,  the  demand  for  political  reform  within  Germany  was 
growing.  Among  thinking  people,  the^e  might  be  scepticism  about 
the  desirability  of  the  Socialist  program,  but  there  could  be  little  de- 
fence of  a  political  system  such  as  that  by  which  Prussia  was  ruled. 
And  the  burdens  of  taxation  for  war  purposes  and  the  arrogance  of 
the  personnel  of  the  German  army  were  beginning  to  cause  restlessness 
among  even  the  docile  German  masses. 

The  Kiel  Canal  had  just  been  broadened  and  deepened. 

Finally,  the  threat  of  an  invasion  of  Servia  by  Austria  would  cause 
Russia  to  mobilize,  and  the  German  leaders  could  rally  Germany  against 
Russia  as  against  no  other  country.  The  autocracy  of  Russia  under 
the  Tsar  was  less  defensible  than  even  the  autocracy  of  Germany 
under  the  Kaiser;  and  the  most  vehement  internationalist  among  all 
the  German  Socialists  would  support  a  war  which  could  be  officially 
colored  so  as  to  represent  a  war  of  German  defence  against  Russian 
invasion. 

If  hope  of  German  domination  of  the  world  was  not  to  be  abandoned 
for  all  time.  Germanv  must  strike  now  or  never. 


THE  FOURTEEN  DAYS 

Who's  Who  in  the  Correspondence 

M.  ALLIZE,  I'rcHch  Minister  to  Bavaria  at  Munich  (Germany). 
Mr.  ASQUITH,  British  Premier. 
M.  BARRERE,  French  Ambassador  to  Italy. 
M.  DE  BASSOMPIERRE,  of  the  Belgian  Diplomatic  Service. 
HERR  VON  BELOW  SALESKE,  German  Minister  at  Brussels. 
COUNT  BENCKENDORFF,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London. 
COUNT  BERCHTOLD,  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
M.  BERTHELOT,  of  the  French  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
SIR  F.  BERTIE,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
DR.  VON  BETHMANN-HOLLWEG,  German  Chancellor. 
BARON  BEYENS,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin. 
M.  BOPPE,  French  Minister  to  Servia. 
M.  BOSCHKOVITCH,  Servian  Minister  at  London. 
M.  BRONEWSKY,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin. 
HERR  VON  BUCH,  German  Minister  to  Luxemburg. 
SIR  G.  BUCHANAN,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 
SIR  M.  DE  BUNSEN,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
M.  PAUL  CAMBON,  French  Ambassador  at  London. 
M.  JULES  CAMBON,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
M.  DAVIGNON,  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
M.  DELCASSE,  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
M.  DUMAINE,  French  Ambassador  to  Austria-Hungary. 
M.  EYSCHEN,  President  of  Luxemburg  Government. 
M.  DE  FLEURIAU,  French  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London. 
HERR  VON  FLOTOW,  German  Ambassador  to  Italy. 
BARON  GEISL  VON  GEISLINGEN,  Austrian  Minister  at  Belgrade. 
MARQUIS  DI  SAN  GIULIANO,  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
SIR  E.  GOSCHEN,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
SIR  EDWARD  GREY,  British  Foreign  Secretary. 
BARON  GUILLAUME,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris. 
M.  ISVOLSKY,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
HERR  VON  JAGOW,  German  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
SIR  A.  JOHNSTONE,  British  Minister  to  Luxemburg. 

1 08 


llic  Foitrtcoi  Days  109 

M.  KAZANSKY,  Geraiit  of  Russian  Consulate  at  Prayue,  Austria. 

M.  KLOBUKOWSKI,  French  Minister  at  Brussels. 

COUNT  DE  LALAING,-5t'/(7m»  Minister  at  London. 

PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY,  German  Ambassador  at  London. 

M.  DE  MANNEVILLE,  French  Charge  d'Affaircs,  Berlin. 

AI.  BIENVENU   MARTIN,   French  Minister  of  Justice   and  Acting  Minister 

of  Foreign  Affairs. 
COUNT  MENSDORFF,  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London. 
M.  MOLLARD,  French  Minister  to  Luxemburg. 
COUNT  VON  MOLTKE,  Chief  of  German  General  Staff. 
SIR  ARTHUR  NICHOLSON,  British   Under  Secretary  for  Foreign   Affairs. 
M.  PACHITCH,  Servian  Premier  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
M.  PALEOLOGUE,  French  Ambassador  to  Russia. 
M.  POINCARE,  President  of  the  French  Republic. 
COUNT  POURTALES,  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 
SIR  R.  RODD,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome. 
SIR  H.  RUMBOLD,  British  Councilor  of  Embassy  at  Berlin. 
M.  SAZONOF,  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
M.  SCHEBEKO,  Russian  Ambassador  at   Vienna. 
BARON  VON   SCHOEN,   German  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
M.  SEVASTOPOULO,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Paris. 
M.  STRANDTMAN,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Belgrade. 
GEN.  SUCHOMLINOF,  Russian  Minister  of  War. 
M.  DE  SWERBEEW,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
COUNT  SZAPARY,  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 
COUNT  SZECSEN,  Austriati  Ambassador  to  France. 
COUNT  SZOGYENY,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  to   Germany. 
HERR  VON   TSCHIRSCHKY  UND   BOGENDORFF,   German  Ambassador 

at  Vienna. 
COUNT  DE  VILLERS,  Luxemburg  Minister  at  Berlin. 
SIR  F.  VILLIERS,  British  Minister  to  Belgium. 
M.  VIVIANI,  Premier  of  France. 
HERR  VON  ZIMMERMANN,  German  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 

Affairs. 


Prelim  I XARV  Period,  June  28-JuLv  2^,  1914 

There  was  naturally  wide-spread  horror  in  Europe  and  even  in 
America  at  the  murder  of  the  heir  apparent  to  the  Austrian  throne, 
but  only  the  few  persons  initiated  into  the  innermost  significance  of 
European  diplomacy  realized  the  extent  of  the  complications  which 
might  arise  from  the  murder  of  Sarajevo.  P"or  the  rest,  the  world 
went  ahead  in  its  usual  course  of  daily  routine,  blissfully  oblivious  to 
the  threat  of  another  war-cloud  on  the  horizon.  Ikit  every  student  of 
international  relations  turned  his  gaze  toward  \'ienna,  and  awaited 
with  ill-concealed  anxiety  the  attitude  of  Austria. 

Austria  moved  slowly.  She  put  on  foot  an  investigation  before 
acting. 

0)1  July  2,  the  French  ambassador  at  A'ienna  reports  a  general  and 
deep  anti-Serbian  feeling  in  Austria  and  preparations  to  force  the 
issue  with  Servia  and  to  assert  without  further  delay  Austrian  mastery 
in  the  Balkans. 

M.  Dummnc,  Prcnch  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  to  M.  Viviani.  Prime  Minister  and 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

Vienna.  July  2.  1914. 
The   crime   of    Serajevo   is   inflaming   the   liveliest   resentment    in   Austrian 
military  circles  and  among  all  those  who  are  not  resigned  to  allowing  Servia 
to  keep  the  place  she  has  won  in  the  Balkans. 

The  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  the  outrage,  which  is  to  be  demanded  on 
conditions  intolerable  to  the  dignity  of  the  Belgrade  Government,  would,  in 
case  of  a  refusal,  provide  the  excuse  for  proceeding  to  military  execution. 

DUMAINE. 

The  interest  which  Germany  is  taking  in  the  attitude  of  her  ally  is 
revealed  on  Jtily  2,  as  follows : 

.1/.  de  Manneville.  French  Charyc  d' Affaires  in  Berlin,  to  .If.  Viviani.  Prime 
Minister  and  .Mijiister  for  Foreign  .Affairs 

Berlin,  July  4,  1914. 

The  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  told  me  yesterday,  and 

repeated   to  the   Russian  Ambassador  today,  that  he  hoped   that   Servia  would 

give  satisfaction   to  the  demands   which  Austria  might  address   to  her,  with  a 

view   to   the   search    for   and   prosecution   of   those   concerned   in   the    Serajevo 

no 


The  fuurtccii  Days  iii 

crime.  He  added  that  he  was  confident  that  this  would  be  the  case,  because, 
if  Servia  acted  otherwise,  she  would  have  the  opinion  of  the  whole  civilized 
world  against  her.  And  the  German  Government  does  not,  therefore,  appear 
to  share  the  apprehensions  displayed  in  a  portion  of  the  German  press  as  to 
possible  tension,  or  at  least  does  not  wish  to  appear  to  do  so. 

On  July  5,  Austria  publishes  an  official  communiqite  reproving  Ser- 
via for  lack  of  consideration  toward  Austria  and  warning  Servia  to 
be  "reasonable"  in  the  forthcoming  diplomatic  negotiations. 

On  July  6,  the  Austrian  charge  d'affaires  at  Petrograd  (Count 
Czernin)  informs  the  Russian  government  that  Austria  may  be  forced 
to  search  on  Serbian  soil  for  the  perpetrators  of  the  murder  of  the 
Archduke,  only  to  be  met  by  a  warning  from  Russia  against  such  a 
course : 

M.   Palcologue,  French  Ambassador   in   St.   Petersburg,   to   M.    Viviani,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

St.  Petersburg,  July  6,  1914. 

Count  Czernin,  having  let   it  be  understood  that  the   Austro- 

Hungarian  Government  might  perhaps  be  forced  to  search,  on  Servian  terri- 
tory, for  the  instigators  of  the  Serajevo  outrage,  M.  Sazonof  interrupted  him 
to  say :  "No  country  has  suffered  more  than  Russia  from  outrages  planned 
upon  foreign  territory.  Have  we  ever  claimed  to  adopt  against  any  country 
whatever  the  measures  with  which  your  newspapers  threaten  Servia?  Do  not 
enter  upon  that  path." 

May  this  warning  not  be  lost.  PALEOLOGUE. 

On  Jitl\  9,  Count  Tisza,  the  President  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ministry  for  Hungary,  announces  in  the  Hungarian  Chamber  that 
Austria  is  determined  to  settle  her  accounts  with  Servia  and  to  fight 
the  Pan-Serbian  propaganda. 

On  July  IT,  the  French  consul  at  Budapest,  the  capital  of  Hungary, 
informs  his  government  that  Austria  seems  to  be  preparing  a  coup  and 
calls  attention  to  the  fall  in  the  Hungarian  4  per  cents : 

M.  d'Apchier  le   Maugin,  French   Consul   General  at  Budapest,  to  M.    Viviani, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

Budapest,  July  il,  191J. 
Questioned  in  the  Chamber  as  to  the  state  of  the  Austro-Servian  question, 
Count   Tisza   declared  that   first  of   all   the   result  of   the  judicial   inquiry,   of 
which  he  refused  to  reveal  the  slightest  detail,  must  be  awaited 


112  A  History  of  the  Great  Jl'ar 

Everything  is  for  peace  in  the  newspapers,  but  the  mass  of  the  public  be- 
lieves in  war  and  fears  it.  Moreover,  persons  in  whom  I  have  every  reason 
to  have  confideiice  have  told  me  that  they  know  that  every  day  guns  and 
ammunition  have  been  sent  in  large  quantities  to  the  frontier 

The  tone  of  the  Government  newspapers  has  been  lowered  first,  by  one 
note  and  then  by  two,  until  now  it  has  become  almost  optimistic.  But  the 
Government  newspapers  themselves  have  carefully  spread  the  alarm.  Their 
optimism  to  order  is  really  without  an  echo.  The  nervousness  of  the  Bourse, 
a  barometer  one  cannot  neglect,  is  a  sure  proof  of  that.  Stocks,  without 
exception,  have  fallen  to  improbably  low  prices.  The  Hungarian  4  per  cent, 
was  yesterday  quoted  at  79.95,  a  price  which  has  never  been  quoted  since 
the  first  issue. 

D'APCHIER  LE  MAUGIN. 

On  July  /5,  Count  Tisza  again  warns  in  the  Hungarian  Chamber 
that  Austria  intends  to  assert  herself  strongly  against  Servia. 

On  July  20,  a  report  from  a  French  consul  in  Austria  to  the  French 
government  gives  a  forecast  of  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum, 
and  warns  that  the  terms  will  be  such  that  Servia  will  not  be  able  to 
meet  them,  with  the  result  that  war  will  ensue.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  Germany  is  kept  informed  in  a  general  way  of  the  steps  Austria 
is  preparing  to  take,  although  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  German 
govel-nment  assists  directly  in  the  drafting  of  the  ultimatum  Austria  is 
to  send  to  Servia.  In  the  preface  to  the  official  German  White  Book, 
it  is  stated : 

In  view  of  these  circumstances  Austria  had  to  admit  that  it  would  not  be 
consistent  either  with  the  dignity  or  self-preservation  of  the  monarchy  to  look 
on  longer  at  the  operations  on  the  other  side  of  the  border  without  taking 
action.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  advised  us  of  this  view  of  the 
situation  and  asked  our  opinion  in  the  matter.  We  were  able  to  assure  our 
ally  most  heartily  of  our  agreement  with  her  view  of  the  situation  and  to 
assure  her  that  any  action  that  she  might  consider  it  necessary  to  take  in  order 
to  put  an  end  to  the  movement  in  Servia  directed  against  the  existence  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  would  receive  our  approval. 

On  July  JO,  the  British  ambassador  at  Vienna  was  to  wire  the  British 
government : 

S\r  M.  de  Bunsen  to  Sir  Edzvard  Grey 

Vienna,  July  30,  1914. 
Although  I  am  not  able  to  verify  it,  I  have  private  informa- 
tion that  the   German   Ambassador   knew   the   text  of   the   Austrian   ultimatum 
to  Servia  before  it  was  dispatched  and  telegraphed  it  to  the  German  Emperor. 


AIRSHIP  STATION  FROM  ABOVE 

This   illustration   shows   one   of  the    British   air-Stations  along  the  coast  as 
seen  from  a  dirigible  balloon  flying  above  it. 


TJic  Fourteen  Days  113 

I  know  from  the  German  Ambassador  himself  that  he  indorses  every  line  of 
it 

On  July  21,  the  day  upon  which  the  trial  of  Madame  Caillaux  is 
opened  in  Paris,  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Afifairs 
(von  Jagow)  informs  the  British  charge  d'affaires  at  Berhn  that 
there  onght  to  be  no  outside  interference  in  the  quarrel  between  Aus- 
tria and  Servia : 

Sir  H.  Rtiiiibold  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey 

Berlin,  July  i2,  1914. 

He    (von  Jagow)    insisted  that  question  at  issue  was  one  for 

settlement  between  Servia  and  Austria  alone,  and  that  there  should  be  no  in- 
terference from  outside  in  the  discussions  between  those  two  countries.  He 
had,  therefore,  considered  it  inadvisable  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment should  he  approached  by  the  German  Government  on  the  matter 

On  July  22,.  the  French  ambassador  at  Vienna  informs  his  govern- 
ment that  he  has  been  told  by  the  Russian  ambassador  at  \'ienna : 

that   his    Government    will   have   no   objection   to   steps    being 

taken  for  the  punishment  of  the  guilty,  and  for  the  dissolution  of  the  notoriously 
revolutionary  associations,  but  could  not  admit  exactions  which  would  have 
been  humiliating  for  Servian  national  feeling. 

DUMAINE. 

Note — -The  double  dates  in  some  of  the  following  correspondence  repre- 
sent the  difference  between  the  calendar  of  western  Europe  and  that  of  Russia, 
Servia,  etc. 


JULY  27, 

The  Austrian  ambassador  at  London  explains  unofficially  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  the  steps  upon  which  Austria  has  determined  and  the 
nature  of  the  ultimatum  to  be  presented  to  Servia.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
objects  to  the  ultimatum  feature  of  the  Austrian  note,  and  to  the  pro- 
posed time-limit  for  the  Serbian  answer. 

Sir  Edzvard  Grey  to  Sir  M.  dc  Buiiscii 

London,  1-orcign    Office,  July  23,  i<^i-l. 
Sir: 

Count  Mensdorff explained  privately  what  the  nature  of  the 

demand   (on  Servia)   would  be. 

When  Count  Mensdorff  told  me  that  he  supposed  there  would 

be  something  in  the  nature  of  a  time  limit,  which  was  in  effect  akin  to  an  ulti- 
matum, I  said  that  I  regretted  this  very  much.  To  begin  with,  a  lime  limit 
might  inflame  opinion  in  Russia,  and  it  would  make  it  difficult,  if  not  impos- 
sible, to  give  more  time,  even  if  after  a  few  days  it  appeared  that  by  giving 
more  time   there  would  be   a  prospect  of   securing  a   peaceful    settlement  and 

getting  a  satisfactory  reply  from  Servia I  urged  that  a  time  limit 

could  always  be  introduced  afterward;  that,  if  the  demands  were  made  with- 
out a  time  limit  in  the  first  instance,  Russian  public  opinion  might  be  less 
excited,  after  a  week  it  might  have  cooled  down,  and  if  the  Austrian  case 
was  very  strong  it  might  be  apparent  that  the  Russian  Government  would  be 
in  a  position  to  use  their  influence  in  favor  of  a  satisfactory  reply  from  Servia. 
A  time  limit  was  generally  a  thing  to  be  used  only  in  the  last  resort,  after 
other  means  had  been  tried  and  failed. 

Count  Mensdorff  said  that  if  Servia,  in  the  interval  that  had  elapsed  since 
the  murder  of  the  Archduke,  had  voluntarily  instituted  an  inquiry  on  her  own 
territory,  all  this  might  have  been  avoided.  In  1909  Servia  had  said  in  a  note 
that  she  intended  to  live  on  terms  of  good  neighborliness  with  Austria ;  but  she 
had  never  kept  her  promise,  she  had  stirred  up  agitation  the  object  of  which 
was  to  disintegrate  Austria,  and  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  Austria  to  pro- 
tect herself 

I  could  not  help  dwelling  upon  the  awful  consequences  involved  in  the 
situation 

Count  Mensdorff  did  not  demur  to  this  statement  of  the  possible  conse- 
quences of  the  present  situation,  but  he  said  that  all  would  depend  upon 
Russia. 

At  6  P.  M.,  the  long-awaited  and  greatly-feared  Austrian  ultimatum 
is  delivered  to  Servia.  After  rehearsing  the  relations  between  Austria 
and  Servia  on  the  question  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Ilerze- 

114 


The  Fourteen  Days  115 

govina,  Austria  proceeds  to  charge  Servia  with  having  tolerated  anti- 
Austrian  propaganda  within  Servia  and  of  having  fostered  it  within 
Htingary.  The  note  then  proceeds  to  give  the  result  of  the  investiga- 
tion conducted  by  Austria  respecting  the  murder  of  Sarajevo,  and 
then  states  the  Austrian  demands : 

It  results  from  the  depositions  and  confessions  of  the  criminal  perpetrators 
of  the  outrage  of  the  28th  June  that  the  Serajevo  assassinations  were  planned 
in  Belgrade,  that  the  arms  and  explosives  with  which  the  murderers  were 
provided  had  been  given  to  them  by  Servian  officers  and  functionaries  belong- 
ing to  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  and  finally,  that  the  passage  into  Bosnia  of  the 
criminals  and  their  arms  was  organized  and  effected  by  the  chiefs  of  the  Servian 
frontier  service. 

The  above-mentioned  results  of  the  Magisterial  investigation  do  not  per- 
mit the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  pursue  any  longer  the  attitude  of 
expectant  forbearance  which  it  has  maintained  for  years  in  face  of  the  machina- 
tions hatched  in  Belgrade,  and  thence  propagated  in  the  territories  of  the 
monarchy.  The  results,  on  the  contrary,  impose  on  it  the  duty  of  putting  an 
end  to  the  intrigues  which  form  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  tranquillity  of  the 
monarchy. 

To  achieve  this  end  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  sees  itself  com- 
pelled to  demand  from  the  Royal  Servian  Government  a  formal  assurance  that 
it  condemns  this  dangerous  propaganda  against  the  monarchy ;  in  other  words, 
the  whole  series  of  tendencies,  the  ultimate  aim  of  which  is  to  detach  from 
the  monarchy  territories  belonging  to  it,  and  that  it  undertakes  to  suppress  by 
everj'  means  this  criminal  and  terrorist  propaganda. 

In  order  to  give  a  formal  character  to  this  undertaking  the  Royal  Servian 
Government  shall  publish  on  the  front  page  of  its  Official  Journal  of  the  26th 
July   (13th  July)   the  following  declaration: 

"The  Royal  Government  of  Servia  condemns  the  propaganda  directed 
against  Austria-Hungary — i.  e.,  the  general  tendency  of  which  the  final  aim 
is  to  detach  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  territories  belonging  to 
it,  and  it  sincerely  deplores  the  fatal  consequences  of  these  criminal  proceed- 
ings. 

"The  Royal  Government  regrets  that  Servian  officers  and  functionaries 
participated  in  the  above-mentioned  propaganda  and  thus  compromised  the 
good  neighborly  relations  to  which  the  Royal  Government  was  solemnly  pledged 
by  its  declaration  of  the  31st  March,   1909. 

"The  Royal  Government,  which  disapproves  and  repudiates  all  idea  of 
interfering  or  attempting  to  interfere  with  the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants  of 
any  part  whatsoever  of  Austria-Hungary,  considers  it  its  duty  formally  to 
warn  officers  and  functionaries,  and  the  whole  population  of  the  kingdom, 
that  henceforward  it  will  proceed  with  the  utmost  rigor  against  persons  who 
may  be  guilty  of  such  machinations,  which  it  will  use  all  its  efforts  to  anticipate 
and  suppress." 

This  declaration  shall  simultaneously  be  communicated  to  the  royal  army 
as  an  order  of  the  day  by  his  Majesty  the  King  and  shall  be  published  in  the 
Official    Bulletin   of   the   army. 

The  Roval   Servian  Government   further  undertakes : 


ii6  A  History  of  the  Great   JJ'ar 

1.  To  suppress  any  publication  which  incites  to  hatred  and  contempt  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  general  tendency  of  which  is  directed 
against  its  territorial  integrity; 

2.  To  dissolve  immediately  the  society  styled  Narodna  Odbrana,  to  con- 
fiscate all  its  means  of  propaganda,  and  to  proceed  in  the  same  manner  against 
other  societies  and  their  branches  in  Servia  which  engage  in  propaganda  against 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  The  Royal  Government  shall  take  the  neces- 
sary measures  to  prevent  the  societies  dissolved  from  continuing  their  activity 
under  another  name  and  form ; 

3.  To  eliminate  without  delay  from  public  instruction  in  Servia,  both  as 
regards  the  teaching  body  and  also  as  regards  the  methods  of  instruction, 
everything  that  serves,  or  might  serve,  to  foment  the  propaganda  against  Aus- 
tria-Hungary; 

4.  To  remove  from  the  military  service,  and  from  the  administration  in 
general,  all  officers  and  functionaries  guilty  of  propaganda  against  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  whose  names  and  deeds  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment reserves  to  itself  the  right  of  communicating  to  the  Royal  Government: 

5.  To  accept  the  collaboration  in  Servia  of  representatives  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  in  the  suppression  of  the  subversive  movement  directed 
against  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  monarchy; 

6.  To  take  judicial  proceedings  against  accessories  to  the  plot  of  the  28th 
June  who  are  on  Servian  territory.  Delegates  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment will  take  part  in  the  investigation  relating  thereto ; 

7.  To  proceed  without  delay  to  the  arrest  of  Major  Voija  Tankositch 
and  of  the  individual  named  Milan  Ciganovitch,  a  Servian  State  employee,  who 
have  been  compromised  by  the  results  of  the  magisterial  inquiry  at  Serajevo; 

8.  To  prevent  by  effective  measures  the  co-operation  of  the  Servian  au- 
thorities in  the  illicit  traffic  in  arms  and  explosives  across  the  frontier,  to 
dismiss  and  punish  severely  the  officials  of  the  frontier  service  at  Schabatz  and 
Loznica  guilty  of  having  assisted  the  perpetrators  of  the  Serajevo  crime  by  facili- 
tating their  passage  across  the  frontier ; 

9.  To  furnish  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  with  explanations  regard- 
ing the  unjustifiable  utterances  of  high  Servian  officials,  both  in  Servia  and 
abroad,  who,  notwithstanding  their  official  position,  did  not  hesitate  after  the 
crime  of  the  28th  June  to  express  themselves  in  interviews  in  terms  of  hos- 
tility to  the  Austro-Hungarian   Government ;   and,   finally, 

10.  To  notify  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  without  delay  of  the 
execution  of  the  measures  comprised  under  the  preceding  heads. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  expects  the  reply  of  the  Royal  Gov- 
ernment at  the  latest  by  6  o'clock  on  Saturday  evening,  the  25th  July. 

Of  the  terms,  Servia  could  readily  yield  to  those  demanding  a  con- 
demnation of  the  anti-Austrian  propaganda,  the  punishment  and  dis- 
missal of  all  Serbian  officials  and  teachers  who  should  participate  in 
it,  the  dissolution  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  the  suppression  of  all  anti- 
Austrian  publications  in  Servia,  the  arrest  of  Serbians  named  as  being 
implicated  in  the  murder  of  the  Archduke,  the  prevention  of  illegal 
traffic  in  fire-arms  across  the  Austro-Serbian  frontier  and  the  punish- 


The  Fourteen  Days  iiy 

ment  of  all  Serbian  ofificials  participating  in  or  permitting  such  traffic. 
But  to  the  demands  concerning  the  collaboration  of  Austrian  officials 
on  Serbian  soil  in  suppressing  the  anti-Austrian  propaganda  and  in 
investigating  the  plot  which  resulted  in  the  murder  of  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand,  Servia  could  not  yield  without  virtually  surrendering  her 
sovereignty.  And  the  demand  for  an  answer  within  forty-eight  hours 
was  in  itself  a  threat  which  struck  vitally  at  Serbian  pride  and  at  Serb- 
ian nationalistic  freedom  from  subordination  to  Austria. 


JULY  24 

The  text  of  the  Austrian  note  is  communicated  by  Austria  to  all  the 
great  Powers. 

Germany  supports  Austria.  A  note  communicated  by  the  Germ;ui 
ambassadors  at  London,  Paris  and  Petrograd  echoes  the  Austrian 
complaints  against  Servia  and  ends  with  a  direct  warning  to  the  Entente, 
and  especially  to  Rtissia,  to  withhold  support  from  Servia  and  10 
leave  her  to  her  fate  at  the  hands  of  Austria.  In  part,  the  note  reads 
as  follows : 

N^ote  Coiiniiuniccitcd  by  German  Ambassador  to  the  British  GovcriiniCHt 

London,  July  24,  191.}. 

The  publications  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  concerning  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian  heir  presumptive 
and  his  consort  has  taken  place  disclose  unmistakably  the  aims  which  the  Great 
Servian  propaganda  has  set  itself,  and  the  means  it  employs  to  realize  them. 
The  facts  now  made  known  must  also  do  away  with  the  last  doubts  that  the 
center  of  activity  of  all  those  tendencies  which  are  directed  toward  the  detach- 
ment of  the  southern  Slav  provinces  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
and  their  incorporation  into  the  Servian  Kingdom  is  to  be  found  in  Belgrade, 
and  is  at  work  there  with  at  least  the  connivance  of  members  of  Government 
and  army 

It  has  become  clearly  evident  that  it  would  not  be  consistent  either  with 
the  dignity  or  with  the  self-preservation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Alonarchy 
still  longer  to  remain  inactive  in  face  of  this  movement  on  the  other  side  of 
the  frontier,  by  which  the  security  and  the  integrity  of  her  territories  are  con- 
stantly menaced.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  course  of  procedure  and 
demands  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  can  only  be  regarded  as  equitable 
and  moderate.  In  spite  of  that,  the  attitude  which  public  opinion  as  well  as 
the  Government  in  Servia  have  recently  adopted  does  not  exclude  the  appre- 
hension that  the  Servian  Government  might  refuse  to  comply  with  those  de- 
mands, and  might  allow  themselves  to  be  carried  away  into  a  provocative  atti- 
tude against  Austria-Hungary.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  if  it  does 
not  wish  definitely  to  abandon  Austria's  position  as  a  great  power,  would  then 
have  no  choice  but  to  obtain  the  fulfillment  of  their  demands  from  the  Servian 
Government  by  strong  pressure  and,  if  necessary,  by  using  military  measures, 
the  choice  of  the  means  having  to  be  left  to  them. 

The  Imperial  (German)  Government  want  to  emphasize  their  opinion  that 
in  the  present  case  there  is  only  question  of  a  matter  to  be  settled  exclusively 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  that  the  great  powers  ought  seriously 
to  endeavor  to  reserve  it  to  those  two  immediately  concerned.     The   Imperial 

118 


The  Fourteen  Days  119 

Government  desire  urgently  the  localization  of  the  conflict,  because  every  inter- 
ference of  another  power  would,  owing  to  the  different  treaty  obligations,  be 
followed  by  incalculable  consequences. 

Servia  appeals  to  Russia  for  assistance,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Ser\ia 
in  a  telegram  to  the  Tsar  complaining  that  Servia,  although  willing  to 
comply  with  most  of  Austria's  demands,  would  not,  indeed,  could 
not,  comply  with  all  of  them.  The  telegram  of  the  Servian  Crown 
Prince  is  in  part  as  follows : 

Telegram  from  the  Prince  Regent  of  Servia  to  the  Tsar  of  Russia 

Belgrade,  11  (24)  July,  1914. 

We    are    ready    to    accept    the    Austro-Hungarian    conditions 

which  are  compatible  with  the  situation  of  an  independent  State,  as  well  as 
those  whose  acceptance  shall  be  advised  us  by  your  Majesty Cer- 
tain among  these  demands  cannot  be  carried  out  without  changes  in  our  legis- 
lation, which  requires  time.  We  have  been  given  too  short  a  delay.  We  can 
be  attacked  after  the  expiration  of  the  delay  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army, 
which  is  concentrating  on  our  frontier.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  defend  our- 
selves, and  we  supplicate  your  Majesty  to  give  us  your  aid  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible  

In  these  difficult  moments  I  interpret  the  sentiment  of  the  Servian  people, 
which  supplicates  your  Majesty  to  interest  himself  in  the  lot  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Servia. 

ALEXANDER. 

Russia  calls  a  meeting  of  the  British  and  French  ambassadors  at 
Petrograd  with  M.  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
The  French  ambassador  assures  M.  Sazonof  that  France  will  con- 
sider herself  bound  by  the  Franco-Russian  alliance.  The  British 
ambassador,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  non- 
committal. He  zvill  not  promise  Russia  the  military  support  of  Eng- 
land in  case  of  actual  hostilities.  The  salient  points  of  the  British 
ambassador's  stand  (which  was  approved  in  a  telegram  to  him  the 
following  day  from  his  chief,  Sir  Edward  Grey)  as  reported  by  him  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  are  as  follows : 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey 

St.  Petersburg,  July  24,  1914. 

Personally    I    saw    no    reason    to    expect    any    declaration    of 

solidarity  from  his  Majesty's  Government  that  would  entail  an  unconditional 
engagement  on  their  part  to  support  Russia  and  France  by  force  of  arms. 
Direct  British  interests  in  Servia  were  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf  of  that  coun- 
try would  never  be  sanctioned  by  British  public   opinion 


I20  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

I  said  that  it  sccnicd  to  mc  that  the  important  point  was  to  induce  Austria 
to  extend  the  time  limit,  and  that  the  first  thing  to  do  was  to  bring  an  influence 
to  bear  on  Austria  with  that  end  in  view 

French  Ambassador  and  M.  Sazonof  both  continued  to  press  me  for  a 
declaration  of  complete  solidarity  of  his  Majesty's  Government  with  French 
and  Russian  Governments,  and  1  therefore  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  possible 
that  you  might  perhaps  be  willing  to  make  strong  representations  to  both  Ger- 
man and  Austrian  Governments,  urging  upon  them  that  an  attack  upon  Servia 
by  Austria  would  endanger  the  whole  peace  of  Europe.  Perhaps  you  might 
see  your  way  to  saying  to  them  that  such  action  on  the  part  of  Austria  would 
probably  mean  Russian  intervention,  which  would  involve  France  and  Ger- 
many, and  that  it  would  be  difficult  for  Great  Britain  to  keep  out  if  war 
were  to  become  general 

It  seems  to  me,  from  the  language  held  by  French  Ambassador,  that,  even 
if  we  decline  to  join  them,  France  and  Russia  are  determined  to  make  a  strong 
stand. 

England,  therefore,  is  trying  to  keep  Russia  from  war  by  refusing 
to  make  a  definite  promise  of  English  support  in  case  of  war. 

Later  in  the  day  Rtissia  asks  Vienna  for  an  extension  of  time  for 
Servia  in  which  to  answer  the  ultimatum.  The  Russian  request  is  as 
follows : 

The  communication  made  by  Austria-Hungary  to  the  Powers  the  day  after 
the  presentation  of  the  ultimatum  at  Belgrade  leaves  a  period  to  the  Powers 
which  is  quite  insufficient  to  enable  them  to  take  any  steps  which  might  help 
to  smooth  away  the  difficulties  that  have  arisen. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  consequences,  equally  incalculable  and  fatal  to 
all  the  Powers,  which  may  result  from  the  course  of  action  followed  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government,  it  seems  to  us  to  be  above  all  essential  that 
the  period  allowed  for  the  Servian  reply  should  be  extended.  Austria-Hungary, 
having  declared  her  readiness  to  inform  the  Powers  of  the  results  of  the 
inquiry  upon  which  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  base  their  accusa- 
tions, should  equally  allow  them  sufficient  time  to  study  them. 

In  this  case,  if  the  Powers  were  convinced  that  certain  of  the  Austrian 
demands  were  well  founded  they  would  be  in  a  position  to  offer  advice  to  the 
Servian  Government. 

A  refusal  to  prolong  the  term  of  the  ultimatum  would  render  nugatory  the 
proposals  made  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  the  Powers,  and 
would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  very  bases  of  international  relations. 

M.  Sazonof  also  informs  the  German  ambassador  at  Petrograd  that 
Russia  is  agitated  by  Austria's  action : 

Telegram   of   the   Imperial  German  Ambassador  in   St.   Petersburg   to   the 
Imperial  German  Chancellor 

July  24,  iQi.f. 
I  have  just  availed  myself  of   the  contents  of  Decree  592  in  a  long  talk 
with   Sazonof.     The  Minister  made   wild  complaints   against   Austria-Hungary, 
and   was   much   excited.     What   he   said   most   definitely   was   this :   that   Russia 


The  Fourteen  Days  121 

could  not  possibly  permit  the  Servian-Austrian  dispute  to  be  confined  to  the 
parties  concerned. 

In  England,  Sir  Edward  Grey  suggests  to  the  German  ambassador 
that  France,  Italy,  Germany  and  Great  Britain  shall  work  together 
for  moderation  in  both  Petrograd  and  Vienna.  The  German  ambas- 
sador, however,  has  evidently  received  no  information  concerning 
any  change  in  the  opinion  of  the  German  government  that  the  quarrel 
in  the  Balkans  is  one  which  concerns  solely  Austria  and  Servia  and 
that  no  other  nation  should  interfere. 

^jV  Edzi'ard  Grey  to  Sir  H.  Rumbold 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

German    Ambassador   has    communicated   to   me   the   view   of 

the  German  Government  about  the  Austrian  demand  in  Servia.  I  under.stand 
the  Germany  Government  is  making  the  same  communication  to  the  powers. 

I  said  that  if  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  did  not  lead  to  trouble 
between  Austria  and  Russia  I  had  no  concern  with  it ;  I  had  heard  nothing 
yet  from  St.  Petersburg,  but  I  was  very  apprehensive  of  the  view  Russia  would 

take   of   the   situation I    said   that,    in   view   of   the   extraordinarily 

stiff  character  of  the  Austrian  note,  the  shortness  of  the  time  allowed,  and  the 
wide  scope  of  the  demands  upon  Servia,  I  felt  quite  helpless  as  far  as  Russia 
was  concerned,  and  I  did  not  believe  any  power  could  exercise  influence  alone. 

The  only  chance  I  could  see  of  mediating  or  moderating  influence  being 
effective  was  that  the  four  powers,  Germany,  Italy,  France,  and  ourselves, 
should  work  together  simultaneously  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  in  favor  of 
moderation  in  the  event  of  the  relations  between  Austria  and  Russia  becoming 
threatening. 

The  immediate  danger  was  that  in  a  few  hours  Austria  might  march  into 
Servia  and  Russian  Slav  opinion  demand  that  Russia  should  march  to  help 
Servia ;  it  would  be  very  desirable  to  get  Austria  not  to  precipitate  military 
action  and  so  to  gain  more  time.  But  none  of  us  could  influence  Austria  in 
this  direction  unless  Germany  would  propose  and  participate  in  such  action  at 
Vienna. 

England  adz'iscs  Servia  to  adopt  a  conciliatory  attitude: 

Sir  Edzvard  Grey  to  Mr.  CracJ^anthorpc 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  24.  1914. 

Servia  ought  to  promise  that,  if  it  is  proved  that  Servian  officials,  how- 
ever subordinate  they  may  be,  were  accomplices  in  the  murder  of  the  Arch- 
duke at  Serajevo,  she  will  give  Austria  the  fullest  satisfaction.  She  certainly 
ought  to  express  concern  and  regret.  For  the  rest,  Servian  Government  must 
reply  to  Austrian  demands  as  they  consider  best  in  Servian  interests. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  military  action  by  Austria  when  time  limit 
expires  can  be  averted  by  anything  but  unconditional  acceptance  of  her  demands, 
but  only  chance  appears  to  lie  in  avoiding  an  absolute  refusal  and  replying 
favorably  to  as  many  points  as  the  time  limit  allows. 


JULY  25 

Austria  refuses  to  extend  the  time  limit  for  the  Serbian  anszcer 
to  her  ultimatum,  in  s])ite  of  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  supports 
Russia  in  the  latter's  request  in  behalf  of  Servia. 

Serz'ia  then  presents  her  official  reply  to  the  Austrian  ultimaliim. 
Servia  opens  by  declaring  unfounded  the  Austrian  charges  of  bad 
faith  in  her  relations  with  Austria.  On  the  other  hand,  Servia  can- 
not hold  herself  liable  for  the  activities  of  private  bodies  or  for  news- 
paper articles.  Nevertheless,  she  stands  ready  to  hand  over  for  trial 
any  Serbian  official  or  citizen  against  whom  evidence  may  be  brought 
and  to  publish  a  strong  official  disapproval  and  repudiation  of  all 
anti-Austrian  propaganda  within  Servia.  and  at  the  first  legal  oppor- 
tunity will  take  steps  to  make  such  propaganda  punishable.  The 
A'arod)ia  Odhrana  will  be  dissolved.  Servia  will  similarly  proceed 
against  the  illicit  trade  in  arms  across  the  frontier.  Finally,  Servia 
agrees  to  remove  all  officials  and  to  end  all  activities  against  whom  and 
which  Austria  will  submit  proof  showing  that  such  persons  and 
activities  are  anti-Austrian,  and  agrees  also  to  keep  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  govei-nment  fully  informed  of  the  steps  which  Servia  is 
taking  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  Austria-Hungary. 

But  Servia  cannot  completely  yield  to  the  demands  that  Austrian 
officials  enter  Servia  in  order  to  collaborate  in  putting  dozvn  the  anti- 
Austrian  propaganda  and  in  investigating  the  plot  leading  to  the  murder 
of  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand. 

Reply   of  Servian   Government   to   /iustro-Hungarian  Note 
(Communicated  by  the  Servian  Minister,  July  27.) 

Belgrade,  July  12,  (23)   1914. 

5.  The  Royal  Government  must  confess  that  they  do  not  clearly  grasp 
the  meaning  or  the  scope  of  the  demand  made  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Gov- 
ernment that  Servia  shall  undertake  to  accept  the  collaboration  of  the  organs 
of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  upon  their  territory,  but  they  declare 
that  they  will  admit  such  collaboration  as  agrees  with  the  principle  of  interna- 
tional law,  with  criminal  procedure,  and  with  good  neighborly  relations. 

6.  It   goes    without    saying    that    the    Royal    Government  -consider    it    their 

122 


The  Fourteen  Days  123 

duty  to  open  an  inquiry  against  all  such  persons  as  are,  or  eventually  may  be, 
implicated  in  the  plot  of  the  15th  June,  and  who  happen  to  be  within  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  kingdom.  As  regards  the  participation  in  this  inquiry  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  agents  or  authorities  appointed  for  this  purpose  by  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  the  Royal  Government  cannot  accept  such  an  arrange- 
ment, as  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  law  of  criminal 
procedure ;  nevertheless,  in  concrete  cases  communications  as  to  the  results  of 
the  investigation  in  question  might  be  given  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  agents. 

//  even  these  co}ieessio)is  do  not  satisfy  Austria,  Serz'ia  is  ivUling 
to  leave  the  dispute  to  the  arbitrament  of  neutrals: 

If   the    Imperial   and   Royal    Government   are   not   satisfied    with   this    reply 

the  Servian  Government are  ready,  as  always,  to  accept  a  pacific 

understanding,  either  by  referring  this  question  to  the  decision  of  the  Inter- 
national Tribunal  of  The  Hague,  or  to  the  Great  Powers  which  took  part  in  the 
drawing  up  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  Servian  Government  on  the  i8th 
(31st)   March,  1909. 

Nevertheless,  within  several  hours  tlie  Austrian  minister  at  Bel- 
grade pronounces  the  Serbian  anszuer  unsatisfaetory,  and  gives  notice 
of  his  withdrawal  from  Servia,  together  with  his  entire  diplomatic 
staff.    The  Serbian  government  prepares  to  remove  its  capital  to  Nish. 

Germany  admits  that  Austria  is  intending  to  proceed  to  military 
measures  in  order  to  teach  Servia  a  lesson ;  but  at  the  same  time  the 
German  Foreign  Secretary  agrees  to  join  the  Conference  of  the  Four 
Powers  proposed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  case  of  an  Austro-Russian 

dispute,  but  still  insists  that  there  be  no  outside  interference  in  the 
Austro-Serbian  dispute. 

Sir   H.    Ruiidwld    to    Sir   Edward    Grey 

Berlin,  July  2$,  1914. 

Secretary  of  State  said  that  he  did  not  know  what  Austria- 
Hungary  had  ready  on  the  spot,  but  he  admitted  quite  freely  that  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  wished  to  give  the  Servians  a  lesson,  and  that  they 
meant  to  take  military  action.  He  also  admitted  that  Servian  Government 
could  not   swallow   certain   of   the  Austro-Hungarian    demands 

He  remained  of  opinion  that  crisis  could  be  localized He  said 

that  he  had  given  the  Russian  Government  to  understand  that  last  thing  Ger- 
many wanted  was  a  general  war,  and  he  would  do  all  in  his  power  to  prevent 
such  a  calamity.  If  the  relations  between  Austria  and  Russia  became  threat- 
ening, he  was  quite  ready  to  fall  in  with  your  suggestion  as  to  the  four  powers 
working  in  favor  of  moderation  at  Vienna  and  St.   Petersburg 


124  ^  History  of  the  Great  ]Var 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  German   Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  German 
^Imbassador  in  London 

July  25,  1914. 
The  distinction  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  between  the  Austro-Servian 
and  Austro-Russian  conflict  is  quite  correct.  We  wish  as  little  as  England  to 
mix  in  the  first,  and,  first  and  last,  we  take  the  ground  that  this  question 
must  be  localized  by  the  abstention  of  all  the  Powers  from  intervention  in  it. 
It  is  therefore  our  earnest  hope  that  Russia  will  refrain  from  any  active 
intervention,  conscious  of  her  responsibility  and  of  the  seriousness  of  the  situa- 
tion. If  an  Austro-Russian  dispute  should  arise,  we  are  ready,  with  the  reser- 
vation of  our  known  duties  as  allies,  to  co-operate  with  the  other  great  powers 
in    mediation   between   Russia   and   Austria. 

Germany  also  informs  the  French  Foreign  Office  that  the  Austrian 
note  to  Servia  was  presented  withotit  Germany's  knowledge ;  that 
Germany,  hoivet'cr,  strongly  sympathizes  with  her  ally  and  -ccill  stand 
by  her  in  case  of  war. 

The  Russia)i   Charge  d'Affaircs  in  France   to   the  Russian  Minister  of 
foreign  Affairs 

Paris,  12  (25)  July,  1914. 

The  Ambassador  of   Germany today   visited  the 

Gerant  of  the  Political  Department  to  declare  that  Austria  had  presented  its 
note  to  Servia  without  a  precise  understanding  with  Berlin,  but  that  never- 
theless Germany  approved  the  point  of  view  of  Austria,  and  that  certainly 
"the  arrow  once  sent,"  (these  are  his  own  words,)  Germany  could  not  allow 
herself  to  be  guided   except  by  her   duties   as   ally. 

SEVASTOPOULO. 

Servia  orders  general  mobilization  at  j  P.  M. 

Russia  also  is  willing  to  leave  the  Austro-Serbian  dispute  to  the 
disinterested  great  Powers,  btit  feels  that  Austria  is  in  reality  strik- 
ing at  Russia  through  Servia,  and  that  the  triumph  of  Austria  over 
Servia  vvotild  result  in  upsetting  the  Balance  of  Power.  In  event  of 
the  great  Powers  being  involved  in  the  quarrel,  Russia  hopes  for  Eng- 
lish stipport  to  maintain  the  diplomatic  eciuilibrium  of  Europe. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan   to   Sir  Edivard   Grey 

St.  Petersburg,  July  23,  1914. 

If  Servia  should  appeal  to  the  Powers,  Russia  would  be  quite 

ready  to  stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the  hands  of  England,  France, 
German}^,  and  Italy.  It  was  possible  in  his  opinion,  that  Servia  might  propose 
to   submit  the  question  to  arbitration 

Austria's  action  was  in  reality  directed  against  Russia.  She  aimed  at 
overthrowing  the  present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  and  establishine  her  own 


The  T'oiirlccn  Days  125 

hegemony  there.  He  (the  Russian  Foreign  Minister)  did  not  believe  that 
Germany  really  wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  was  decided  by  ours.  If  we 
took  our  stand  firmly  with  France  and  Russia  there  would  be  no  war.  If  we 
failed   them   now   rivers   of   blood   would   flow,   and   we   would   in   the   end  be 

dragged  into  war 

I  said  all  I  could  to  impress  prudence  on  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Afifairs, 
and  warned  him  that  if  Russia  mobilized  Germany  would  not  be  content  with 
mere  mobilization  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry  out  hers,  but  would  prob- 
ably declare  war  at  once.  His  Excellency  replied  that  Russia  could  not  allow 
Austria  to  crush  Servia  and  become  the  predominant  power  in  the  Balkans, 
and,  if  she  feels  secure  of  the  support  of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks  of 
war.  He  assured  me  once  more  that  he  did  not  wish  to  precipitate  a  conflict, 
but  that  unless  Germany  could  restrain  Austria  I  could  regard  the  situation 
as  desperate. 

The  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London 

St.  Petersburg,  12  (25)  July,  1914. 
In  case  of  a  new  aggravation  of  the  situation,  possibly  provoking  on  the 
part  of  the  Great  Powers  united  action,  we  count  that  England  will  not  delay 
in  placing  herself  clearly  on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France  with  a  view  to 
maintaining  the  equilibrium  of  Europe  in  favor  of  which  she  has  constantly 
intervened  in  the  past,  and  which  would  without  doubt  be  compromised  in  the 
case  of  the  triumph  of  Austria. 

SAZONOF. 

Russia  secretly  begins  mobilization,  according  to  a  telegram  from 
the  Tsar  to  the  Kaiser  on  July  30,  in  which  the  Russian  ruler  reports 
that  Russia  mohilization  was  decided  upon  five  days  previously,  that  is, 
today. 

The  Tsar  to  the  Kaiser 

Peterhof,  July  jo,  1914. 

The  military  measures  now  being  taken  were  decided  upon  five 

days  ago  for  defensive  purposes  against  Austria's  preparations 

At  the  trial  of  General  SoukhomlinotT,  months  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  Great  War,  it  was  revealed  that  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Afifairs  kept  the  news  of  the  order  for  general  Russian  mobilization, 
not  only  from  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  but  also  from  the  Entente,  and 
even  from  the  heads  of  the  Russian  Government. 

England  informs  the  German  ambassador  that  England  ivill  not 
intervene  in  an  Austro-Serbian  quarrel  but  zvill  feel  constrained  to 
play  a  part  if  the  zvar  cannot  remain  localized. 


126  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  11.  Kiiinbold 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  J3,  1914. 

I said   that    I    felt    I    had    no   title    to    intervene 

between  Austria  and  Servia,  but  as  soon  as  the  question  became  one  as  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  the  peace  of  Europe  was  afifected,  in  which  we  must  all 
take   a   hand 

Iial\  is  ill  general  agreement  witli  the  attitude  of  England. 

Sir  Edzcard  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Rodd 

London,  Foreign  Office.  July  _'5,  /y//. 
Sir: 

The  Italian  Ambassador  came  to  see  me  today.     I  told  him  in  general  terms 
what  I  had  said  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  cordiallj-  approved  of  this.     He  made  no  secret  of 
the  fact  that  Italy  was  most  desirous  to  see  war  avoided.     I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 


JULY  26 

Germany  expresses  a  belief  that  Austria  is  contemplating  no  annexa- 
tion of  Serbian  territory,  and,  holding  that  the  peace  of  Europe  lies 
in  the  hands  of  Russia,  requests  the  Government  of  the  Tsar  to  adopt 
an  attitude  of  moderation. 

Telegram   of  the  hiiperial   Genuaii   Chancellor     to   the  Imperial  German  Am- 
bassador ill  London 

Important ! 

July  26,  igi4. 

Austria-Hungary  has  declared  officially  and  solemnly  in  St.  Petersburg  that 
she  contemplates  no  acquisition  of  territory  in  Servia,  and  that  she  will  not 
endanger  the  continuance  of  the  kingdom,  but  wishes  only  to  secure  quiet. 
According  to  reports  reaching  here,  Russia  is  about  to  summon  several  bodies 
of  reservists  immediately,  which  would  be  equivalent  to  mobilization  against  us. 
If  this  news  is  corroborated,  we  shall  be  forced  against  our  will  to  take  measures 
to  meet  it.  Today  our  efforts  are  still  directed  toward  localizing  the  trouble  and 
maintaining  the  peace  of  Europe.  For  this  reason  we  ask  that  the  strongest 
possible  pressure  be  brought  to  bear  in  St.  Petersburg  for  achieving  this  end. 

From  England  comes  a  modification  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  pro- 
posal that  the  four  disinterested  great  Powers  mediate  in  the  Serbian- 
Austro-Russian  dispute.  His  new  suggestion  is  that  he  and  the  am- 
bassadors to  England  of  Germany,  France  and  Italy  confer  to  prevent 
complications,  no  military  steps  to  be  taken  pending  conference 

Sir  Edzvard  G.'ey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie.  Sir  H.  Rumbold,  and  Sir  R.  Rodd 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  26,  1914. 

Would  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  be  disposed  to  instruct  Ambassador 
here  to  join  with  representatives  of  France,  Italy,  and  Germany,  and  myself  to 
meet  here  in  conference  immediately  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  an  issue 
which  would  prevent  complications? If  so repre- 
sentatives at  Belgrade,  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  could  be  authorized  to  request 
that  all  active  military  operations  should  be  suspended  pending  results  of  con- 
ference. 

Italy  agrees  immediately  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal. 

/;/  the  meantime,  Russia  completes  plans  immediately  precedent  to 
mobilisation  and  sends  mobilisation  u'arnings  to  all  the  frontier  dis- 
tricts. 


127 


JULY  27 

Germany  informs  the  British  ambassador  that  she  does  not  look 
with  favor  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal,  as  his  plan  virtually 
constitutes  a  court  of  arbitration,  which  should  be  called  only  at  the 
request  of  the  disputants,  Russia  and  Austria.  Germany  prefers  direct 
negotiations  between  Austria  and  Russia.  Germany  also  zvarns  Eng- 
land that  Russian  ^nobilization  against  Germany  zvould  of  necessity 
be  follozved  by  German  mobilizatio}i. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edzvord  Grey 

Berlin,  July  27,  1914. 

(German)  Secretar}-  of  State  says  that  conference  you  suggest  would  prac- 
tically amount  to  a  court  of  arbitration  and  could  not,  in  his  opinion,  be  called 
together  except  at  the  request  of  Austria  and  Russia.  He  could  not,  therefore, 
fall   in   with  your   suggestion,   desirous   though   he  was   to   co-operate   for  the 

maintenance   of   peace He   added   that   news   he   had   just   received 

from  St.  Petersburg  showed  that  there  was  no  intention  on  the  part  of  M.  dp 
Sazonof  to  exchange  views  with  Count  Berchtold.  He  thought  that  this  method 
of  procedure  might  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result,  and  that  it  would  be  best, 
before  doing  anything  else,  to  await  outcome  of  the  exchange  of  views  between 
the  Austrian  and  Russian  Governments. 

In  the  course  of  a  short  conversation  Secretary  of  State  said  that  as  yet 
Austria  was  only  partially  mobilizing,  but  that  if  Russia  mobilized  against  Ger- 
many latter  would  have  to  follow  suit.  I  asked  what  he  meant  by  "mobilizing 
against  Germany."  He  said  that  if  Russia  only  mobilized  in  south,  Germany 
would  not  mobilize,  but  if  she  mobilized  in  north,  Germany  would  have  to  do  so 
too,  and  Russian  system  of  mobilization  was  so  complicated  that  it  might  be  diffi- 
cult exactly  to  locate  her  mobilization.  Germany  would  therefore  have  to  be 
very  careful  not  to  be  taken  by  surprise. 

Germany  formally  informs  France  that  German  mobili::ation  will 
be  ordered  if  Rtissiu  mobilises  on  the  German  frontier,  and  that  Ger- 
many zmll  attack  Russia  if  Russia  attacks  Austria. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Avibassador  in  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu  Martin,  Acting 
French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

Berlin,  July  27,  igi.f. 

I  pointed  out  that  we  had  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal,  which 

opened  the  way  to  a  peaceful  issue.  Herr  von  Jagow  repeated  again  that  he 
was  willing  to  adhere  to  it,  but  he  pointed  out  that  if  Russia  mobilized  Germany 
would  be  obliged  to  mobilize  as  well,  that  we  also  would  be  forced  to  do  so,  and 

128 


@  Underwood   cS:  Underwood 


(g)  International  Film  Service 


DESCRIPTION    OF    PICTURES   ON    REVERSE    SIDE 

Upper  Left  Hand  Corner — Robert  Lansing,  Counselor,  Department  of 
State,  March  ^0,  1914-June  23,  1915,  and  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States,  June  23,    1915—. 

L'pper  Right  Hand  Corner — Georges  Clenienceau,  Premier  of  France  and 
Minister  of  War,  November  17,   1917—. 

Center — David  Lloyd  George,  British  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  1908- 
1915;  Minister  of  Munitions,  May,  1915-July,  1916;  Secretary  of  State  for 
War,  July,  1916-December  6,  1916;  and  Prime  Minister  and  First  Lord  of  the 
Treasury,  December  6,   1916 — . 

Lower  Left  Hand  Corner — Vittorio  Orlando,  Premier  of  Italy,  October 
.^1,  1917—. 

Lower  Right  Hand  Corner — Eleutherios  Venizelos,  Prime  Minister  of 
Greece,  and  Minister  of  War,   Tune  21,   1917 — . 


The  Fourteen  Days  129 

that  the  struggle  would  be  almost  inevitable.  I  asked  him  if  Germany  would  believe 
herself  bound  to  mobilize  in  the  event  of  Russia  mobilizing  only  on  her  Austrian 
frontier.  He  replied  "No,"  and  formally  authorized  me  to  acquaint  you  with 
this  restriction.  He  would  also  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  intervention 
in  Russia  by  the  powers  allied  or  friendly  with  that  State. 

Finally,  he  remarked  that  if  Russia  attacked  Austria,  Germany  would  have 
to  attack  at  once  on  her  side 

Nevertheless,  the  Berlin  representatives  of  the  London  Times,  the 
Manchester  Guardian  and  the  London  Daily  Chronicle  agree  that 
Germany,  is  trying  to  turn  Austria  into  paths  where  peace  may  be 
found. 

Russia  once  more  asks  England  for  definite  guarantees  of  support, 
but  England  sticks  to  her  previous  attitude.  England  asks  that  Russia 
postpone  mobilization,  but  Russia  is  non-committal  because  of  the 
danger  of  Austrian  mobilisation. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edzvard  Grey 

St.  Petersburg,  July  2;r,  1914. 

On  the    (Russian)    Minister   for   Foreign  Affairs   c^uestioning 

me,  I  told  him  that  I  had  correctly  defined  the  attitude  of  his  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment in  my  conversation  with  him,  which  I  reported  in  my  telegram  of,  the 
24th  instant.  I  added  that  you  could  not  promise  to  do  anything  more,  and 
that  his  Excellency  was  mistaken  if  he  believed  that  the  cause  of  peace  could 
be  promoted  by  our  telling  the  German  Government  that  they  would  have  to 
deal  with  us  as  well  as  with  Russia  and  France  if  she  supported  Austria  by 
force  of  arms.  Their  attitude  would  merely  be  stiffened  by  such  a  menace, 
and  we  could  only  induce  her  to  use  her  influence  at  Vienna  to  avert  war  by 
approaching  her  in  the  capacity  of  a  friend  who  was  anxious  to  preserve  peace. 
His  Excellency  must  not,  if  our  efforts  were  to  be  successful,  do  anything  to 
precipitate  a  conflict.  In  these  circumstances  I  trusted  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment would  defer  the  mobilization  ukase  for  as  long  as  possible  and  that  troops 
would  not  be  allowed  to  cross  the  frontier  even  when  it  was  issued. 

In  reply  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  told  me  that  until  the  issue  of  the 
Imperial  ukase  no  effective  steps  toward  mobilization  could  be  taken,  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  profit  by  delay  in  order  to  complete  her 
military  preparations  if  it  was  deferred  too  long. 

Russia  is  willing  to  arbitrate  the  dispute  before  a  conference  of  the 
four  disinterested  great  Powers,  btit  has  not  yet  heard  from  Austria 
regarding  the  Russian  suggestion  of  a  modification  in  the  terms  to 
Servia. 


304 


130  A  History  of  ihe  Great  JJ'ar 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  July  2S.) 

St.   Petersburg,  July  S/,   1914. 
His   Excellency    (the   Russian   Minister   for   Foreign   Affairs)    said   he   was 
perfectly  ready  to  stand  aside  if  the   Powers  accepted  the  proposal  for  a  con- 
ference, but  he  trusted  that  you  would  keep  in  touch  with  the  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor in  the  event  of  its  taking  place. 

M.  Sazonof  to  Count  Bcnckcndorff 
(Communicated  by   Count   Bcnckcndorff ,  July  2S.) 

St.  Petersburg,  July  27,  1914. 

I   replied that   I  have   begun  conversations   with   the  Austro- 

Hungarian  Ambassador  under  conditions  which  I  hope  may  be  favorable.  I 
have  not,  however,  received  as  yet  any  reply  to  the  proposal  made  by  me  for 
revising  the  note  between  the  two  Cabinets. 

If  direct  explanations  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet  were  to  prove  impossible, 
I  am  ready  to  accept  the  British  proposal,  or  any  other  proposal  of  a  kind  that 
would  bring  about  a  favorable  solution  of  the  conflict. 

On  the  other  hand,  Russia  disagrees  completely  with  Germany's 
contention  that  no  other  Power  should  interest  itself  in  the  Austro- 
Serbian  dispute.  In  reply  to  the  Serbian  cry  for  assistance,  Russia 
assures  Serz'ia.  that  iJie  Tsar  zvill  not  allozv  his  ally  in  the  Balkans  to 
be  crushed  by  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

Telegram  from  the  Tsar  to  Prince  Alexander  of  Servia  under  Date 
of  14  (27)  July,  1914 

Your  Royal  Highness  in  addressing  Me  in  a  moment  of  particular  difficulty 
was  not  deceived  in  regard  to  the  sentiments  which  animate  me  in  his  regard 
and  in  regard  to  my  cordial  sympathy  for  the  Servian  people. 

My  most  serious  attention  is  drawn  by  the  present  situation  and  my  Govern- 
ment  is  devoting  itself  with  all  its  force  to  smoothing  out  the  present  difficulties. 
I  have  no  doubt  that  your  Highness  and  the  Royal  Government  wish  to  facilitate 
this  task  by  neglecting  nothing  to  arrive  at  a  solution  which  would  prevent  the 
horrors  of  a  new  war  while  at  the  same  time  safeguarding  the  dignity  of  Servia. 

So  long  as  there  is  the  least  hope  of  avoiding  bloodshed  all  our  efforts  must 
tend  toward  this  object.  H,  despite  Our  most  sincere  desire,  We  do  not  suc- 
ceed, your  Highness  may  be  assured  that  in  no  case  will  Russia  disinterest  her- 
self in  regard  to  the  fate  of  Servia. 

NICHOLAS. 

England  issues  orders  not  to  disperse  the  English  fleet  at  Ports- 
mouih. 

France  accepts  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  arbitration. 

Russian  mobilisation  gets  definitely  under  zvay. 


The  Fourteen  Days  131 

England  informs  Germany  that  Russia  has  gone  to  the  limit  of  con- 
cession in  seeing  that  the  Serbian  reply  to  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was 
highly  conciliatory  and  that,  if  peace  is  to  be  preserved,  there  is  more 
need  of  German  pressure  upon  Vienna  than  of  English  pressure  upon 
Petrograd. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschcn 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  2^.  1914. 

I  have  replied  (to  Germany)  that  the  Servian  reply  went  further  than  could 
have  been  expected  to  meet  the  Austrian  demands.  German  Secretary  of  State 
has  himself  said  that  there  v^^ere  some  things  in  the  Austrian  note  that  Servia 
could  hardly  be  expected  to  accept.  I  assumed  that  Servian  reply  could  not 
have  gone  as  far  as  it  did  unless  Russia  had  exerted  conciliatory  influence  at 
Belgrade,  and  it  was  really  at  Vienna  that  moderating  influence  was  now  re- 
quired. If  Austria  put  the  Servian  reply  aside  as  being  worth  nothing  and 
marched  into  Servia,  it  meant  that  she  was  determined  to  crush  Servia  at  all 
costs,  being  reckless  of  the  consequences  that  might  be  involved.  Servian  reply 
should  at  least  be  treated  as  a  basis  for  discussion  and  pause.  I  said  German 
Government  should  urge  this  at  Vienna. 

Other  issues  might  be  raised  that  would  supersede  the  dispute 

between  Austria  and  Servia,  and  would  bring  other  Powers  in,  and  the  war 
would  be  the  biggest  ever  known ;  but  as  long  as  Germany  would  work  to  keep 
the  peace  I  would  keep  closely  in  touch.  I  repeated  that  after  the  Servian  reply 
it  was  at  Vienna  that  some  moderation  must  be  urged. 

England  also  points  to  her  orders  against  the  dispersion  of  the 
English  fleet  to  allay  any  impression  that  in  case  of  a  general  European 
outbreak  England  will  not  support  the  Entente. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunscn 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  27,  1914. 

I  said  (to  the  Austrian  ambassador  to  England)  that  it  seemed  to  me  as  if 
the  Austrian  Government  believed  that,  even  after  the  Servian  reply,  they  could 
make  war  upon  Servia  anyhow,  without  risk  of  bringing  Russia  into  the  dispute. 
If  they  could  make  war  on  Servia  and  at  the  same  time  satisfy  Russia,  well 
and  good;  but,  if  not,  the  consequences  would  be  incalculable.  I  pointed  out 
that  our  fleet  was  to  have  dispersed  today,  but  we  had  felt  unable  to  let  it  dis- 
perse. We  should  not  think  of  calling  up  reserves  at  this  moment,  and  there 
was  no  menace  in  what  we  had  done  about  our  fleet,  but,  owing  to  the  possibility 
of  a  European  conflagration,  it  was  impossible  for  us  to  disperse  our  forces  at 
this  moment.  I  gave  this  an  as  illustration  of  the  anxiety  that  was  felt.  It 
seemed  to  me  that  the  Servian  reply  already  involved  the  greatest  humiliation  to 
Servia  that  I  had  ever  seen  a  country  undergo,  and  it  was  very  disappointing  to 
me  that  the  reply  was  treated  by  the  Austrian  Government  as  if  it  were  as  un- 
satisfactory as  a  blank  negative. 

I  am,  &c.,  E.  GREY. 


JULY  28 

AUSTRIA  DECLARES  WAR  ON  SERVIA,  AND  PROCEEDS 
WITH  GENERAL  MOBILIZATION. 

In  Germany,  the  Kaiser,  who  returned  only  two  days  ago  from  a 
trip,  telegraphs  the  Tsar  that  he  is  trying  to  bring  about  an  under- 
standing between  Russia  and  Austria. 

The  Kaiser  to  the  Tsar 

July  28,  10:45  P.  M.. 

Remembering   the    heartfelt    friendship    which    has    bound    us 

closely  for  a  long  time,  I  am exerting  all  my  influence  to  endeavor 

to  make  Austria-Hungary  come  to  an  open  and  satisfying  understanding  with 
Russia.  I  earnestly  hope  that  you  will  help  me  in  my  eflforts  to  set  aside  all 
obstacles  that  may  yet  arise. 

Your  very  sincere  and  devoted  friend  and  cousin. 

WILHELM. 

The  German  chancellor,  von  Bethman-Hollweg,  reports  to  Eng- 
land that  the  news  of  the  Russian  mobilization,  if  true,  will  hamper  his 
moves  for  peace. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  July  2g.) 

Berlin,  July  28,  1914. 

If  the  news  were  true  which  he   (the  German  chancellor)   had 

just  read  in  the  papers  that  Russia  had  mobilized  fourteen  army  corps  in  the 
south,  he  thought  situation  was  very  serious,  and  he  himself  would  be  in  a 
very  difficult  position,  as  in  these  circumstances  it  would  be  out  of  his  power 
to  continue  to  preach  moderation  at  Vienna.  He  added  that  Austria,  who  as 
yet  was  only  partially  mobilizing,  would  have  to  take  similar  measures,  and  if 
war  were  to  result,  Russia  would  be  entirely  responsible.  I  ventured  to  say  that 
if  Austria  refused  to  take  any  notice  of  Servian  note,  which,  to  my  mind,  gave 
way  in  nearly  every  point  demanded  by  Austria,  and  which  in  any  case  offered 
a  basis  for  discussion,  surely  a  certain  portion  of  responsibility  would  rest  with 
her.  His  Excellency  said  that  he  did  not  wish  to  discuss  Servian  note,  but 
that  Austria's  standpoint,  and  in  this  he  agreed,  was  that  her  quarrel  with  Servia 
was  a  purely  Austrian  concern  with  which  Russia  had  nothing  to  do 

The  German  ambassador  at  Paris  reports  to  the  French  Government 
that  Austria  will  annex  no  territory  from  Servia  but  gives  no  guaran- 
tees respecting  Serbian  independence. 

132 


The  Fourteen  Days  133 

Sir  F.  Bertie  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Paris,  July  28,  19 14. 

German  Ambassador  (at  Paris)  has  stated  that  Austria  would 

respect  the  integrity  of  Servia,  but  when  asked  whether  her  independence  also 
would  be  respected,  he  gave  no  assurance. 

In  a  confidential  communication  to  the  various  Governments  of 
Germany,  the  Imperial  German  chancellor  rehearses  the  danger  and 
insult  to  Austria  in  the  pan-Serb  agitation,  and  then  explains  why 
Germany  will  support  Austria. 

The  Imperial  (German)  Chancellor  to  the  Confederated  Governments 

of  Germany 

Confidential! 

Berlin,  July  28,  1914. 

If  Russia  feels  constrained  to  take  sides  with  Servia  in  this 

conflict  she  certainly  has  a  right  to  do  it.  But  she  must  bear  clearly  in  mind 
that  in  so  doing  she  makes  Servia's  aspirations  to  undermine  the  conditions 
necessary  for  the  existence  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  identical  with 
her  own,  and  that  she  alone  must  bear  the  responsibility  if  a  European  war 
arises  from  the  Austro-Servian  question,  which  all  the  rest  of  the  great 
European  powers  wish  to  localize.  This  responsibility  of  Russia  is  perfectly 
apparent  and  is  all  the  heavier  since  Count  Berchtold  has  officially  declared  to 
Russia  that  there  is  no  intention  of  acquiring  Servian  territory,  nor  of  threat- 
ening the  continued  existence  of  the  Servian  Kingdom,  but  that  all  that  is 
desired  is  to  obtain  permanent  relief  from  Servian  machinations  that  threaten 
Austria's  existence. 

The  attitude  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  in  this  matter  is  clearly 
outlined.  The  agitation  conducted  by  the  Pan-Slavs  against  Austria-Hungary 
has  as  its  principal  aim  the  dissolution  of  weakening  of  the  Triple  Alliance  by 
means  of  the  destruction  of  the  Danube  Empire  and,  as  a  result,  the  complete 
isolation  of  the  German  Empire.  Our  closest  interests,  therefore,  summon  us 
to  the  side  of  Austria-Hungary. 

If,  contrary  to  hope,  the  trouble  should  spread,  owing  to  the 

intervention  of  Russia,  then,  true  to  our  duty  as  an  ally,  we  should  have  to 
support  the  neighboring  monarchy  with  the  entire  might  of  the  German  Em- 
pire  

Despite  the  declaration  of  war  upon  Servia  by  Austria,  the  Russian 
ambassador  to  Vienna  is  not  yet  recalled ;  but  Russia  zvarns  that  she 
will  mobilize  on  the  same  day  that  Austria  crosses  the  Serbian  frontier. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  July  29.) 

St.  Petersburg,  July  28,  1914. 

His  Excellency   (Sazonof)   stated that  order  for 

(Russian)  mobilization  against  Austria  would  be  issued  on  the  day  that  Austria 
crossed   Servian  frontier. 


134  ^^   History  of  the  Great   War 

I  told  the  German  Ambassador,  who  appealed  to  me  to  give  moderating 
counsels  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  from  the  beginning  I  h^d 
not  ceased  to  do  so,  and  that  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  should  now  in 
his  turn  use  his  restraining  influence.  I  made  it  clear  to  his  Excellency  that, 
Russia  being  thoroughly  in  earnest,  a  general  war  could  not  be  averted  if 
Servia  were  attacked  by  Austria. 

Russia  informs  Gcrumny  that  sJie  icill  mohilice  tomorrow  in  tJic 
military  districts  of  Odessa,  Kicff,  Moscow  and  Kazan  (to  the  south 
of  Russia),  but  disclaims  any  intention  to  mobiliae  against  Germany. 

M.  Sazonof  to   Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  July  28,  iQT.f 

In  consequence  of  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria  against  Servia,  the 
Imperial  (Russian)  Government  will  announce  tomorrow  (29th)  the  mobiliza- 
tion in  the  military  circonscriptions  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow,  and  Kazan. 
Please  inform  German  Government,  confirming  the  absence  in  Russia  of  any 
aggressive   intention   against   Germany. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  has  not  been  recalled  from  his  post. 


JULY  29 

Hostilities  between  Austria  and  Scrvia  begin  along  the  Danube. 

Belgium  places  its  army  on  an  advanced  peace  footing. 

Bulgaria  declares  its  neutrality. 

The  British,  French  and  ItaHan  ambassadors  in  Vienna  agree  that 
nothing  can  now  stop  the  direct  hostilities  between  Austria  and  Servia. 

Russia  informs  the  Powers  of  the  partial  Russian  mobilization. 

In  Germany,  a  war  council  is  held  at  Potsdam.  After  the  meeting, 
the  German  chancellor  asks  the  British  ambassador  if  England  will 
remain  neutral,  in  case  Germany  does  not  aim  at  crushing  France.  If 
Great  Britain  will  remain  neutral,  Germany  will  give  assurance  not  to 
annex  any  French  territory  in  Europe.  However,  Germany  zvill  not 
agree  to  refrain  from  annexing  French  colonial  territory,  nor  will  she 
guarantee  to  respect  Belgian  territory,  as  her  attitude  toivard  Belgium 
will  depend  upon  the  attitude  of  France.  Germany  will  respect  Dutch 
neutrality. 

Sir  E.  Goschcn  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Berlin,  July  2g,  1914. 

He  (the  German  Chancellor)  then  proceeded  to  make  the  fol- 
lowing strong  bid  for  British  neutrality.  He  said  that  it  was  clear,  so  far  as  he 
was  able  to  judge  the  main  principle  which  governed  British  policy,  that  Great 
Britain  would  never  stand  by  and  allow  France  to  be  crushed  in  any  conflict 
there  might  be.  That,  however,  was  not  the  object  at  which  Germany  aimed. 
Provided  that  neutrality  of  Great  Britain  were  certain,  every  assurance  would 
be  given  to  the  British  Government  that  the  Imperial  Government  aimed  at 
no  territorial  acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  France  should  they  prove  victorious 
in   any  war   that  might   ensue. 

I  questioned  his  Excellency  about  the  French  colonies,  and  he  said  that  he 
was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking  in  that  respect.  As  regards  Holland, 
however,  his  Excellency  said  that,  so  long  as  Germany's  adversaries  respected 
the  integrity  and  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany  was  ready  to  give 
his  Majesty's  Government  an  assurance  that  she  would  do  likewise.  It  depended 
upon  the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany  might  be  forced  to  enter 
upon  in  Belgium,  but  when  the  war  was  over  Belgian  integrity  would  be 
respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany 

The  Kaiser  telegraphs  the  Tsar  supporting  Austria's  action  and  once 
more  asking  Russia  not  to  interfere. 

135 


136  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

The  Kaiser  to  the  Tsar 

July  2g,  19 1 4. 
As  I  said  to  you  in  my  first — I  cannot  consider  Austria- 
Hungary's  action  "disgraceful  war."  Austria-Hungary  knows  by  experience 
that  Servia's  promises,  when  they  are  merely  on  paper,  are  quite  unreliable. 
According  to  my  opinion,  Austria-Hungary's  action  is  to  be  looked  upon  as 
an  attempt  to  secure  full  guarantees  that  Servia's  promises  shall  also  be 
turned  into  deeds.  I  am  confirmed  in  this  view  by  the  statement  of  the  Austrian 
Cabinet  that  Austria-Hungary  contemplates  no  acquisition  of  territory  at  the 
expense  of  Servia.  I  think,  therefore,  that  it  is  quite  possible  for  Russia  to 
remain  in  the  role  of  a  spectator  toward  the  Austrian-Servian  war,  without 
dragging  Europe  into  the  most  terrible  war  that  it  has  ever  seen 

Germany  warns  Russia  that  Germany  zvill  mobilise  unless  Russia 
eeascs  her  military  preparations. 

The    (Russian)    Minister    of    Foreign    Affairs    to    the    (Russian)    Ambassador 

in  France 

St.   Petersburg,   16    (2gth)   July,   1914. 
Today   the   Ambassador   of    Germany   communicated   to   me   the   resolution 
taken    by    his    Government    to    mobilize    if    Russia    did    not    stop    her    military 
preparations 

Germany   warns    France   of   the    dangers    inherent    in   the    French 
niihtary  preparations  which  by  this  time  seem  to  have  been  begun. 

Telegram  of   the  Imperial   German   Chancellor  to   the  Imperial  German  Am- 
bassador in  Paris 

July  2g,  J914. 
Reports  to  us  of  French  preparations  for  war  increase  from  hour  to  hour. 
I  request  that  you  talk  on  this  matter  with  the  French  Government  and  make 
it  clear  to  them  that  such  measures  would  lead  to  precautionary  measures  on 
our  part.  We  should  be  obliged  to  proclaim  "Kriegsgefahr,"  (danger  of  war,) 
and  even  if  this  should  not  mean  calling  in  reserves  and  mobilization,  it  would, 
nevertheless,  increase  the  tension.  We  still  hope  uninterruptedly  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace. 

France  informs  Russia  that  France  zvill  be  bound  by  the  Franco- 
Russian  treaty  and  will  support  her  ally. 

The   (Russian)  Ambassador  in  France   to   the   (Russian)   Minister  of  Foreign 

Affairs 

Paris,  16  (2gth)  July,  1914. 
Viviani  has  just  confirmed  to  me  the  full  determination  of  the  French 
Government  to  act  in  accordance  with  us.  This  resolution  is  supported  by 
the  most  extended  circles  and  by  all  parties,  including  the  Radical  Socialists, 
who  have  presented  to  him  a  declaration,  expressing  the  absolute  confidence 
and  the  patriotic  disposition  of  the  group 


The  Fourteen  Days  i-^j 

Russia  declines  to  cease  her  military  preparations,  but  is  willing  to 
continue  direct  negotiations  with  Austria  or  to  leave  the  dispute  to 
the  four  disinterested  great  Powers.  Russia  is  happy  that  she  can 
count  upon  the  support  of  France. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edzvard  Grey 

St.  Petersburg,  July  2(),  1914. 

The     (Russian)     Minister     for    Foreign    Affairs 

proposed,  when  informing  German  Ambassador  of  this  refusal  of  Austria's, 
(for  direct  conversation  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  on  the  question  of 
Servia)  to  urge  that  a  return  should  be  made  to  your  proposal  for  a  confer- 
ence of  four  Ambassadors,  or,  at  all  events,  for  an  exchange  of  views  between 
the  three  Ambassadors  less  directly  interested,  yourself,  and  also  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  if  you  thought  it  advisable.  Any  arrangement  approved  by  France 
and  England  would  be  acceptable  to  him,  and  he  did  not  care  what  form 
such   conversations  took 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris 

St.  Petersburg,  July  16  (sg) ,  1914. 

Since   we   cannot    accede   to    the   desire   of   Germany   it   only 

remains  for  us  to  accelerate  our  own  armament,  and  to  take  measures  for  the 
probable  inevitability  of  war.  Be  so  good  as  to  notify  the  French  Government 
and  express  to  it  at  the  same  time  our  sincere  gratitude  for  the  declaration 
which  the  Ambassador  of  France  made  me  in  its  name  to  the  effect  that  we 
can  count  entirely  upon  the  assistance  of  our  ally,  France.  In  the  present 
circumstances  this  declaration  is  particularly  precious  to  us 

England  still  refuses  to  encourage  Russia  and  France  by  promising 
them  support  in  case  of  war,  but  still  refuses  to  encourage  Germany 
by  promising  neutrality  in  case  of  a  general  European  war. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  2g,  1914. 
Sir:  After  telling  M.  Cambon  today  how  grave  the  situation  seemed  to 
be,  I  told  him  that  I  meant  to  tell  the  German  Ambassador  today  that  he 
must  not  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  into  any  sense 
of  false  security  that  we  should  stand  aside  if  all  the  efforts  to  preserve  the 
peace,  which  we  were  now  making  in  common  with  Germany,  failed.  But  I 
went  on  to  say  to  M.  Cambon  that  I  thought  it  necessary  to  tell  him  also  that 
the  public  opinion  here  approached  the  present  difficulty  from  a  quite  different 
point  of  view  from  that  taken  during  the  difficulty  as  to  Morocco  a  few  years 
ago.  In  the  case  of  Morocco  the  dispute  was  one  in  which  France  was  primarily 
interested,  and  in  which  it  appeared  that  Germany,  in  an  attempt  to  crush 
France,  was  fastening  a  quarrel  on  France  on  a  question  that  was  the  subject 
of  a  special  agreement  between  France  and  us.  In  the  present  case  the  dis- 
pute between  Austria  and  Servia  was  not  one  in  which  we  felt  called  to  take 
a  hand.     Even   if   the   question   became   one  between   Austria   and   Russia   we 


138  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

should  not  feel  called  upon  to  take  a  hand  in  it.  It  would  then  be  a  question 
of  the  supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav — a  struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  Balkans ; 
and  our  idea  had  always  been  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  a  war  over  a  Balkan 
question.  If  Germany  became  involved  and  France  became  involved,  we  had 
not  made  up  our  minds  what  we  should  do ;  it  was  a  case  that  we  should 
have  to  consider.  France  would  then  have  been  drawn  into  a  quarrel  which 
was  not  hers,  but  in  which,  owing  to  her  alliance,  her  honor  and  interest  ob- 
liged her  to  engage.  We  were  free  from  engagements,  and  we  should  have 
to  decide  what  British  interests  required  us  to  do.  I  thought  it  necessary  to 
say  that,  because  as  he  knew,  we  were  taking  all  precautions  with  regard  to 
our  fleet,  and  I  was  about  to  warn  Prince  Lichnowsky  not  to  count  on  our 
standing  aside,  but  it  would  not  be  fair  that  I  should  let  M.  Cambon  be  misled 
into  supposing  that  this  meant  that  we  had  decided  what  to  do  in  a  contingency 
that  I  still  hoped  might  not  arise. 

M.  Cambon  said  that  I  had  explained  the  situation  very  clearly.  He  under- 
stood it  to  be  that  in  a  Balkan  quarrel  and  in  a  struggle  for  supremacy  between 
Teuton  and  Slav  we  should  not  feel  called  to  intervene;  should  other  issues 
be  raised,  and  Germany  and  France  become  involved,  so  that  the  question  be- 
came one  of  the  hegemony  of  Europe,  we  should  then  decide  what  it  was  neces- 
sary for  us  to  do.  He  seemed  quite  prepared  for  this  announcement,  and  made 
no  criticism  upon  it. 

He  said  French  opinion  was  calm,  but  decided.  He  anticipated  a  demand 
from  Germany  that  France  would  be  neutral  while  Germany  attacked  Russia. 
This  assurance,  France,  of  course,  could  not  give;  she  was  bound  to  help 
Russia  if   Russia  was  attacked. 

I  am,  &c.,  E.  GREY. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

Sir:  After  speaking  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  about  the 
European  situation,  I  said  that  I  wished  to  say  to  him,  in  a  quite  private  and 
friendly  way,  something  that  was  on  my  mind.  The  situation  was  very  grave. 
While  it  was  restricted  to  the  issues  at  present  actually  involved  we  had  no 
thought  of  interfering  in  it.  But  if  Germany  became  involved  in  it,  and  then 
France,  the  issue  might  be  so  great  that  it  would  involve  all  European  interests : 
and  I  did  not  wish  him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversation 
— which  I  hoped  would  continue — into  thinking  that  we  should  stand  aside. 

He  said  that  he  quite  understood  this,  but  he  asked  whether  I  meant  that 
we  should  under  certain  circumstances  intervene. 

I  replied  that  I  did  not  wish  to  say  that,  or  to  use  anything  that  was  like 
a  threat  or  an  attempt  to  apply  pressure  by  saying  that,  if  things  became  worse, 
we  should  intervene.  There  would  be  no  question  of  our  intervening  if  Ger- 
many was  not  involved,  or  even  if  France  was  not  involved.  But  we  knew 
very  well  that  if  the  issue  did  become  such  that  we  thought  British  interests 
required  us  to  intervene,  we  must  intervene  at  once,  and  the  decision  would 
have  to  be  very  rapid,  just  as  the  decisions  of  other  powers  had  to  be.  I  hoped 
that  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  would  continue  as  at  present,  and 
that  I  should  be  able  to  keep  as  closely  in  touch  with  the  German  Government 
in  working  for  peace.  But  if  we  failed  in  our  efforts  to  keep  the  peace,  and 
if  the  issue  spread  so  that  it  involved  practically  every  European  interest,  I 


The  Fourteen  Days  .  ^39 

aid  no.  w.h  .0  be  open  to  an.  reproacj,  ^f-^-:™  *«  t  Jlt'o^.r  *« 

:;i:Lrrri';rot,"rr.o^iC^^-.; « *-  -  -  - » 

he  tdd  me  that  It  aecorded  with  what  he  had  already  given  m  Berlm  as  h,s 
view  of  the  situation.  ^   GREY. 

I  am,  &c., 


JULY  30 

Austria  begins  the  homhardiitcnt  of  Belgrade,  Servia. 

Nevertheless,  Austria  begins  to  feel  seriously  alarmed  about  the 
consequences  which  are  now  threatening  all  mankind  as  a  result  of  her 
attack  upon  Servia.  The  news  of  the  Russian  mobilization  and  of  the 
preparations  for  war  of  the  other  great  Powers  has  a  sobering  efifect 
upon  Austrian  opinion.  Germany  also  is  putting  strong  pressure 
upon  her  ally  in  the  direction  of  peace,  and  in  the  following  dispatch 
zvarns  her  that  Germany  zvill  refuse  to  be  draum  into  a  tvorld  zvar 
because  Austria  ivill  not  listen  to  German  advice. 

From  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  to  the  German  Ambassador  in  Vienna 

Berlin,  July  30,  19 14. 

We  cannot  expect  Austria-Hungary  to  negotiate  with  Servia, 

with  whom  she  is  in  a  state  of  war.  The  refusal  to  exchange  views  with  St. 
Petersburg,  however,  would  be  a  grave  mistake.  We  are  indeed  ready  to  fulfil 
our  duty.  As  an  ally,  we  must  refuse,  however,  to  be  drawn  into  a  world  con- 
flagration through  Austria-Hungary  not  respecting  our  advice.  Your  Excel- 
lency will  express  this  to  Count  Berchtold  with  all  emphasis  and  great 
seriousness. 

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG. 

The  authenticity  of  the  above  document  has  been  questioned,  al- 
though it  was  given  to  a  British  newspaper  by  the  German  Foreign 
Ofifice  on  this  day  and  was  printed  in  that  newspaper  on  August  2. 
But  it  is  supported  by  a  conversation  between  the  French  and  the 
British  ambassadors  in  Vienna. 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Vienna,  July  30,  igi.f. 

The  French  Ambassador  hears  from  Berlin  that  the  German 

Ambassador  at  Vienna  is  instructed  to  speak  seriously  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  against  acting  in  a  manner  calculated  to  provoke  a  European 
war 

But  the  German  ambassador  to  Austria-Hungary  is  known  as  an 
ardent  Pan-German  and  as  an  uncompromising  Slavophobist,  and 
may  not  have  delivered  the  message  to  Austria  as  desired  by  his  home 
government. 

140 


The  Fourteen  Days  141 

Germany,  as  mentioned  above,  is  still  pressing  Austria  for  a  more 
moderate  stand  in  the  interests  of  peace.  The  Kaiser  again  wires  the 
Tsar  of  the  danger  in  Russian  mobihzation. 

The  Kaiser  to   the   Tsar 

July  so,  19 14. 
My  Ambassador  has  been  instructed  to  call  your  Government's  attention 
to  the  dangers  and  serious  consequences  of  mobilization ;  I  said  the  same  thing 
to  you  in  my  last  telegram.  Austria-Hungary  mobilized  only  against  Servia, 
and  at  that  she  mobilized  only  a  part  of  her  army.  If  Russia,  as  appears  from 
what  you  and  your  Government  say,  is  mobilizing  against  Austria-Hungary, 
the  position  of  mediator,  which  you  intrusted  to  me  in  a  friendly  manner  and 
which  I  accepted  at  your  urgent  request,  is  jeopardized  if  not  rendered  un- 
tenable. The  whole  weight  of  the  decision  now  rests  on  your  shoulders ;  they 
must  bear  the  responsibility  for  war  or  peace. 

WILHELM. 

Germany  withdraws  her  assurance  to  Russia  of  German  mobilisa- 
tion only  in  case  of  Russian  mobilization  along  the  German  frontier. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani,  (French) 
Prime   Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

Berlin,  July  jo,  1914. 

I  pointed  out  to  the  Secretary  of   State  that  he  himself  had 

said  to  me  that  Germany  would  not  consider  herself  forced  to  mobilize  unless 
Russia  mobilized  upon  the  German  frontier,  and  that  such  was  not  the  case. 
He  replied  that  that  was  true,  but  that  the  heads  of  the  army  insisted  that  all 
delay  was  a  loss  of  strength  to  the  German  Army,  and  that  "the  words  I  re- 
called did  not  constitute  a  firm  engagement  on  his  side."     .... 

The  more  conciliatory  attitude  adopted  by  Austria-Hungary  today 
is  revealed  in  the  following  documents : 

Sir  M.  de  Bnnsen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Vienna,  July  30,  1914. 

The   Russian   Ambassador   gave  the   French   Ambassador   and   myself   this 

afternoon   at   the   French    Embassy an   account   of   his    interview 

with  the  (Austrian)  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  which  he  said  was  quite 
friendly.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  told  him  that  as  Russia  had 
mobilized,  Austria  must,  of  course,  do  the  same.  This,  however,  should  not  be 
regarded  as  a  threat,  but  merely  as  the  adoption  of  military  precautions  similar 
to  those  which  had  been  taken  across  the  frontier.  He  said  he  had  no  objection 
to  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  continuing  their  conversation,  although  he  did  not  say  that 
they  could  be  resumed  on  the  basis  of  the  Servian  reply. 

On  the  whole,  the  Russian  Ambassador  is  not  dissatisfied.  He  had  begun 
to  make  his  preparations   for  his   departure  on  the  strength  of  a  rumor  that 


142  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Austria  would  declare  war  in  reply  to  mobilization.  He  now  hopes  that  some- 
thing may  yet  be  done  to  prevent  war  with  Austria. 

Sir  E.  Goschcn  to  Sir  E.  Grey 

Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 
I  asked  him  (the  German  Chancellor)  whether  he  could  not  still  put 
pressure  on  the  authorities  at  Vienna  to  do  something  in  general  interests  to 
reassure  Russia  and  to  show  themselves  disposed  to  continue  discussions  on  a 
friendly  basis.  He  replied  that  last  night  he  had  begged  Austria  to  reply  to 
your  last  proposal,  and  that  he  had  received  a  reply  to  the  effect  that  Austrian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  would  take  wishes  of  the  Emperor  this  morning 
in  the  matter. 

France  again  asks  England  for  assurance  of  unconditional  support 
of  France  and  Russia. 

Sir  F.  Bertie  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Paris,  July  30,  1914. 

He   (President  Poincare)   is  convinced  that  peace  between  the 

Powers  is  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain.  If  his  Majesty's  Government  an- 
nounced that  England  would  come  to  the  aid  of  France  in  the  event  of  a 
conflict  between  France  and  Germany  as  a  result  of  the  present  differences 
between  Austria  and  Servia,  there  would  be  no  war,  for  Germany  would  at 
once  modify  her  attitude. 

I  explained  to  him  how  difficult  it  would  be  for  his  Majesty's  Government 
to  make  such  an  announcement,  but  he  said  that  he  must  maintain  that  it  would 

be  in  the  interests  of  peace A  declaration  now  of  her  intention  to 

support  France,  whose  desire  it  is  that  peace  should  be  maintained,  would 
almost  certainly  prevent  Germany  from  going  to  war  (President  Poincare 
believed). 

England  still  refuses  to  give  France  unqualified  assurance  of  sup- 
port. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

He  (the  French  Ambassador  at  London)  did  not  wish  to  ask  me  to  say 
directly  that  we  would  intervene,  but  he  would  like  me  to  say  what  we  should 
do  if  certain  circumstances  arose.     The  particular  hypothesis  he  had  in  mind 

was  an  aggression  by  Germany  on  France He  anticipated  that  the 

aggression  would  take  the  form  of  either  a  demand  that  France  should  cease 
her  preparations,  or  a  demand  that  she  should  engage  to  remain  neutral  if 
there  was  war  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Neither  of  these  things  could 
France  admit. 

I  said  that  the  Cabinet  was  to  meet  tomorrow  morning,  and  I  would  see 
him  again  tomorrow  afternoon. 

I  am,  &c.,  E.  GREY. 


The  Fourteen  Days  143 

England  also  in  definite  terms  rejects  Germany's  bid  for  England's 
neutrality  in  case  France's  colonial  possessions  or  Belgian  neutrality 
will  be  involved  by  Germany's  actions,  but  at  the  same  time  proposes 
a  better  understanding  for  the  future  between  the  two  countries  and 
mitigation  of  the  international  rivalries. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschcn 

London,  Foreign   Office,  July  30,  1914. 

His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain  the  Chancellor's 
proposal  that  they  should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while  French  colonies 
are  taken  and  France  is  beaten  so  long  as  Germany  does  not  take  French  ter- 
ritory as   distinct  from  the  colonies. 

From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is  unacceptable,  for  France, 
without  further  territory  in  Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crushed, 
as  to  lose  her  position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  become  subordinate  to  German 
policy. 

Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this  bar- 
gain with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the  good 
name  of  this  country  would  never  recover. 

The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away  whatever  obligations 
or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could  not  enter- 
tain  that   bargain,    either We   must   preserve   our    full    freedom    to 

act  as  circumstances  may  seem  to  us  to  require  in  any  such  unfavorable  and 
regrettable  development  of  the  present  crisis  as  the  Chancellor  contem- 
plates  

One  way  of  maintaining  good  relations  between  England  and  Germany  is 
that  they  should  continue  to  work  together  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe ;  if 
we  succeeded  in  this  object,  the  mutual  relations  of  Germany  and  England 
will,  I  believe,  be  ipso   facto  improved  and  strengthened 

And  I  will  say  this :  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and  the 
present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavor  will  be  to  promote  some  arrange- 
ment, to  which  Germany  couM  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured  that 
no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against  her  or  her  allies  by 
France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately.  I  have  desired  this  and 
worked  for  it,  as  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis,  and,  Germany 
having  a  corresponding  object,  our  relations  sensibly  improved.  The  idea  has 
hitherto  been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if  this 
present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through  for 
generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction  which 
will  follow  may  make  possible  some  more  definite  rapprochement  between  the 
Powers  than  has  been  possible  hitherto. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  SO,  I9i4- 
I  have  warned  Prince  Lichnowsky  that  Germany  must  not  count  upon  our 
standing  aside  in  all  circurnstances.     .... 


iz^  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

France  imthdrazvs  all  her  troops  ten  kilometers  from  the  Franco- 
German  frontier,  in  the  hope  that  mobiHzation  will  not  result  in  open 
conflict  between  the  opposing  forces  before  war  is  actually  declared. 

From   M.   Rene    Viviant,   French  Prime   Minister  and   Minister  for   Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  in  London 

Paris,  July  30,  J914. 

Although  Germany  has  taken  her  covering  precautions  up  to 

within  a  few  hundred  meters  of  the  frontier  along  the  whole  front  from 
Luxemburg  to  the  Vosges,  and  has  advanced  her  covering  troops  to  their  fight- 
ing positions,  we  have  kept  our  troops  at  a  distance  of  ten  kilometers  of  the 

frontier,    and    have    forbidden    them    to    advance    further In    thus 

leaving  a  strip  of  territory  without  defense  against  the  sudden  aggression  of 
the  enemy,  the  Government  of  the  Republic  is  anxious  to  show  that  France,  no 
more  than  Russia,  is  responsible  for  the  attack. 

Russia  makes  one  more  effort  to  modify  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Servia,  but  threatens  general  mobilisation  if  it  is  not  successful. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  to  Sir  Eduard  Grey 

St.  Petersburg,  July  30,  1914. 

German  Ambassador    (at  Petrograd)    had  a  second  interview 

with  (Russian)  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  2  A.  M.,  when  former  com- 
pletely broke  down  on  seeing  that  war  was  inevitable.  He  appealed  to 
M.  Sazonof  to  make  some  suggestion  which  he  could  telegraph  to  German 
Government  as  a  last  hope.  M.  Sazonof  accordingly  drew  up  and  handed  to 
German  Ambassador  a   formula  in   French,  of   which   following  is   translation : 

"If  Austria,  recognizing  that  her  conflict  with  Servia  has  assumed  character 
of  question  of  European  interest,  declares  herself  ready  to  eliminate  from  her 
ultimatum  points  which  violate  principle  of  sovereignty  of  Servia,  Russia 
engages  to  stop  all  military  preparations." 

Preparations  for  general  mobilization  will  be  proceeded  with  if  this  pro- 
posal  is   rejected  by  Austria,   and   the   inevitable   result   will   be   a   European 


On  this  night  Russia  orders  a  general  mobilisation,  without  waiting 
further  for  answer  to  her  profifer  of  the  morning  to  Austria.  Russia 
maintains  that  Germany  is  making  military  and  naval  preparations 
against  her. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

St.  Petersburg,  July  30,  IQI4. 

M.  Sazonof  told  us  that  absolute  proof  was  in  possession  of 

Russian  Government  that  Germany  was  making  military  and  navaj  prepara- 
tions against  Russia — more  particularly  in  the  direction  of  the  Gulf  of  Fin- 
land. Excitement  here  has  reached  such  a  pitch  that  if  Austria  refuses  to 
make  a  concession  Russia  cannot  hold  back,  and,  now  that  she  knows  that  Ger- 
many is  arming,  she  can  hardly  postpone,  for  strategical  reasons,  converting 
partial  into  general  mobilization. 


Photos   by   International   Film   Servire 


THE  END  OF  A  GERMAN  GOTHA 

The  upper  panel   shows  the  remains  of  a   huge  German  bombing  "Gotha," 
brought  down  by  a  British  flyer. 


ANTI-AIRCRAFT  GUN  AT  THE  FRONT 

The   central   panel   shows  a  battery   of  field   artillery  manning  a  light   anti- 
aircraft gun  in  the  trenches  in  France. 


A  FOKKER  IN  RANGE 

The  lower  panel  shows  the  crew  of  a  British  anti-aircraft  brigade  hurry- 
ing to  man  their  guns  as  a  German  "Fokker,"  or  light  scouting  plane,  comes 
into  range. 


JULY  31 

In  Austria,  the  outlook  for  peace  is  constantly  more  hopeful.  The 
Austrian  ambassador  at  Petrograd  and  the  Russian  minister  for  foreign 
affairs  are  still  in  direct  consultation  about  the  Austro-Russian  crisis. 
Austria  again  asserts  her  willingness  not  to  infringe  upon  Serbian 
sovereignty  nor  to  annex  Serbian  territory.  Austria  is  mobilising  on 
the  Russian  frontier  in  anszvcr  to  Russia's  general  mobilisation,  but  the 
greatest  danger  lies  in  a  possible  German  mobilisation. 

Sir  M.  dc  Bunscn  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Vienna,  July  31,  IQI4. 
I  am  informed  by  Count  Forgach,  (Austrian)  Under  Secretary  of  State, 
that  although  Austria  was  compelled  to  respond  to  Russian  mobilization,  which 
he  deplored,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  London  has  received  instructions  to 
inform  you  that  mobilization  was  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  necessarily  hostile 
act  on  either  side.  Telegrams  were  being  exchanged  between  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  and  the  German  Emperor,  and  conversations  were  proceeding  between 
Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  and  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  A  general  war  might,  he  seriously  hoped,  be  staved  off  by  these 
efforts.     .     .    '.     . 

Russia  announces  to  the  great  Powers  that  she  is  mobilizing  as  a 
result  of  Austrian  mobilization  against  Russia  and  Austria's  refusal 
to  accept  the  mediation  of  the  great  PoM^ers.  Russia  gives  no  reason 
for  the  Russian  m^obilisation  on  the  German  frontier  as  tvell  as  on  the 
Austrian  frontier,  except  a  general  belief  that  Germ-any  is  arming 
against  Russia. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

St.  Petensburg,  July  ^i.  1914. 

It  has  been  decided  to  issue  orders  for  general    (Russian)   mobilization. 

This  decision  was  taken  in  consequence  of  report  received  from  Russian 
Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the  effect  that  Austria  is  determined  not  to  yield  to 
intervention  of  Powers,  and  that  she  is  moving  troops  against  Russia  as  well 
as  against  Servia. 

Russia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  is  making  active  military 
preparations,  and  she  cannot  afford  to  let  her  get  a  start. 

Germany  replies  to  the  Russian  general  mobilisation  with  an  ulti- 
matum to  Russia  announcing  general  German  mobilisation  unless  unth- 

145 


146  A  History  of  the  Great   War 

in  tzveh'0  hours  Russia  agrees  to  demobilise  at  once  against  botji  Ger- 
many and  Austria. 

Telegram    of   the    Imperial   German    Chancellor   to    the   Imperial   German    .Im- 
bassador   in  St.   Petersburg 

July  31.  IQ14. 
In  spite  of  still  pending  mediatory  negotiations,  and  although  we  our- 
selves have  up  to  the  present  moment  taken  no  measures  for  mobilization, 
Russia  has  mobilized  her  entire  army  and  navy ;  in  other  words,  mobilized 
against  us  also.  By  these  Russian  measures  we  have  been  obliged,  for  the 
safeguarding  of  the  empire,  to  announce  that  danger  of  war  threatens  us, 
which  does  not  yet  mean  mobilization.  Mobilization,  however,  must  follow 
unless  Russia  ceases  within  twelve  hours  all  warlike  measures  against  us  and 
Austria-Hungary  and  gives  us  definite  assurance  thereof.  Kindly  communicate 
this  at  once  to  M.   Sazonof  and  wire  hour  of   its  communication  to  him. 

Germany  informs  Russia  that  the  German  ultimatum  is  not  in  itself 
a  declaration  of  war,  but  is  near  it. 

Secret   Telegram   to   the   (Russian)    Representatives   in   Other  Countries 

igth  July  (ist  Aug.),  1014. 
At  midnight  the  Ambassador  of  Germany  declared  to  me,  by  order  ol  his 
Government,  that  if  within  twelve  hours,  that  is  at  midnight  of  Saturday,  we 
did  not  commence  demobilization,  not  only  in  regard  to  Germany  but  also  in 
regard  to  Austria,  the  German  Government  would  be  forced  to  give  the  order 
of  mobilization.  To  my  question  if  this  was  war  the  Ambassador  replied  in 
the  negative,  but  added  that  we  were  very  near  it. 

SAZONOF. 

Germany   informs   England   that  the  general   Russian   mobilization 
ends  all  hopes  for  a  peaceful  solution. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

According  to  information  just  received  by  German  Government  from*  their 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  whole  Russian  Army  and  Fleet  are  being  mo- 
bilized. Chancellor  tells  me  that  "Kriegsgefahr"  will  be  proclaimed  at  once 
by  German  Government,  as  it  can  only  be  against  Germany  that  Russian  gen- 
eral mobilization  is  directed.  Mobilization  would  follow  almost  immediately. 
His  Excellency  added  in  explanation  that  "Kriegsgefahr"  signified  the  taking 
of  certain  precautionary  measures  consequent  upon  strained  relations  with  a 
foreign    country. 

This  news  from  St.  Petersburg,  added  his  Excellency,  seemed  to  him  to 
put  an  end  to  all  hope  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  crisis.  Germany  must 
certainly  prepare  for  all  emergencies. 

At   two  P.  M.   Germany  proclaims  "Kriegzustand,"   the  condition 
immediately  preceding  mobilization, 


The  Fourteen  Days  147 

The  Kaiser  informs  the  Tsar  and  the  King  of  England  of  the  ulti- 
matum to  Russia. 

Germany  closes  the  bridges  across  the  Luxemburg-German  fron- 
tier; Luxemburg  asks  both  France  and  Gennany  if  they  will  respect 
her  neutrality. 

Germany  asks  France  zvlrnt  steps  France  zmll  take  as  a  result  of  the 
German  tdtimatum  to  Russia,  and  demands  a  reply  within  eighteen 
hours.  If  the  general  German  mobilisation  is  carried  out  as  a  result 
of  an  unsatisfactory  answer  from  Russia,  it  will  be  along  the  French 
frontier  as  well  as  along  the  Russian. 

Telegram  of  the  German  Chancellor  to  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris 

Important! 

July  SI,  I914. 

In  spite  of  our  still  pending  mediatory  action,  and  although  we  ourselves 
have  adopted  no  steps  toward  mobilization,  Russia  has  mobilized  her  entire 
army  and  navy,  which  means  mobilization  against  us  also.  Thereupon  we 
declared  the  existence  of  a  threatening  danger  of  war,  which  must  be  followed 
by  mobilization,  unless  Russia  within  twelve  hours  ceases  all  warlike  steps 
against  us  and  Austria.  Mobilization  inevitably  means  war.  Kindly  ask  the 
French  Government  whether  it  will  remain  neutral  in  a  Russian-German  war. 
Answer  must  come  within  eighteen  hours.  Wire  at  once  hour  that  inquiry  is 
made.     Act  with  the  greatest  possible  dispatch. 

Sir  F.  Bertie  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

The  German  Government  will  consider  it  necessary  to  order 

the  total  mobilization  of  the  German  army  on  the  Russian  and  French  frontiers 
if  within  twelve  hours  the  Russian  Government  do  not  give  an  undertaking  to 
comply  with  German  demand 

He  (the  German  Ambassador  to  France)  is  going  to  call  at  the  Ministry 
for  Foreign  Affairs  tomorrow  (Saturday)  at  i  P.  M.  in  order  to  receive  the 
French  Government's  answer  as  to  the  attitude  they  will  adopt  in  the  cir- 
cumstances. 

He  intimated  the  possibility  of  his  requiring  his  passports 

England  asks  France  and  Germany  if  they  will  respect  Belgian 
neutrality,  and  informs  Belgium  that  England  expects  Belgium  to  re- 
sist any  encroachments  upon  Belgian  soil. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  P.  Bertie  and  Sir  E.  Goschen 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 
I  still  trust  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but  in  view  of  prospect  of  mobiliza- 
tion in  Germany  it  becomes  essential  to  his  Majesty's  Government,  in  view  of 
existing  treaties,   to   ask  whether   French    (German)    Government   is   prepared 


148  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

to  engage  to  respect  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  no  other  Power  violates  it. 
A  similar  reques    is  being  addressed  to  German  (French)  Government.     It 
is  important  to  have  an  early  answer. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.   Villiers 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  3T,  1914. 

You    should    say    (to    the    Belgian    Foreign    Minister)    that   1 

assume  that  the  Belgian  Government  will  maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her  power 
her  neutrality,  which  I  desire  and  expect  other  Powers  to  uphold  and  observe. 

You  should  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  an  early  reply  is  desired. 

Germany  again  refuses  to  commit  herself  to  respect  Belgian  neii^ 
tralify,  saying  that  the  German  attitude  will  depend  tipon  the  attitude 
of  France. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  Aug.  i.J 

Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

I  have  seen  (German)  Secretary  of  State,  who  informs  me  that  he  must 
consult  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor  before  he  could  possibly  answer 
(about  the  neutrality  of  Belgium).  I  gathered  from  what  he  said  that  he 
thought  any  reply  they  might  give  could  not  but  disclose  a  certain  amount  of 
their  plan  of  campaign  in  the  event  of  war  ensuing,  and  he  was  therefore  very 
doubtful  whether  they  would  return  any  answer  at  all 

It  appears  from  what  he  said  that  German  Government  consider  that  cer- 
tain hostile  acts  have  already  been  committed  by  Belgium.  As  an  instance  of 
this,  he  alleged  that  a  consignment  of  corn  for  Germany  had  been  placed 
under  an  embargo  already. 

^ The  prospect  of  obtaining  a  definite  answer  seems  to  me  re- 
mote. 

In  speaking  to  me  today  the  Chancellor  made  it  clear  that  Germany  would 
in  any  case  desire  to  know  the  reply  returned  to  you  by  the  French  Govern- 
ment   (concerning  the  neutrality  of  Belgium). 

In  response  to  inquiries  from  Belgium  and  England,  France  agrees 
to  respect  Belgian  neutrality  in  case  it  is  not  violated  by  another  Power. 

Sir  F.  Bertie  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  August  i.) 

Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

(France  oflficially  informs  England  and  Belgium  that)  French 

Government  are  resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  it  would 
only  be  in  the  event  of  some  other  Power  violating  that  neutrality  that  France 
might  find  herself  under  the  necessity,  in  order  to  assure  defense  of  her  own 
security,  to  act  otherwise.  This  assurance  has  been  given  several  times.  Pres- 
ident of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  and  the  French 
Minister  at  Brussels  has  spontaneously  renewed  the  assurance  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  today. 


The  Fourteen  Days  149 

M.  Davignon,  (Belgian)  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian  Ministers 
in  Berlin,  Paris,  and  London 

Brussels,  sist  July,  191 4. 
Monsieur  le   Ministre : 

The  French  Minister  (to  Belgium) said  to  me :  I  take  ad- 
vantage of  this  opportunity  to  declare  to  you  that  no  incursion  of  French 
troops  will  take  place  in  Belgium,  even  if  large  forces  were  massed  upon  the 
frontiers  of  your  country.  France  does  not  wish  to  have  the  responsibility  of 
carrying  out  the  first  act  of  hostility  toward  Belgium.  Instructions  to  this 
effect  will  be  given  to  the   French   authorities. 

Jean  Jaures,  the  noted  French  Sociahst  leader,  is  assassinated  in  a 
Paris  cafe  by  a  Frenchman  who  fears  Jaures  will  exert  uj>on  the 
diplomatic  situation  an  influence  not  to  the  best  interests  of  France. 

England  refuses  to  ask  Russia  to  demobilize  unless  Austria  will  limit 
her  advance  into  Servia. 

Sir  Edzvard  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

I  informed  the  German  Ambassador  that,  as  regards  military 

preparations,  I  did  not  see  how  Russia  could  be  urged  to  suspend  them  unless 
some  limit  were  put  by  Austria  to  the  advance  of  her  troops  into  Servia. 

France  asks  England  what  the  English  attitude  will  be  as  a  result 
of  the  German  ultimatum  to  Russia, 

Sir  F.  Bertie   to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  July  31.) 

Paris,  July  SI,   1914. 

The     (French)     Minister     for    Foreign    Affairs        

inquires  what,  in  these  circumstances,  will  be  the  attitude  of  England 


England  is  still  maintaining  her  position  of  refusing  unqualified 
support  to  France  and  Russia  and  yet  of  warning  Germany  not  to 
expect  English  neutrality  in  case  of  a  general  European  War;  the 
question  of  Belgian  neutrality  is  an  important  one  in  English  eyes. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to   Sir  F.  Bertie 

London,  Foreign   Office,  July  31,   1914. 

I   said    (to   the  French  Ambassador   in  London)    that   it  was 

quite  wrong  to  suppose  that  we  had  left  Germany  under  the  impression  that 
we  would  not  intervene.  I  had  refused  overtures  to  promise  that  we  should 
remain  neutral.  I  had  not  only  definitely  declined  to  say  we  would  remain 
neutral,  I  had  even  gone  so  far  this  morning  as  to  say  to  the  German  Am- 
bassador that  if  France  and  Germany  became  involved  in  war  we  should  be 
drawn  into  it 


150  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Though  we  should  have  to  put  our  policy  before  Parliament 

we  could  not  pledge  Parliament  in  advance.  Up  to  the  present  moment  we 
did  not  feel,  and  public  opinion  did  not  feel,  that  any  treaties  or  obligations 
of  this  country  were  involved.  Further  developments  might  alter  this  situa- 
tion and  cause  the  Government  and  Parliament  to  take  the  view  that  inter- 
vention was  justified.  The  preservation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  might  be, 
I  would  not  say  a  decisive,  but  an  important  factor,  in  determining  our  attitude. 
Whether  we  proposed  to  Parliament  to  intervene  or  not  to  intervene  in  a  war, 
Parliament  would  wish  to  know  how  we  stood  with  regard  to  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium 

M.  Cambon  repeated  his  question  whether  we  would  help  France  if  Ger- 
many made  an  attack  on  her. 

I  said  I  could  only  adhere  to  the  answer  that,  as  far  as  things  had  gone  at 
present,  we  could  not  make  any  engagement. 

England  will  not  support  France  and  Russia  if  they  do  not  listen 
to  any  Austro-German  proposals  of  a  reasonable  nature ;  but  otherwise 
England  will  be  drawn  into  war. 

Sir  Edzvard  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschcn 

London,  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 
I  said  to  German  Ambassador  (in  London)  this  morning  that  if  Germany 
could  get  any  reasonable  proposal  put  forward  which  made  it  clear  that  Ger- 
many and  Austria  were  striving  to  preserve  European  peace,  and  that  Russia 
and  France  would  be  unreasonable  if  they  rejected  it,  I  would  support  it  at 
St.  Petersburg  and  Paris,  and  go  the  length  of  saying  that  if  Russia  and  France 
would  not  accept  it  his  Majesty's  Government  would  have  nothing  more  to 
do  with  the  consequences ;  that,  otherwise,  I  told  German  Ambassador  that  if 
France  became  involved  we  should  be  drawn  in. 

The  Bank  of  England  doubles  its  discount  rate. 

Belgium  orders  the  mobilisation  of  the  Belgian  army. 

Italy  informs  Germany  that  Austria's  attitude  has  been  aggressive, 
not  defensive ;  and  that  as  Italy  considers  the  Triple  Alliance  only  a 
defensive  union,    Italy  will  remain  neutral  in  case  of  war. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie 

London,  Foreign  Office,  Aug.  3,  1914. 

To  the  question  as  to  what  were  the  intentions  of  Italy,  the 

Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  (Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs)  replied  (to 
Germany)  : 

"The  war  undertaken  by  Austria,  and  the  consequences  which  might  result, 
had,  in  the  words  of  the  German  Ambassador  himself,  an  aggressive  object. 
Both  were  therefore  in  conflict  with  the  purely  defensive  character  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  and  in  such  circumstances  Italy  would  remain  neutral." 


AUGUST  I 

Germany  orders  the  release  of  English  ships  illegally  detained  at 
Hamburg. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen 

London,  Foreign  Office,  Aug.  I,  IQ14. 

We  are  informed*  that  authorities  at  Hamburg  have  forcibly  detained 
steamers  belonging  to  the  Great  Central  Company  and  other  British  merchant 
ships. 

I  cannot  ascertain  on  what  grounds  the  detention  of  British  ships  has  been 
ordered. 

You  should  request  German  Government  to  send  immediate  orders  that 
they  should  be  allowed  to  proceed  without  delay.  The  effect  on  public  opinion 
here  will  be  deplorable  unless  this  is  done.  His  Majesty's  Government,  on 
their  side,  are  most  anxious  to  avoid  any  incident  of  an  aggressive  nature, 
and  the  German  Government  will,  I  hope,  be  equally  careful  not  to  take  any 
step  which  would  make  the  situation  between  us  impossible. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  August  2.) 

Berlin,  Aug.   i,  1914. 

(German)     Secretary    of    State,    who    expressed    the    greatest 

surprise  and  annoyance    (at  the  detention  of  British   shipping),  has  promised 
to  send  orders  at  once  to  allow  steamers  to  proceed  without  delay. 

In  the  afternoon  Germany  orders  general  mobilisation  of  the  Ger- 
man army  and  navy,  the  first  day  of  mobilisation  to  be  tomorrow. 

Germany  informs  England  that  she  cannot  accept  England's  view 
that  Germany  is  being  drawn  into  war  solely  because  of  her  alliance 
with  Austria.  Germany  insists  that  her  strategic  position  compels  her 
to  strike  while  the  iron  is  hot,  because  Germany  has  the  speed  while 
Russia  has  the  numbers.  Russia  has  not  answered  the  German  ulti- 
matum zvithin  the  time  specified,  and  has  been  informed  that  further 
silence  will  create  a  state  of  war. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
(Received  August  2.) 

Berlin,  Aug.   i,  19 14. 

I  spent  a  long  time  arguing  with  him    (the  German  Foreign 

Secretary)    that  the   chief   dispute   was   between   Austria  and   Russia,   and   that 
Germany  was  only  drawn  in  as  Austria's  ally Secretary  of   State 


152  A  History  of  the  Great  iVar 

for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Austria's  readiness  to  discuss  was  the  result  of 
German  influence  at  Vienna,  and,  had  not  Russia  mobilized  against  Germany, 
all  would  have  been  well.  But  Russia,  by  abstaining  from  answering  Ger- 
many's demand  that  she  should  demobilize,  had  caused  Germany  to  mobilize 
also.  Russia  had  said  that  her  mobilization  did  not  necessarily  imply  war, 
and  that  she  could  perfectly  well  remain  mobilized  for  months  without  making 
war.  This  was  not  the  case  with  Germany.  She  had  the  speed  and  Russia 
had  the  numbers,  and  the  safety  of  the  German  Empire  forbade  that  Germany 
should  allow  Russia  time  to  bring  up  masses  of  troops  from  all  parts  of  her 
wide  dominions.  The  situation  now  was  that,  though  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment had  allowed  her  several  hours  beyond  the  specified  time,  Russia  had  sent 
no  answer.  Germany  had,  therefore,  ordered  mobilization,  and  the  German 
representative  at  St.  Petersburg  had  been  instructed  within  a  certain  time  to 
inform  the  Russian  Government  that  the  Imperial  Government  must  regard 
their  refusal  to  answer  as  creating  a  state  of  war. 

Russia,  through  the  Tsar,  asks  Germany,  through  the  Kaiser,  but  two 
hours  after  the  expiration  of  the  time-limit,  to  see  that  the  German 
mobiHzation  does  not  involve  war  between  Russia  and  Germany. 
Germany,  however,  insists  upon  an  unequivocal  answer  to  her  ulti- 
matum. 

The  Tsar  to  the  Kaiser 

St.  Petersburg,  Aug.  i,  1914. 
I  have  received  Your  telegram.  I  understand  that  You  are  forced  to 
mobilize,  but  I  should  like  to  have  from  You  the  same  guarantee  which  I  have 
given  You,  viz.,  that  these  measures  do  not  mean  war,  and  that  we  shall  con- 
tinue to  negotiate  for  the  welfare  of  our  two  countries  and  the  universal  peace 
which  is  so  dear  to  our  hearts.  With  the  aid  of  God  it  must  be  possible  to 
our  long-tried  friendship  to  prevent  the  shedding  of  blood.  I  expect  with  full 
confidence  Your  urgent  reply. 

NICOLAS. 

The  Kaiser  to  the  Tsar 

Berliti,  Aug.  1,  1914. 
I  thank  You  for  Your  telegram.  I  showed  yesterday  to  Your  Govern- 
ment the  way  through  which  war  may  alone  be  averted.  Although  I  asked 
for  a  reply  by  today  noon,  no  telegram  from  my  Ambassador  has  reached 
me  with  the  reply  of  Your  Government.  I  therefore  have  been  forced  to 
mobilize  my  army.  An  immediate,  clear  and  unmistakable  reply  of  Your 
Government  is  the  sole  way  to  avoid  endless  misery.  Until  I  receive  this 
reply,  I  am  unable,  to  my  great  grief,  to  enter  upon  the  subject  of  Your 
telegram.  I  must  ask  most  earnestly  that  You,  without  delay,  order  Your 
troops  to  commit,  under  no  circumstances,  the  slightest  violation  of  our 
frontiers. 

WILHELM. 


The  Fourteen  Days  153 

Germany  undertakes  not  to  attack  France  in  case  France  will  re- 
main neutral. 

Telegram   of  the   German  Ambassador  in  London   to   the  German   Chancellor, 

August  1st,  19 14 

Sir  E.  Grey  just  asked  me  by  telephone  whether  I  believed  I  was  in  a 
position  to  declare  that  we  would  not  attack  France  in  a  war  between  Ger- 
many and  Russia  in  case  France  should  remain  neutral.  I  declared  I  believed 
I  was  able  to  give  such  a  pledge. 

LICHNOWSKY. 

Telegram  of  the  Kaiser  to  the  King  of  England,  August  ist,  igi4 

I  just  received  the  communication  from  Your  Government  offering  French 
neutrality  under  guarantee  of  Great  Britain.  Added  to  this  offer  was  the 
inquiry  whether  under  these  conditions  Germany  would  refrain  from  attack- 
ing France.  On  technical  grounds  My  mobilization,  which  had  already  been 
proclaimed  this  afternoon,  must  proceed  against  the  two  fronts,  east  and 
west,  as  prepared ;  this  cannot  be  countermanded  because,  I  am  sorry.  Your 
telegram  came  so  late.  But  if  France  offers  Me  neutrality,  which  must  be 
guaranteed  by  the  British  fleet  and  army,  I  shall  of  course  refrain  from 
attacking  France  and  employ  My  troops  elsewhere.  I  hope  that  France  will 
not  become  nervous.  The  troops  on  My  frontier  are  about  to  be  stopped  by 
telegraph  and  telephone  from  crossing  into  France. 

Telegram   of   the  German   Chancellor  to   the   German  Ambassador  in  London, 

August  1st,  19 1 4 

Germany  is  ready  to  accept  British  proposal  in  case  England  guarantees 
with  all  her  forces  absolute  neutrality  of  France  in  Russo-German  conflict. 
German  mobilization  has  been  ordered  today  on  account  of  Russian  chal- 
lenge, before  English  proposal  was  known  here.  It  is  therefore  now  im- 
possible to  make  any  change  in  strategical  distribution  of  troops  ordered  to 
the  French  frontier.  But  we  guarantee  that  our  troops  will  not  cross  the 
French  frontier  before  7  P.  M.  on  Monday  the  3rd  inst.  in  case  England 
will  pledge  herself  meanwhile. 

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG. 

France  professes  not  to  understand  the  threatening-  nature  of  the 
communication  received  yesterday  from  Germany.  The  German  am- 
bassador has  madje  preparations  to  leave  Paris. 

Sir  F.  Bertie  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Paris,  Aug.  i,  IQ14. 
.  .  ,  .  .  The  German  Ambassador  was  informed,  on  calling  at  the 
(French)  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  this  morning,  that  the  French  Gov- 
ernmenft  failed  to  comprehend  the  reason  which  prompted  his  communica- 
tion of  yesterday  evening.  It  was  pointed  out  to  his  Excellency  that  general 
mobilization  In  Russia  had  not  been  ordered  until  after  Austria  had  decreed 
a    general    mobilization,    and    that    the    Russian    Government    were    ready    to 


154  ^  History  of  the  Great  War 

demobilize    if   all    Powers   did   likewise There   were   no   differences 

at  issue  between  France  and  Germany,  but  the  German  Ambassador  had 
made  a  menacing  communication  to  the  French  Government  and  had  requested 
an  answer  the  next  day,  intimating  that  he  would  have  to  break  off  rela- 
tions and  le^ve  Paris  if  the  reply  were  not  satisfactory.  The  Ambassador  was 
informed  that  the  French  Government  considered  that  this  was  an  extraor- 
dinary proceeding. 

The  German  Ambassador,  who  is  to  see  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
again  this  evening,  said  nothing  about  demanding  his  passports,  but  he  stated 
that  he  had  packed  up. 

France  then  informs  Germany  that,  in  the  ez'ent  of  a  Riisso-Gcrman 
tvar,  France  ivill  act  according  to  her  oivn  interests. 

M.  Rene  Vivian'i,  French  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  .Affairs,  to 
M.  Palcologiie,  French  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg 

Paris,  July  31,  J914. 

In  conclusion.  Baron  von  Schoen  asked  me  on  behalf  of  his 

Government,  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  France  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  be- 
tween Germany  and  Russia.  He  told  me  that  he  would  call  to  receive  my  answer 
at  I  o'clock  tomorrow. 

I  do  not  intend  to  make  any  statement  to  him  on  this  subject,  and  I 
shall  confine  myself  to  telling  him  that  France  will  be  inspired  by  her  interests. 
The  Government  of  the  Republic,  indeed,  owes  only  to  her  ally  a  statement 
as  to  her  intentions. 

Telegram  of  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris  to  the  German  Chancellor 

Aug.  I,  1:03  P.  M. 
To    my    repeated    inquiry   as    to    whether    France,    in    case    of    a    German- 
Russian   war,   would   remain   neutral   the   Premier   declared   that   France   would 
do  that  which  might  be  required  of  her  by  her  interests. 

France  orders  general  mobilisation  of  the  French  army  at  3:40  h .  M. 

Sir  F.  Bertie   to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Paris,  August   I    1914. 

(French)  Minister  of  War  informed  (British)  Military  Attache  this 
afternoon  that  orders  had  been  given  at  3 :40  for  a  general  mobilization  of 
the  French  Army.  This  became  necessary  because  th«.  Minister  of  War  knows 
that,  under  the  system  of  "Kriegszustand,"  the  Germans  have  called  up  six 
classes.  Three  classes  are  sufficient  to  bring  their  covering  troops  up  to  war 
strength,  the  remaining  three  being  the  reserve.  This,  he  says,  being  tanta- 
mount to  mobilization,  is  mobilization  under  another  name. 

The  French  forces  on  tlie  frontier  have  opposed  to  them  eight  army 
corps  on  a  war  footing,  and  an  attack  is  expected  at  any  moment.  It  is 
therefore  of  the  utmost  importance  to  guard  against  this.  A  zone  of  ten 
kilometers  has  been  left  between  the  French  troops  and  the  German  frontier. 
The  French  troops  will  not  attack,  and  the  Minister  of  War  is  anxious  that 
it  should  be  explained  that  this  act  of  mobilization  is  one  for  purely  defensive 
purposes. 


The  Pourtecn  Days  155 

France  agrees  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  if  it  is  not 
violated  by  Germany. 

M.   Viviani,  French  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to 
M.  Mollard,  French  Minister  in  Luxemburg 

Paris,  Aug.  i,  1914. 
Please  state  to  the  Prime  Minister  (of  Luxemburg)  that  in  conformity 
with  the  Treaty  of  London  of  1867  the  Government  of  the  (French)  Republic 
intends  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  as  it  has 
shown  by  its  attitude.  A  German  violation  of  this  neutrality,  however,  would 
be  of  a  nature  to  force  France  to  act  thereafter  in  accordance  with  the  require- 
ments of  her  defense  and  her  interests. 

RENE  VIVIANL 

Belgium  informs  England  that  the  Belgian  Government  intends  to 
protect  the  soil  of  Belgium  from  invasion. 

Sir  F.  Villiers  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Brussels,  Aug.  i,  1914. 
Belgium  expects  and  desires  that  other  Powers  will  observe  and  uphold 
her  neutrality,  which  she  intends  to  maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her  power.  In 
so  informing  me  (the  Belgian)  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that,  in  the 
event  of  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  their  territory,  they  believed  that 
they  were  in  a  position  to  defend  themselves  against  intrusion.  The  relations 
between  Belgium  and  her  neighbors  were  excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason 
to  suspect  their  intentions ;  but  he  thought  it  well,  nevertheless,  to  be  prepared 
against  emergencies. 

England  corrects  the  mistaken  impression  of  Germany  that  England 
thought  it  possible  for  France  to  remain  neutral  in  case  of  a  Russian- 
German  war. 

The  King  of  England  to  the  Emperor  of  Germany,  August  i,  1914 

In  answer  to  your  telegram  just  received,  I  think  there  must  be  some  mis- 
understanding as  to  a  suggestion  that  passed  in  friendly  conversation  between 
Prince  Lichnowsky  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  this  afternoon  when  they  were  dis- 
cussing how  actual  fighting  between  German  and  French  armies  might  be 
avoided  while  there  is  still  a  chance  of  some  agreement  between  Austria  and 
Russia.  Sir  Edward  Grey  will  arrange  to  see  Prince  Lichnowsky  early  to- 
morrow morning  to  ascertain  whether  there  is  a  misunderstanding  on  his  part. 

GEORGE. 

The  German  Ambassador  in  London  to  the  German  Chancellor,  August  2,  1914 

Sir  E.  Grey's  suggestion?  were  prompted  by  a  desire  to  make  it  possible  for 
England  to  keep  permanent  neutrality,  but  as  they  were  not  based  on  a  previous 
understanding  with  France  and  made  without  knowledge  of  our  mobilization, 
they  have  been  abandoned  as  absolutely  hopeless. 

LICHNOWSKY. 


156  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

England  informs  Germany  that  German  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality will  greatly  inflame  British  popular  opinion,  but  refuses  to  go 
on  record  as  stating  that  it  will  ipso  facto  cause  a  declaration  of  war 
from  England.  Nevertheless,  German  respect  for  Belgian  neutrality 
will  greatly  lessen  tension  in  England,  but  again  England  refuses  to 
say  that  she  will  remain  neutral  in  case  Belgium  is  not  attacked. 
England  finally  refuses  to  state  terms  on  which  she  will  remain  neutral, 
desiring  to  keep  her  hands  free. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen 

London,  Foreign  Office,  Aug.  i,  1914. 

Sir:  I  told  the  German  Ambassador  today  that  the  reply  of  the  German 
Government  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  a  matter  of  very 
great  regret,  because  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  affected  feeling  in  this  country. 
If  Germany  could  see  her  way  to  give  the  same  assurance  as  that  which  had 
been  given  by  France  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and 
tension  here.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  by  one  combatant  while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this  country.     I  said 

I   was   authorized  to  tell  him   this 

He  asked  me  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgium 
neutrality,  we  would  engage  to  remain  neutral. 

I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that;  our  hands  were  still  free,  and  we  were 
considering  what  our  attitude  should  be.  All  I  could  say  was  that  our  attitude 
would  be  determined  largely  by  public  opinion  here,  and  that  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  would  appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion  here.  I  did  not  think 
that  we  could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition  alone. 

The  Ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could  not  formulate  condi- 
tions on  which  we  would  remain  neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity 
of  France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed. 

I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to  remain  neutral 
on  similar  terms,  and  I  could  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our  hands  free. 
I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 

Austria  is  thoroughly  alarmed  at  her  inability  to  localize  her  quarrel 
with  Servia  and  is  now  willing  to  accept  mediation  and  to  cease  her 
mobilization  against  Russia  if  Russia  will  countermand  the  Russian 
mobilization  against  Austria. 

Sir  Edward  Grey   to  Sir  G.  Buchanan 

London,  Foreign  Office,  Aug.  i,  1914. 
Information  reaches  me  from  a  most  reliable  source  that  Austrian  Govern- 
ment have  informed  German  Government  that,  though  the  situation  has  been 
changed  by  the  mobilization  of  Russia,  they  would  in  full  appreciation  of  the 
eiforts  of  England  for  the  preservation  of  peace  be  ready  to  consider  favorably 


The  Fourteen  Days  157 

my  proposal  for  mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia.  The  understanding 
of  this  acceptance  would  naturally  be  that  the  Austrian  military  action  against 
Servia  would  continue  for  the  present,  and  that  the  British  Government  would 
urge  upon  Russian  Government  to  stop  the  mobilization  of  troops  directed 
against  Austria,  in  which  case  Austria  would  naturally  cancel  those  defensive 
military  counter-measures  in  Galicia,  which  have  been  forced  upon  Austria  by 
Russian  mobilization 

The  Russian  Ambassador  in  France  to  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Paris,  19  July,  (i  Aug.,)  191 4. 
The   Ambassador  of  Austria  yesterday  called  upon   Viviani  and  declared 
to   him   that  Austria  not   only  had   no   intention   of    infringing   the   territorial 
integrity  of  Servia,  but  was  ready  to  discuss  with  the  other  Powers  the  basis 
of   its  conflict  with   Servia 

The  Austrian  ambassador  to  Russia  remains  in  Petrograd  and  con- 
tinues to  discuss  the  Russian-Austrian  impasse  with  the  Russian 
Foreign  Office. 

HAVING  RECEIVED  NO  REPLY  FROM  RUSSIA  TO  HIS 
ULTIMATUM,  AT  7:10  P.  M.  THE  GERMAN  AMBASSADOR 
IN  PETROGRAD  HANDS  THE  RUSSIAN  GOVERNMENT  A 
FORMAL  DECLARATION  OF  WAR  ON  RUSSIA  BY  GER- 
MANY. 

Note  Handed  in  by  the  Ambassador  of  Germany  at  St.  Petersburg  the  19th  July, 
(Aug.  I,)  1914,  at  10  Minutes  Past  7  in  the  Evening 

St.  Petersburg,  19th  July,  (ist  Aug.,)  1914. 

The  Imperial  Government  has  endeavored  from  the  opening  of  the  crisis 
to  lead  it  to  a  pacific  solution.  In  accordance  with  a  desire  which  had  been 
expressed  to  him  by  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  his  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  Germany  in  accord  with  England  had  applied  himself  to  filling  a 
mediator  role  with  the  Cabinets  of  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg,  when  Russia, 
without  awaiting  the  result  of  this,  proceeded  to  the  complete  mobilization  of 
her  forces  on  land  and  sea.  As  a  consequence  of  this  threatening  measure, 
motived  by  no  military  "presage"  on  the  part  of  Germany,  the  German  Empire 
found  itself  in  face  of  a  grave  and  imminent  danger.  If  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment had  failed  to  safeguard  herself  against  this  peril  it  would  have  com- 
promised the  safety  and  the  very  existence  of  Germany.  Consequently  the 
German  Government  saw  itself  forced  to  address  to  the  Government  of  his 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  All  the  Russias  an  insistence  on  the  cessation  of  the 
said  military  acts.  Russia  not  having  thought  it  should  reply  to  this  demand, 
and  having  manifested  by  this  attitude  that  its  action  was  directed  against 
Germany,  I  have  the  honor  to  make  known  to  your  Excellency  the  following: 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  My  August  Sovereign,  in  the  nam.e  of  the 
Empire,  taking  up  the  challenge,  considers  himself  in  a  state  of  war  with 
Russia. 

F.   POURTALES. 


AUGUST  2 

Germany  presents  an  ultimatum  to  Belgium,  demanding  that  Belgium 
grant  passage  to  Germ-an  troops. 

Note  handed  in  on  August  2d  at  7  o'clock  P.  M.  by  the  German  Minister  to 
Belgium  to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

Highly  Confidential. 

Brussels,  2  August,  1914. 

The  German  Government  has  received  reliable  information  according  to 
which  the  French  forces  intend  to  march  on  the  J^teuse,  by  way  of  Givet  and 
Namur.  This  information  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  France  of 
marching  on  Germany  through  Belgian  territory.  The  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment cannot  avoid  the  fear  that  Belgium,  in  spite  of  its  best  will,  will  be 
in  no  position  to  repulse  such  a  largely  developed  French  march  without  aid. 
In  this  fact  there  is  sufficient  certainty  of  a  threat  directed  against  Germany. 

It  is  an  imperative  duty  for  the  preservation  of  Germany  to  forestall  this 
attack  of  the  enemy. 

The  German  Government  would  feel  keen  regret  if  Belgium  should  regard 
as  an  act  of  hostility  against  herself  the  fact  that  the  measures  of  the  enemies 
of  Germany  oblige  her  on  her  part  to  violate  Belgian  territory. 

In  order  to  dissipate  any  misunderstanding  the  German  Government  de- 
clares as  follows : 

1.  Germany  does  not  contemplate  any  act  of  hostility  against  Belgium.  If 
Belgium  consents  in  the  war  about  to  commence  to  take  up  an  attitude  of 
friendly  neutrality  toward  Germany,  the  German  Government  on  its  part  under- 
takes, on  the  declaration  of  peace,  to  guarantee  the  kingdom  and  its  possessions 
in  their  whole  extent. 

2.  Germany  undertakes  under  the  conditions  laid  down  to  evacuate  Belgian 
territory  as  soon  as  peace  is  concluded. 

3.  If  Belgium  preserves  a  friendly  attitude,  Germany  is  prepared,  in  agree- 
ment with  the  authorities  of  the  Belgian  Government,  to  buy  against  cash  all 
that  is  required  by  her  troops,  and  to  give  indemnity  for  the  damages  caused 
in  Belgium. 

4.  If  Belgium  behaves  in  a  hostile  manner  toward  the  German  troops,  and 
in  particular  raises  difficulties  against  their  advance  by  the  opposition  of  the 
fortifications  of  the  Meuse,  or  by  destroying  roads,  railways,  tunnels,  or  other 
engineering  works,  Germany  will  be  compelled  to  consider  Belgium  as  an 
enemy. 

In  this  case  Germany  will  take  no  engagements  toward  Belgium,  but  she 
will  leave  the  later  settlement  of  relations  of  the  two  States  toward  one  an- 
other to  the  decision  of  arms.  The  German  Government  has  a  justified  hope 
that  this  contingency  will  not  arise  and  that  the  Belgian  Government  will  know 
how  to  take  suitable  measures  to  hinder  its  taking  place.  In  this  case  the 
friendly  relations  which  unite  the  two  neighboring  States  will  become  closer 
and  more  lasting. 

158 


The  Fourteen  Days  159 

Germany's  forces  enter  Luxonbnrg,  Germany  asserting  that  her 
intentions  are  not  hostile  and  that  compensation  will  be  made. 

Minister  of  State,  Luxemburg,  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey 

Luxemburg,  Aug.  2,  1914. 
The  Luxemburg  Minister  of  State  has  just  received  through  the  German 
Minister  in  Luxemburg,  M.  de  Buch,  a  telegram  from  the  Chancellor  of  the 
German  Empire,  Bethmann-Hollweg,  to  the  effect  that  the  military  measures 
taken  in  Luxemburg  do  not  constitute  a  hostile  act  against  Luxemburg,  but 
are  only  intended  to  insure  against  a  possible  attack  of  a  French  army.  Full 
compensation  will  be  paid  to  Luxemburg  for  any  damage  caused  by  using  the 
railways,  which  are  leased  to  the  Empire. 

Germany  informs  France  that  the  measures  taken  in  Luxemburg 
are  not  hostile,  but  preventive. 

Note  Presented  by  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  the  French  Minister  of 

Foreign  Affairs 

Paris,  Aug.  2,  IQ14. 
The  German  Ambassador  has  just  been  ordered  and  hastens  to  inform 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  the  military  steps  taken  by  Germany  in 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  do  not  constitute  an  act  of  hostility.  They 
must  be  considered  as  being  purely  preventive  measures  taken  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  railways  which  under  existing  treaties  between  Germany  and  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  are  under  German  administration. 

Luxefitbitrg  protests  against  the  violation  of  her  neutrality. 

Minister  of  State,  Luxemburg,  to  Sir*  Edivard  Grey 

Luxemburg,  Aug.  2,  1Q14. 

The   Luxemburg  Government  have   not  failed   to   address   an 

energetic  protest  against  this  aggression'  (of  Germany)  to  the  representatives 
of  his  Majesty  the  German  Emperor  at  Luxemburg.  An  identical  protest  vv^ill 
be  sent  by  telegraph  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Berlin. 

England  informs  France  that  the  British  fleet  will  not  permit  the 
German  fleet  to  proceed  through  the  English  Channel  or  the  North 
Sea  to  attack  French  coasts  or  French  shipping,  this  action  being  in 
accord  with  a  secret  naval  agreement  of  1912  between  France  and 
England  whereby  England  undertook  to  protect  northern  France  so 
that  France  might  concentrate  her  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean.  Eng- 
land does  not  feel  called  upon  to  defend  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg 
but  feels  that  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  is  a  much  more  im- 
portant matter.  England,  therefore,  has  not  yet  definitely  committed 
herself. 


i6o  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie 

London,  foreign  Office,  Aug.  2,  1914. 

After  the  Cabinet  this  morning  I  gave  M.  Cambon  the  following  memo- 
randum : 

"I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the  German  fleet  comes  into 
the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations  against 
French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in  its 
power. 

"This  assurance  is,  of  course,  subject  to  the  policy  of  his  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment receiving  the  support  of  Parliament,  and  must  not  be  taken  as  binding 
his  Majesty's  Government  to  take  any  action  until  the  above  contingency  of 
action  by  the  German  fleet  takes  place." 

I  pointed  out  that  we  had  very  large  questions  and  most  difficult  issues  to 
consider,  and  that  Government  felt  that  they  could  not  bind  themselves  to 
declare  war  upon  Germany  necessarily  if  war  broke  out  between  France  and 
Germany  tomorrow,  but  it  was  essential  to  the  French  Government,  whose 
fleet  had  long  been  concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean,  to  know  how  to  make 
their  dispositions  with  their  north  coast  entirely  undefended.  We  therefore 
thought  it  necessary  to  give  them  this  assurance.  It  did  not  bind  us  to  go  to 
war  with  Germany  unless  the  German  fleet  took  the  action  indicated,  but  it 
did  give  a  security  to  France  that  would  enable  her  to  settle  the  disposition  of 
her  own   Mediterranean   fleet. 

M.  Cambon  asked  me  about  the  violation  of  Luxemburg.  I  told  him  the 
doctrine  on  that  point  laid  down  by  Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Clarendon  in  1867. 
He  asked  me  what  we  should  say  about  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium. I  said  that  was  a  much  more  important  matter ;  we  were  considering 
what  statement  we  should  make  in  Parliament  tomorrow — in  eflfect,  whether 
we  should  declare  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  to  be  a  casus  belli.  I  told 
him  what  had  been  said  to  the  German  Ambassador  on  this  point. 

The  English  Opposition  Party  (Unionist)  pledges  its  support  to 
the  Government  in  any  policy  of  coming  to  the  rescue  of  France  and 
Russia. 

Russia  proclaims  the  state  of  war  with  Germany,  declaring  that  she 
has  been  attacked  by  Germany. 


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DESCRIPTION    OF    PICTURES   ON    REVERSE    SIDE 

Upper  Left   Hand   Corner — Henry   Morgenthau,   United   States  Ambassador 
to  Turkey,   1913-1916. 

Upper    Right    Hand    Corner — Brand    Whitlock,    United    States    Minister    to 
Belgium,   December  2,  1913 — . 

Center — James   W.    Gerard,    United    States   Ambassador   to    Germany,   July, 
1913-February   3,    1917. 

Lower  Left  Hand   Corner — Thomas   Nelson   Page,  United   States  Ambassa- 
dor to  Italy,  June  21,  1913 — . 

Lower    Right    Hand    Corner — William    Graves    Sharp,    L^nited    States    Am- 
bassador   to    France,    1914-1919. 


AUGUST  3 

At  7  A.  M.,  Belgium  replies  to  the  German  ultimatum,  zvarning 
Germany  that  Belgium  zvill  resist  any  attempt  to  violate  her  neutrality 
and  asserting  no  fear  that  France  zinll  violate  it. 

Note  Handed  in  by  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  German  Minister  to 

Belgium 

Brussels,  s  August,  1914. 
(7  o'clock  in  the  morning.) 

The    intentions    attributed    to    France    (by    Germany)    are    in 

contradiction  with  the  express  declarations  whicli  were  made  to  us  on  the  ist 
August,  in  the  name  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic. 

Moreover,  if,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
were  to  be  committed  by  France,  Belgium  would  fulfill  all  her  international 
duties  and  her  army  would  offer  the  most  vigorous  opposition  to  the  invader. 

The  treaties  of  1839,  confirmed  by  the  treaties  of  1870,  establish  the 
independence  and  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
Powers,  and  particularly  of  the  Government  of  his  Majesty  the  King  of 
Prussia 

The  attempt  against  her  (Belgium's)  independence  with  which  the  German 
Government  threatens  her  would  constitute  a  flagrant  violation  of  interna- 
tional law.     No  strategic  interest  justifies  the  violation  of  that  law. 

The  Belgian  Government  would,  by  accepting  the  propositions  which  are 
offered  to  her,  sacrifice  the  honor  of  the  nation  while  at  the  same  time  betray- 
ing her  duties  toward  Europe. 

Conscious  of  the  part  Belgium  has  played  for  more  than  eighty  years  in 
the  civilization  of  the  world,  she  refuses  to  believe  that  the  independence  of 
Belgium  can  be  preserved  only  at  the  expense  of  the  violation  of  her  neutrality. 

If  this  hope  is  disappointed  the  Belgian  Government  has  firmly  resolved  to 
repulse  by  every  means  in  her  power  any  attack  upon  her  rights. 

Germany  promises  that  if  England  remains  neutral  Germany  will 
forego  all  naval  operations  and  the  use  of  the  Belgian  coast  as  a  sup- 
porting base. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Minister  in  London,  to  M.  Viviani,  French  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

London,  Aug.  3,  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  has  sent  a  communique  to  the  press 

stating  that  if  England  remains  neutral  Germany  will  forego  all  naval  opera- 
tions and  will  not  use  the  Belgian  coasts  as  supporting  base.  I  am  making 
the  reply  that  respect  for  coasts  is  not  respect  for  the  neutrality  of  territory, 
and  that  the  German  ultimatum  is  already  a  violation  of  neutrality. 

PAUL  CAMBON. 

305  161 


1 62  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Belgium  appeals  to  England  for  diploinatie  protection  but  informs 
France  that  she  does  not  yet  require  French  assistance  and  will  not 
yet  appeal  to  the  guaranty  of  the  Powers. 

Letter  addressed  by  Belgian  Alinistcr  for  Foreign  Affairs   to   the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburg 

Brussels,  3d  August,  (Midday,)  191 4. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre : 

As  you  are  aware,  Germany  has  delivered  to  Belgium  an  ultimatum  expir- 
ing this  morning,  Aug.  3,  at  7  o'clock.  No  act  of  war  having  taken  place  up 
to  the  present  time,  the  Council  of  Ministers  has  decided  that  there  was  not 
for  the  moment  reason  to  appeal  to  the  guaranteeing  powers. 

I  thanked  M.  Klobukowski  for  the  support  which  the  French 

Government  would  presumably  be  good  enough  to  offer,  and  I  told  him  that 
the  Belgian  Government  were  not  at  the  moment  making  an  appeal  for  the 
guarantee  of  the  Powers  and  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  decide  later 
on  what  it  would  be  best  to  do. 

DAVIGNON. 

Telegram  addressed  by  the  King  of  Belgium  to  the  King  of  England 

Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's  friendship  and  that 
of  your  predecessor,  and  the  friendly  attitude  of  England  in  1870  and  the  proof 
of  friendship  you  have  just  given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme  appeal  to  the 
diplomatic  intervention  of  your  Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard  the  in- 
tegrity of  Belgium. 

In  England,  Sir  Edward  Grey  addresses  the  House  of  Commons  in 
the  afternoon,  tracing  the  history  of  the  entente  with  France  and 
asserting  that  it  implies  a  moral  obligation  to  support  France  today. 
He  rejects  the  German  ofifer  to  respect  the  north  coast  of  France.  He 
explains  the  importance  of  the  issue  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
and  reveals  for  the  first  time  the  naval  understanding  with  France 
entered  into  in  1912. 

England  informs  Belgium  that  German  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality ivill  result  in  war  between  England  and  Germany. 

Telegram  addressed  by  the  Belgian  Minister  in  London  to  the  Belgian  Minister 

for  Foreign  Affairs 

London,  sd  August,  1914. 
I   showed  your  telegram  to  the   Minister   for   Foreign  Affairs,  who  com- 
municated   same   to   the   Cabinet    Council.      The    Minister    for   Foreign    Affairs 
told  me  that  if  your  neutrality  were  violated  it  would  mean  war  with  Germany. 

COMTE  DE  LALAING. 


The  Fourteen  Days  163 

CITING  ALLEGED  HOSTILE  ACTS  OF  FRANCE,  GER- 
MANY ISSUES  A  DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST 
FRANCE. 

Letter  Handed  by  German  Ambassador  (to  France)  to  M.  Rene  Viviani  During 
His  farewell  Audience,  Aug.  j,  1914,  at  6:4^  P.  M. 

Paris,  Aug.  3,  1914. 
M.  le  President: 

The  German  administrative  and  military  authorities  have  remarked  a  cer- 
tain number  of  definitely  hostile  acts  committed  on  German  territory  by  French 
military  airmen.  Several  of  these  latter  have  manifestly  violated  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  by  flying  over  the  territory  of  that  country.  One  has  en- 
deavored to  destroy  buildings  near  Wesel ;  others  have  been  seen  in  the  Eifel 
region ;  another  has  thrown  bombs  on  the  railway  line  near  Carisruhe  and 
Nuremberg.  I  am  ordered,  and  I  have  the  honor,  to  inform  your  Excellency 
that  in  view  of  these  aggressions  the  German  Empire  considers  itself  to  be  in 
a  state  of  war  with  France  by  the  act  of  this  latter  power 

France  charges  (in  a  speech  of  Premier  Viviani  to  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies)  that  Germany  has  been  guiky  of  aggression  against  France 
before  the  declaration  of  war  between  the  two  countries. 

France  offers  Belghmi  military  assistance. 

Sir  F.  Villicrs  to  Sir  Edzvard  Grey 

Brussels,  Aug.  3,  IQ14. 
French  Government  have  offered  through  their  Military  Attache  the  sup- 
port of  five  French  Army  corps  to  the  Belgian  Government 


AUGUST  4 

EARLY  IN  THE  MORNING  GERMANY  INFORMS  BEL- 
GIUM THAT  IT  IS  NECESSARY  FOR  GERMANY  TO  INVADE 
BELGIUM.  LATER  IN  THE  DAY  GERMAN  TROOPS  ENTER 
BELGIUM. 

Letter  addressed  by  the  German  Minister  to  Belgium  to  the  Belgian  Minister  for 

Foreign  Affairs 

Brussels,  4th  August,  1Q14. 
(6  A.  M.) 
Monsieur  le  Ministre: 

I  have  been  instructed,  and  have  the  honor  to  inform  your  Excellency, 
that  in  consequence  of  the  Government  of  his  Majesty  the  King  having  de- 
clined the  vv^ell-intentioned  proposals  submitted  to  them  by  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, the  latter  will,  deeply  to  their  regret,  be  compelled  to  carry  out — if 
necessary  by  force  of  arms — the  measures  of  security  which  have  been  set 
forth  as  indispensable  in  view  of  the  French  menaces.     I  am,  &c., 

VON  BELOW. 

Telegram  addressed  by  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  in  London  and  Paris 

B}'ussels,  4th  August,   IQ14. 
The   General   Staff  notify  that  the   national  territory   has   been   violated   at 
Gemmenich. 

DAVIGNON. 

Sir  F.   VilUers  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 

Brussels,  Aug.  4,  19 14. 
Military  Attache  has  been  informed  at  War  Office  that  German  troops  have 
entered  Belgian  territory,  and  that  Liege  has  been  summoned  to  surrender  by 
small  party  of  Germans,  who,  however,  were  repulsed. 

il/.  Pellet,  French  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  il/.  Viviani,  French  Prime  Minister 
and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

The  Hague,  Aug.  s,  1914. 
The  German  Minister  called  upon  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  yester- 
day in  order,  he  said,  to  explain  the  necessity  of  the  violation  of  Luxemburg 
neutrality  by  Germany.  He  added  that  today  he  would  have  a  further  com- 
munication to  make  to  him.  This  morning,  indeed,  he  announced  the  entry 
of  German  troops  into  Belgium  in  order,  he  declared,  to  avoid  an  occupation 
of  that  country  by  France. 

PELLET. 

164 


The  Fourteen  Days  165 

Belgium  hands  the  German  ambassador  his  passports. 

Letter  addressed  by  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  German 

Minister  to  Belgium 

Brussels,  4th  August,  19 14. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre: 

I  have  the  honor  of  acquainting  your  Excellency  that  from  today  the 
King's  Government  can  no  longer  acknowledge  your  diplomatic  character,  and 
must  cease  to  have  official  relations  with  you.  Your  Excellency  will  find  in- 
closed the  passports  which  are  necessary  for  your  departure  and  that  of  the 
staff  of  the  legation.     I  am,  &c., 

DAVIGNON. 

France  notifies  the  Pozvers  of  a  state  of  zvar  between  France  and 
Germany. 

The  German  Chancellor  explains  the  reasons  for  Germany's  actions 
in  the  Reichstag,  laying  the  blame  for  the  war  at  the  door  of  Russia. 
He  admits  that  Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium  is  in  violation  of  treaty 
and  international  law,  but  defends  it  on  the  grounds  of  strategical 
necessity.  The  German  Socialists  declare  that  the  war  is  not  a  people's 
war,  but  support  it  in  order  to  repel  Russia. 

Germany  informs  England  that  there  will  be  no  annexation  of  Bel- 
gian territory  and  that  Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium  is  rendered 
necessary  by  an  intended  French  invasion  of  Belgium. 

German  Foreign  Secretary  to  Prince  Lichnozvsky 

Berlin,  August  4,  1914. 
Please  dispel  any  mistrust  that  may  subsist  on  the  part  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment  with    regard   to   our    intentions   by   repeating   most   positively    formal 
assurance  that,  even  in  the  case  of  armed  conflict  with  Belgium,  Germany  will, 

under  no  pretense  whatever,  annex  Belgian  territory Please  impress 

upon  Sir^E.  Grey  that  German  army  could  not  be  exposed  to  French  attack 
across  Belgium,  which  was  planned  according  to  absolutely  unimpeachable  in- 
formation. Germany  had  consequently  to  disregard  Belgian  neutrality,  it 
being  for  her  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent  French  advance. 

England  informs  Belgium  that  England  will  join  zvith  Russia  and 
France  in  protecting  Belgium  against  Germany  and  that  England  ex- 
pects Belgium  to  defend  herself. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Villiers 

London,  Foreign  Office,  Aug.  4,  1914. 
You  should  inform  Belgian  Government  that  if  pressure  is  applied  to 
them  by  Germany  to  induce  them  to  depart  from  neutrality,  His  Majesty's 
Government  expect  that  they  will  resist  by  any  means  in  their  power,  and  that 
His  Majesty's  Government  will  support  them  in  offering  such  resistance,  and 
that  His  Majesty's  Government  in  this  event  are  prepared  to  join  Russia  and 


i66  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

France,  if  desired,  in  offering  to  the  Belgian  Government  at  once  common  ac- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  resisting  use  of  force  by  Germany  against  them,  and 
a  guarantee  to  maintain  their  independence  and  integrity  in  future  years. 

England  notifies  Norway  and  Holland  that  England  will  protect 
them  as  well  as  Belgium  against  Germany. 

Telegram  addressed  by  the  Belgian  Minister  in  London  to  the  Belgian  Minister 

for  Foreign  Affairs 

London,  4th  August,  1914. 
The  (English)  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  informed  the  British  Min- 
isters in  Norway,  Holland  and  Belgium,  that  Great  Britain  expects  that  these 
three  kingdoms  will  resist  the  pressure  of  Germany  and  maintain  neutrality. 
They  will  be  supported  in  their  resistance  by  England,  who  in  such  a  case  is 
ready  to  co-operate  with  France  and  Russia  if  such  is  the  desire  of  these  three 
Governments  in  offering  an  alliance  to  the  said  Governments  to  repel  the  em- 
ployment of  force  against  them  by  Germany,  and  a  guarantee  for  the  future 
maintenance  of  the  independence  and  the  integrity  of  the  three  kingdoms.  1 
pointed  out  that  Belgium  is  neutral  in  perpetuity.  The  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  replied :     "It  is  for  the  event  of  neutrality  being  violated." 

COMTE  DE  LALAING. 

In  the  afternoon,  England  delivers  an  ultimatum  to  Germany,  de- 
manding that  Belgian  neutrality  he  respected  and  that  German  troops 
be  zi'ithdraivn  from  Belgian  soil.  England  demands  a  satisfactory 
anszver  by  midnight. 

Sir  Edzvard  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen 

London,  Foreign  Office,  Aug.  4,  1914. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  also  informed  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  has  delivered  to  the  Belgian  Government  a  note  proposing 
friendly  neutrality  entailing  free  passage  through  Belgian  territory,  and  prom- 
ising to  maintain  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  kingdom  and  its  pos- 
sessions at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  threatening  in  case  of  refusal  to  treat 
Belgium  as  an  enemy.     An  answer  was  requested  within  twelve  hours. 

We  also  understand  that  Belgium  has  categorically  refused  this  as  a  flagrant 
violation  of  the  law  of  nations. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  bound  to  protest  against  this  violation  of 
a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  a  party  in  common  with  themselves,  and  must 
request  an  assurance  that  the  demand  made  upon  Belgium  will  not  be  pro- 
ceeded with,  and  that  her  neutrality  will  be  respected  by  Germany. 

5"jV  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen 

London,  Foreign  Office,  Aug.  4,  1914. 
We  hear  that  Germany  has  addressed  note  to  Belgian  Minister   for  For- 
eign Affairs  stating  that  German   Government  will  be  compelled  to  carry  out, 
if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures  considered  indispensable. 

We  are  also  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has  been  violated  at  Gem- 
menich. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  declined  to 
give  the  same  assurance  respecting  Belgium  as  France  gave  last  week  in  reply 


The  Fourteen  Days  167 

to  our  request  made  simultaneously  at  Berlin  and  Paris,  we  must  repeat  that 
request,  and  ask  that  a  satisfactory  reply  to  it  and  to  my  telegram  of  this  morn- 
ing (see  above),  be  received  here  by  12  o'clock  tonight.  If  not.  you  are 
instructed  to  ask  for  your  passports,  and  to  say  that  his  Majesty's  Government 
feel  bound  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  party  as  our- 
selves. 

Germany  refuses  to  comply  with  the  British  ultimatum.  Germany 
protests  against  the  action  of  England,  calling  the  treaty  guaranteeing 
Belgian  neutrality  a  "scrap  of  paper,"  and  "neutrality"  a  "mere  word." 
The  British  ambassador  to  Germany  demands  his  passports  at  p.'^o 
P.  M. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  E.  Grey 

London,  Aug.  8,  1914. 

Sir — In  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  your  telegram  of  the 
4th  instant,  I  called  upon  the  (German)  Secretary  of  State  that  afternoon  and 
enquired,  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  whether  the  Imperial 
(German)  Government  would  refrain  from  violating  Belgian  neutrality.  Herr 
von  Jagow  at  once  replied  that  he  was  sorry  to  say  that  his  answer  must  be 
"No,"  as,  in  consequence  of  the  German  troops  having  crossed  the  frontier 
that  morning,  Belgian  neutrality  had  been  already  violated.  Herr  von  Jagow 
again  went  into  the  reasons  why  the  Imperial  Government  had  been  obliged 
to  take  this  step,  namely,  that  they  had  to  advance  into  France  by  the  quickest 
and  easiest  way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead  with  their  operations  and 
endeavor  to  strike  some  decisive  blow  as  early  as  possible 

I  again  proceeded  to  the  Imperial  Foreign  Office  and  informed  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  that  unless  the  Imperial  Government  could  give  the  assurance 
by  12  o'clock  that  night  that  they  would  proceed  no  further  with  their  viola- 
tion of  the  Belgian  frontier  and  stop  their  advance,  I  had  been  instructed  to 
demand  my  passports  and  inform  the  Imperial  Government  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  would  have  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  was  as 
much  a  party  as  themselves. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  to  his  great  regret  he  could  give  me  no  other 
answer  than  that  which  he  had  given  me  earlier  in  the  day,  namely,  that  the 
safety  of  the  Empire  rendered  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the  Imperial  troops 
should  advance  through  Belgium.  I  gave  his  Excellency  a  written  summary 
of  your  telegram  and,  pointing  out  that  you  had  mentioned  12  o'clock  as  the 
time  when  His  Majesty's  Government  would  expect  an  answer,  asked  him 
whether,  in  view  of  the  terrible  consequences  which  would  necessarily  ensue, 
it  were  not  possible  even  at  the  last  moment  that  their  answer  should  be  recon- 
sidered. He  replied  that  if  the  time  given  were  even  twenty-four  hours  or 
more,  his  answer  must  be  the  same.  I  said  that  in  that  case  I  should  have  to 
demand  my  passports.     This  interview  took  place  at  about  7  o'clock 

His  Excellency  (the  German  Chancellor)  at  once  began  a  harangue,  which 
lasted  for  about  twenty  minutes.  He  said  that  the  step  taken  by  his  Majesty's 
Government  was  terrible  to  a  degree;  just  for  a  word — "neutrality,"  a  word 
which  in  war  time  had  so  often  been  disregarded — just  for  a  scrap  of  paper 


i68  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Great  Britain  was  going  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  desired  nothing 

better  than  to  be  friends  with  her 

I    said   that,    in    the   same   way   as   he  and   Herr    von   Jagow 

wished  me  to  understand  that  for  strategical  reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  life 
and  death  to  Germany  to  advance  through  Belgium  and  violate  the  latter's 
neutrality,  so  I  would  wish  him  to  understand  that  it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  mat- 
ter of  "life  and  death"  for  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  that  she  should  keep  her 
solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost  to  defend  Belgium's  neutrality  if  attacked. 
That  solemn  compact  simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what  confidence  could  any  one 
have  in  engagements  given  by  Great  Britain  in  the  future?    .... 

At  about  9:30  P.  M.  Herr  von  Zimmermann,  the  Under-Secre- 
tary of  State,  came  to  see  me.  After  expressing  his  deep  regret  that  the  very 
friendly  official  and  personal  relations  between  us  were  about  to  cease,  he  asked 
me  casually  whether  a  demand  for  passports  was  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of 
war.  I  said  that  such  an  authority  on  international  law  as  he  was  known  to 
be  must  know  as  well  or  better  than  I  what  was  usual  in  such  cases.  I  added 
that  there  were  many  cases  where  diplomatic  relations  had  been  broken  off 
and,  nevertheless,  war  had  not  ensued ;  but  that  in  this  case  he  would  have 
seen  from  my  instructions,  of  which  I  have  given  Herr  von  Jagow  a  written 
summary,  that  his  Majesty's  Government  expected  an  answer  to  a  definite  ques- 
tion by  12  o'clock  that  night  and  that  in  default  of  a  satisfactory  answer  they 
would  be  forced  to  take  such  steps  as  their  engagements  required.  Herr  Zim- 
mermann said  that  that  was,  in  fact,  a  declaration  of  war,  as  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment could  not  possibly  give  the  assurance  required  either  that  night  or  any 
other  night 

I  should  also  like  to  mention  the  great  assistance  rendered  to 

us  all  by  my  American  colleague,  Mr.  Gerard,  and  his  staff.  Undeterred  by 
the  hooting  and  hisses  with  which  he  was  often  greeted  by  the  mob  on  enter- 
ing and  leaving  the  embassy,  his  Excellency  came  repeatedly  to  see  me  to  ask 
how  he  could  help  us  and  to  make  arrangements  for  the  safety  of  stranded 
British  subjects.  He  extricated  many  of  these  from  extremely  difficult  situa- 
tions at  some  personal  risk  to  himself,  and  his  calmness  and  savoir-faire  and 
his  firmness  in  dealing  with  the  Imperial  authorities  gave  full  assurance  that 
the  protection  of  British  subjects  and  interests  could  not  have  been  left  in  more 
efficient  and  able  hands.    I  have,  &c., 

W.  E.  GOSCHEN. 

AT  MIDNIGHT,  HAVING  RECEIVED  NO  ANSWER  TO 
THE  BRITISH  ULTIMATUM  TO  GERMANY  DEMANDING 
THAT  GERMANY  RESPECT  THE  NEUTRALITY  OF  BEL- 
GIUM, ENGLAND  DECLARES  WAR  ON  GERMANY. 

AUGUST  5 

AUSTRIA  DECLARES  WAR  ON  RUSSIA  BECAUSE  OF 
THE  STATE  OF  WAR  EXISTING  BETWEEN  GERMANY 
AND  RUSSIA. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WAR, 
AUGUST  1,  1914— APRIL  6,  1917 

Neutrality  in  Thought  and  Action 

A  feeling  of  horror  completely  overshadowed  all  other  feelings  in 
the  United  States  when  the  great  nations  of  Europe  plunged  into  war. 
At  that  time,  there  was  practically  no  general  popular  understanding 
in  this  country  of  the  tremendous  issues  which  had  given  birth  to 
the  holocaust  and  which  would  be  involved  in  its  results.  The  United 
States  was  thousands  of  miles  from  the  seat  of  the  war.  It  possessed 
no  territory  adjacent  to  the  main  battle  arena.  It  had  no  alliances  or 
even  "understandings"  with  any  of  the  great  Powers  involved.  It 
had  followed  in  its  own  diplomacy  a  tradition  of  isolated  publicity 
which  rendered  it  all  the  more  disinterested  in  or  even  intolerant  of 
the  secret  and  public  alliances  which  for  many  years  had  aligned 
Europe  into  two  hostile  camps.  It  contained  no  royal  families,  no 
aristocracy  of  birth,  no  large  standing  army  and  no  policy  of  univer- 
sal military  training.  Small  wonder  then  that  the  war  should  have 
presented  itself  to  our  minds  as  a  mere  product  of  political  and  eco- 
nomic ambitions,  and  that  we  should  have  echoed  fervently  the  old 
adage  that  wars  were  fought  by  the  people,  not  by  the  rulers,  but  for 
the  benefit  of  the  rulers,  not  of  the  people. 

A  policy  of  neutrality  was  thus  acclaimed  with  unanimous  consent. 
On  August  4,  1914,  the  President  issued  a  Neutrality  Proclamation,  of 
which  the  salient  passages  are  as  follows  and  which  is  a  sample  of  our 
neutrality  proclamations  issued  later  as  other  nations  became  drawn 
into  the  general  conflict. 

Whereas  a  state  of  war  unhappily  exists  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia  and  between  Germany  and  Russia  and  be- 
tween Germ^any  and  France;  And  Whereas  the  United  States  is 
on  terms  of  friendship  and  amity  with  the  contending  powers,  and 
with  the  persons  inhabiting  their  several  dominions; 

169 


170  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

And  Whereas  there  are  citizens  of  the  United  States  residing 
within  the  territories  or  dominions  of  each  of  the  said  belhgerents 
and  carrying  on  commerce,  trade,  or  other  business  or  pursuits 
therein ; 

And  Whereas  there  are  subjects  of  each  of  the  said  belhgerents 
residing  within  the  territory  or  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States, 
and  carrying  on  commerce,  trade,  or  other  business  or  pursuits 
therein ; 

And  Whereas  the  laws  and  treaties  of  the  United  States,  with- 
out interfering  with  the  free  expression  of  opinion  and  sympathy, 
or  with  the  commercial  manufacture  or  sale  of  arms  or  munitions 
of  war,  nevertheless  impose  upon  all  persons  who  may  be  within 
their  territory  and  jurisdiction  the  duty  of  an  impartial  neutrality 
during  the  existence  of  the  contest ; 

And  Whereas  it  is  the  duty  of  a  neutral  government  not  to 
permit  or  suffer  the  making  of  its  waters  subservient  to  the  pur- 
poses of  war; 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  in  order  to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the 
United  States  and  of  its  citizens  and  of  persons  within  its  terri- 
tory and  jurisdiction,  and  to  enforce  its  laws  and  treaties,  and  in 
order  that  all  persons,  being  warned  of  the  general  tenor  of  the 
laws  and  treaties  of  the  United  States  in  this  behalf,  and  of  the 
law  of  nations,  may  thus  be  prevented  from  any  violation  of  the 
same,  do  hereby  declare  and  proclaim  that  by pro- 
visions of  the  act  approved  on  the  4th  day  of  March,  A.  D.  1909, 
commonly   known   as  the   "Penal   Code   of   the   United    States'' 

(certain)    acts    are    forbidden    to    be    done,    under 

severe  penalties,  within  the  territory  and  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States 

And  I  do  hereby  further  declare  and  proclaim  that  any  fre- 
quenting and  use  of  the  waters  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States  by  the  armed  vessels  of  a  belligerent,  whether 
public  ships  or  privateers,  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  for  hostile 
operations,  or  as  posts  of  observation  upon  the  ships  of  war  or 
privateers  or  merchant  vessels  of  a  belligerent  lying  within  or  being 
about  to  enter  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  must  be  re- 
garded as  unfriendly  and  offensive,  and  in  violation  of  that  neU' 
trality  which  it  is  the  determination  of  this  government  to  ob. 
serve 

And  I  do  further  declare  and  proclaim  that  the  statutes  and  the 
treaties  of  the  United  States  and  the  law  of  nations  alike  re- 


U.  S.  and  the   War,  August   i,   1914-April  6,  igi'j         171 

quire  that  no  person,  within  the  territory  and  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States,  shall  take  part,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  the  said 
wars,  but  shall  remain  at  peace  with  all  of  the  said  belligerents, 
and  shall  maintain  a  strict  and  impartial  neutrality. 

And  I  do  hereby  enjoin  all  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and 
all  persons  residing  or  being  within  the  territory  or  jurisdiction  of 
the  United  States,  to  observe  the  laws  thereof,  and  to  commit  no 
act  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  the  said  statutes  or  treaties  or  in 
violation  of  the  law  of  nations  in  that  behalf. 

And  I  do  hereby  warn  all  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  all 
persons  residing  or  being  within  its  territory  or  jurisdiction  that, 
while  the  free  and  full  expression  of  sympathies  in  public  and 
private  is  not  restricted  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  military 
forces  in  aid  of  a  belligerent  cannot  lawfully  be  originated  or 
organized  within  its  jurisdiction;  and  that,  while  all  persons  may 
lawfully  and  without  restriction  by  reason  of  the  aforesaid  state 
of  war  manufacture  and  sell  within  the  United  States,  arms  and 
munitions  of  war,  and  other  articles  ordinarily  known  as  "contra- 
band of  war,"  yet  they  cannot  carry  such  articles  upon  the  high 
seas  for  the  use  or  service  of  a  belligerent,  nor  can  they  transport 
soldiers  and  officers  of  a  belligerent,  or  attempt  to  break  any 
blockade  which  may  be  lawfully  established  and  maintained  dur- 
ing the  said  wars  without  incurring  the  risk  of  hostile  capture 
and  the  penalties  denounced  by  the  law  of  nations  in  that  behalf. 

And  I  do  hereby  give  notice  that  all  citizens  of  the  United 
States  and  others  who  may  claim  the  protection  of  this  govern- 
ment, who  may  misconduct  themselves  in  the  premises,  will  do 
so  at  their  peril,  and  that  they  can  in  no  wise  obtain  any  pro- 
tection from  the  government  of  the  United  States  against  the  con- 
sequences of  their  misconduct 

Coupled  with  this  determination  to  remain  neutral  toward  the  Eu- 
ropean conflict  was  a  realization  that  by  its  position  the  United  States 
was  the  one  great  Power  which  could  act  with  comf)lete  impartiality 
as  mediator,  when  the  time  for  mediation  should  arrive,  and  as  peace- 
maker when  the  time  for  peace  should  arrive.  This  feeling  was  well 
expressed  by  President  Wilson  in  an  address  to  the  members  of  the 
Associated  Press  at  a  luncheon  in  New  York  on  April  20,  1915- 

Do  you  realize,  that,  roughly  speaking,  we  are  the 

only  great  nation  at  present  disengaged?    I  am  not  speaking,  of 


172  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

course,  with  disparagement  of  the  greatness  of  those  nations  in  Eu- 
rope which  are  not  parties  to  the  present  war,  but  I  am  thinking  of 
their  close  neighborhood  to  it.  I  am  thinking  how  their  hves 
much  more  than  ours  touch  the  very  heart  and  stuff  of  the  busi- 
ness, whereas  we  have  rolHng  between  us  and  those  bitter  days 
across  the  water  3,000  miles  of  cool  and  silent  ocean.  Our 
atmosphere  is  not  yet  charged  with  those  disturbing  elements 
which  must  permeate  every  nation  of  Europe.  Therefore,  is  it 
not  likely  that  the  nations  of  the  world  will  some  day  turn  to  us 
for  the  cooler  assessment  of  the  elements  engaged?  I  am  not 
now  thinking  so  preposterous  a  thought  as  that  we  should  sit  in 
judgment  upon  them — no  nation  is  fit  to  sit  in  judgment  upon 
any  other  nation — but  that  we  shall  some  day  have  to  assist  in 
reconstructing  the  processes  of  peace.  Our  resources  are  un- 
touched; we  are  more  and  more  becoming  by  the  force  of  circum- 
stances the  mediating  nation  of  the  world  in  respect  of  its  finance. 
We  must  make  up  our  minds  what  are  the  best  things  to  do  and 
what  are  the  best  ways  to  do  them.  We  must  put  our  money,  our 
energy,  our  enthusiasm,  our  sympathy  into  these  things,  and  we 
must  have  our  judgments  prepared  and  our  spirits  chastened 
against  the  coming  of  that  day 

Possible  Dangers  to  America 

The  historically-minded  among  us  were  not  slow  to  recall  that 
slightly  more  than  one  hundred  years  before,  the  ramifications  of  the 
last  previous  general  war  in  Europe  had  finally  involved  the  United 
States  in  armed  conflict  with  a  great  European  power.  The  issue  at 
stake  in  the  War  of  1812  was  the  issue  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and 
was  thus  stated  by  the  President  who  guided  the  destinies  of  the  na- 
tion during  that  war: 

[From  President  Madison's  Message  to  Congress,  June  i,  1812] 

'-  British  cruisers  have  been  in  the  continued  prac- 
tice of  violating  the  American  flag  on  the  great  highway  of  nations, 
and  of  seizing  and  carrying  off  persons  sailing  under  it,  not  in  the 
exercise  of  a  belligerent  right  founded  on  the  law  of  nations 
against  an  enemy,  but  of  a  municipal  prerogative  over  British 
subjects.     .)  .     .     . 

Thousands  of  American  citizens,  under  the  safeguard  of  public 


U.  S.  and  the   War,  August   i,   1914-April  6,   K^iy         173 

law  and  of  their  national  flag,  have  been  torn  from  their  country 
and  from  everything  dear  to  them ;  have  been  dragged  on  board 
ships  of  war  of  a  foreign  nation  and  exposed,  under  the  severities 
of  their  discipline,  to  be  exiled  to  the  most  distant  and  deadly 
climes,  to  risk  their  lives  in  the  battles  of  their  oppressors,  and 
to  be  the  melancholy  instruments  of  taking  away  those  of  their 
own  brethren 

British  cruisers  have  been  in  the  practice  also  of  violating  the 
rights  and  the  peace  of  our  coasts.     They  hover  over  and  harass 

our  entering  and  departing  commerce 

^  Under  pretended  blockades,  without  the  presence  of  an  adequate 
force  and  sometimes  without  the  practicability  of  applying  one, 
our  commerce  has  been  plundered  in  every  sea,  the  great  staples 
of  our  country  have  been  cut  oflf  from  their  legitimate  markets, 
and  a  destructive  blow  aimed  at  our  agricultural  and  maritime  in- 
terests  

Not  content  with  these  occasional  expedients  for  laying  waste 
our  neutral  trade,  the  cabinet  of  Great  Britain  resorted  at  length 
to  the  sweeping  system  of  blockades,  under  the  name  of  orders  in 
council,  which  has  been  molded  and  managed  as  might  best  suit 
its  political  views,  its  commercial  jealousies,  or  the  avidity  of  Brit- 
ish cruisers.  1 

To  our  remonstrances  against  the  complicated  and  transcendent 
injustice  of  this  innovation  the  first  reply  was  that  the  orders 
were  reluctantly  adopted  by  Great  Britain  as  a  necessary  retalia- 
tion on  decrees  of  her  enemy  proclaiming  a  general  blockade  of 
the  British  Isles  at  a  time  when  the  naval  force  of  that  enemy 
dared  not  issue  from  his  own  ports 

We  behold,  in  fine,  on  the  side  of  Great  Britain  a  state  of  war 
against  the  United  States,  and  on  the  side  of  the  United  States 
a  -^tate  of  peace  toward  Great  Britain. 

Whether  the  United  States  shall  continue  passive  under  these 
progressive  usurpations  and  these  accumulating  wrongs,  or,  oppos- 
ing force  to  force  in  defense  of  their  national  rights,  shall  com- 
mit a  just  cause  into  the  hands  of  the  Almighty  Disposer  of 
Events,  avoiding  all  connections  which  might  entangle  it  in  the 
contest  or  views  of  other  powers,  and  preserving  a  constant  readi- 
ness' to  concur  in  an  honorable  reestablishment  of  peace  and 
friendship,  is  a  solemn  question  which  the  Constitution  wisely 
confides  to  the  legislative  department  of  the  Government.  In 
recommending  it  to  their  early  deliberations  I  am  happy  in  the 
assurance  that  the  decision  will  be  worthy  the  enlightened  and 


174  ^  History  of  the  Great  War 

patriotic     councils     of    a    virtuous,     a     free,     and     a     powerful 
nation 

But  in  one  hundred  years  the  United  States  had  grown  from  a  few 
states  in  an  under-developed  economic  condition,  and  devoted  chiefly 
to  agricultural  pursuits,  into  a  great  industrial  and  commercial  Power. 
She  had  interests  which  far  transcended  the  territorial  boundaries  of 
the  land  and  in  turn  her  home  interests  were  vitally  affected  by  foreign 
conditions. 

Moreover,  in  those  one  hundred  years,  new  developments  in  science 
and  industry  had  broken  down  the  barriers  of  time  and  space.  With 
cables  and  wireless  systems  between  Europe  and  America,  with  vessels 
crossing  the  Atlantic  in  six  days,  America  could  not  consider  herself 
unrelated  to  the  world  which  was  seething  in  struggle.  All  the  more 
reason,  then,  why  the  United  States  should  be  over-scrupulous  in  pre- 
serving an  attitude  of  stem  and  strict  neutrality,  not  only  in  deed,  but 
even  in  thought. 

On  August  20,  1914,  President  Woodrow  Wilson  signified  the 
gravity  of  the  situation  by  openly  addressing  his  fellow-countrymen 
in  the  interests  of  neutrality: 

My  Fellow-Countrymen :  I  suppose  that  every  thoughtful 
man  in  America  has  asked  himself,  during  these  last  troubled 
weeks,  what  influence  the  European  war  may  exert  upon  the 
United  States,  and  I  take  the  liberty  of  addressing  a  few  words 
to  you  in  order  to  point  out  that  it  is  entirely  within  our  own 
choice  what  its  efifects  upon  us  will  be  and  to  urge  very  earnestly 
upon  you  the  sort  of  speech  and  conduct  which  will  best  safeguard 
the  Nation  against  distress  and  disaster. 

The  effect  of  the  war  upon  the  United  States  will  depend  upon 
what  American  citizens  say  and  do.  Every  man  who  really  loves 
America  will  act  and  speak  in  the  true  spirit  of  neutrality,  which 
is  the  spirit  of  impartiality  and  fairness  and  friendliness  to  all 
concerned.  The  spirit  of  the  Nation  in  this  critical  matter  will 
be  determined  largely  by  what  individuals  and  society  and  those 
gathered  in  public  meetings  do  and  say,  upon  what  newspapers 
arid  magazines  contain,  upon  what  ministers  utter  in  their  pulpits 
and  men  proclaim  as  their  opinions  on  the  street. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  are  drawn  from  many  nations, 
and  chiefly  from  the  nations  now  at  war.    It  is  natural  and  inevit- 


U.  Si  and   the    War,  August   i,   ipi4-April  6,   ipi/         175 

able  that  there  should  be  the  utmost  variety  of  sympathy  and 
desire  among  them  with  regard  to  the  issues  and  circumstances 
of  the  conflict.  Some  will  wish  one  nation,  others  another,  to 
succeed  in  the  momentous  struggle.  It  will  be  easy  to  excite 
passion  and  difficult  to  allay  it.  Those  responsible  for  exciting 
it  will  assume  a  heavy  responsibility,  responsibility  for  no  less  a 
thing  than  that  the  people  of  the  United  States,  whose  love  of 
their  country  and  whose  loyalty  to  its  Government  should  unite 
them  as  Americans  all,  bound  in  honor  and  affection  to  think 
first  of  her  and  her  interests,  may  be  divided  in  camps  of  hostile 
opinion,  hot  against  each  other,  involved  in  the  war  itself  in  im- 
pulse and  opinion  if  not  in  action. 

Such  divisions  among  us  would  be  fatal  to  our  peace  of  mind 
and  might  seriously  stand  in  the  way  of  the  proper  performance 
of  our  duty  as  the  one  great  nation  at  peace,  the  one  people  hold- 
ing itself  ready  to  play  a  part  of  impartial  mediation  and  speak  the 
counsels  of  peace  and  accommodation,  not  as  a  partisan,  but  as 
a  friend. 

I  venture,  therefore,  my  fellow-countrymen,  to  speak  a  solemn 
word  of  warning  to  you  against  that  deepest,  most  subtle,  most 
essential  breach  of  neutrality  which  may  spring  out  of  partisan- 
ship, out  of  passionately  taking  sides.  The  United  States  must 
be  neutral  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name  during  these  days  that  are  to 
try  men's  souls.  We  must  be  impartial  in  thought  as  well  as  in 
action,  must  put  a  curb  upon  our  sentiments  as  well  as  upon  every 
transaction  that  might  be  construed  as  a  preference  of  one  party 
to  the  struggle  before  another 

Leaders  in  private  as  well  as  in  public  life  enjoined  strict  impartiality 
upon  America.  Ex-President  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  only  one  of  the 
prominent  Americans  to  advocate  unadulterated  neutrality  toward  tlie 
quarrel  across  the  seas. 

Our  hope  for  the  speedy  ending  of  the  War  was  well  reflected  in 
President  Wilson's  proclamation  on  September  8,  1914,  setting  aside 
a  day  for  prayers  for  peace. 

Whereas  great  nations  of  the  world  have  taken  up  arms  against 
one  another  and  war  now  draws  millions  of  men  into  battle  whom 
the  counsel  of  statesmen  has  not  been  able  to  save  from  the 
terrible  sacrifice ; 

And  Whereas  in  this  as  in  all  things  it  is  our  privilege  and  duty 


176  A  Histary  of  the  Great  War 

to  seek  counsel  and  succor  of  Almighty  God,  humbling  ourselves 
before  Him,  confessing  our  weakness  and  our  lack  of  any  wisdom 
equal  to  these  things ; 

And  Whereas  it  is  the  especial  wish  and  longing  of 'the  people 
of  the  United  States,  in  prayer  and  counsel  and  all  friendliness, 
to  serve  the  cause  of  peace ; 

Therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  do  designate  Sunday,  the  fourth  day  of  October  next, 
a  day  of  prayer  and  supplication  and  do  request  all  God-fearing 
persons  to  repair  on  that  day  to  their  places  of  worship  there  to 
unite  their  petitions  to  Almighty  God  that,  overruling  the  counsel 
of  men,  setting  straight  the  things  they  can  not  govern  or  alter, 
taking  pity  on  the  nations  now  in  the  throes  of  conflict,  in  His 
mercy  and  goodness  showing  a  way  where  men  can  see  none,  He 
vouchsafe  His  children  healing  peace  again  and  restore  once  more 
that  concord  among  men  and  nations  without  which  there  can  be 
neither  happiness  nor  true  friendship  nor  any  wholesome  fruit  of 
toil  or  thought  in  the  world ;  praying  also  to  this  end  that  He  for- 
give us  our  sins,  our  ignorance  of  His  holy  will,  our  wilfulness 
and  many  errors,  and  lead  us  in  the  paths  of  obedience  to  places 
of  vision  and  to  thoughts  and  counsels  that  purge  and  make 
wise.    .    §    .    . 

The  American  Policy  of  Isolation 

The  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  from  the  first  days  of  the 
Republic  through  an  uninterrupted  cycle  of  years  had  been  definitely 
a  policy  of  isolation  from  European  political  quarrels  and  affiliations. 
Our  first  President  had  successfully  resisted,  during  his  stewardship 
of  the  nation's  affairs,  the  tremendous  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon 
him  to  show^  gratitude  for  France's  help  in  the  War  of  the  American 
Revolution  by  intervening  on  the  side  of  France  in  the  struggle  be- 
tween France  and  England.  And  when  George  Washington  finally 
was  ready  to  lay  down  the  burdens  of  office  and  to  retire  to  Mount 
Vernon,  in  his  Farewell  Address  to  his  country  he  solemnly  advised  it 
against  all  foreign  entangling  alliances  and  all  over-strong  foreign 
affections :  ■ 

Nothing  is  more  essential  than  tliat  permanent, 

inveterate  antipathies  against  particular  nations   and  passionate 


U.  S.  and  the   War,  August   i,   igi4-April  6,   iQiy         177 

attachments  for  others  should  be  exckided,  and  that  in  place  of 
them  just  and  amicable  feelings  toward  all  should  be  cultivated. 
The  nation  which  indulges  toward  another  an  habitual  hatred  or 
an  habitual  fondness  is  in  some  degree  a  slave.  It  is  a  slave  to 
its  animosity  or  to  its  affection,  either  of  which  is  sufficient  to 
lead  it  astray  from  its  duty  and  its  interest.  Antipathy  in  one 
nation  against  another  disposes  each  more  readily  to  offer  insult 
and  injury,  to  lay  hold  of  slight  causes  of  umbrage,  and  to  be 
haughty  and  intractable  when  accidental  or  trifling  occasions  of 
dispute  occur 

So,  likewise,  a  passionate  attachment  of  one  nation  for  another 
produces  a  variety  of  evils.  Sympathy  for  the  favorite  nation, 
facilitating  the  illusion  of  an  imaginary  common  interest  in  cases 
where  no  real  common  interest  exists,  and  infusing  into  one  the 
enmities  of  the  other,  betrays  the  former  into  a  participation  in 
the  quarrels  and  wars  of  the  latter  without  adequate  inducement 
or  justification.  It  leads  also  to  concessions  to  the  favorite  nation 
of  privileges  denied  to  others,  which  is  apt  doubly  to  injure  the 
nation  making  the  concessions  by  unnecessarily  parting  with  what 
ought  to  have  been  retained,  and  by  exciting  jealousy,  ill  will, 
and  a  disposition  to  retaliate  in  the  parties  from  whom  equal 
privileges  are  withheld 

Against  the  insidious  wales  of  foreign  influence  (I  conjure  you 
to  believe  me,  fellow-citizens)  the  jealousy  of  a  free  people  ought 
to  be  constantly  awake,  since  history  and  experience  prove  that 
foreign  influence  is  one  of  the  most  baneful  foes  of  republican 
government.  But  that  jealousy,  to  be  useful,  must  be  impartial, 
else  it  becomes  the  instrument  of  the  very  influence  to  be  avoided, 
instead  of  a  defense  against  it.  Excessive  partiality  for  one 
foreign  nation  ajid  excessive  dislike  of  another  cause  those  whom 
they  actuate  to  see  danger  only  on  one  side,  and  serve  to  veil  and 
even  second  the  arts  of  influence  on  the  other.  Real  patriots  who 
may  resist  the  intrigues  of  the  favorite  are  liable  to  become  sus- 
pected and  odious,  while  its  tools  and  dupes,  usurp  the  applause 
and  confidence  of  the  people  to  surrender  their  interests. 

The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations 
is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations  to  have  with  them  as 
little  political  connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already 
formed  engagements  let  them  be  fulfilled  with  perfect  good  faith. 
Here  let  us  stop. 

Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none  or 
&.  very  remote  relation,     Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent 


178  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our 
concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate 
ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her 
politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of  her  friend- 
ships or  enmities 

Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situation?  Why 
quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  grounds  ?  Why,  by  interweav- 
ing our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part,  of  Europe,  entangle  our 
peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European  ambition,  rivalship, 
interest,  humor,  or  caprice  ? 

It  is  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent  alliances  with 
any  portion  of  the  foreign  world,  so  far,  I  mean,  a^  we  are  now 
at  liberty  to  do  it ;  for  let  me  not  be  understood  as  capable  of 
patronizing  infidelity  to  existing  engagements.  I  hold  the  maxim 
no  less  applicable  to  public  than  to  private  afifairs  that  honesty  is 
always  the  best  policy.  I  repeat,  therefore,  let  those  engagements 
be  observed  in  their  genuine  sense.  But  in  my  opinion  it  is  un- 
necessary and  would  be  unwise  to  extend  them. 

Taking  care  always  to  keep  ourselves  by  suitable  establishments 
on  a  respectable  defensive  posture,  we  may  safely  trust  to  tempor- 
ary alliances  for  extraordinary  emergencies 

In  relation  to  the  still  subsisting  war  in  Europe  my  proclamation 
of  the  22d  of  April,  1793,  is  the  index  to  my  plan.  Sanctioned  by 
your  approving  voice  and  by  that  of  your  representatives  in  both 
Houses  of  Congress,  the  spirit  of  that  measure  has  continually 
governed  me,  uninfluenced  by  any  attempts  to  deter  or  divert  me 
from  it. 

After  deliberate  examination,  with  the  aid  of  the  best  lights  I 
could  obtain,  I  was  well  satisfied  that  our  country,  under  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  had  a  right  to  take,  and  was  bound  in 
duty  and  interest  to  take,  a  neutral  position.  Having  taken  it, 
I  determined  as  far  as  should  depend  upon  me  to  maintain  it 
with  moderation,  perseverance,  and  firmness 

Washington's  advice  was  repeated  with  eloquent  firmness  by  Thomas 
Jefferson,  in  his  Inaugural  on  March  4,  1801 : 

About  to  enter,  fellow-citizens,  on  the  exercise  of  duties  which 
comprehend  everything  dear  and  valuable  to  you,  it  is  proper 
you  should  understand  what  I  deem  the  essential  principles  of 
our  Government,  and  consequently  those  which  ought  to  shape 
its  Administration.     I  will  compress  them  within  the  narrowest 


U.  S.   and   the   War,   August   i,   igi^-April  6,   iQi"/         179 

compass  they  will  bear,  stating  the  general  principle,  but  not  all 
its  limitations.  Equal  and  exact  justice  to  all  men,  of  whatever 
state  or  persuasion,  religious  or  political ;  peace,  commerce,  and 
honest  friendship  with  all  nations,  entangling  alliances  with 
none 

The  Monroe  Doctrine 

Another  reason  for  the  aloofness  of  America  from  European  politi- 
cal interests  lay  in  the  implications  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

During  the  Napoleonic  Wars  the  Spanish-American  colonies  in 
America  revolted  and  proceeded  to  govern  themselves.  This  denial 
of  the  governing  rights  of  royal  monarchs  was,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
violation  of  the  principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance ;  and  in  1823,  when 
the  monarchy  was  restored  in  Spain,  Spain  undertook  preparations  to 
place  the  former  Spanish  colonies  in  America  once  more  under  Spanish 
rule.     Both  France  and  Russia  evinced  intentions  of  supporting  Spain. 

But  the  United  States  was  committed  to  the  principle  of  political 
democracy,  and  had  come  to  regard  the  fomier  American  colonies  of 
Spain  as  morally  and  legally  independent.  Indeed,  in  1822,  the  United 
States  had  recognized  the  separate  existence  of  several  of  them,  and 
had  dispatched  diplomatic  representatives  to  them. 

Great  Britain  also  was  opposed  by  1823  to  interference  by  European 
Powers  in  the  political  affairs  of  America  and  offered  to  cooperate  with 
the  United  States  in  issuing  a  warning  to  that  effect.  But  President 
Monroe  decided  that  even  such  a  joint  declaration  would  be  in  con- 
tradiction to  the  United  States's  tradition  of  no  entangling  alliances, 
and  finally  determined  that  the  policy  of  preventing  European  nations 
from  further  acquiring  territorial  possessions  in  America  must  be  a 
purely  American  policy. 

In  President  Monroe's  message  to  Congress  in  December,  1823,  the 
following  doctrine  was  laid  down,  and  was  soon  to  become  famous 
under  the  name  of  the  man  who  formulated  it: 

At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, made  through  the  minister  of  the  Emperor  residing  here,  a 
full  power  and  instructions  have  been  transmitted  to  the  minister 
of  the  United  States  at  St.  Petersburg  to  arrange  by  amicable 


l8o  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

negotiation  the  respective  rights  and  interests  of  the  two  nations 
on  the  northwest  coast  of  this  continent.  A  similar  proposal  had 
heen  made  by  His  Imperial  Majesty  to  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain,  which  has  likewise  been  acceded  to.  The  Government  of 
the  United  States  has  been  desirous  by  this  friendly  proceeding 
of  manifesting  the  great  value  which  they  have  invariably  attached 
to  the  friendship  of  the  Emperor  and  their  solicitude  to  cultivate 
the  best  understanding  with  his  Government.  In  the  discussions 
to  which  this  interest  has  given  rise  and  in  the  arrangements  by 
which  they  may  terminate  the  occasion  has  been  judged  proper 
for  asserting,  as  a  principle  in  wdiich  the  rights  and  interests  of 
the  United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by 
the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and 
maintain,   are   henceforth  not   to   be   considered   as   subjects    for 

future  colonization  by  any  European  powers 

It  was  stated  at  the  commencement  of  the  last  session  that  a 
great  effort  was  then  making  in  Spain  and  Portugal  to  improve 
the  condition  of  the  people  of  those  countries,  and  that  it  appeared 
to  be  conducted  with  extraordinary  moderation.  It  need  scarcely 
be  remarked  that  the  result  has  been  so  far  very  different  from 
w^hat  was  then  anticipated.  Of  events  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe, 
with  w^hich  we  have  so  much  intercourse  and  from  which  we  de- 
rive our  origin,  we  have  always  been  anxious  and  interested  spec- 
tators. The  citizens  of  the  United  States  cherish  sentiments  the 
most  friendly  in  favor  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  their  fellow- 
men  on  that  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  wars  of  the  European 
powers  in  matters  relating  to  themselves  we  have  never  taken  any 
part,  nor  does  it  comport  with  our  policy  so  to  do.  It  is  only  when 
our  rights  are  invaded  or  seriously  menaced  that  w^e  resent  in- 
juries or  make  preparation  for  our  defense.  With  the  movements 
in  this  hemisphere  we  are  of  necessity  more  immediately  con- 
nected, and  by  causes  which  must  be  obvious  to  all  enlightened  and 
impartial  observers.  The  political  system  of  the  allied  powers  is 
essentially  different  in  this  respect  from  that  of  America.  This 
difference  proceeds  from  that  which  exists  in  their  respective 
Governments;  and  to  the  defense  of  our  own,  which  has  been 
achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much  blood  and  treasure,  and  matured 
by  the  wisdom  of  their  most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under  which 
we  have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity,  this  wdiole  nation  is  devoted. 
We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable  relations  exist- 
ing between  the  United  States  and  those  powers  to  declare  that 
we  should   consider  any  attempt  on   their  part  to  extend   their 


U.  S.  and  the   War,  Aiigiust   i,   1914-AprU  6,   1917         181 

system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of 
any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  inter- 
fere. But  with  the  Governments  who  have  declared  their  inde- 
pendence and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on 
great  consideration  and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we 
could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of^  oppressing 
them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any 
European  power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of 
an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United  States.  In  the  war 
between  those  new  Governments  and  Spain  we  declared  our 
neutrality  at  the  time  of  their  recognition,  and  to  this  we  have 
adhered,  and  shall  continue  to  adhere,  provided  no  change  shall 
occur  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of  this 
Government  shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  indispensable  to  their  security. 

The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  shew  that  Europe  is  still 
unsettled.     Of  this  important  fact  no  stronger  proof  can  be  ad- 
duced than  that  the  allied  powers  should  have  thought  it  proper, 
on  any  principle  satisfactory  to  themselves,  to  have  interposed 
by  force  in  the  internal  concerns  of  Spain.    To  what  extent  such 
interposition  may  be  carried,  on  the  same  principle,  is  a  question 
in  which  all  independent  powers  whose  governments  differ  from 
theirs  are  interested,  even  those  most  remote,  and  surely  none 
more  so  than  the  United  States.    Our  policy  in  regard  to  Europe, 
which  was  adopted  at  an  early  stage  of  the  wars  which  have  so 
long  agitated  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  nevertheless  remams  the 
same,  which  is,  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of 
its  powers ;  to  consider  the  government  de  facto  as  the  legitimate 
government  for  us ;  to.  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  it,  and  to 
preserve  those  relations  by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly  policy,  meet- 
ing in  all  instances  the  just  claims  of  every  power,  submitting  to 
inj'uries  from  none.     But  in  regard  to  those  continents  circum- 
stances are  eminently  and  conspicuously  different.    It  is  impossible 
that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their  political  system  to  any 
portion  of  either  continent  without  endangering  our  peace  and 
happiness;  nor  can  anyone  believe  that  our  southern  brethren, 
if  left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  ^  It  is 
equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such  inter- 
position in  any  form  with  indifference.     If  we  look  to  the  com- 
parative strength  and  resources  of  Spain  and  those  new  Govern- 
ments, and  their  distance  from  each  other,  it  must  be  obvious  that 


i82  _     A  History  of  the  Great  ll^ar 

she  can  never  subdue  them.  It  is  still  the  true  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  leave  the  parties  to  themselves,  in  the  hope  that 
other  powers  will  pursue  the  same  course 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  promulgating  his  doctrine,  President  ]\Ion- 
roe  was  but  following  in  the  footsteps  of  his  predecessors.  For 
instance,  in  a  communication  to  Congress  on  January  3,  181 1,  Pres- 
ident Aladison  uttered  words  prophetic  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine: 

I  communicate  to  Congress,  in  confidence,  a  letter  of  the  2d  of 
December  from  Governor  Folch.  of  West  Florida,  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  and  another  of  the  same  date  from  the  same  to 
John  McKee. 

I  communicate  in  like  manner  a  letter  from  the  British  charge 
d'affaires  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  with  the  answer  of  the  latter. 
Although  the  letter  can  not  have  been  written  in  consequence 
of  any  instruction  from  the  British  Government  founded  on  the 
late  order  for  taking  possession  of  the  portion  of  West  Florida 
well  known  to  be  claimed  by  the  United  States ;  although  no  com- 
munication has  ever  been  made  by  that  Government  to  this  of 
any  stipulation  with  Spain  contemplating  an  interposition  which 
might  so  materially  afifect  the  United  States,  and  although  no 
call  can  have  been  made  by  Spain  in  the  present  instance  for  the 
fulfillment  of  any  such  subsisting  engagement,  yet  the  spirit  and 
scope  of  the  document,  with  the  accredited  source  from  which  it 
proceeds,  required  that  it  should  not  be  withheld  from  the  con- 
sideration of  Congress. 

Taking  into  view  the  tenor  of  these  several  communications,  the 
posture  of  things  with  which  they  are  connected,  the  intimate 
relation  of  the  country  adjoining  the  United  States  eastward  of 
the  river  Perdido  to  their  security  and  tranquillity,  and  the  pe- 
culiar interest  they  otherwise  have  in  its  destiny,  I  recommend  to 
the  consideration  of  Congress  the  seasonableness  of  a  declaration 
that  the  United  States  could  not  see  without  serious  inquietude 
any  part  of  a  neighboring  territory  in  which  they  have  in  difTerent 
respects  so  deep  and  so  just  a  concern  pass  from  the  hands  of 
Spain  into  those  of  any  other  foreign  power. 

I  recommend  to  their  consideration  also  the  expediency  of 
authorizing  the  Executive  to  take  temporary  possession  of  any 
part  or  parts  of  the  said  Territory,  in  pursuance  of  arrangements 
which  may  be  desired  by  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  for  making 
provision  for  the  government  of  the  same  during  such  possession. 


U.  S.   and   the   War,  August   i,   ipi^-April  6,   ipiy         183 

The  wisdom  of  Congress  will  at  the  same  time  determine  how 
far  it  may  be  expedient  to  provide  for  the  event  of  a  subversion 
of  the  Spanish  authorities  within  the  Territory  in  question,  and 
an  apprehended  occupancy  thereof  by  any  other  foreign  power. 

In  his  Eighth  Annual  Message  to  Congress  on  December  7,  1824, 
President  Monroe  repeated  the  implications  of  his  previous  utter- 
ances on  the  relations  between  America  and  Europe,  as  affected  by 
the  independence  of  the  former  Spanish  colonies  in  America,  in  the 
following  words : 

With  respect  to  the  contest  to  which  our  neighbors 

are  a  party,  it  is  evident  that  Spain  as  a  power  is  scarcely  felt  in  it. 
These  new  States  had  completely  achieved  their  independence 
before  it  was  acknowledged  by  the  United  States,  and  they  have 
since  maintained  it  with  little  foreign  pressure.  The  disturbances 
which  have  appeared  in  certain  portions  of  that  vast  territory 
have  proceeded  from  internal  causes,  which  had  their  origin  in 
their  former  Governments  and  have  not  yet  been  thoroughly 
removed.  It  is  manifest  that  these  causes  are  daily  losing  their 
effect,  and  that  these  new  States  are  settling  down  under  Gov- 
ernments elective  and  representative  in  every  branch,  similar  to 
our  own.  In  this  course  we  ardently  wish  them  to  persevere, 
under  a  firm  conviction  that  it  will  promote  their  happiness.  In 
this,  their  career,  however,  we  have  not  interfered,  believing 
that  every  people  have  a  right  to  institute  for  themselves  the 
government  which,  in  their  judgment,  may  suit  them  best.  Our 
example  is  before  them,  of  the  good  effect  of  which,  being  our 
neighbors,  they  are  competent  judges,  and  to  their  judgment  we 
leave  it,  in  the  expectation  that  other  powers  will  pursue  the  same 
policy.  The  deep  interest  which  we  take  in  their  independence, 
which  we  have  acknowledged,  and  in  their  enjoyment  of  all  the 
rights  incident  thereto,  especially  in  the  very  important  one  of 
instituting  their  own  Governments,  has  been  declared,  and  is 
known  to  the  world.  "^Separated  as  we  are  from  Europe  by  the 
great  Atlantic  Ocean,  we  can  have  no  concern  in  the  wars  of  the 
European  Governments  nor  in  the  causes  which  produce  them. 
The  balance  of  power  between  them,  into  whichever  scale  it 
may  turn  in  its  various  vibrations,  can  not  affect  us.  It  is  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  to  preserve  the  most  friendly  rela- 
tions with  every  power  and  on  conditions  fair,  equal,  and  appli- 
cable to  all.     But  in  regard  to  our  neighbors  our  situation  is  dif- 


184  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

ferent.  It  is  impossible  for  the  European  Governments  to  in- 
terfere in  their  concerns,  especially  in  those  alluded  to,  which 
are  vital,  without  affecting  us;  indeed,  the  motive  which  might 
induce  such  interference  in  the  present  state  of  the  war  between 
the  parties,  if  a  war  it  may  be  called,  would  appear  to  be  equally 
applicable  to  us.  It  is  gratifying  to  know  that  some  of  the  powers 
with  whom  we  enjoy  a  very  friendly  intercourse,  and  to  whom 
these  views  have  been  communicated,  have  appeared  to  acquiesce 
in  them. 

As  an  evidence  of  the  importance  felt  by  Monroe's  successors  of 
reiterating  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  following  passage  from  the  Third 
Annual  Message  of  President  Fillmore,  December  6,  1852,  is  sig- 
nificant . 

.  .  .  ,1.  Jt  has  been  the  uniform  policy  of  this  Government, 
from  its  foundation  to  the  present  day,  to  abstain  from  all  inter- 
ference in  the  domestic  affairs  O'f  other  nations.  The  consequence 
has  been  that  while  the  nations  of  Europe  have  been  engaged  in 
desolating  wars  our  country  has  pursued  its  peaceful  course  to 
unexampled  prosperity  and  happiness.  The  wars  in  which  we 
have  been  compelled  to  engage  in  defense  of  the  rights  and  honor 
of  the  country  have  been,  fortunately,  of  short  duration.  During 
the  terrific  contest  of  nation  against  nation  which  succeeded  the 
French  Revolution  we  were  enabled  by  the  wisdom  and  firmness 
of  President  Washington  to  maintain  our  neutrality.  While  other 
nations  were  drawn  into  this  wide-sweeping  whirlpool,  we  sat 
quiet  and  unmoved  upon  our  own  shores.  While  the  flower  of 
their  numerous  armies  was  wasted  by  disease  or  perished  by 
hundreds  of  thousands  upon  the  battlefield,  the  youth  of  this 
favored  land  were  permitted  to  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace 
beneath  the  paternal  roof.  While  the  States  of  Europe  incurred 
enormous  debts,  under  the  burden  of  which  their  subjects  still 
groan,  and  which  must  absorb  no  small  part  of  the  product  of 
the  honest  industry  of  those  countries  for  generations  to  come, 
the  United  States  have  once  been  enabled  to  exhibit  the  proud 
spectacle  of  a  nation  free  from  public  debt,  and  if  permitted  to 
pursue  our  prosperous  v^y  for  a  few  years  longer  in  peace  we 
may  do  the  same  again,     j 

But  it  is  now  said  by^ome  that  this  policy  must  be  changed. 
Europe  is  no  longer  separated  from  us  by  a  voyage  of  months, 
but  steam  navigation  has  brought  her  within  a  few  days'  sail  of 


U.  S.  and  the   War,  August   i,   ipi^-April  6,   igiy         185 

our  shores.  We  see  more  of  her  movements  and  take  a  deeper 
interest  in  her  controversies.  Although  no  one  proposes  that  we 
should  join  the  fraternity  of  potentates  who  have  for  ages  lav- 
ished the  blood  and  treasure  of  their  subjects  in  maintaining 
"the  balance  of  power,"  yet  it  is  said  that  we  ought  to  interfere 
between  contending  sovereigns  and  their  subjects  for  the  purpose 
of  overthrowing  the  monarchies  of  Europe  and  establishing  in 
their  place  republican  institutions.  It  is  alleged  that  we  have 
heretofore  pursued  a  different  course  from  a  sense  of  our  weak- 
ness, but  that  now  our  conscious  strength  dictates  a  change  of 
policy,  and  that  it  is  consequently  our  duty  to  mingle  in  these 
contests  arid  aid  those  who  are  struggling  for  liberty. 

This  is  a  most  seductive  but  dangerous  appeal  to  the  generous 
sympathies  of  freemen.  Enjoying,  as  we  do,  the  blessings  of  a 
free  Government,  there  is  no  man  who  has  an  American  heart 
that  would  not  rejoice  to  see  these  blessings  extended  to  all  other 
nations.  We  can  not  witness  the  struggle  between  the  oppressed 
and  his  oppressor  anywhere  without  the  deepest  sympathy  for 
the  former  and  the  most  anxious  desire  for  his  triumph.  Never- 
theless, is  it  prudent  or  is  it  wise  to  involve  ourselves  in  these 
foreign  wars?  Is  it  indeed  true  that  we  have  heretofore  refrained 
from  doing  so  merely  from  the  degrading  motive  of  a  conscious 
weakness?  For  the  honor  of  the  patriots  who  have  gone  before 
us,  I  can  not  admit  it.  Men  of  the  Revolution,  who  drew  the 
sword  against  the  oppressions  of  the  mother  country  and  pledged 
to  Heaven  "their  lives,  their  fortunes,  and  their  sacred  honor'* 
to  maintain  their  freedom,  could  never  have  been  actuated  by  so 
unworthy  a  motive.  They  knew  no  weakness  or  fear  where 
right  or  duty  pointed  the  way,  and  it  is  a  libel  upon  their  fair 
fame  for  us,  while  we  enjoy  the  blessings  for  which  they  so 
nobly  fought  and  bled,  to  insinuate  it.  The  truth  is  that  the  course 
which  they  pursued  was  dictated  by  a  stern  sense  of  international 
justice,  by  a  statesmanlike  prudence  and  a  far-seeing  wisdom, 
looking  not  merely  to  the  present  necessities  but  to  the  perma- 
nent safety  and  interest  of  the  country.  They  knew  that  the 
world  is  governed  less  by  sympathy  than  by  reason  and  force ; 
that  it  was  not  possible  for  this  nation  to  become  a  "propagandist" 
of  free  principles  without  arraying  against  it  the  combined  powers 
of  Europe,  and  that  the  result  was  more  likely  to  be  the  over- 
throw of  republican  liberty  here  than  its  establishment  there. 
History  has  been  written  in  vain  for  those  who  can  doubt  this. 
France  had  no  sooner  established  a  republican  form  of  govern- 


i86  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

ment  than  she  manifested  a  desire  to  force  its  blessings  on  all  the 
world.  Her  own  historian  informs  us  that,  hearing  of  some  petty 
acts  of  tyranny  in  a  neighboring  principality,  "the  National  Con- 
vention declared  that  she  would  afford  succor  and  fraternity  to 
all  nations  who  wished  to  recover  their  liberty,  and  she  gave  it 
in  charge  to  the  executive  power  to  give  orders  to  the  generals 
of  the  French  armies  to  aid  all  citizens  who  might  have  been  or 
should  be  oppressed  in  the  cause  of  liberty."  Here  was  the  false 
step  which  led  to  her  subsequent  misfortunes.  She  soon  found 
herself  involved  in  war  with  all  the  rest  of  Europe.  In  less  than 
ten  years  her  Government  was  changed  from  a  republic  to  an 
empire,  and  finally,  after  shedding  rivers  of  blood,  foreign  powers 
restored  her  exiled  dynasty  and  exhausted  Europe  sought  peace 
and  repose  in  the  unquestioned  ascendency  of  monarchical  princi- 
ples. Let  us  learn  wisdom  from  her  example.  Let  us  remember 
that  revolutions  do  not  always  establish  freedom.  Our  own  free 
institutions  were  not  the  offspring  of  our  Revolution.  They 
existed  before.  They  were  planted  in  the  free  charters  of  self- 
government  under  which  the  English  colonies  grew  up,  and  our 
Revolution  only  freed  us  from  the  dominion  of  a  foreign  power 
whose  government  was  at  variance  with  those  institutions.  But 
European  nations  have  had  no  such  training  for  self-government, 
and  every  effort  to  establish  it  by  bloody  revolutions  has  been, 
and  must  without  that  preparation  continue  to  be,  a  failure. 
Liberty  unregulated  by  law  degenerates  into  anarchy,  which  soon 
becomes  the  most  horrid  of  all  despotisms.  Our  policy  is  wisely 
to  govern  ourselves,  and  thereby  to  set  such  an  example  of  na- 
tional justice,  prosperity,  and  true  glory  as  shall  teach  to  all 
nations  the  blessings  of  self-government  and  the  unparalleled 
enterprise  and  success  of  a  free  people 

None  of  our  Presidents  has  taken  a  deeper  interest  in  expound- 
ing the  Monroe  Doctrine  than  Theodore  Roosevelt.  In  the  follow- 
ing passages  from  his  official  utterances,  he  insists  upon  the  necessity 
for  the  United  States  to  maintain  sufficient  military  and  naval  forces 
to  support  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  touches  also  upon  the  misunder- 
standing in  South  America  regarding  the  Monroe  Doctrine : 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be  the  cardinal  fea- 
ture of  the  foreign  policy  of  all  the  nations  of  the  two  Americas,  as 
it  is  of  the  United  States.  Just  seventy-eight  years  have  passed 
since  President   Monroe  in  his  Annual  Message  announced  that 


U.  S.  and  the   War,  August   i,   ipi^-April  6,   i^ij         187 

"The  American  continents  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered 
as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European  power."  In 
other  words,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  that  there  must 
be  no  territorial  aggrandizement  by  any  non-American  power 
at  the  expense  of  any  American  power  on  American  soil.  It  is 
in  no  wise  intended  as  hostile  to  any  nation  in  the  Old  World. 
Still  less  is  it  intended  to  give  cover  to  any  aggression  by  one  New 
World  power  at  the  expense  of  any  other.  It  is  simply  a  step, 
and  a  long  step,  toward  assuring  the  universal  peace  of  the  world 
by  securing  the  possibility  of  permanent  peace  on  this  hemisphere. 

During  the  past  century  other  influences  have  established  the 
permanence  and  independence  of  the  smaller  states  of  Europe. 
Through  the  Monroe  Doctrine  we  hope  to  be  able  to  safeguard 
like  independence  and  secure  like  permanence  for  the  lesser  among 
the  New  World  nations. 

This  doctrine  has  nothing  to  dO'  wath  the  commercial  relations 
of  any  American  power,  save  that  it  in  truth  allows  each  of  them 
to  form  such  as  it  desires.  In  other  words,  it  is  really  a  guar- 
anty of  the  commercial  independence  of  the  Americas.  We  do 
not  ask  under  this  doctrine  for  any  exclusive  commercial  deal- 
ing's with  any  other  American  state.  We  do  not  guarantee  any 
state  against  punishment  if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that 
punishment  does  not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of  territory 
by  any  non-American  power. 

Our  attitude  in  Cuba  is  a  sufficient  guaranty  of  our  own  good 
faith.  We  have  not  the  slightest  desire  to  secure  any  territory  at 
the  expense  of  any  of  our  neighbors.  We  wish  to  work  with  them 
hand  in  hand,  so  that  all  of  us  may  be  uplifted  together,  and  we 
rejoice  over  the  good  fortune  of  any  of  them,  we  gladly  hail  their 
material  prosperity  and  political  stability,  and  are  concerned  and 
alarmed  if  any  of  them  fall  into  industrial  or  political  chaos.  We 
do  not  wish  to  see  any  Old  World  military  power  grow  up  on 
this  continent,  or  to  be  compelled  to  become  a  military  power 
ourselves.  The  peoples  of  the  Americas  can  prosper  best  if  left 
to  work  out  their  own  salvation  in  their  own  way 

Our  people  intend  to  abide  by  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  to  insist  upon  it  as  the  one  sure  means  of  securing  the 
peace  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  Navy  ofifers  us  the  only 
means  of  making  our  insistence  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  any- 
thing but  a  subject  of  derision  to  whatever  nation  chooses  to  dis- 
regard it.     We  desire  the  peace  which  comes  as  of  right  to  the 


l88  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

just  man  armed ;  not  the  peace  granted  on  terms  of  ignominy  to 
the  craven  and  the  weakHng. 

It  is  not  possible  to  improvise  a  navy  after  war  breaks  out. 
The  ships  must  be  built  and  the  men  trained  long  in  advance. 
Some  auxiliary  vessels  can  be  turned  into  makeshifts  which  will 
do  in  default  of  any  better  for  the  minor  work,  and  a  proportion 
of  raw  men  can  be  mixed  with  the  highly  trained,  their  short- 
comings being  made  good  by  the  skill  of  their  fellows ;  but  the 
efficient  fighting  force  of  the  Navy  when  pitted  against  an  equal 
opponent  will  be  found  almost  exclusively  in  the  war  ships  that 
have  been  regularly  built  and  in  the  officers  and  men  who  through 
years  of  faithful  performance  of  sea  duty  have  been  trained  to 
handle  their  formidable  but  complex  and  delicate  weapons  with 
the  highest  efficiency.  In  the  late  war  with  Spain  the  ships  that 
dealt  the  decisive  blows  at  Manila  and  Santiago  had  been  launched 
from  two  to  fourteen  years,  and  they  were  able  to  do  as  they  did 
because  the  men  in  the  conning  towers,  the  gun  turrets,  and  the 
engine-rooms  had  through  long  years  of  practice  at  sea  learned 

how  to  do  their  duty 

[First  Annual  Message,  December  s,  1901] 

One  of  the  most  effective  instruments  for  peace 

is  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  it  has  been  and  is  being  gradually  de- 
veloped by  this  Nation  and  accepted  by  other  nations.  No  other 
policy  could  have  been  as  efficient  in  promoting  peace  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  and  in  giving  to  each  nation  thereon  the 
chance  to  develop  along  its  own  lines.  If  we  had  refused  to  apply 
the  doctrine  to  changing  conditions  it  would  now  be  completely 
outworn,  would  not  meet  any  of  the  needs  of  the  present  day, 
and,  indeed,  would  probably  by  this  time  have  sunk  into  complete 
oblivion.  It  is  useful  at  home,  and  is  meeting  with  recognition 
abroad  because  we  have  adapted  our  application  of  it  to  meet  the 
growing  and  changing  needs  of  the  hemisphere.  When  we  an- 
nounce a  policy  such  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  we  thereb)-  commit 
ourselves  to  the  consequences  of  the  policy,  and  those  consequences 
from  time  to  time  alter.  It  is  out  of  the  question  to  claim  a  right 
and  yet  shirk  the  responsibility  for  its  exercise.  Not  only  we,  but 
all  American  republics  who  are  benefited  by  the  existence  of  the 
doctrine,  must  recognize  the  obligations  each  nation  is  under  as 
regards  foreign  peoples  no  less  than  its  duty  to  insist  upon  its  own 
rights. 

That  our  rights  and  interests  are  deeply  concerned  in  the  main- 


U.  S.  and  the   War,  August   i,   ipi4-April  6,   igi"/         189 

tenance  of  the  doctrine  is  so  clear  as  hardly  to  need  argument. 
This  is  especially  true  in  view  of  the  construction  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  As  a  mere  matter  of  self-defense  we  must  exercise  a  close 
watch  over  the  approaches  to  this  canal ;  and  this  means  that  we 
must  be  thoroughly  alive  to  our  interests  in  the  Caribbean  Sea. 
There  are  certain  essential  points  which  must  never  be  for- 
gotten as  regards  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  the  first  place  we 
must  as  a  Nation  make  it  evident  that  we  do  not  intend  to  treat 
it  in  any  shape  or  way  as  an  excuse  for  aggrandizement  on  our 
part  at  the  expense  of  the  republics  to  the  south.  We  must  rec- 
ognize the  fact  that  in  some  South  American  countries  there  has 
been  much  suspicion  lest  we  should  interpret  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine as  in  some  way  inimical  to  their  interests,  and  we  must  try 
to  convince  all  the  other  nations  of  this  continent  once  and  for 
all  that  no  just  and  orderly  Government  has  anything  to  fear 
from  us.  There  are  certain  republics  to  the  south  of  us  which 
have  already  reached  such  a  point  of  stability,  order,  and  pros- 
perity that  they  themselves,  though  as  yet  hardly  consciously,  are 
among  the  guarantors  of  this  doctrine.  These  republics  we  now 
meet  not  only  on  a  basis  of  entire  equality,  but  in  a  spirit  of  frank 
and  respectful  friendship,  which  we  hope  is  mutual.  If  all  of  the 
republics  to  the  south  of  us  will  only  grow  as  those  to  which  I 
allude  have  already  grown,  all  need  for  us  to  be  the  especial 
champions  of  the  doctrine  will  disappear,  for  no  stable  and  grow- 
ing American  Republic  wishes  to  see  some  great  non-American 
military  power  acquire  territory  in  its  neighborhood.  All  that 
this  country  desires  is  that  the  other  republics  on  this  continent 
shall  be  happy  and  prosperous ;  and  they  cannot  be  happy  and 
prosperous  unless  they  maintain  order  within  their  boundaries 
and  behave  with  a  just  regard  for  their  obligations  toward  out- 
siders. It  must  be  understood  that  under  no  circumstances  will 
the  United  States  use  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  cloak  for  terri- 
torial aggression.  We  desire  peace  with  all  the  world,  but  per- 
haps most  of  all  with  the  other  peoples  of  the  American  Con- 
tinent. There  are,  of  course,  limits  to  the  wrongs  which  any 
self-respecting  nation  can  endure.  It  is  always  possible  that 
wrong  actions  toward  this  Nation,  or  toward  citizens  of  this 
Nation,  in  some  State  unable  to  keep  order  among  its  own  peo- 
ple, unable  to  secure  justice  from  outsiders,  and  unwilling  to 
do  justice  to  those  outsiders  who  treat  it  well,  may  result  in  our 
having  to  take  action  to  protect  our  rights ;  but  such  action  will 
not  be  taken  with  a  view  to  territorial  aggression,  and  it  will 


190  A  History  of  the  Great  IVar 

be  taken  at  all  only  with  extreme  reluctance  and  when  it  has 
become  evident  that  every  other  resource  has  been  exhausted. 

Moreover,  we  must  make  it  evident  that  we  do  not  intend  to 
permit  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  be  used  by  any  nation  on  this 
Continent  as  a  shield  to  protect  it  from  the  consequences  of  its 
own  misdeeds  against  foreign  nations.  If  a  republic  to  the  south 
of  us  commits  a  tort  against  a  foreign  nation,  such  as  an  out- 
rage against  a  citizen  of  that  nation,  then  the  iNlonroe  Doctrine 
does  not  force  us  to  interfere  to  prevent  punishment  of  the  tort, 
save  to  see  that  the  punishment  does  not  assume  the  form  of  ter- 
ritorial occupation  in  any  shape.  The  case  is  more  difficult  when 
it  refers  to  a  contractual  obligation.  Our  own  Government  has 
always  refused  to  enforce  such  contractual  obligations  on  behalf 
of  its  citizens  by  an  appeal  to  arms.  It  is  much  to  be  wished 
that  all  foreign  governments  would  take  the  same  view.  But 
they  do  not ;  and  in  consequence  we  are  liable  at  any  time  to  be 
brought  face  to  face  with  disagreeable  alternatives.  On  the  one 
hand,  this  country  would  certainly  decline  to  go  to  war  to  pre- 
vent a  foreign  government  from  collecting  a  just  debt;  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  very  inadvisable  to  permit  any  foreign  power 
to  take  possession,  even  temporarily,  of  the  custom  houses  of  an 
American  Republic  in  order  to  enforce  the  payment  of  its  obli- 
gations ;  for  such  temporary  occupation  might  turn  into  a  per- 
manent occupation.  The  only  escape  from  these  alternatives 
may  at  any  time  be  that  we  must  ourselves  undertake  to  bring 
.  about  some  arrangement  by  which  so  much  as  possible  of  a  just 
obligation  shall  be  paid.  It  is  far  better  that  this  country  should 
put  through  such  an  arrangement,  rather  than  allow  any  foreign 
country  to  undertake  it.  To  do  so  insures  the  defaulting  repub- 
lic from  having  to  pay  debt  of  an  improper  character  under  duress, 
while  it  also  insures  honest  creditors  of  the  republic  from  being 
passed  by  in  the  interest  of  dishonest  or  grasping  creditors.  More- 
over, for  the  United  States  to  take  such  a  position  offers  the  only 
possible  way  of  insuring  us  against  a  clash  with  some  foreign 
power.  The  position  is,  therefore,  in  the  interest  of  peace  as  well 
as  in  the  interest  of  justice.  It  is  of  benefit  to  our  people;  it 
is  of  benefit  to  foreign  peoples :  and  most  of  all  it  is  really  of 
benefit  to  the  people  of  the  country  concerned. 

This  brings  me  to  what  should  be  one  of  the  fundamental  ob- 
jects of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  We  must  ourselves  in  good  faith 
try  to  help  upward  toward  peace  and  order  those  of  our  sister 
republics  which  need  such  help.    Just  as  there  has  been  a  gradual 


U.  S.   and   the   War,  August   i,    ipi^-April  6,   ipi/         191 

growth  of  the  ethical  element  in  the  relations  of  one  individual 
to  another,  so  we  are,  even  though  slowly,  more  and  more  com- 
ing to  recognize  the  duty  of  bearing  one  another's  burdens,  not 

only  as  among  individuals,  but  also  as  among  nations 

[Fifth  Annual  Message,  December  5,  190^.] 


In  many  parts  of  South  America  there  has  been 

much  misunderstanding  of  the  attitude  and  purposes  of  the 
United  States  towards  the  other  American  Republics.  An  idea 
had  become  prevalent  that  our  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
implied,  or  carried  with  it,  an  assumption  of  superiority,  and  of 
a  right  to  exercise  some  kind  of  protectorate  over  the  countries 
to  whose  territory  that  doctrine  applies.  Nothing  could  be  farther 
from  the  truth.  Yet  that  impression  continued  to  be  a  serious 
barrier  to  good  understanding,  to  friendly  intercourse,  to  the  in- 
troduction of  American  capital  and  the  extension  of  American 
trade.  The  impression  was  so  widespread  that  apparently  it  could 
not  be  reached  by  any  ordinary  means. 

It  was  part  of  Secretary  Root's  mission  (to  South  America  in 
1906)  to  dispel  this  unfounded  impression,  and  there  is  just  cause 
to  believe  that  he  has  succeeded.  In  an  address  to  the  Third 
Conference  at  Rio  on  the  31st  of  July — an  address  of  such  note 
that  I  send  it  in,  together  with  this  message — he  said: 

"We  wish  for  no  victories  but  those  of  peace ;  for  no  terri- 
tory except  our  own ;  for  no  sovereignty  except  the  sov- 
ereignty over  ourselves.  We  deem  the  independence  and 
equal  rights  of  the  smallest  and  weakest  member  of  the 
family  of  nations  entitled  to  as  much  respect  as  those  of  the 
greatest  empire,  and  we  deem  the  observance  of  that  respect 
the  chief  guaranty  of  the  weak  against  the  oppression  of  the 
strong.  We  neither  claim  nor  desire  any  rights  or  privileges 
or  powers  that  we  do  not  freely  concede  to  every  American 
Republic.  We  wish  to  increase  our  prosperity,  to  extend  our 
trade,  to  grow  in  wealth,  in  wisdom,  and  in  spirit,  but  our 
conception  of  the  true  way  to  accomplish  this  is  not  to  pull 
down  others  and  profit  by  their  ruin,  but  to  help  all  friends 
to  a  common  prosperity  and  a  common  growth,  that  we  may 
all  become  greater  and  stronger  together.  Within  a  few 
months  for  the  first  time  the  recognized  possessors  of  every 
foot  of  soil  upon  the  American  continents  can  be  and  I  hope 
will  be  represented  with  the  acknowledged  rights  of  equal 
sovereign  states  in  the  great  World  Congress  at  The  Hague. 
This  will  be  the  world's  formal  and  final  acceptance  of  the 
declaration  that  no  part  of  the  American  continents  is  to  be 


192  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

deemed  subject  to  colonization.  Let  us  pledge  ourselves  to 
aid  each  other  in  the  full  performance  of  the  duty  to  human- 
ity which  that  accepted  declaration  implies,  so  that  in  time  the 
weakest  and  most  unfortunate  of  our  Republics  may  come  to 
march  with  equal  step  by  the  side  of  the  stronger  and  more 
fortunate.  Let  us  help  each  other  to  show  that  for  all  the 
races  of  men  the  liberty  for  which  we  have  fought  and  lalx)red 
is  the  twin  sister  of  justice  and  peace.  Let  us  unite  in  creat- 
ing and  maintaining  and  making  effective  an  all-American 
public  opinion,  whose  power  shall  influence  international  con- 
duct and  prevent  international  wrong,  and  narrow  the  causes 
of  war,  and  forever  preserve  our  free  lands  from  the  burden 
of  such  armaments  as  are  massed  behind  the  frontiers  of 
Europe,  and  bring  us  ever  nearer  to  the  perfection  of  ordered 
liberty.  So  shall  come  security  and  prosperity,  production  and 
trade,  wealth,  learning,  the  arts,  and  happiness  for  us  all." 

These  words  appear  to  have  been  received  with  acclaim  in 
every  part  of  South  America.  They  have  my  hearty  approval,  as 
I  am  sure  they  will  have  yours,  and  I  can  not  be  wrong  in  the 
conviction  that  they  correctly  represent  the  sentiments  of  the 
whole  American  people.  I  can  not  better  characterize  the  true 
attitude  of  the  United  States  in  its  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine than  in  the  words  of  the  distinguished  former  minister  of 
foreign  affairs  of  Argentina,  Doctor  Drago,  in  his  speech  wel- 
coming Mr.  Root  at  Buenos  Ayres.     He  spoke  of — 

"The  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States  (which)  with- 
out accentuating  superiority  or  seeking  preponderance,  con- 
demned the  oppression  of  the  nations  of  this  part  of  the  world 
and  the  control  of  their  destinies  by  the  great   Powers  of 

Europe " 

[Sixth  Annual  Message,  December  s,  1906.] 

On  the  other  hand,  President  Taft  felt  that  the  apprehensions 
which  originally  gave  rise  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  largely  dis- 
appeared by  the  twentieth  century.  In  his  First  Annual  Message, 
December  7,  1909,  he  stated: 

The  Pan-American  policy  of  this  Government  has 

long  been  fixed  in  its  principles  and  remains  unchanged.  With 
the  changed  circumstances  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Re- 
publics to  the  south  of  us,  most  of  whidh  have  great  natural  re- 
sources, stable  government  and  progressive  ideals,  the  appre- 
hension which  gave  rise  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  may  be  said  to 
have  nearly  disappeared,  and  neither  the  doctrine  as  it  exists 
nor  any  other  doctrine  of  American  policy  should  be  permitted 


Photos   by   Inteinational   Film    Service 


GERMAN   DEAD   ON   THE  BATTLE-FIELD 

The  upper  panel  shows  German  soldiers  lying  dead  on  a  sunken  road  near 
Moislains,  which  has  just  been  taken  by  storm  by   British  troops. 


ABANDONED   TANK 

The  center  panel  shows  a  tank  abandoned  in  the  trench  where  it  has  been 
made  "hors  de  combat." 


THE   EFFECT    OF    FIRE 

The  lower  panel  gives  an  excellent  idea  of  the  devastation  wrought  in 
northern  France  by  heavy  bombardments.  The  charred  trunks  in  the  back- 
ground are  all  that  remain  of  what  a  few  days  previously  had  been  a  lux- 
uriant forest. 


U.  S.  and   the   War,  August   i,   1^14-April  6,   iQiy         193 

to  operate  for  the  perpetuation  of  irresponsible  government,  the 
escape  of  just  obligations,  or  the  insidious  allegation  of  dominat- 
ing ambitions  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 

But  however  ardently  America  in  1914  desired  the  end  of  the 
conflict  abroad,  it  is  psychologically  impossible  for  a  great  mass  of 
people  to  witness  a  life-and-death  struggle  without  taking  sides. 
America  was  a  unit  in  hoping  for  a  speedy  peace  among  the  belligerents 
and  in  insisting  that  our  country  be  not  drawn  into  the  voftex  of 
battle ;  but  as  far  as  the  issue  of  the  war  itself  was  concerned,  America 
soon  fell  into  two  camps — those  desiring  to  see  the  Entente  victorious, 
and  those  desiring  to  se«  the  Central  Powers  victorious. 

Immigrant  Stocks  in  America 

These  partisanships  were  not  only  inevitable  psychologically — ^they 
were  inevitable  because  of  the  fact  that  America  had  welcomed  to 
its  shores  millions  upon  millions  of  men  and  women  who  had  emigrated 
from  the  countries  which  were  now  at  war.  Our  immigration  policy 
had  been  one  which  made  the  United  States  the  home  of  hordes  fleeing 
from  both  political  and  economic  oppression. 

The  traditional  American  attitude  toward  immigration  to  our  shores 
was  outlined  with  eloquent  succinctness  by  President  Wilson  in  his 
message  to  Congress  on  January  28,  191 5,  vetoing  the  bill  providing 
for  the  restriction  of  immigration  by  the  imposition  of  a  literacy  test. 

In  two  particulars  of  vital  consequence  this  bill  embodies  a 
radical  departure  from  the  traditional  and  long-established  policy 
of  this  country,  a  policy  in  which  our  people  have  conceived  the 
very  character  of  their  Government  to  be  expressed,  the  very 
mission  and  spirit  of  the  Nation  in  respect  of  its  relations  to  the 
peoples  of  the  world  outside  their  borders.  It  seeks  to  all  but 
close  entirely  the  gates  of  asylum  which  have  always  been  open 
to  those  who  could  find  nowhere  else  the  right  and  opportunity 
of  constitutional  agitation  for  what  they  conceived  to  be  the  natu- 
ral and  inalienable  rights  of  men ;  and  it  excludes  those  to  whom 
the  opportunities  of  elementary  education  have  been  denied,  with- 
out regard  to  their  character,  their  purposes,  or  their  natural 
capacity. 

Restrictions  like  these,  adopted  earlier  in  our  history  as  a  Na- 

306 


194  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ^ar 

tion,  would  very  materially  have  altered  the  course  and  cooled 
the  humane  ardors  of  our  politics.  The  right  of  political  asylum 
has  brought  to  this  country  many  a  man  of  noble  character  and 
elevated  purpose  who  was  marked  as  an  outlaw  in  his  own  less 
fortunate  land,  and  who  has  yet  become  an  ornament  to  our  citi- 
zenship and  to  our  public  councils 

Hitherto  we  have  generously  kept  our  doors  open  to  all  who 
were  not  unfitted  by  reason  of  disease  or  incapacity  for  self- 
support  or  such  personal  records  and  antecedents  as  were  likely 
to  make  them  a  menace  to  our  peace  and  order  or  to  the  whole- 
some and  essential  relationships  of  life 

In  vetoing  a  similar  bill  years  previously,  President  Grover  Cleve- 
land had  also  defined  our  immigration  policy  in  eloquent  terms.  In 
his  message  to  Congress  on  March  2,  1897,  he  said: 

Heretofore  we  have  welcomed  all  who  came  to 

us  from  other  lands  except  those  whose  moral  or  physical  con- 
dition or  history  threatened  danger  to  our  national  welfare  and 
safety.  Relying  upon  the  zealous  watchfulness  of  our  people  to 
prevent  injury  to  our  political  and  social  fabric,  we  have  encour- 
aged those  coming  from  foreign  countries  to  cast  their  lot  with 
us  and  join  in  the  development  of  our  vast  domain,  securing  in 
return  a  share  in  the  blessings  of  American  citizenship. 

A  century's  stupendous  growth,  largely  due  to  the  assimilation 
and  thrift  of  millions  of  sturdy  and  patriotic  adopted  citizens, 
attests  the  success  of  this  generous  and  free-handed  policy  which, 
while  guarding  the  people's  interests,  exacts  from  our  immigrants 
only  physical  and  moral  soundness  and  a  willingness  and  ability 
to  work. 

A  contemplation  of  the  grand  results  of  this  policy  can  not 
fail  to  arouse  a  sentiment  in  its  defense,  for  however  it  might  have 
been  regarded  as  an  original  proposition  and  viewed  as  an  experi- 
ment its  accomplishments  are  such  that  if  it  is  to  be  uprooted  at 
this  late  day  its  disadvantages  should  be  plainly  apparent  and  the 
substitute  adopted  should  be  just  and  adequate,  free  from  im- 
certainties,  and  guarded  against  difficult  or  oppressive  adminis- 
tration  

The  first  settlers  in  America  were,  of  course,  chiefly  of  English 
descent,  so  that  the  earlier  foundations  of  America  were  English.  In 
political  organization,  in  language,  in  literature,  in  social  customs,  in 


U.  S.   and   the   War,   August   i,   igi4-April  6,   ipi/'  195 

religion,  no  less  than  in  root-stock,  America  and  England  were  prac- 
tically two  branches  of  the  same  civilization. 

In  addition,  America  remembered  with  gratitude  the  help  given  by 
France  in  achieving  American  independence. 

But  the  immigrants  first  to  arrive  in  this  country  in  great  numbers 
during  the  nineteenth  century  were  ethnologically  of  groups  to  counter- 
act in  great  measure  our  basic  bias  in  favor  of  the  Entente  Allies. 
It  has  already  been  seen  how  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Irish  came  to 
America  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  as  a  result  of  the 
famine  and  oppression  prevalent  in  Ireland.  In  1910,  there  were  in 
the  United  States  4,656,170  persons  who  had  either  been  born  in  Ire- 
land or  who  had  parents  of  whom  one  or  both  had  been  born  in 
Ireland.  This  number  amounted  to  about  5%  of  the  total  population 
of  the  United  States  exclusive  of  territorial  possessions.  And  although 
it  would  manifestly  not  be  exact  to  state  that  all  this  group  or  even  a 
majority  of  it  could  be  classified  as  anti-English,  certainly  a  large  per- 
centage of  it  cherished  bitter  feelings  against  England. 

After  the  period  of  the  great  Irish  immigration  came  the  great 
period  of  German  immigration.  The  German  immigrant  stock  in  the 
United  States  in  1910  was  almost  100%  larger  than  the  second  largest 
immigrant  stock  (the  Irish),  and  composed  approximately  25%  of  the 
total  immigrant  stock.  In  1910  there  were  in  the  United  States 
2,501,181  persons  who  had  been  born  in  Germany,  3,911,847  persons 
both  of  whose  parents  had  been  born  in  Germany,  1,869,590  persons 
one  of  whose  parents  had  been  born  in  Germany  (the  other  being 
native-born),  and  212,524  persons  whose  fathers  had  been  born  in 
Germany  and  whose  mothers  had  been  born  in  some  other  foreign 
country.  The  total  of  the  German  immigrant  stock  in  the  United 
States  in  1910  was  accordingly  8,495,142  persons,  or  more  than  9% 
of  the~  total  population  of  the  United  States  exclusive  of  territorial 
possessions. 

It  would  not  be  exact  to  assert  that  the  majority  of  these  persons 
were  pro-German.  Many  of  them  had  left  Germany  or  their  parents 
had  left  Germany  just  because  of  the  autocratic  political  system  of 
Germany.  The  war  was  to  prove  before  it  was  ended  that  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  these  persons  placed  the  welfare  of  their  country 


196  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

of  adoption  above  the  welfare  of  their  country  of  origin.  But  much 
of  the  German  immigration  to  this  country  had  delinitely  exerted  itself 
not  to  allow  all  traces  of  German  culture  to  disappear  in  the  new  land. 
The  Germans,  like  most  immigrants,  tended  to  locate  in  definite  regions 
or  in  definite  sections  of  cities;  and  in  those  places  the  German  lan- 
guage was  often  taught,  German  newspapers  and  books  were  often  read, 
and  social  ties  were  often  determined  by  the  joint  German  origin.  It 
was  hence  inevitable  that  a  large  and  influential  section  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  should  sympathize  with  the  cause  of  Germany  as  against 
the  cause  of  her  declared  enemies  of  1914. 

Again,  in  1910,  5,383.552  persons,  or  almost  6%  of  the  total  popu- 
lation of  the  United  States  exclusive  of  territorial  possessions,  had 
either  been  born  in  Russia  or  Austria-Hungary  or  had  parents  of 
whom  one  or  both  had  been  born  in  Russia  or  Austria-Hungary.  A 
large  proportion  of  these  persons  were  Jews,  the  story  of  whose  race 
in  Russia  was  one  of  heartless  and  ruthless  mistreatment.  To  these, 
the  Russian  government  was  an  unmitigated  evil,  a  mediaeval  anach- 
ronism in  the  twentieth  century.  A  Russian  victory  would  imply  a 
prolongation  of  the  autocratic  government  in  Russia  and  a  Russian 
defeat  would  imply  the  long-desired  democratization  of  Russia.  Ac- 
cordingly, this  group  for  the  greater  part  ardently  desired  the  defeat 
of  the  Tsar  and  his  forces. 

Similarly,  a  large  proportion  of  the  non-Jewish  section  of  the 
Austrian  and  Hungarian  stock  in  America  was  also  of  oppressed 
nationalities.  Many  were  Czechs,  some  were  Slovaks,  many  were 
South  Slavs,  and  the  recent  story  of  their  races  under  Austria-Hung- 
ary had  also  been  one  of  mistreatment.  To  large  numbers  of  this 
group,  the  defeat  of  Austria-Hungary  would  mean  a  relaxation  of  the 
oppression  of  the  minor  nationalities  in  Austria-Hungary  and  possibly 
the  re-arrangement  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  along  ethnological  lines. 

These,  then,  were  the  chief  internal  factors  influencing  American 
partizanship  in  the  first  days  of  the  War.  But  external  developments 
soon  began  to  play  upon  the  situation  and  to  prove  a  far  stronger 
factor  in  making  up  the  minds  of  these  and  most  other  Americans  as 
to  which  of  the  two  warring  groups  in  Europe  was  the  better  entitled 
to  the  unofificial  sympathy  and  support  of  the  American  people. 


V.  S.   and   the    War,   August   i,    1914-April  6,   1917  197 

The  Effect  Upon  America  of  the  German  Treatment  of 

Belgium 

Chief  among  these  external  developments  were  the  German  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  and  tlie  atrocities  committed  by  German 
troops  against  the  Belgian  people.  In  September,  19 14,  the  Royal 
Belgian  Commission  came  to  this  country  to  lay  the  wrongs  of  Belgitun 
before  the  bar  of  American  opinion,  and  the  Commission  was  received 
with  the  deepest  sympathy.  But  Belgium  needed  from  the  United 
States  much  more  than  sympathy.  She  needed  food,  clothing  and  all 
the  other  necessities  of  life.  Belgian  industry  was  paralyzed  or  des- 
troyed; Belgian  supplies  had  been  seized  by  the  invaders;  the  able- 
bodied  Belgian  men  were  or  had  been  in  the  Belgian  army ;  soon  large 
sections  of  the  Belgian  civilian  population  were  deported  to  Germany 
for  industrial  purposes — Belgium  was  helpless.  Germany  was  treating 
Belgium  as  an  enemy,  and  would  not  supply  her  with  materials  needed 
by  Germany  itself.  Moreover,  immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
War,  the  Entente  took  measures  to  prevent  supplies  from  reaching 
Germany  from  other  lands ;  and  Germany  claimed  that  what  she  called 
the  "starvation  blockade"  of  the  Allies  was  resulting  in  a  shortage  of 
food  for  the  German  civilian  population  too  serious  to  permit  her  to 
share  any  food  with  Belgium.  The  Entente,  on  the  other  hand,  obvi- 
ously could  not  send  supplies  of  prime  value  to  the  enemy  to  a  land 
occupied  by  the  enemy.  Accordingly,  It  was  only  from  neutrals  that 
Belgium  could  expect  relief;  and  of  all  the  neutrals  the  richest  and 
most  powerful  was  the  United  States. 

The  deliberate  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  a  stronger 
nation,  which  seventy-five  years  previously  had  deliberately  agreed  to 
respect  it,  struck  at  the  security  of  other  lands  and  of  all  international 
law,  nebulous  as  international  law  was.  Of  course,  most  of  the  great 
Powers  had  violated  the  neutrality  of  other  lands  in  recent  years ;  but 
the  latter  had  been  mostly  backward  countries  like  Egypt,  Morocco, 
Persia  and  China,  not  countries  recognized  as  European  Powers,  if 
not  great  Powers ;  whereas  the  very  smallness  of  Belgium  as  contrasted 
with  the  greatness  of  Germany  and  the  plucky  resistance  made  by 
King  Albert's  forces  to  the  powerful  invading  German  forces  could 


198  A  History  of  ihc  Great  Jl'ar 

not  but  arouse  general  admiration  for  Belgium  in  the  United  States. 
Ex-President  Roosevelt  soon  departed  from  his  earlier  recommenda- 
tion of  strict  neutrality  for  the  United  States,  and  used  his  great 
influence  with  his  fellow-citizens  to  urge  tliem  to  resent  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  as  a  crime  and  an  attack  against  all  civilized 
mankind,  including  America. 

Money  and  supplies  were  soon  collected  throughout  the  United 
States  and  forwarded  to  Belgium.  But  the  need  of  Belgium  was  so 
great — augmented  as  it  was  by  the  need  of  the  portions  of  northern 
France  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans — that  it  became  necessary  to 
organize  the  campaign  for  Belgian  relief  on  a  large  scale.  The  Com- 
mission for  Belgian  Relief,  under  the  able  management  of  Mr.  Herbert 
C.  Hoover,  took  steps  to  tap  all  available  resources  of  the  United 
States  for  the  sake  of  Belgium;  the  strongest  appeals  necessarily  were 
made  to  the  classes  of  greatest  wealth  and  highest  social  standing  in 
the  United  States ;  these  classes  are  all-important  in  moulding  public 
opinion ;  it  was  impossible  for  these  or  for  any  other  classes  to  sym- 
pathize with  and  to  assist  Belgium  without  experiencing  deep  indigna- 
tion at  the  actions  which  were  responsible  for  Belgium's  plight ;  and 
as  a  result,  the  attitude  of  the  mass  of  the  American  people  who  had 
possessed  no  inherent  bias  in  favor  of  either  group  of  belligerents  in 
Europe  was  turned  by  the  story  of  Belgium  into  repugnance  at  the 
cause  of  the  Central  Powers. 

But  Belgium  had  suffered  more  than  invasion — she  had  suffered  un- 
speakable atrocities.  Bit  by  bit  the  revolting  stories  of  the  conduct 
of  German  officers  and  privates  toward  Belgian  women  and  children 
filtered  through  to  the  United  States.  It  was  generally  recognized,  of 
course,  that  war  evokes  the  basest  impulses  in  men's  breasts,  and 
that  in  every  war  atrocities  have  been  committed  by  troops ;  but  the 
disquieting  feature  of  the  atrocities  in  Belgium  lay  in  the  fact  that 
they  seemed  to  have  been  ordered  in  cold  blood  as  a  definite  policy  of 
terrorization  ("Shrecklichkeit")  ;  and  that  Germany  was  callous  con- 
cerning them  rather  than  ashamed.  When  the  German  sympathizers 
in  Europe  and  America  then  raised  the  cry  that  these  stories  of  German 
bestiality  were  part  of  a  campaign  of  British  propaganda.  Great  Britain 
took  pains  to  verify  them.     She  appointed  a  commission  of  investiga- 


U.  S.   and   tlie   War,  August   i,   1^14- April  6,   igi'j         199 

tion  under  the  chairmanship  of  Lord  Bryce,  for  many  years  England's 
ambassador  to  the  United  States.  The  United  States  had  learned  to 
repose  implicit  faith  in  the  word  of  Lord  Bryce,  and  when  the  Bryce 
report  on  the  Belgian  atrocities  was  published,  few  there  were  who 
dared  to  question  its  authenticity.  As  appeal  after  appeal  was  spread 
throughout  the  United  States  for  help  to  Belgium,  the  Bryce  report 
became  better  and  better  known ;  and  Germany's  course  inspired  gener- 
ally a  hatred  of  German  Kultur  among  even  those  who  had  been 
ignorant  of  the  type  of  civilization  nourished  in  Germany  in  the  past 
quarter  of  a  century. 

But  the  issue  presented  to  American  minds  was  soon  to  undergo 
even  more  radical  change.  It  was  no  longer  to  be  The  Entente  Allies 
versus  The  Central  Powers ;  it  was  to  become  the  United  States  versus 
the  Central  Powers. 

As  a  corollary  to  the  diplomatic  disputes  between  the  United  States 
and  Germany,  however,  there  eventuated  also  a  serious  diplomatic  issue 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  This  issue  was  main- 
tained by  both  disputants  with  gravity  and  persistence,  and  it  often 
covered  principles  as  vital  to  the  well-being  of  both  countries  as  the 
freedom  of  the  seas ;  but  it  never  reached  a  point  of  acerbity  where 
neither  party  would  yield  rather  than  see  a  serious  crisis  develop.  The 
points  at  issue  concerned  property  and  neutral  rights  rather  than  loss 
of  lives.  In  all  the  Anglo-American  diplomatic  discussions  between 
August  I,  1914,  and  April  6,  191 7,  the  possibility  of  war  never  hovered 
in  the  background;  and  the  results  of  these  negotiations  had  little  efifect 
upon  the  final  decision  of  the  United  States  to  enter  the  War  or  upon 
its  conduct  of  hostilities  after  it  had  entered  the  War.  It  will  there- 
fore be  well  to  consider  these  negotiations  at  this  point  before  passing 
01,  to  the  diplomatic  negotiations  between  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many. 


Diplomatic    Negotiations   Between    the   United   States 
AND  Great  Britain 

The  salient  point  about  the  Anglo-American  diplomatic  discussions 
from  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  to  the  entrance  of  the  United 
States  into  the  War  was  the  existence  of  an  arbitration  treaty  between 
the  two  countries  which  had  resulted  from  the  efforts  of  Secretary  of 
State  Bryan  and  which  made  well-nigh  impossible  a  resort  to  war. 

There  was  a  similar  treaty  between  America  and  France;  but  all 
efforts  to  arrange  a  similar  treaty  with  Germany  had  failed.  These 
arbitration  treaties  provided  for  the  reference  of  all  disputes  between 
the  countries  concerned,  irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  disputes,  to  a 
permanent  International  Commission,  provided  that  such  disputes 
could  not  be  settled  by  diplomatic  methods  of  adjustment.  The  coun- 
tries involved  agreed  not  to  declare  or  to  wage  war  upon  each  other 
until  the  Commission  had  investigated  and  reported,  and  the  Com- 
mission had  a  year  in  which  to  investigate  and  report. 

From  the  very  first  days  of  the  struggle,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  foresaw  that  complications  on  the  high  seas  might  in- 
volve the  question  of  American  rights,  and  on  August  6,  1914,  we  dis- 
patched an  identic  note  to  the  Powers  then  at  war,  calling  attention 
to  the  uncertainty  regarding  the  maritime  rights  of  neutrals  and  sug- 
gesting that  all  the  belligerents  adopt  the  Declaration  of  London.  The 
Declaration  of  London  was  the  result  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference 
in  1907.  It  represented  the  code  adopted  and  announced  on  February 
26,  1909,  by  the  International  Naval  Conference,  called  to  organize 
the  International  Prize  Court  established  by  the  Hague  Conference. 
The  Declaration  of  London  comprised  an  exhaustive  set  of  rules  gov- 
erning naval  operations  of  both  belligerents  and  neutrals  in  time  of 
war.  It  represented  not  only  a  codification  of  existing  rules  sanctioned 
by  the  usage  of  international  law,  but  also  a  distinct  advance  in  clarify- 
ing the  rights  and  the  duties  of  belligerents  and  neutrals  on  the  seas 

200 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zcitJi  England  201 

in  war-times.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  Declaration  of  London 
had  not  been  ratified  by  all  the  Powers  signatory  to  the  Second  Hague 
Conference  by  August  i,  1914;  so  that  it  was  non-effective  during  the 
Great  War. 

England,  it  is  true,  announced  as  she  entered  the  lists  against  Ger- 
many that  she  intended  to  abide  by  the  obligations  of  the  Declaration 
of  London ;  but  soon  altered  her  intention  in  that  respect,  and  to  the 
note  of  Secretary  of  State  Bryan  of  August  6,  1914,  replied  that  the 
developments  of  the  War  compelled  Great  Britain  to  use  her  control 
of  the  seas  to  the  limit  of  power  sanctioned  by  existing  international 
law. 

Unfortunately,  international  law  was  very  vague  concerning  the 
status  of  contraband.  The  question  of  contraband  was  further  com- 
plicated in  the  early  days  of  the  war  by  the  fact  that  Germany  was 
contiguous  to  neutral  territory  through  which  supplies  might  be  ob- 
tained. England's  argument  was,  roughly,  that  goods  sent  from  the 
United  States  to  such  neutral  countries  to  be  re-exported  to  Germany 
could  enjoy  no  status  different  from  the  status  of  goods  dispatched 
directly  to  Germany.  Accordingly,  throughout  1914,  American  ships 
were  stopped  and  searched,  and  their  cargoes  seized,  by  British  war- 
ships; while  the  new  element  brought  into  the  question  of  maritime 
rights  by  the  submarine  activities  of  Germany  also  served  to  create 
dissatisfaction  in  this  country  with  the  existing  state  of  affairs  regard- 
ing American  cargoes  and  shipping  on  the  high  seas. 

Finally,  on  December  26,  1914,  a  formal  note  of  protest  was  sent 
to  England  concerning  the  English  violation  of  American  maritime 
rights. 

England's  reply  to  this  protest  was  published  on  January  7,  1915. 
England  declared  that  she  was  not  interfering  in  the  legitimate  trade 
of  the  United  States  with  neutrals,  but  adduced  statistics  of  unusual 
increases  in  United  States  exports  to  countries  contiguous  to  Ger- 
many of  materials  vitally  necessary  to  Germany.  England  maintained 
that  these  figures  proved  that  the  maritime  trafific  with  which  she 
was  interfering  was  in  reality  traffic  intended  for  German  use.  How- 
ever, England  was  willing  to  make  reparation  for  illegal  damages  to 
neutral  shipping. 


202  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

On  February  4,  191 5,  Germany  charged  that  England  was  using 
neutral  flags  over  her  ships  to  protect  them  from  German  submarines 
and  that,  as  an  example,  the  Lusitania  had  sailed  under  the  American 
flag  on  a  recent  trip  when  it  was  approaching  the  British  coast.  Six 
days  later,  the  United  States  officially  informed  England  of  Germany's 
charges,  calling  England's  attention  to  the  danger  to  American  shipping 
involved  in  such  practices : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  reserv- 
ing for  future  consideration  the  legality  and  propriety  of  the  de- 
ceptive use  of  the  flag  of  a  neutral  power  in  any  case  for  the  pur- 
pose of  avoiding  capture,  desires  very  respectfully  to  point  out 
to  his  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  the  serious  consequences 
which  may  result  to  American  vessels  and  American  citizens  if 
this  practice  is  continued. 

The  occasional  use  of  the  flag  of  a  neutral  or  an  enemy  under 
the  stress  of  immediate  pursuit  and  to  deceive  an  approaching 
enemy,  which  appears  by  the  press  reports  to  be  represented  as 
the  precedent  and  justification  used  to  support  this  action,  seems 
to  this  Government  a  very  different  thing  from  an  explicit  sanction 
by  a  belligerent  Government  for  its  merchant  ships  generally  to 
fly  the  flag  of  a  neutral  power  within  certain  portions  of  the  high 
seas,  which  are  presumed  to  be  frequented  with  hostile  warships. 
The  formal  declaration  of  such  a  policy  of  general  misuse  of  a 
neutral's  flag  jeopardizes  the  vessels  of  a  neutral  visiting  those 
wars  in  a  peculiar  degree  by  raising  the  presumption  that  they 
are  of  belligerent  nationality  regardless  of  the  flag  which  they 
may  carry 

A  policy  such  as  the  one  which  his  Majesty's  Government  is 

said  to  intend  to  adopt,  would afi^ord  no  protection 

to  British  vessels,  while  it  would  be  a  serious  and  constant  menace 
to  the  lives  and  vessels  of  American  citizens. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  therefore,  trusts  that  his 
Majesty's  Government  will  do  all  in  their  power  to  restrain  vessels 
of  British  nationality  in  the  deceptive  use  of  the  United  States 
flag  in  the  sea  area  defined  by  the  German  declaration,  since  such 
practice  would  greatly  endanger  the  vessel  of  a  friendly  power 
navigating  those  waters  and  would  even  seem  to  impose  upon  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain  a  measure  of  responsibility  for  the 
loss  of  American  lives  and  vessels  in  case  of  an  attack  by  a  Ger- 
man naval  force. 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zmth  England  203 

You  will  impress  upon  his  Majesty's  Government  the  grave 
concern  which  this  Government  feels  in  the  circumstances  in  re- 
gard to  the  safety  of  American  vessels  and  lives  in  the  war  zone 
declared  by  the  German  Admiralty. 

England  replied,  on  February  19,  191 5,  that  such  action  was  not  in 
violation  of  the  principles  of  international  law,  and  that  Union  vessels 
had  utilized  the  British  flag  to  escape  capture  during  the  Civil  War ; 
but  England  agreed  not  to  resort  to  the  display  of  neutral  flags  over 
her  ships  as  a  general  practice. 

On  March  i,  191 5,  England  further  complicated  the  situation  by  an 
announcement  of  her  intention  to  confiscate  all  goods  "presumably" 
destined  to  or  originating  in  enemy  countries,  but  without  declaring  a 
lawful  blockade  of  German  ports.  On  March  30,  191 5,  therefore,  the 
United  States  addressed  another  note  of  protest  to  England: 

The   (British)   Order  in  Council  of  the  15th  of 

March  would  constitute,  were  its  provisions  to  be  actually  carried 
into  effect  as  they  stand,  a  practical  assertion  of  unlimited  belli- 
gerent rights  over  neutral  commerce  within  the  whole  European 
area,  and  an  almost  unqualified  denial  of  the  sovereign  rights  of 
the  nations  now  at  peace 

But  the  novel  and  quite  unprecedented  feature  of  (the  pro- 
posed English)  blockade, is  that  it  embraces  many 

neutral  ports  and  coasts,  bars  access  to  them,  and  subjects  all 
neutral  ships  seeking  to  approach  them  to  the  same  suspicion  that 
would  attach  to  them  were  they  bound  for  the  ports  of  the  enemies 
of  Great  Britain,  and  to  unusual  risks  and  penalties. 

It  is  manifest  that  such  limitations,  risks,  and  liabilities  placed 
upon  the  ships  of  a  neutral  power  on  the  seas,  beyond  the  right 
of  visit  and  search  and  the  right  to  prevent  the  shipment  of  con- 
traband already  referred  to,  are  a  distinct  invasion  of  the  sovereign 
rights  of  the  nation  whose  ships,  trade,  or  commerce  is  interfered 
with. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is,  of  course,  not  oblivi- 
ous to  the  great  changes  which  have  occurred  in  the  conditions 
and  means  of  naval  warfare  since  the  rules  hitherto  governing 
legal  blockade  were  formulated.  It  might  be  ready  to  admit  that 
the  old  form  of  "close"  blockade,  with  its  cordon  of  ships  in  the 
immediate  ofling  of  the  blockaded  ports  is  no  longer  practicable 
in  the  face  of  an  enemy  possessing  the  means  and  opportunity  to 


204 


A  History  of  the  Great  War 

make  an  effective  defense  by  the  use  of  submarines,  mines  and 
air  craft;  but  it  can  hardly  be  maintained  that,  whatever  form  of 
effective  blockade  may  be  made  use  of,  it  is  impossible  to  confomi 
at;  least  to  the  spirit  and  principles  of  the  established  rules  of 
war 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  notes  that  in  the  Order  in 
Council  his  Majesty's  Government  gives  as  their  reason  for  enter- 
ing upon  a  course  of  action,  which  they  are  aware  is  without  pre- 
cedent in  modern  warfare,  the  necessity  they  conceive  themselves 
to  have  been  placed  under  to  retaliate  upon  their  enemies  for 
measures  of  a  similar  nature,  which  the  latter  have  announced  it 
their  intention  to  adopt  and  which  they  have  to  some  extent 
adopted,  but  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  recalling  the 
principles  upon  which  his  Majesty's  Government  have  hitherto 
been  scrupulous  to  act,  interprets  this  as  merely  a  reason  for  cer- 
tain extraordinary  activities  on  the  part  of  his  Majesty's  naval 
forces  and  not  as  an  excuse  for  or  prelude  to  any  unlawful  action. 

If  the  course  pursued  by  the  present  enemies  of  Great  Britain 
should  prove  to  be  in  fact  tainted  by  illegality  and  disregard  of 
the  principles  of  war  sanctioned  by  enlightened  nations,  it  can- 
not be  supposed,  and  this  Government  does  not  for  a  moment 
suppose,  that  his  Majesty's  Government  would  wish  the  same 
taint  to  attach  to  their  own  actions  or  would  cite  such  illegal  acts 
as  in  any  sense  or  degree  a  justification  for  similar  practices  on 
their  part  in  so  far  as  they  affect  neutral  rights 

The  possibilities  of  serious  interruption  of  American  trade 
under  the  Order  in  Council  are  so  many,  and  the  methods  proposed 
are  so  unusual,  and  seem  liable  to  constitute  so  great  an  impedi- 
ment and  embarrassment  to  neutral  commerce,  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  if  the  Order  in  Council  is  strictly  en- 
forced, apprehends  many  interferences  with  its  legitimate  trade 
which  will  impose  upon  his  Majesty's  Government  heavy  responsi- 
bilities for  acts  of  the  British  authorities  clearly  subversive  of 
the  rights  of  neutral  nations  on  the  high  seas.  It  is,  therefore, 
expected  that  his  Majesty's  Government,  having  considered  these 
possibilities,  will  take  the  steps  necessary  to  avoid  them,  and,  in 
the  event  that  they  should  unhappily  occur,  will  be  prepared  to 
make  full  reparation  for  every  act  which  under  the  rules  of  inter- 
national law  constitutes  a  violation  of  neutral  rights 

In  conclusion,  you  will  reiterate  to  his  Majesty's  Government 
that  this  statement  of  the  view  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  made  in  the  most  friendly  spirit,  and  in  accordance  with 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  with  England  205 

the  uniform  candor  which  has  characterized  the  relations  of  the 
two  Governments  in  the  past,  and  which  has  been  in  large  measure 
the  foundation  of  the  peace  and  amity  existing  between  the  two 
nations  without  interruption  for  a  century. 

BRYAN. 

But  by  this  time,  diplomatic  controversies  with  Germany  had  be- 
come more  acute  than  those  with  England,  and  despite  the  growing 
irritation  in  America  at  the  English  interference  with  American  trade, 
no  further  action  was  taken  for  some  time  by  the  United  States  with 
respect  to  England's  interpretation  of  international  law. 

Nevertheless,  the  United  States  was  still  endeavoring  to  reach  a 
workable  understanding  with  England  on  the  points  at  issue  between 
them,  and  on  August  3,  191 5,  the  State  Department  at  Washington 
made  public  five  notes  which  had  been  addressed  to  England  since 
March  30,  191 5,  on  the  subject  of  the  rights  of  American  shipping 
and  cargoes.  To  none  of  these  notes  was  the  English  reply  considered 
satisfactory,  and  in  a  note  to  His  Majesty's  Government  on  October 
21,  191 5,  the  United  States  took  a  far  stronger  stand  than  she  had 
previously  taken : 

While    the    United    States    Government    was    at 

first  inclined  to  view  with  leniency  the   British  measures  which 

were  termed  in  the  correspondence a  "blockade," 

because  of  the  assurances  of  the  British  Government  that  incon- 
venience to  neutral  trade  would  be  minimized  by  the  discretion 
left  to  the  courts  in  the  application  of  the  Order  in  Council  and 
by  the  instructions  which  it  was  said  would  be  issued  to  the  ad- 
ministrative and  other  authorities  having  to  do  with  the  execution 
of  the  so-called  "blockade"  measures,  this  Government  is  now 
forced  to  the  realization  that  its  expectations,  which  were  fully 
set  forth  in  its  note  of  March  30,  were  based  on  a  misconception 
of  the  intentions  of  the  British  Government.  Desiring  to  avoid 
controversy  and  in  the  expectation  that  the  administration  of  the 
Order  in  Council  would  conform  to  the  established  rules  of  inter- 
national law,  this  Government  has  until  now  reserved  the  question 
of  the  actual  validity  of  the  Order  in  Council  of  March  11,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  considered  by  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  to 
establish  a  blockade  within  the  meaning  of  that  term  as  understood 
in  the  law  and  the  practice  of  nations ;  but  in  the  circumstances 


2o6  A  History  of  llie  Great  JVar 

now  developed  it  feels  that  it  can  no  longer  permit  the  validity  of 
the  alleged  blockade  to  remain  unchallenged 

It  is  incumbent  upon  the  United  States  Government,  therefore, 
to  give  the  British  Government  notice  that  the  blockade,  which 
they  claim  to  have  instituted  under  the  Order  in  Council  of  AlarcJi 
II,  cannot  be  recognized  as  a  legal  blockade  by  the  United 
States 

I  believe  it  has  been  conclusively  shown  that  the  methods  sought 
to  be  employed  by  Great  Britain  to  obtain  and  use  evidence  of 
enemy  destination  of  cargoes  bound  for  neutral  ports  and  to  im- 
pose a  contraband  character  upon  such  cargoes  are  without  justi- 
fication ;  that  the  blockade  upon  which  such  methods  are  partly 
founded,  is  ineffective,  illegal,  and  indefensible;  that  the  judicial 
procedure  offered  as  a  means  of  reparation  for  an  international 
injury  is  inherently  defective  for  the  purpose ;  and  that  in  many 
cases  jurisdiction  is  asserted  in  violation  of  the  law  of  nations. 
The  United  States,  therefore,  can  not  submit  to  the  curtailment 
of  its  neutral  rights  by  these  measures,  which  are  admittedly  re- 
taliatory, and  therefore  illegal,  in  conception  and  in  nature,  and 
intended  to  punish  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain  for  alleged 
illegalities  on  their  part.  The  United  States  might  not  be  in  a 
position  to  object  to  them  if  its  interests  and  the  interests  of  all 
neutrals  were  unaffected  by  them,  but,  being  affected,  it  can  not 
with  complacence  suffer  further  subordination  of  its  rights  and 
interests  to  the  plea  that  the  exceptional  geographic  position  of 
the  enemies  of  Great  Britain  require  or  justify  oppressive  and 
illegal  practices. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  desires,  therefore,  to  im- 
press most  earnestly  upon  His  Majesty's  Government  that  it  must 
insist  that  the  relations  between  it  and  His  Majesty's  Government 
.  be  governed,  not  by  a  policy  of  expediency,  but  by  those  established 
rules  of  international  conduct  upon  which  Great  Britain  in  the 
past  has  held  the  United  States  to  account  when  the  latter  natioi; 
was  a  belligerent  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  national  existence.  It 
is  of  the  highest  importance  to  neutrals  not  only  of  the  present 
day  but  of  the  future  that  the  principles  of  international  right  be 
maintained  unimpaired. 

This  task  of  championing  the  integrity  of  neutral  rights,  which 
have  received  the  sanction  of  the  civilized  world  against  the  law- 
less conduct  of  belligerents  arising  out  of  the  bitterness  of  the 
great  conflict  which  is  now  wasting  the  countries  of  Europe,  the 
United  States  unhesitatingly  assumes,  and  to  the  accomplishment 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  unth  England  207 

of  that  task  it  will  devote  its  energies,  exercising  always  that  im- 
partiality which  from  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  has  sought  to 
exercise  in  its  relations  with  the  warring  nations 

Early  in  19 16,  the  United  States  again  felt  itself  forced  to  protest 
to  England,  this  time  on  account  of  provisions  in  England's  Trading 
with  the  Enemy  Act.  The  United  States  objected  to  the  clauses  which 
forbade  English  merchants  to  trade  with  firms  in  neutral  countries 
which  had  German  trade  connections. 

By  this  time,  feeling  had  become  strong  in  this  country  also  against 
the  rigid  censorship  upon  neutral  mails  imposed  by  Great  Britain. 
American  feeling  finally  culminated  in  another  note  of  protest  to 
England  on  Alay  24,  1916.  The  United  States  maintained  that  its 
merchants  were  being  subjected  to  serious  losses,  inconveniences  and 
lack  of  opportunities  through  England's  examination  of  letters  in  the 
trade  branch  of  the  Postal  Service. 

Though    giving    assurances    that    they    consider 

"genuine  correspondence"  to  be  "inviolable,"  and  that  they  will, 
"true  to  their  engagements,"  refrain  "on  the  high  seas"  from 
seizing  and  confiscating  such  correspondence,  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments proceed  to  deprive  neutral  Governments  of  the  benefits  of 
these  assurances  by  seizing  and  confiscating  mail  from  vessels  in 
port  instead  of  at  sea.  They  compel  neutral  ships  without  just 
cause  to  enter  their  own  ports,  or  they  induce  shipping  lines, 
through  some  form  of  duress,  to  send  their  mail  ships  via  British 
ports,  or  they  detain  all  vessels  merely  calling  at  British  ports, 
thus  acquiring  by  force  or  unjustifiable  means  an  illegal  jurisdic- 
tion. Acting  upon  this  enforced  jurisdiction,  the  authorities  re- 
move all  mail,  genuine  correspondence  as  well  as  post  parcels, 
take  them  to  London,  where  every  piece,  even  though  of  neutral 
origin  and  destination,  is  opened  and  critically  examined  to  de- 
termine the  "sincerity  of  their  character,"  in  accordance  with  the 
interpretation  given  that  undefined  phrase  by  the  British  and 
French  censors.  Finally  the  expurgated  remainder  is  forwarded, 
frequently  after  irreparable  delay,  to  its  destination.  Ships  are 
detained  en  route  to  or  from  the  United  States  or  to  and  from 
other  neutral  countries,  and  mails  are  held  and  delayed  for  several 
days,  and,  in  some  cases,  for  weeks  and  even  months,  even  though 
not  routed  to  ports  of  North  Europe  via  British  ports.  This  has 
been  the  procedure  which  has  been  practiced  since  the  announce- 


2o8  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

ment  of  February  15,  191 6.  To  some  extent  the  same  practice 
was  followed  before  that  date,  calling  forth  the  protest  of  this 
Government  on  January  4,  1916.  But  to  that  protest  the  memo- 
randum under  acknowledgment  makes  no  reference  and  is  entirely 
unresponsive. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  must  again  insist  with 
emphasis  that  the  British  and  French  Governments  do  not  obtain 
rightful  jurisdiction  of  ships  by  forcing  or  inducing  them  to  visit 
their  ports  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  their  mails,  or  thereby 
obtain  greater  belligerent  rights  as  to  such  ship  than  they  could 
exercise  on  the  high  seas,  for  there  is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  no  legal  distinction  between  the 
seizure  of  mails  at  sea,  which  is  announced  as  abandoned,  and 
their  seizure  from  vessels  voluntarily  or  involuntarily  in  port. 

The  British  and  French  practice  amounts  to  an  unwarranted 
limitation  on  the  use  by  neutrals  of  the  world's  highway  for  the 
transmission  of  correspondence.  The  practice  actually  followed 
by  the  Allied  Powers  must  be  said  to  justify  the  conclusion, 
therefore,  that  the  announcement  of  February  15  was  merely 
notice  that  one  illegal  practice  had  been  abandoned  to  make  place 
for  the  development  of  another  more  onerous  and  vexatious  in 
character 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  in  view  of  the  improper 
methods  employed  by  the  British  and  French  authorities  in  in- 
terrupting mails  passing  between  the  United  States  and  other 
neutral  countries  and  between  the  United  States  and  the  enemies 
of  Great  Britain,  can  no  longer  tolerate  the  wrongs  which  citizens 
of  the  United  States  have  suffered  and  continue  to  suffer  through 
these  methods.  To  submit  to  a  lawless  practice  of  this  character 
would  open  the  door  to  repeated  violations  of  international  law 
by  the  belligerent  powers  on  the  ground  of  military  necessity  of 
which  the  violator  would  be  the  sole  judge.  Manifestly  a  neutral 
nation  cannot  permit  its  rights  on  the  high  seas  to  be  determined 
by  belligerents  or  the  exercise  of  those  rights  to  be  permitted  or 
denied  arbitrarily  by  the  Government  of  a  warring  nation.  The 
rights  of  neutrals  are  as  sacred  as  the  rights  of  belligerents  and 
must  be  as  strictly  observed. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  confident  in  the  regard 
for  international  law  and  the  rights  of  neutrals  which  the  British 
and  French  Governments  have  so  often  proclaimed  and  the  dis- 
regard of  which  they  have  urged  so  vigorously  against  their 
enemies  in  the  present  war,  expects  the  present  practice  of  the 


DESCRIPTION   OF   PICTURES   ON   REVERSE   SIDE 

Upper  Left  Hand  Corner — Evangeline  C.  Booth,  Commander  of  Salvation 
Army  in  United  States  and  its  Possessions,  1904 — . 

Upper  Right  Hand  Corner — John  R.  Mott,  General  Secretary,  International 
Committee  and  National  War  Work  Council,  Young  Men's  Christian  Asso- 
ciations. 

Center — Henry  P.  Davison,  Chairman,  War  Council,  American  Red  Cross, 
May  11,   1917—. 

Lower  Left  Hand  Corner — William  J.  Mulligan,  Chairman,  Overseas  Com- 
mittee, Knights  of  Columbus. 

Lower  Right  Hand  Corner — Colonel  Harry  Cutler,  Chairman,  War  Ac- 
tivities, Jewish  Welfare  Board. 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zcith  England  209 

British  and  French  authorities  in  the  treatment  of  mails  from 
or  to  the  United  States  to  cease,  and  beUigerent  rights,  as  exer- 
cised, to  conform  to  the  principle  governing  the  passage  of  mail 
matter  and  to  the  recognized  practice  of  nations.  Only  a  radical 
charge  in  the  present  British  and  French  policy,  restoring  to  the 
United  States  its  full  rights  as  a  neutral  power,  will  satisfy  this 
Government. 
I  have,  &:c., 

ROBERT  LANSING. 

Great  Britain  promised,  in  reply  to  the  American  protest,  to  take 
all  possible  measures  to  minimize  the  extent  of  inspection  of  mails 
and  likewise  to  minimize  the  delay  thereby  caused. 

Several  other  protests  to  England  were  caused  by  the  action  of 
English  cruisers  in  taking  sailors  from  American  ships,  and  resulted 
in  disavowal  by  England  of  such  actions  where  they  were  manifestly 
illegal. 

On  January  27,  1916,  Great  Britain  had  published  a  "blacklist"  of 
almost  one  hundred  firms  and  business  establishments  located  in  this 
country,  and  forbade,  under  the  English  Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act, 
all  subjects  of  England  to  indulge  in  trade  relations  with  them.  Against 
this  action,  the  United  States  protested  on  July  26,  1916: 

The  announcement  that  his  Britannic  Majesty's 

Government  has  placed  the  names  of  certain  persons,  firms,  and 
corporations  in  the  United  States  upon  a  proscriptive  "blacklist" 
and  has  forbidden  all  financial  or  commercial  dealings  between 
them  and  citizens  of  Great  Britain  has  been  received  with  the 
most  painful  surprise  by  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United 
States,  and  seems  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to 
embody  a  policy  of  arbitrary  interference  with  neutral  trade 
against  which  it  is  its  duty  to  protest  in  the  most  decided 
terms 

There  are  well-known  remedies  and  penalties  for  breaches  of 
blockade,  where  the  blockade  is  real  and  in  fact  efifective,  for 
trade  in  contraband,  for  every  unneutral  act  by  whomsoever  at- 
tempted. The  Government  of  the  United  States  cannot  consent 
to  see  those  remedies  and  penalties  altered  or  extended  at  the  will 
of  a  single  power  or  group  of  powers  to  the  injury  of  its  own  citi- 
zens or  in  derogation  of  its  own  rights.  Conspicuous  among  the 
principles  which  the  civilized  nations  of  the  world  have  accepted 


2IO  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ^ar 

for  the  safeguarding  of  the  rights  of  neutrals  is  the  just  and  honor- 
able principle  that  neutrals  may  not  be  condemned  nor  their  goods 
confiscated,  except  upon  fair  adjudication  and  after  an  opportunity 
to  be  heard  in  prize  courts  or  elsewhere.  Such  safeguards  the 
blacklist  brushes  aside.  It  condemns  without  hearing,  without 
notice,  and  in  advance.  It  is  manifestly  out  of  the  question  that 
the  Government  of  the  United   States  should  acquiesce  in  such 

methods  or  applications  of  punishment  to  its  citizens 

There  is  no  purpose  or  inclination  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  shield  American  citizens  or  business 
houses  in  any  way  from  the  legitimate  consequences  of  unneutral 
acts  or  practices ;  it  is  quite  willing  that  they  should  suffer  the 
appropriate  penalties  which  international  law  and  the  usage  of 
nations  have  sanctioned;  but  his  Britannic  Majesty's  Government 
cannot  expect  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  consent  to 
see  its  citizens  put  upon  an  ex  parte  blacklist  without  calling  the 
attention  of  his  Majesty's  Government,  in  the  gravest  terms,  to 
the  many  serious  consequences  to  neutral  right  and  neutral  rela- 
tions which  such  an  act  must  necessarily  involve.  It  hopes  and 
believes  that  his  Majesty's  Government,  in  its  natural  absorption 
in  a  single  pressing  object  of  policy,  has  acted  without  a  full 
realization  of  the  many  undesired  and  undesirable  results  that 
might  ensue. 

POLK,  Acting  Secretary  of  State. 

On  October  lo.  1916,  and  again  on  October  12,  1916,  England  replied 
to  the  American  protests  against  England's  blacklisting  procedure  and 
interference  with  American  mails.  England  went  into  great  detail  to 
prove  that  her  actions  were  well  within  the  sanction  of  international 
law  and  that  the  American  protests  were  not  well  taken.  The  more 
serious  nature  of  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Germany 
was  throwing  these  disputes  between  the  United  States  and  England 
into  the  background,  and  the  replies  to  the  various  protests  and  answers 
to  protests  were  greatly  delayed. 


Diplomatic    Negotiations    of    the    United    States    with 
Germany  and  Austria 

The  Great  War  was  primarily  a  struggle  of  material  resources  and 
business  efficiency.  After  the  first  rush  of  the  invading  German  armies 
had  been  halted,  and  the  German  forces  had  entrenched  themselves  in 
northern  France  and  Belgium,  the  personal  conflicts  between  the  vari- 
ous armies  were  of  far  less  significance  in  determining  the  results  of 
engagements  than  the  artillery  combats.  Only  in  the  air  did  the  per- 
sonal prowess  of  individuals  make  itself  effective.  The  very  presence 
of  airplanes  served  in  most  cases  to  inform  the  belligerents  of  the  in- 
tentions of  the  enemy — skilful  manoeuvres  and  secret  manipulation  of 
large  armies  to  gain  the  victory  were  impossible.  The  number  of  guns ; 
the  supply  of  shells  and  of  small-arms,  with  small-arms  ammunition; 
the  strength  of  the  air  squadrons ;  the  number  of  gas  bombs  and  hand 
grenades ;  the  extent  of  the  submarine  fleets ;  and  especially  the  quan- 
tity and  quality  of  the  food,  these  were  the  decisive  factors  in  the 
final  result  of  the  most  devastating  war  known  to  modern  times. 

Shipments  of  Munitions 

Each  belligerent,  therefore,  was  compelled  to  give  as  much  attention 
to  the  organization  of  industry  at  home  as  to  the  organization  of  the 
armies  on  the  land  and  of  the  navies  on  the  seas.  Soon  each  belligerent 
was  developing  its  industrial  resources  to  their  utmost.  The  next  step 
was  then  inevitable — the  belligerents  turned  to  the  few  remaining 
neutral  countries  for  additional  supplies  and  equipment.  And  the 
United  States  was  soon  to  be  the  only  neutral  with  material  resources 
vast  enough  to  be  of  great  assistance. 

The  rules  of  war  and  the  regulations  of  international  law  permitted 
neutrals  to  furnish  munitions  of  war  to  belligerents  without  affecting 
their  status  as  neutrals.    According  to  all  accepted  interpretation,  the 

2X1 


212  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

United  States  had  a  legal  right  to  supply  all  belligerent  nations  who 
came  to  buy  of  the  United  States.  Indeed,  as  President  Wilson  was 
later  to  point  out  to  the  Central  Powers,  if  international  law  had  for- 
bidden neutrals  to  furnish  munitions  to  belligerents,  each  country 
would  have  relied  entirely  upon  its  own  preparations  of  armament  for 
war;  and  the  burdens  of  armament  in  times  of  peace  would  have  sat 
even  more  heavily  upon  the  people  of  Europe  than  they  sat  in  the 
decade  preceding  the  murder  of  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  at  Sara- 
jevo. 

But  the  Central  Powers,  unfortunately  for  them,  were  so  situated 
as  to  be  almost  completely  unable  to  utilize  the  resources  of  neutrals. 
While  England  held  undisputed  sway  of  the  sea,  the  Central  Powers 
were  unable  to  avail  themselves  of  the  resources  of  the  United  States. 
They  were  separated  by  the  territory  of  Entente  Powers  from  Spain. 
For  a  period,  supphes  might  be  obtained  from  Italy,  but  before  the 
war  was  a  year  old,  Italy  threw  in  her  lot  with  the  Entente.  The 
neutral  countries  contiguous  to  Germany  were  Holland,  Switzerland 
and  Denmark,  but  few  supplies  could  be  obtained  directly  from  these 
small  and  poor  countries.  This  neutral  trio  was  largely  dependent  upon 
supplies  from  Entente  Powers  for  necessities  such  as  fats,  and  the 
Entente  Powers  soon  evinced  determination  not  to  supply  neutrals 
which  were  rendering  supplies  to  their  enemies.  In  addition,  Switzer- 
land had  been  financially  hard  hit  by  the  absence  of  the  tourist  trade, 
and  the  incursion  of  refugees  from  Belgium  helped  to  absorb  the 
resources  of  Holland.  Greece  was  also  not  prolific  of  supplies  helpful 
for  war  purposes,  and  the  resources  of  the  enemy  countries  occupied 
by  the  Central  Powers — Belgium,  Servia,  Montenegro  and  Roumania — ■ 
were  eclipsed  practically  to  the  point  of  disappearance  by  the  re- 
sources of  the  United  States. 

Naturally,  the  first  eflfect  of  the  war  had  been  destructive  of  Ameri- 
can prosperity.  Trade  with  abroad  almost  ceased ;  supplies  from 
abroad  were  not  forthcoming;  the  revenue  from  customs  dwindled  and 
had  to  be  replaced  by  higher  internal  revenue  taxes.  But  after  some 
months,  America  began  to  pour  forth  her  riches  and  to  ship  the 
products  of  her  factories  to  the  Entente  Allies,  and  an  unprecedented 
era  of  industrial  activity  and  of  prosperity  was  ushered  in. 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zvith  Germany  213 

But  Germany  was  in  no  mood  to  recognize  America's  legal  right 
to  sell  supplies  to  the  only  group  of  belligerents  able  to  procure  them, 
the  Entente  Allies.  The  inexorable  food  blockade  around  Germany 
soon  impressed  itself  more  and  more  firmly  upon  living  conditions  in 
Germany.  As  long  as  Germany  persisted  in  prosecuting  war,  that 
long  was  she  compelled  to  divert  food  to  her  soldiers  and  sailors  first 
and  to  her  civilian  population  secondly.  Shortage  of  food  was  tak- 
ing heavy  toll  of  disease  and  death  in  Germany,  and  before  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice  in  November,  1918,  was  to  inflict  awful  punish- 
ment upon  the  civil  population  of  Germany.  Indeed,  it  is  estimated 
that  during  the  war  between  300,000  and  700,000  persons  in  Germany 
died  directly  or  indirectly  as  a  result  of  malnutrition  and  weakness ; 
and  naturally  the  deaths  were  chiefly  among  the  very  young,  the  very 
old  and  the  infirm. 

To  this  condition,  Germany  reacted  with  an  unreasoning  and  blatant 
hatred  of  the  United  States  which  became  apparent  before  the  first 
year  of  war  had  elapsed.  Germany  persisted  in  conceiving  America  as 
unneutral,  and  threats  of  revenge  against  America  were  published 
openly  in  the  German  press.  So  that  in  addition  to  the  inevitable  bias 
against  the  cause  of  Germany  in  most  American  minds  as  a  result  of 
the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  and  of  the  atrocities  committed  in 
Belgium,  American  feeling  was  aroused  against  Germany  by  the  very 
fact  that  German  feeling  was  aroused  against  America.  It  was  im- 
possible not  to  regard  with  hostile  eyes  a  nation  which  was  regarding 
us  with  hostile  eyes. 

On  April  4,  1915,  Ambassador  von  Bernstorfif  ofiicially  protested  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  against  the  shipment  of  munitions 
of  war  to  the  enemies  of  Germany.  As  in  most  of  the  diplomatic  notes 
from  Germany  to  the  United  States  in  the  period  from  August  i,  1914, 
to  April  6,  1917,  Germany  defended  her  attitude  largely  by  attacking 
the  attitude  of  England.  The  present  protest  complained  bitterly  of 
the  violation  of  international  law  by  England,  and  of  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  was  not  taking  what  seemed  to  the  German  point 
of  view  a  sufficiently  strong  position  against  such  violations.  Ger- 
many   maintained    that    the    conditions    in    the    present    war    were 


214  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

unique,  in  that  it  was  manifestly  impossible  for  Germany  to  obtain 
munitions  in  the  United  States;  so  that  the  willingness  of  the  United 
States  to  sell  to  all  buyers  was  a  willingness  existing  in  theory  rather 
than  in  reality.  The  German  conclusion  was  that  the  shipment  of 
munitions  to  the  Entente  was  therefore  in  essence,  if  not  in  law,  an 
unneutral  act,  and  should  be  ended  by  the  United  States. 

In  the  reply  of  the  United  States  to  this  protest,  published  on 
April  22,  191 5,  the  position  was  taken  which  the  United  States  was 
likewise  to  take  in  all  the  diplomatic  correspondence  with  Germany 
from  August  i,  1914.  to  April  6.  1917 — namely,  that  Germany  had  no 
authority  to  discuss  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  England, 
but  that  the  relationship  of  Germany  and  the  United  States  must  be 
discussed  on  its  own  merits.  President  Wilson  pointed  out  that  it 
would  be  unfair,  indeed,  essentially  unneutral,  arbitrarily  to  change 
the  rulings  of  international  law  while  a  war  w^as  actually  being  fought. 

Your  Excellency's  (i.  e.  Ambassador  von  Berns- 

dorff's)  long  experience  in  international  affairs  will  have  sug- 
gested to  you  that  the  relations  of  the  two  Governments  (i.  e. 
England  and  the  United  States)  with  one  another  cannot  wisely 
be  made  a  subject  of  discussion  with  a  third  Government,  which 
cannot  be  fully  informed  as  to  the  facts,  and  which  cannot  be 
fully  cognizant  of  the  reasons  for  the  course  pursued. 

This  Government  holds,  as  I  believe  your  Excellency  is  aware 
and  as  it  is  constrained  to  hold  in  view  of  the  present  indisputable 
doctrines  of  accepted  international  law,  that  any  change  in  its  own 
laws  of  neutrality  during  the  progress  of  a  war,  which  would 
affect  unequally  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  the  nations 
at  war,  would  be  an  unjustifiable  departure  from  the  principle  of 
strict  neutrality,  by  which  it  has  consistently  sought  to  direct  its 
actions,  and  I  respectfully  submit  that  none  of  the  circumstances, 
urged  in  your  Excellency's  memorandum,  alters  the  principle 
involved. 

The  placing  of  an  embargo  on  the  trade  in  arms  at  the  present 
time  would  constitute  such  a  change  and  be  a  direct  violation  of 
the  neutrality  of  the  United  States.  It  wn'll,  I  feel  assured,  be 
clear  to  your  Excellency  that  holding  this  view  and  considering 
itself  in  honor  bound  by  it,  it  is  out  of  the  question  for  this  Gov- 
ernment to  consider  such  a  course. 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zuith  Germany  215 

The  Central  Powers  sent  their  second  protest  against  the  shipment 
of  munitions  through  Austria-Hungary.  On  August  i,  1915,  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  Government  lodged  a  formal  protest  with  the  United 
States,  taking  much  the  same  ground  on  the  shipment  of  munitions  to 
the  Entente  Allies  that  had  been  taken  in  the  German  note. 

The  reply  of  the  United  States  was  published  on  August  15,  191 5. 
It  went  into  greater  detail  than  the  reply  to  the  protest  of  Germany 
had  gone,  and  elaborated  upon  the  increase  of  militarism  which  would 
result  if  all  countries  were  compelled  to  provide  themselves  with  all 
the  supplies  required  in  time  of  war.  Furthermore,  President  Wilson 
pointed  out  to  Austria  the  fact  that  the  military  establishment  of  the 
United  States  had  always  been  a  small  one  in  comparison  with  the 
huge  military  establishments  of  Europe,  and  that  such  action  as  that 
asked  by  Austria-Hungary  would  be  a  direct  blow  at  the  safety  of 
America  itself.  The  United  States  reminded  Austria  that  throughout 
the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  both  Austria  and  Germany, 
while  neutral,  had  sold  munitions  of  war  to  belligerents.  In  the  Boer 
War,  where  conditions  were  much  the  same  regarding  belligerents  as 
in  1914,  in  the  Crimean  War,  in  the  Turco-Italian  War  in  1911-12, 
and  in  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912  and  1913,  belligerents  had  been  able 
to  replenish  their  military  supplies  from  Austrian  and  German  sources : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  given 

careful  consideration  to  the  statement  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  in  regard  to  the  exportation  of  armies  and  ammu- 
nition from  the  United  States  to  the  countries  at  war  with  Aus- 
tria-Hungary  and    Germany.      The    Government   of    the    United 

States is  surprised  to  find  the  Imperial  and  Royal 

Government  implying  that  the  observance  of  the  strict  principles 
of  the  law  under  the  conditions  which  have  developed  in  the 
present  war  is  insufficient,  and  asserting  that  this  Government 
should  go  beyond  the  long-recognized  rules  governing  such  traffic 
by  neutrals  and  adopt  measures  to  "maintain  an  attitude  of  strict 
parity  with  respect  to  both  belligerent  parties." 

To  this  assertion  of  an  obligation  to  change  or  modify  the  rules 
of  international  usage  on  account  of  special  conditions,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  cannot  accede.  The  recognition 
of  an  obligation  of  this  sort,  unknown  to  the  international  prac- 
tice of  the  past,  would  impose  upon  every  neutral  nation  a  duty 


2i6  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

to  sit  in  judgment  on  the  progress  of  a  war  and  to  restrict  its  com- 
mercial intercourse  with  a  belhgerent  whose  naval  successes  pre- 
vented the  neutral   from  trade  with  the  enemy On 

the  novel  principle  that  equalization  is  a  neutral  duty,  neutral 
nations  would  be  obligated  to  place  an  embargo  on  such  articles 
because  one  of  the  belligerents  could  not  obtain  them  through 
commercial  intercourse. 

But  if  this  principle,  so  strongly  urged  by  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government,  should  be  admitted  to  obtain  by  reason  of  the 
superiority  of  a  belligerent  at  sea,  ought  it  not  to  operate  equally 
as  to  a  belligerent  superior  on  land?  Applying  this  theory  of 
equalization,  a  belligerent  who  lacks  the  necessary  munitions  to 
contend  successfully  on  land  ought  to  be  permitted  to  purchase 
them  from  neutrals,  while  a  belligerent  with  an  abundance  of  war 
stores  or  wuth  the  power  to  produce  them  should  be  debarred  from 
such  trafific. 

Manifestly  the  idea  of  strict  neutrality  now  advanced  by  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  would  involve  a  neutral  nation 
in  a  mass  of  perplexities  which  would  obscure  the  whole  field  of 
international  obligation,  produce  economic  confusion  and  deprive 
all  commerce  and  industry  of  legitimate  fields  of  enterprise, 
already  heavily  burdened  by  the  unavoidable  restriction  of 
war 

But,  in.  addition  to  the  question  of  principle,  there  is  a  practical 
and  substantial  reason  why  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  from  the  foundation  of  the  Republic  to  the  present  time  advo- 
cated and  practiced  unrestricted  trade  in  arms  and  military  sup- 
plies. It  has  never  been  the  policy  of  this  country  to  maintain  in 
in  time  of  peace  a  large  military  establishment  or  stores  of  arms 
and  ammunition  sufficient  to  repel  invasion  by  a  well  equipped  and 
powerful  enemy.  It  has  desired  to  remain  at  peace  with  all 
nations  and  to  avoid  any  appearance  of  menacing  such  peace  by  the 
threat  of  its  armies  and  navies.  In  consequence  of  this  stand- 
ing policy  the  United  States  would,  in  the  event  of  attack  by  a 
foreign  power,  be  at  the  outset  of  the  war  seriously,  if  not  fatally, 
embarrassed  by  the  lack  of  arms  and  ammunition  and  by  the  means 
to  produce  them  in  sufficient  quantities  to  supply  the  requirements 
of  national  defense.  The  United  States  has  always  depended 
upon  the  right  and  power  to  purchase  arms  and  ammunition  from 
neutral  nations  in  casq  of  foreign  attack.  This  right,  which  it 
claims  for  itself,  it  cannot  deny  to  otliers. 

A  nation  whose  principle  and  policy  it  is  to  rely  upon  inter- 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zvith  Germany  217 

national  obligations  and  international  justice  to  preserve  its  politi- 
cal and  territorial  integrity  might  become  the  prey  of  an  aggressive 
nation  whose  policy  and  practice  it  is  to  increase  its  military 
strength  during  times  of  peace  with  the  design  of  conquest,  unless 
the  nation  attacked  can,  after  war  had  been  declared,  go  into  the 
markets  of  the  world  and  purchase  the  means  to  defend  itself 
against  the  aggressor. 

The  general  adoption  by  the  nations  of  the  world  of  the  theory 
that  neutral  powders  ought  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  arms  and  ammu- 
nition to  belligerents  would  compel  every  nation  to  have  in  readi- 
ness at  all  times  sufficient  munitions  of  war  to  meet  any  emergency 
which  might  arise,  and  to  erect  and  maintain  establishments  for 
the  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammunition  sufficient  to  supply  the 
needs  of  its  military  and  naval  forces  throughout  the  progress 
of  a  war.  Manifestly  the  application  of  this  theory  would  result 
in  every  nation  becoming  an  armed  camp,  ready  to  resist  aggres- 
sion and  tempted  to  employ  force  in  asserting  its  rights  rather 
than  appeal  to  reason  and  justice  for  the  settlement  of  interna- 
tional disputes. 

Perceiving,  as  it  does,  that  the  adoption  of  the  principle  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  a  neutral  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion to  a  belligerent  during  the  progress  of  a  war  would  inevitably 
give  the  advantage  to  the  belligerent  which  had  encouraged  the 
manufacture  of  munitions  in  time  of  peace,  and  which  had  laid  in 
vast  stores  of  arms  and  ammunition  in  anticipation  of  war,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  is  convinced  that  the  adoption 
of  the  theory  would  force  militarism  on  the  world  and  work 
against  the  universal  peace  which  is  the  desire  and  purpose  of  all 
nations  with  one  another 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  deems  it  unnecessary 
to  extend  further  at  the  present  time  a  consideration  of  the  state- 
ment of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  The  principles  of 
international  law,  the  practice  of  nations,  the  national  safety  of 
the  United  States  and  other  nations  without  great  military  and 
naval  establishments,  the  prevention  of  increased  armies  and 
navies,  the  adoption  of  peaceful  methods  for  the  adjustment  of 
international  dilTerences,  and.  finally,  neutrality  itself  are  opposed 
to  the  prohibition  by  a  neutral  nation  of  the  exportation  of  arms, 
ammunition  or  other  munitions  of  war  to  belligerent  powers  dur- 
ing the  progress  of  the  war.  LANSING. 


2i8  A  History  of  the  Great  IVar 

Gkrman   Plots  in  the  United  States 

Thwarted  thus  in  open  attempts  to  stop  tlie  shipment  of  munitions 
of  war  from  the  United  States  to  the  Entente,  the  Central  Powers  re- 
sorted to  more  indirect  but  also  more  underhanded  methods.  German 
agents  in  the  United  States  encouraged  strikes  in  factories  produc- 
ing munitions  and  planned  delays  in  the  transportation  on  land  and  sea 
of  supplies  to  the  Entente.  German  sympathizers  were  found  to  have 
attempted  to  procure  fraudulent  clearance  papers,  manifests  and  pass- 
ports. Attempts  were  made  to  destroy  the  Welland  Canal  and  bridges 
across  the  St.  Lawrence.  It  must  be  admitted  that  direct  evidence 
of  the  hand  of  the  Gennan  government  in  planning  these  activities  was 
usually  lacking,  but  the  indirect  evidence  was  usually  present,  and  was 
overwhelming.  Indeed,  on  this  account  in  191 5  the  United  States  re- 
quested the  recall  of  the  German  naval  and  military  attaches  to  the 
Gemian  embassy  in  the  United  States,  Captains  Boy-Ed  and  von 
Papen,  and  with  this  request  Germany  w^as  compelled  to  comply. 

These  and  similar  actions  were  not  only  in  violation  of  the  criminal 
laws  of  the  United  States — they  were  in  violation  of  international  law. 
In  other  words,  they  constituted  unneutral  actions  on  the  part  of 
Germany  in  so  far  as  the  German  Government  was  responsible  for 
them;  and  by  the  end  of  1915,  whatever  popularity  of  Germany  had 
existed  in  the  United  States  was  sadly  on  the  wane. 

In  February,  1916,  the  German  consul-general  at  San  Francisco, 
Bopp,  and  some  of  his  subordinates  were  indicted  under  the  Anti-trust 
Law  on  charges  of  having  planned  to  blow  up  tunnels  and  munition 
plants  and  to  perform  other  criminal  acts.  The  defendants  were  later 
found  guilty  and  imprisoned. 

Throughout  191 6,  other  German  subjects  and  sympathizers  were 
arrested  on  similar  serious  charges.  It  was  only  natural,  therefore, 
that  much'  of  the  loss  of  life  and  property  due  to  explosions  and  fires 
in  munition  plants  should  be  charged  to  the  account  of  Germany.  In- 
deed, so  strong  was  the  feeling  aroused  in  the  United  States  by  this 
program  that,  although  the  United  States  never  felt  that  it  had  suffi- 
cient direct  evidence  to  warrant  definite  complaint  to  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, on  May   18,   1916,  Germany  officially  informed  the  United 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  ivith  Germany  2ig 

States  that  it  had  issued  orders  to  all  German  subjects  in  the  United 
States  to  obey  to  the  letter  all  the  laws  of  the  United  States ;  and  the 
criminal  activities  of  German  agents  and  propagandists  in  this  country 
thereafter  declined. 

Nevertheless,  legal  efforts  at  German  propaganda  in  this  country 
continued  uninterrupted.  Like  so  much  of  German  diplomacy,  these 
efforts — such  as  attempts  to  buy  pro-German  editorials  in  newspapers 
and  to  deliver  in  political  campaigns  an  alleged  solid  German-Ameri- 
can vote — were  palpably  clumsy,  and  served  only  to  react  against  their 
originators. 

The  highest  official  to  be  implicated  in  criminal  and  unneutral 
activities  in  the  United  States  was  the  ambassador  from  Austria- 
Hungary,  Dr.  Theodore  Dumba.  A  letter  from  him  was  intercepted 
by  England  and  called  to  the  attention  of  the  United  States,  in  which 
the  Austrian  ambassador  suggested  fomenting  strikes  among  Austro- 
Hungarian  workers  in  American  munition  plants.  The  United  States 
immediately  demanded  the  recall  of  Ambassador  Dumba  and  on  Sep- 
tember 27,  191 5,  his  Government  agreed  to  the  request. 

The  German    Submarine  Warfare 

Had  these  remained  the  only  issues  in  dispute  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Central  Powers,  however,  the  United  States  in  all  human 
probability  would  never  had  entered  the  Great  War.  The  direct  casus 
belli  which  was  to  result  first  in  strained  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany,  secondly  in  the  termination  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, and  finally  in  an  open  declaration  of  war  was  the  submarine  war- 
fare waged  by  the  Imperial  German  Government. 

The  war  which  opened  in  the  summer  of  1914  was  the  first  in  which 
submarines  were  used  on  a  scale  large  enough  to  affect  the  final  result. 
There  was  accordingly  no  well-defined  code  of  international  law  re- 
specting the  use  of  submarines,  and  it  was  therefore  for  the  greater 
part  necessary  to  define  the  legitimate  activities  of  the  undersea  craft 
according  to  general  principles  of  previous  international  understanding. 
The  delicate  and  vulnerable  nature  of  the  submarine  compelled  it  to  act 
quickly  and  unexpectedly  in  the  presence  of  armed  craft.     Its  small 


226  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

size  restricted  its  personnel,  so  that  it  was  seldom  feasible  for  it  to 
place  a  prize  crew  on  captured  merchantmen.  It  obviously  could  not 
conduct  its  captives  to  port  over  seas  patrolled  by  submarine  hunters 
and  by  other  enemy  warships.  If  vessels  could  not  be  sunk,  there 
was  no  gain  in  submarine  warfare ;  and  unless  a  submarine  could 
attack  armed  vessels  without  warning,  there  was  every  probability  that 
armed  vessels  could  not  be  sunk.  But  the  rules  of  international  law 
demanded  that  merchant  vessels  be  not  sunk  until  every  precaution  had 
been  taken  for  the  safety  of  the  passengers  and  crew.  International 
law  sanctioned  exceptions  to  this  rule  only  if  merchant  vessels  should 
attempt  to  escape. 

Under  these  circumstances,  there  was  grave  fear  in  the  United 
States  at  the  outbreak  of  the  War  that  Germany's  submarine  cam- 
paign would  conflict  with  the  rights  of  neutrals  upon  the  high  seas ; 
and  that  fear  seemed  destined  to  justification  early  in  191 5.  On  Febru- 
ary 4,  191 5,  the  Imperial  German  Government,  in  revenge  for  the 
British  blockade  of  Gennany,  declared  that  after  two  weeks  every 
merchant  vessel  belonging  to  the  enemy  would  be  sunk  irrespective  of 
measures  for  the  safety  of  the  passengers  and  crew,  and  that  even 
neutral  vessels  entering  what  Germany  declared  to  be  a  "war  zone" 
around  the  British  Isles  would  be  in  danger  because  of  England's  use 
of  neutral  flags. 

The  United  States  was  alert  to  the  perils  inherent  in  the  intention 
of  the  German  Government,  and  on  February  10,  191 5,  dispatched  a 
friendly  but  firm  note  to  Germany  calling  attention  to  the  violation  of 
international  law  implied  in  Germany's  intentions,  to  the  danger  that 
American  lives  might  thereby  be  placed  in  jeopardy  and  American 
rights  transgressed,  and  to  the  purpose  of  the  United  States  to  hold 
Germany  to  "strict  accountability"  for  its  actions. 

The   Government   of   the   United   States,    having 

had  its  attention  directed  to  the  proclamation  of  the  German 
Admiralty,  issued  on  the  4th  of  February,  ....  feels  it 
to  be  its  duty  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment, with  sincere  respect  and  the  most  friendly  sentiments, 
but  very  candidly  and  earnestly,  to  the  very  serious  possibilities 


Diplojnatic  Negotiations  with  Germany  221 

of  jhe  course  of  action  apparently  contemplated  under  that  proc- 
lamation. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  views  those  possibilities 
with  such  grave  concern  that  it  feels  it  to  be  its  privilege,  and. 
indeed,  its  duty,  in  the  circumstances  to  request  the  Imperial 
German  Government  to  consider  before  action  is  taken,  the  crit- 
ical situation  in  respect  of  the  relation  between  this  country  and 
Germany  which  might  arise  were  the  German  naval  forces,  in 
carrying  out  the  poHcy  foreshadowed  in  the  Admiralty's  proclama- 
tion, to  destroy  any  merchant  vessel  of  the  United  States  or  cause 
the  death  of  American  citizens 

This  Government takes  this  occasion  to  remind 

the  Imperial  German  Governmenf  very  respectfully  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  is  open  to  none  of  the  criticisms 
for  unneutral  action  to  which  the  German  Government  believes 
the  Governments  of  certain  other  neutral  nations  have  laid  them- 
selves open ;  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  not 
consented  ta  or  acquiesced  in  any  measures  which  may  have  been 
taken  by  the  other  belligerent  nations  in  the  present  war  which 
operate  to  restrain  neutral  trade,  but  has,  on  the  contrary,  taken, 
in  all  such  matters,  a  position  which  warrants  it  in  holding  those 
Governments  responsible  in  the  proper  way  for  any  untoward 
effects  on  American  shipping  which  the  accepted  principles  of 
international  law  do  not  justify;  and  that  it,  therefore,  regards 
itself  as  free  in  the  present  instance  to  take  with  a  clear  conscience 
and  upon  accepted  principles  the  position  indicated  in  this  note. 

If  the  commanders  of  German  vessels  of  war  should  act  upon 
the  presumption  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  was  not  being 
used  in  good  faith  and  should  destroy  on  the  high  seas  an  Amer- 
ican vessel  or  the  lives  of  American  citizens,  it  would  be  difficult 
for  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  view  the  act  in  any 
other  light  than  as  an  indefensible  violation  of  neutral  rights, 
which  it  would  be  very  iiard,  indeed,  to  reconcile  with  the  friendly 
relations  now  happily  subsisting  between  the  two  Governments. 

If  such  a  deplorable  situation  should  arise,  the  Imperial  German 
Government  can  readily  appreciate  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  would  be  constrained  to  hold  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment of  Germany  to  a  strict  accountability  for  such  acts  of 
their  naval  authorities,  and  to  take  any  steps  it  might  be  neces- 
sary to  take  to  safeguard  American  lives  and  property  and  to 
secure  to  American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of  their  acknowl- 
edged rights  on  the  high  seas 


222  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Germany  replied  with  a  note  published  on  February  i8,  191 5,  which 
attempted  to  justify  Germany's  position  by  the  illegal  actions  of  Eng- 
land in  preventing  the  transportation  from  neutrals  to  Germany  of 
materials  not  comprised  in  the  category  of  contraband  of  war.  Ger- 
many also  called  attention  to  the  "necessity'"  on  her  part  of  preventing 
in  any  way  possible  to  Germany  great  stores  of  ammunition  from  reach- 
ing England.  Germany  suggested  that  if  vessels  of  the  United  States 
should  be  placed  in  danger  because  of  England's  use  of  neutral  flags 
over  English  vessels,  United  States  vessels  should  proceed  under  the 
guard  of  a  convoy. 

With  this  disagreement  between  the  United  States  and  Germany,  and 
with  similar,  but  less  serious  disputes  between  the  United  States  and 
England,  President  Wilson  proceeded  to  dispatch  an  identic  note  to 
Germany  and  England  suggesting  a  modus  vivendi  on  the  conduct  of 
naval  warfare.  Mr.  Wilson  endeavored  to  formulate  certain  rules 
for  the  guidance  of  both  Germany  and  England,  which  would  accord- 
ingly lay  the  United  States  open  to  no  charge  of  favoritism  from 
either  country.  The  proposals  of  the  United  States  in  this  identic  note 
might  be  summarized  as  follows : 

I — Both  Germany  and  England  to  use  no  floating  mines. 

2 — Both  Germany  and  England  to  use  anchored  mines  only  around 
harbors,  and  so  constructed  as  to  become  harmless  if  loosed  from 
anchorage. 

3 — Both  Germany  and  England  to  refrain  from  attacking  neutral 
vessels  by  submarines,  .unless  the  neutral  vessels  tried  to  escape  search. 

4 — Both  Germany  and  England  to  refrain  from  using  over  their 
vessels  the  flags  of  neutrals. 

5 — England  not  to  place  foodstuffs  in  the  list  of  absolute  contraband, 
and  not  to  interfere  with  foodstuffs  sent  by  the  United  States  to  cer- 
tain designated  agencies  in  Germany,  Germany  to  guarantee  that  such 
foodstuffs  would  be  used  only  by  non-combatants. 

But  the  proposals  of  this  identic  note  met  with  little  favor  in  either 
Germany  or  England.  Neither  would  agree  to  all  its  provisions,  so 
that  it  could  be  regarded  only  as  failing  to  reconcile  the  positions  of 
England  and  Germany  with  the  position  of  the  United  States. 

Accordingly,  no  further  step  could  be  taken  by  the  United  States 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  with  Germany  223 

until  a  definite  act  of  Germany  in  accord  with  its  pronouncement  of 
February  4,  191 5  should  give  an  opportunity  for  the  United  States  to 
clarify  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "strict  accountability." 

On  March  28,  191 5,  the  British  steamship  Falaba  was  sunk,  with 
the  loss  of  one  American  life.  Germany  claimed  that  the  vessel  had 
tried  to  escape  after  being  halted,  and  that  the  passengers  and  crew 
had  had  ten  minutes  in  which  to  lower  life-boats  before  the  vessel  was 
torpedoed.  • 

On  April  29,  1915,  the  United  States  vessel  Cushing  was  attacked 
in  the  English  Channel  by  an  airplane. 

On  May  i,  191 5,  the  United  States  vessel  GuJ flight  was  attacked  by 
a  submarine  off  the  Scilly  Islands,  with  the  loss  of  two  American  lives. 

The  "Lusitania"  Case 

But  before  the  United  States  had  formally  stated  Its  attitude  toward 
these  actions  of  Germany,  the  entire  civiHzed  world  was  stirred  to  the 
foundations  of  its  consciousness  by  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  The 
Lusitania  was  one  of  the  very  largest  ocean  liners  and  probably  the 
fastest  in  existence.  With  a  length  of  almost  800  feet  and  a  displace- 
ment of  almost  40,000  tons,  she  was  famous  as  the  highest  develop- 
ment of  the  art  of  shipbuilding.  She  sailed  from  New  York  on  May 
3,  with  1,917  passengers.  Several  days  before,  advertisements,  signed 
"Imperial  German  Embassy,"  had  appeared  in  newspapers  of  New 
York  and  other  cities,  giving  public  warning  that  the  vessel  was  in 
danger  because  of  the  existing  state  of  war  and  that  passengers  on 
the  boat  were  risking  their  lives.  Moreover,  some  of  the  prominent 
persons  on  board  seem  to  have  received  anonymous  advice  to  cancel 
their  bookings ;  but,  as  far  as  is  known,  neither  the  advertisements  nor 
the  anonymous  warnings  were  taken  seriously  by  any  one  whose 
attention  had  been  drawn  to  them.  And  at  about  half  after  two  on  the 
afternoon  of  May  7,  191 5,  while  approaching  the  Irish  coast,  the  Lusi- 
tania was  struck  by  a  torpedo  and  sank  less  than  fifteen  minutes  after- 
vv^ard.  Of  the  passenger  and  crew  list  of  almost  2,000,  the  loss  of 
life  was  1,152.     Of  the  dead,  114  were  American  citizens. 

The  loss  of  the  Lusitania  brought  the  United  States  for  the  first 


224  ^  History  of  the  Great  War 

time  face  to  face  with  possible  entrance  into  the  struggle  in  Europe. 
It  was  inconceivable  that  this  country  should  respond  with  mere  for- 
mal protest  to  the  loss  of  more  than  one  hundred  of  its  citizens  travel- 
ing on  a  merchant  vessel.  It  was  even  more  inconceivable  that  this 
country  should  permit  similar  occurrences  in  the  future.  The  continued 
threat  of  German  lawlessness  brought  very  near  to  the  practical  vision 
of  America  a  day  when  only  by  force  of  sheer  might  would  Germany 
be  brought  to  terms.  With  breathless  interest,  not  only  the  United 
States  but  the  whole  world  awaited  the  action  of  Woodrow  Wilson  on 
the  dead  of  the  Lusitania. 

Only  a  minority,  if  a  noisy  minority,  of  the  Americans  of  German 
descent  disapproved  of  America's  sober  resentment  at  the  sinking 
of  the  Lusitania.  That  the  majority  of  German-Americans  were  loyal 
to  the  country  of  their  adoption  was  in  harmony  with  the  utterances 
of  President  Wilson  condemning  the  supporters  of  Germany  as  against 
the  United  States  but  asserting  confidently  that  such  persons  were 
not  representative  of  the  entire  German-American  group. 

I  look  forward  to  the  necessity  in  every  political 

agitation  in  the  years  which  are  immediately  at  hand  of  calling 
upon  every  man  to  declare  himself,  where  he  stands.  Is  it  "Amer- 
ica First"  or  is  it  not  ?  We  ought  to  be  very  careful  about  some  of 
the  impressions  that  we  are  forming  just  now.  There  is  too  gen- 
eral an  impression,  I  fear,  that  very  large  numbers  of  our  fellow- 
citizens  born  in  other  lands  have  not  entertained  with  sufficient 
intensity  and  afifection  the  American  ideal,  but  their  numbers  are 
not  large.  Those  who  would  seek  to  represent  them  are  very 
vocal,  but  they  are  not  very  influential.  Some  of  the  best  stuff 
of  America  has  come  out  of  foreign  lands,  and  some  of  tlie  best 
stufif  in  America  is  in  the  men  who  are  naturalized  citizens  of  the 
United  States. 

I  would  not  be  afraid  upon  the  test  of  America  First  to  take 
a  census  of  all  the  foreign-born  citizens  of  the  United  States,  for 
I  know  the  vast  majority  of  them  came  here  because  they  believed 
in  America,  and  their  belief  in  America  has  made  them  better 
citizens  than  some  people  who  were  born  in  America.  They 
can  say  that  they  have  bought  this  privilege  with  a  great  price. 
They  have  left  their  homes,  they  have  left  their  kindred,  they 
have  broken  all  the  nearest  and  dearest  ties  of  human  life  in  order 


FOOD  FOR  THE  GUNS 

The   upper   panel   shows    cases   of   ammunition    being   stacked    at   Fort    Sill, 
Oklahoma. 


CARRIER  PIGEONS 

The  central  panel  gives  an  excellent  idea  of  the  combination  of  modern 
and  ancient  ideas  utilized  during  the  war.  American  officers  are  watching 
the  flight  of  homing  pigeons,  just  released  with  messages  of  great  importance, 
as  in  the  days  before  the  advent  of  the  telephone  and  telegraph. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  A  CAMP 

In  the  lower  panel.  American  engineers  are  shown  beginning  the  construc- 
tion of  a  camp  "somewhere  in   France." 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  with  Germany  225 

to  come  to  a  new  land,  take  a  new  rootage,  begin  a  new  life,  and 
so  by  self-sacrifice  express  their  confidence  in  a  new  principle, 
whereas,  it  costs  us  nothing  of  these  things.  We  were  born  into 
this  privilege,  we  were  rocked  and  cradled  in  it;  we  did  nothing 
to  create  it,  and  it  is,  therefore,  the  greater  duty  on  our  part  to 
do  a  great  deal  to  enhance  it  and  preserve  it.  I  am  not  deceived 
as  to  the  balance  of  opinion  among  the  foreign-born  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  but  I  am  in  a  hurry  to  have  an  opportunity  to 
have  a  line-up  and  let  the  men  who  are  thinking  first  of  other 
countries  stand  on  one  side — Biblically,  it  should  be  the  left— and 
all  those  that  are  for  America,  first,  last  and  all  the  time  on  the 

other  side 

[Address  to  Daughters  of  the  American  Revolution,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C,  October  11,  19 15.] 

I  am  sorry  to  say  that  the  gravest  threats  against 

our  national  peace  and  safety  have  been  uttered  within  our  own 
borders.  There  are  citizens  of  the  United  States,  I  blush  to  admit, 
born  under  other  flags  but  welcomed  under  our  generous  natu- 
ralization laws  to  the  full  freedom  and  opportunity  of  America, 
who  have  poured  the  poison  of  disloyalty  into  the  very  arteries 
of  our  national  life;  who  have  sought  to  bring  the  authority  and 
good  name  of  our  Government  into  contempt,  to  destroy  our  in- 
dustries wherever  they  thought  it  effective  for  their  vindictive 
purposes  to  strike  at  them,  and  to  debase  our  politics  to  the  uses 
of  foreign  intrigue.  Their  number  is  not  great  as  compared  with 
the  whole  number  of  those  sturdy  hosts  by  which  our  nation  has 
been  enriched  in  recent  generations  out  of  virile  foreign  stock; 
but  it  is  great  enough  to  have  brought  deep  disgrace  upon  us  and 
to  have  made  it  necessary  that  we  should  promptly  make  use  of 
processes  of  law  by  which  we  may  be  purged  of  their  corrupt 
distempers.  America  never  witnessed  anything  like  this  before. 
It  never  dreamed  it  possible  that  men  sworn  into  its  own  citizen- 
ship, men  drawn  out  of  great  free  stocks  such  as  supplied  some 
of  the  best  and  strongest  elements  of  that  little,  but  how  heroic, 
nation  that  in  a  high  day  of  old  staked  its  very  life  to  free  itself 
from  every  entanglement  that  had  darkened  the  fortunes  of  the 
older  nations  and  set  up  a  new  standard  here, — ^that  men  of  such 
origins  and  such  free  choices  of  allegiance  would  ever  turn  in 
malign  reaction  against  the  Government  and  people  who  had  wel- 
comed and  nurtured  them  and  seek  to  make  this  proud  country 
once  more  a  hotbed  of  European  passion.     A  little  while  ago 

307 


226  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

such  a  thing  would  have  seemed  incredible.  Because  it  was  incred- 
ible we  made  no  preparation  for  it.  We  would  have  been  almost 
ashamed  to  prepare  for  it,  as  if  we  were  suspicious  of  ourselves, 
our  own  comrades  and  neighbors !  But  the  ugly  and  incredible 
thing  has  actually  come  about  and  we  are  without  adequate  fed- 
eral laws  to  deal  with  it.  I  urge  you  to  enact  such  laws  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  and  feel  that  in  doing  so  I  am  urging 
you  to  do  nothing  less  than  save  the  honor  and  self-respect  of 
the  nation.  Such  creatures  of  passion,  disloyalty,  and  anarchy 
must  be  crushed  out.  They  are  not  many,  but  they  are  infinitely 
malignant,  and  the  hand  of  our  power  should  close  over  them  at 
once.  They  have  formed  plots  to  destroy  property,  they  have 
entered  into  conspiracies  against  the  neutrality  of  the  Govern- 
ment, they  have  sought  to  pry  into  every  confidential  transac- 
tion of  the  Government  in  order  to  serve  interests  alien  to  our 
own.  It  is  possible  to  deal  with  these  things  very  effectually. 
I  need  not  suggest  the  terms  in  which  they  may  be  dealt  with. 

I  wish  that  it  could  be  said  that  only  a  few  men,  misled  by  mis- 
taken sentiments  of  allegiance  to  the  governments  under  which 
they  were  born,  had  been  guilty  of  disturbing  the  self-possession 
and  mispresenting  the  temper  and  principles  of  the  country  during 
these  days  of  terrible  war,  when  it  would  seem  that  every  man 
who  was  truly  an  American  would  instinctively  make  it  his  duty 
and  his  pride  to  keep  the  scales  of  judgment  even  and  prove  him- 
self a  partisan  of  no  nation  but  his  own.  But  it  cannot.  There 
are  some  men  among  us,  and  many  resident  abroad  who,  though 
born  and  bred  in  the  United  States  and  calling  themselves  Ameri- 
cans, have  so  forgotten  themselves  and  their  honor  as  citizens 
as  to  put  their  passionate  sympathy  with  one  or  the  other  side 
in  the  great  European  conflict  above  their  regard  for  the  peace 
and  dignity  of  the  United  States.  They  also  preach  and  practise 
disloyalty.  No  laws,  I  suppose,  can  reach  corruptions  of  the 
mind  and  heart ;  but  I  should  not  speak  of  others  without  also 
speaking  of  these  and  expressing  the  even  deeper  humiliation  and 
scorn  which  every  self-possessed  and  thoughtfully  patriotic  Amer- 
ican must  feel  when  he  thinks  of  them  and  of  the  discredit  they 

are  daily  bringing  upon  us 

[Third  Annual  Address,  December  J,  J()i^.\ 

The  tension  in  America  was  felt  even  by  the  Imperial  German 
Government,  and  it  hastened  to  take  the  first  diplomatic  action  on  the 
Lusitania  case.     On  May  lO,  1915,  Germany  officially  expressed  its 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zvith  Germany  227 

regrets  at  the  loss  of  American  lives,  but  still  persisted  in  excusing 
its  performance  by  the  example  of  England.  Calling  attention  to  the 
alleged  cruelty  of  the  English  food  blockade,  Germany  asserted  that 
English  merchant  vessels  were  often  armed,  so  that  they  could  be 
safely  attacked  by  submarines  only  w^ithout  v^arning.  Germany  closed 
her  exhibit  by  a  flat  assertion  that  the  Lusitania  had  been  transporting 
ammunition,  which  Germany  had  declared  to  be  warrant  for  sinking 
any  merchant  vessel. 

And  on  the  following  day,  also,  Germany  seemed  anxious  to  allay 
some  of  the  bitterness  caused  in  the  United  States  by  the  attack  on  the 
Lusitania.  On  May  11,  191 5,  Germany  published  a  notice  explaining 
in  more  definite  terms  than  theretofore  the  German  attitude  toward 
neutral  ships  in  the  waters  around  the  British  Isles,  which  Germany 
had  proclaimed  a  war  zone.  Gennany  agreed  not  to  attack  unarmed 
neutral  ships  if  they  committed  no  hostile  act  against  German  sub- 
marines ;  and  to  accept  full  responsibility  for  any  neutral  ships  sunk 
by  mistake  or  otherwise  sunk  in  violation  of  this  agreement.  Ger- 
many's attitude  was  thus  made  not  only  more  definite — it  was  thus 
rendered  more  conciliatory,  and  it  retracted  some  of  Germany's  former 
statements  of  her  intentions  toward  neutral  craft. 

On  May  13,  191 5,  the  official  American  response  to  the  sinking  of 
the  Lusitania  was  given  to  the  world.  Mr.  Wilson  was  now  no  longer 
oblivious  to  the  nearness  of  the  war-cloud  to  America.  He  still  rea- 
lized the  gravity  and  the  horror  of  war,  and  his  note  was  replete  with 
a  spirit  of  gravity  at  the  crisis  Germany  had  forced  upon  America  and 
with  a  spirit  of  horror  at  Germany's  deed.  Never  abandoning  his  tone 
of  calm  friendliness  toward  Germany,  refusing  to  admit  that  Ger- 
many's spirit  was  other  than  friendly  toward  America,  but  again  in- 
sisting that  Germany's  attitude  was  placing  her  outside  the  pale  of 
international  relations,  the  United  States  frankly  asserted  that  the 
actions  of  Germany  had  rendered  necessary  without  further  delay  a 
definite  understanding  between  the  two  countries.  The  United  States 
demanded  a  disavowal  of  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  It  demanded 
assurance  that  another  such  act  would  not  be  perpetrated.  It  demanded 
a  recognition  by  Germany  of  the  determination  of  the  United  States 


228  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

not  "to  omit  any  word  or  any  act  necessary  to  the  performance  of  the 
sacred  duty  of  the  United  States  of  maintaining  its  rights." 

In  view  of  recent  acts  of  the  German  authorities 

in  violation  of  American  rights  on  the  high  seas,  which  cuhuin- 
ated  in  the  torpedoing  and  sinkinr;  of  the  British  steamship 
Lusitania  on  May  y,  191 5,  by  which  over  100  American  citizens 
lost  their  lives,  it  is  clearly  wise  and  desirable  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  die  United  States  and  the  Imperial  German  Government 
should  come  to  a  clear  and  full  understanding  as  to  the  grave 
situation   which   has   resulted 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  been  apprised  that 
the  Imperial  German  Government  considered  themselves  to  be 
obliged  by  the  extraordinary  circumstances  of  the  present  war 
and  the  measures  adopted  by  their  adversaries  in  seeking  to  cut 
Germany  off  from  all  commerce,  to  adopt  methods  of  retaliation 
which  go  much  beyond  the  ordinary  methods  of  warfare  at  sea, 
in  the  proclamation  of  a  war  zone  from  which  they  have  warned 
neutral  ships  to  keep  away.  This  Government  has  already  taken 
occasion  to  inform  the  Imperial  German  Government  that  it 
cannot  admit  the  adoption  of  such  measures  or  such  a  w^arning 
of  danger  to  operate  as  in.  any  degree  an  abbreviation  of  the 
rights  of  American  shipmasters  or  of  American  citizens  bound 
on  lawful  errands  as  passengers  on  merchant  ships  of  belligerent 
nationality,  and  that  it  must  hold  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment to  a  strict  accotmtability  for  any  infringement  of  those 
rights,  intentional  or  incidental 

American  citizens  act  within  their  indisptitable  rights  in  taking 
their  ships  and  in  traveling  w^herever  their  legitimate  business 
calls  them  upon  the  high  seas,  and  exercise  those  rights  in  what 
should  be  the  well-justified  confidence  that  their  lives  will  not  be 
endangered  by  acts  done  in  clear  violation  of  universally  ac- 
knowledged international  obligations,  and  certainly  in  the  confi- 
dence that  their  own  Government  will  sustain  them  in  the  exer- 
cise of  their  rights. 

There  was  recently  published  in  the  newspapers  of  the  United 
States,  I  regret  to  inform  the  Imperial  German  Government,  a 
formal  warning,  purporting  to  come  from  the  Imperial  German 
Embassy  at  Washington,  addressed  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  and  stating,  in  effect,  that  any  citizen  of  the  United  States 
who  exercised  his  right  of  free  travel  upon  the  seas  would  do  so 
at  his  peril  if  his  journey  should  take  him  within  the  zone  of 


Diploiiialic  Negotiations  with  Gcnniuiy  229 

waters  within  which  the  Imperial  German  Navy  was  using  sub- 
marines against  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  not- 
withstanding the  respectful  but  very  earnest  protest  of  this  Gov- 
ernment, the  Government  of  the  United  States.  I  do  not  refer 
to  this  for  the  purpose  of  calling  the  attention  of  the  Imperial 
German  Government  at  this  time  to  the  surprising  irregularity 
of  a  communication  from  the  Imperial  German  Embassy  at 
Washington  addressed  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  through 
the  newspapers,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  pointing  out  that 
no  warning  that  an  unlawful  and  inhumane  act  will  be  com- 
mitted can  possibly  be  accepted  as  an  excuse  or  palliation  for  that 
act  or  as  an  abatement  of  the  responsibility  for  its  commis- 
sion  

(The  United  States)  confidently  expects,  therefore,  that  the 
Imperial  German  Government  will  disavow  the  acts  of  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  complains ;  that  they  will 
make  reparation  so  far  as  reparation  is  possible  for  injuries 
which  are  without  measure,  'and  that  they  will  take  immediate 
steps  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  anything  so  obviously  sub- 
versive of  the  principles  of  warfare  for  which  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government  have  in  the  past  so  wisely  and  so  firmly  con- 
tended  

Expressions  of  regret  and  ofi'ers  of  reparation  in  case  of  the 
destruction  of  neutral  ships  sunk  by  mistake,  while  they  may 
satisfy  international  obligations,  if  no  loss  of  life  results,  can- 
not justify  or  excuse  a  practice  the  natural  and  necessary  effect 
of  which  is  to  subject  neutral  nations  and  neutral  persons  to  new 
and  immeasurable  risks. 

The  Imperial  German  Government  will  not  expect  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  to  omit  any  word  or  any  act 
necessary  to  the  performance  of  its  sacred  duty  of  maintaining 
the  rights  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  and  of  safeguard- 
ing their   free  exercise  and   enjoyment. 

BRYAN. 

The  President's  note  seemed  to  echo  the  feelings  of  most  of  his 
fellow-countrymen,  and  this  country  awaited  with  grim  patience  the 
disavowal  demanded  from  Germany.  In  the  meantime,  England  de- 
nied the  German  charge  that  the  Lusitania  had  been  armed. 

The  response  of  Germany  was  published  on  May  28,  1915-  With 
respect  to  the  Gushing  and  the  Giilflight,  Germany  promised  to  investi- 


230  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

gate.  With  respect  to  the  Falaha,  Germany  asserted  that  the  vessel 
had  tried  to  escape  capture. 

With  respect  to  the  Lusitania,  Germany  was  far  from  repentant. 
She  repeated  her  denunciation  of  England,  asserting  again  that  Eng- 
land's illegal  actions  compelled  Germany  to  resort  to  illegal  actions. 
She  repeated  her  charges  that  the  Lusitania  had  been  armed,  had  been 
carrying  great  stores  of  ammunition,  had  sunk  so  rapidly  with  so  large 
a  loss  of  life  because  of  the  explosion  of  ammunition,  had  been  in  fact 
a  transport  because  it  was  carrying  Canadian  troops.  Germany  there- 
fore begged  to  be  excused  from  taking  a  definite  position  in  regard  to 
the  American  note  until  the  Government  of  the  United  States  had 
passed  upon  these  charges  of  Germany. 

The  German  note  was  manifestly  an  attempt  to  evade  the  issue  pre- 
sented by  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  and  did  not  serve  to  relax  the 
tension  in  the  United  States.  It  was  known  that  the  President  imme- 
diately prepared  to  draft  another  note  to  Germany  on  the  subject, 
and  speculation  was  rife  as  to  whether  the  second  note  would  be  more 
threatening  than  the  first  had  been,  when  Mr.  Bryan  unexpectedly  an- 
nounced his  resignation  as  Secretary  of  State  because  of  irreconcil- 
able difference  of  opinion  with  his  chief  over  the  negotiations  with 
Germany. 

The  Resignation  of  Mr.  Bryan — Without  the  support  of  W'illiam 
Jennings  Bryan,  Woodrow  Wilson  could  hardly  have  received  the 
Democratic  nomination  for  the  Presidency  at  the  Baltimore  convention 
in  19 1 2.  Although  discredited  in  many  quarters  by  his  former  advo- 
cacy of  "free  silver;"  by  his  three  defeats  in  the  Presidential  contests 
of  1896,  1900  and  1908;  by  his  championing  of  such  radical  measures 
as  government  ownership  of  the  railroads  and  as  the  initiative,  referen- 
dum and  recall ;  by  his  early  support  of  prohibition  and  of  w'oman 
suffrage;  and  by  his  uncompromising  personality,  Mr.  Bryan  still  en- 
joyed a  strong  hold  upon  much  of  the  population  of  the  Middle  West 
and  the  South.  His  political  strength  had  made  inevitable  his  appoint- 
ment as  Secretary  of  State  in  Mr.  Wilson's  Cabinet  and  his  presence 
in  the  Cabinet  had  made  possible  many  of  his  chief's  legislative  ac- 
complishments. 

Mr.   Bryan  had  been  known  throughout   his  life  as  an  unusually 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  with  Germany  231 

trenchant  opponent  of  war  between  nations.  His  term  of  office  at 
the  head  of  the  State  Department  had  been  characterized  by  the  sign- 
ing of  a  number  of  treaties  of  arbitration  with  other  countries,  and 
by  success  in  creating  stronger  international  understandings  and  ties. 
And  in  this  crisis,  again,  he  felt  he  could  conscientiously  support  no 
other  course  than  that  of  arbitration.  He  maintained  that  the  points 
at  issue  between  the  United  States  and  Germany  should  be  settled  by 
an  impartial  tribunal,  and  that  the  United  States  should  refuse  to 
hold  itself  responsible  for  the  lives  of  any  of  its  citizens  who  traveled 
on  belligerent  vessels  or  on  vessels  carrying  ammunition.  Disagreeing 
fundamentally,  therefore,  with  the  President's  stand  in  defence  of 
American  rights  at  all  hazard,  there  was  no  course  left  for  Mr.  Bryan 
but  resignation.  He  was  succeeded  by  the  man  who  had  served  under 
him  as  Counselor  to  the  State  Department,  Robert  Lansing. 

Washington,  D.  C,  June  8,  1915. 
My  dear  Mr.  President : 

It  is  with  sincere  regret  that  I  have  reached  the  conclusion  that 
I  should  return  to  you  the  commission  of  Secretary  of  State,  with 
which  you  honored  me  at  the  beginning  of  your  Administration. 

Obedient  to  your  sense  of  duty  and  actuated  by  the  highest 
motives,  you  have  prepared  for  transmission  to  the  German 
Government  a  note  in  which  I  cannot  join  without  violating  what 
I  deem  to  be  an  obligation  to  my  country,  and  the  issue  involved 
is  of  such  moment  that  to  remain  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  would 
be  as  unfair  to  you  as  it  would  be  to  the  cause  which  is  nearest 
my  heart,  namely,  the  prevention  of  war. 

I,  therefore,  respectfully  tender  my  resignation,  to  take  effect 
when  the  note  is  sent,  unless  you  prefer  an  earlier  hour. 

Alike  desirous  of  reaching  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  problems, 
arising  out  of  the  use  of  submarines  against  merchantmen,  we 
find  ourselves  differing  irreconcilably  as  to  the  methods  which 
should  be  employed. 

It  falls  to  your  lot  to  speak  officially  for  the  nation ;  I  consider 
it  to  be  none  the  less  my  duty  to  endeavor  as  a  private  citizen  to 
promote  the  end  which  you  have  in  view  by  means  which  you  do 
not  feel  at  liberty  to  use. 

In  severing  the  intimate  and  pleasant  relations,  which  have 
existed  between  us  during  the  past  two  years,  permit  me  to 
acknowledge  the  profound  satisfaction  which  it  has  given  me  to 


232  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

be  associated  with  you  in  the  important  work  which  has  come 
before  the  State  Department,  and  to  thank  you  for  the  courtesies 
extended. 

With  the  heartiest  good  wishes  for  your  personal  welfare  and 
for  the  success  of  your  Administration,  I  am,  my  dear  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, 

Very  truly  yours, 

W.  J.  BRYAN. 

Washington,  D.  C,  June  8,  1915. 
My  dear  Mr.  Bryan: 

I  accept  your  resignation  only  because  you  insist  upon  its  accept- 
ance ;  and  I  accept  it  with  much  more  than  deep  regret,  with  a 
feeling  of  personal  sorrow. 

Our  two  years  of  close  association  have  been  very  delightful  to 
me.  Our  judgments  have  accorded  in  practically  every  matter 
of  official  duty  and  of  public  policy  until  now;  your  support  of 
the  work  and  purposes  of  the  Administration  has  been  generous 
and  loyal  beyond  praise ,  your  devotion  to  the  duties  of  your  great 
office  and  your  eagerness  to  take  advantage  of  every  great  oppor- 
tunity for  service  it  offered  have  been  an  example  to  the  rest  of 
us;  you  have  earned  our  affectionate  admiration  and  friendship. 
Even  now  we  are  not  separated  in  the  object  w^e  seek,  but  only 
in  the  method  by  which  we  seek  it. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  my  feeling  about  your  retirement  from 
the  Secretaryship  of  State  goes  so  much  deeper  than  regret.  I 
sincerely  deplore  it. 

Our  objects  are  the  same  and  we  ought  to  pursue  them  together. 
I  yield  to  your  desire  only  because  I  must  and  wish  to  bid  you 
Gcfdspeed  in  the  parting.  We  shall  continue  to  work  for  the 
same  causes  even  when  we  do  not  work  in  the  same  way. 

With  affectionate  regard, 

Sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

Mr.  Bryan's  resignation  in  a  crisis  stirred  up  much  feeling  of  an  un- 
favorable nature  throughout  a  country  aroused  by  the  sinking  of  the 
Lusitania,  as  did  a  reported  conversation  between  Mr.  Bryan,  while 
still  Secretary  of  State,  and  Ambassador  Dumba,  in  which  the  former 
was  said  to  have  informed  the  representative  of  Austria  that  the  firm- 
ness of  the  stand  of  the  United  States  should  not  be  overestimated.    In 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zvith  Germany  233 

that  connection,  the  following  letter  from  the  President  to  Mr.  Bryan 
months  later  will  be  of  interest : 

The  White  House,  December  if,  1^17. 
My  Dear  Mr.  Bryan  :  My  attention  has  been  called  to  a  book 
in  which  the  author  states,  by  very  clear  implication,  tliat  I  de- 
manded your  resignation  as  Secretary  of  State  because  of 
language  used  by  you  in  an  interview  with  Ambassador  Dumba 
soon  after  the  first  Lusitania  note.  You  may  quote  me  as  saying 
that  I  did  not  ask  for  your  resignation  or  desire  it,  as  anyone 
can  learn  from  my  note  accepting  your  resignation.  And  this 
statement  ought  also  to  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  criticism  of 
you  based  upon  the  Dumba  interview,  for  I  could  not  make  it  if 
I  thought  you  responsible  for  the  misinterpretation  placed  upon 
that  interview  in  Berlin.  But  knowing  at  the  time  all  the  facts, 
I  did  not  give  the  matter  serious  thought  and,  I  may  add,  in 
justice  to  you,  that  as  you  promptly  corrected  the  misinterpre- 
tation when,  within  a  few  days,  it  was  brought  to  your  attention, 
it  could  not  have  affected  the  diplomatic  situation. 
Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

On  June  4,  191 5,  while  waiting  for  another  American  note  in  regard 
to  the  Lusitania,  Gennany  disavowed  the  sinking  of  the  Gidflight  and 
asked  for  further  information  concerning  the  Gushing. 

On  June  9,  1915,  the  United  States  dispatched  the  second  note  to 
Germany  on  the  Lusitania  case.  The  United  States  dismissed  the 
German  contentions  in  the  answer  to  the  first  note  as  irrelevant,  and 
firmly  repeated  its  serious  representations.  With  respect  to  the  Fala'ba, 
the  United  States  refused  to  admit  that  disregard  for  the  safety  of  its 
crew  and  passengers  could  be  justified  by  its  attempt  to  escape  capture. 

It   is   stated    (by  Germany)    that   the   Lusitania 

was  undoubtedly  equipped  with  masked  guns,  supplied  with 
trained  gunners  and  special  ammunition,  transporting  troops  from 
Canada,  carrying  a  cargo  not  permitted  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  to  a  vessel  also  carrying  passengers,  and  serving, 
in  virtual  effect,  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  naval  forces  of  Great 
Britain 

(The  Government  of  the  United  States)  is  able  -....* 
to  assure  the  Imperial  German  Government  that  it  has  been  mis- 
informed  


234  '  ^  History  of  the  Great  War 

Whatever  may  be  the  contentions  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government  regarding  the  carriage  of  contraband  of  war  on 
board  the  Ltisitania,  or  regarding  the  explosion  of  that  material 
by  the  torpedo,  it  need  only  be  said  that  in  the  view  of  this  Gov- 
ernment these  contentions  are  irrelevant  to  the  question  of  the 
legality  of  the  methods  used  by  the  German  naval  authorities 
in  sinking  the  vessel. 

But  the  sinking  of  passenger  ships  involves  principles  of  hu- 
manity which  throw  into  the  background  any  special  circiun- 
stances  of  detail  that  may  be  thought  to  affect  the  cases ;  principles 
which  lift  it,  as  the  Imperial  German  Government  will  no  doubt 
be  quick  to  recognize  and  acknowledge,  out  of  the  class  of 
ordinary  subjects  of  diplomatic  discussion  or  of  international 
controversy.  Whatever  be  the  other  facts  regarding  the  Lusi- 
tania,  the  principal  fact  is  that  a  great  steamer,  primarily  and 
chiefly  a  conveyance  for  passengers,  and  carrying  more  than  a 
thousand  souls  who  had  no  part  or  lot  in  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  was  torpedoed  and  sunk  without  so  much  as  a  challenge  or 
a  warning,  and  that  men,  women,  and  children  were  sent  to  their 
death  in  circumstances  unparalleled  in  modern  warfare.  The 
fact  that  more  than  lOO  American  citizens  were  among  those 
who  perished  made  it  the  duty  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  speak  of  these  things,  and  once  more,  with  solemn 
emphasis,  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment to  the  grave  responsibility  which  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  conceives  that  it  has  incurred  in  this  tragic  occur- 
rence, and  to  the  indisputable  principle  upon  which  that  respon- 
sibility rests. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  contending  for  some- 
thing much  greater  than  mere  rights  of  property  or  privileges 
of  commerce.  It  is  contending  for  nothing  less  high  and  sacred 
than  the  rights  of  humanity,  which  every  Government  honors  itself 
in  respecting,  and  which  no  Government  is  justified  in  resigning 
on  behalf  of  those  under  its  care  and  authority 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  therefore,  very  earnestly 
and  very  solemnly  renews  the  representations  of  its  note  trans- 
mitted to  the  Imperial  German  Government  on  the  15th  of  May, 
and  relies  in  these  representations  upon  the  principles  of  human- 
ity, the  universally  recognized  understandings  of  international 
law,  and  the  ancient  friendship  of  the  German  nation. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  cannot  admit  that  the 
proclamation  of  a  war  zone  from  which  neutral  ships  have  been 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zvith  Germany  235 

warned  to  keep  away  may  be  made  to  operate  as  in  any  degree 
an  abbreviation  of  the  rights  either  of  American  shipmasters  or 
of  American  citizens  bound  on  lawful  errands  as  passengers  on 
merchant  ships  of  belligerent  nationality.  It  does  not  understand 
the  Imperial  German  Government  to  question  those  rights.  It 
understands  it  also  to  accept  as  established  beyond  question  the 
principle  that  the  lives  of  non-combatants  cannot  lawfully  or 
rightfully  be  put  in  jeopardy  by  the  capture  or  destruction  of  an 
unresisting  merchantman,  and  to  recognize  the  obligation  to  take 
sufficient  precaution  to  ascertain  whether  a  suspected  merchant- 
man is  in  fact  of  belligerent  nationality  or  is  in  fact  carrying 
contraband  of  war  under  a  neutral  flag.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States  deems  it  reasonable  to  expect  that  the  Imperial 
German  Government  will  adopt  the  measures  necessary  to  put 
these  principles  into  practice  in  respect  of  the  safeguarding  of 
American  lives  and  American  ships,  and  asks  for  assurances  that 
this  will  be  done. 

ROBERT  LANSING, 
Secretary  of  State  ad  Interim. 

To  the  American  note  of  June  9,  Germany  replied  on  July  8,  191 5, 
still  shielding  herself  behind  the  actions  of  England  and  still  with- 
holding disavowal. 

In  the  third  note  on  the  Lusitania  on  July  23,  191 5,  the  United 
States  again  stated  that  Germany  was  attempting  to  evade  an  issue 
upon  which  the  United  States  demanded  a  clear  understanding.  The 
argument  of  the  United  States  was  reiterated,  and  Germany  was 
plainly  informed  that  the  United  States  would  not  be  appeased  until 
its  case  had  been  settled  by  deeds  instead  of  by  words. 

The  note  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  dated  the  8th 
of  July,  191 5,  has  received  the  careful  consideration  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  and  it  regrets  to  be  obliged 
to  say  that  it  has  found  it  very  unsatisfactory,  because  it  fails 
to  meet  the  real  differences  between  the  two  Governments,  and 
indicates  no  way  in  which  the  accepted  principles  of  law  and 
humanity  may  be  applied  in  the  grave  matter  in  controversy,  but 
proposes,  on  the  contrary,  arrangements  for  a  partial  suspension 
of  those  principles  which  virtually  set  them  aside 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is keenly 

disappointed  to  find  that  the  Imperial  German  Government  re- 


236  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

gards  itself  as  in  large  degree  exempt  from  the  obligation  to  ob- 
serve these  principles,  even  where  neutral  vessels  are  concerned, 
by  what  it  believes  the  policy  and  practice  of  the  Government  of 
Great  Britain  to  be  in  the  present  war  with  regard  to  neutral 
commerce.  The  Imperial  German  Government  will  readily 
understand  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  cannot  dis- 
cuss the  policy  of  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  with  regard 
to  neutral  trade  except  with  that  Government  itself,  and  that  it 
must  regard  the  conduct  of  other  belligerent  Governments  as 
irrelevant  to  any  discussion  with  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment of  what  this  Government  regards  as  grave  and  unjustifiable 
violations  of  the  rights  of  American  citizens  by  German  naval- 
commanders 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  not  unmindful  of 
the  extraordinary  conditions  created  by  this  war  or  of  the  radical 
alterations  of  circumstance  and  method  of  attack  produced  by 
the  use  of  instrumentalities  of  naval  warfare  which  the  nations 
of  the  world  cannot  have  had  in  view  when  the  existing  rules  of 
international  law  were  formulated,  and  it  is  ready  to  make  every 
reasonable  allowance  for  these  novel  and  unexpected  aspects  of 
war  at  sea ;  but  it  cannot  consent  to  abate  any  essential  or  funda- 
mental right  of  its  people  because  of  a  mere  alteration  of  circum- 
stance. The  rights  of  neutrals  in  time  of  war  are  based  upon 
principle,  not  upon  expediency,  and  the  principles  are  immutable. 
It  is  the  duty  and  obligation  of  belligerents  to  find  a  way  to  adapt 
the  new  circumstances  to  them 

The  very  value  which  this  Government  sets  upon  the  long  and 
unbroken  friendship  between  the  people  and  Government  of  the 
United  States  and  the  people  and  Government  of  the  German 
nation  impels  it  to  press  very  solemnly  upon  the  Imperial  German 
Government  the  necessity  for  a  scrupulous  observance  of  neu- 
tral rights  in  this  critical  matter.  Friendship  itself  prompts  it 
to  say  to  the  Imperial  Government  that  repetition  by  the  com- 
manders of  German  naval  vessels  of  acts  in  contravention  of 
those  rights  must  be  regarded  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  when  they  afifect  American  citizens,  as  deliberately  un- 
friendly. 

LANSING. 

Nevertheless,  in  the  controversy  caused  by  the  sinking  of  the  Lusi- 
tania,  Germany  still  attempted  to  appease  this  country  by  indirect 
concessions,    rather  than   by   direct   disavowal.      In    September,   she 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  ivitJi  Germany  237 

promised  not  to  sink  any  more  merchant  vessels,  neutral  or  belligerent, 
without  warning.  In  the  same  month,  Germany  agreed  not  to  sink 
American  mercliant  vessels  carrying  conditional  contraband,  although 
reserving  her  right  to  sink  those  carrying  absolute  contraband.  In  the 
case  of  the  sinking  of  the  IVilliam  P.  Frye,  Germany  agreed  to  pay 
damages;  and  in  the  case  of  the  Ncbraskan,  Germany  expressed  re- 
grets. In  November,  Ambassador  von  Bernstorff  was  authorized  to 
speak  for  his  government  in  the  Lusitania  case  in  any  manner  which 
he  found  desirable.  But  while  the  Lusitania  case  was  still  the  subject 
of  negotiations,  another  crisis  had  arisen  in  the  sinking  of  the  British 
liner  Arabic,  on  September  4,  1915,  with  the  loss  of  two  American 
lives. 

The  "Arabic"  Case 

The  sinking  of  the  Arabic  brought  the  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  all  the  closer  to  a  rupture  because  of  the  fact  that 
by  this  time  the  German  Government  had  still  refused  to  meet  squarely 
the  issues  raised  by  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  the  Lusitania. 
Germany  maintained  that  the  Arabic  had  altered  its  course  when 
approaching  a  submarine  so  that  the  commander  of  the  latter  believed 
that  the  liner  was  attempting  to  ram  him.  Nevertheless,  Germany  re- 
fused to  admit  liability  for  the  sinking  of  the  Arabic  even  if  the  inten- 
tions of  the  vessel  had  been  misunderstood  by  the  commander  of  the 
submarine  which  torpedoed  it. 

President  Wilson  was  unqualifiedly  dissatisfied  by  the  German  atti- 
tude, and  informed  Ambassador  von  Bernstorff,  who  handled  the  sit- 
uation for  the  German  Government,  that  the  United  States  would  be 
satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  complete  disavowal  of  the  sinking  of 
the  Arabic  and  the  payment  of  indemnity  for  the  loss  of  American 
lives.  Happily,  to  these  demands  Germany  yielded  on  October  5,  191 5 ; 
and  also  promised  through  her  ambassador  that  instructions  would 
be  given  submarine  commanders  to  refrain  from  further  attacks  upon 
vessels  under  circumstances  like  those  which  had  surrounded  the  sink- 
ing of  the  Arabic. 


238  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

The  "Ancona"  Case 

On  November  7,  191 5,  the  Italian  steamer  Ancona  was  sunk  by  an 
Austrian  submarine  in  the  Alediterranean,  with  the  loss  of  nine  Ameri- 
can lives.  The  Ancona  had  at  first  attempted  to  escape  but  had  stopped 
when  it  was  apparent  that  escape  was  impossible  and  had  been  fired 
upon  even  after  it  had  stopped.  In  a  note  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  on  December  6,  191 5,  the  United  States  assumed  a  no 
less  detennined  position  than  it  had  assumed  with  Germany — demand- 
ing that  Austria  should  punish  the  commander  of  the  submarine  for 
his  act,  disavow  it,  and  pay  indemnity  for  its  consequences. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  has  been  advised,  through 
the  correspondence  which  has  passed  between  the  United  States 
and  Germany,  of  the  attitude  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  as  to  the  use  of  submarines  in  attacking  vessels  of  com- 
merce, and  the  acquiescence  of  Germany  in  that  attitude,  yet  with 
full  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
of  the  views  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  as  expressed 
in  no  uncertain  terms  to  the  ally  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  com- 
mander of  the  submarine  which  attacked  the  Ancona  failed  to 
put  in  a  place  of  safety  the  crew  and  passengers  of  the  vessel 
which  they  purposed  to  destroy  because,  it  is  presumed,  of  the  im- 
possibility of  taking  it  into  port  as  a  prize  of  war 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  forced,  therefore,  to 
conclude  either  that  the  commander  of  the  submarine  acted  in 
violation  of  his  instructions  or  that  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Gov- 
ernment failed  to  issue  instructions  to  the  commanders  of  its  sub- 
marines in  accordance  with  the  law  of  nations  and  the  principles 
of  humanity.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  unwilling 
to  believe  the  latter  alternative  and  to  credit  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government  with  an  intention  to  permit  its  submarines  to 
destroy  the  lives  of  helpless  men,  women  and  children.  It  prefers 
to  believe  that  the  commander  of  the  submarine  committed  this 
outrage  without  authority  and  contrary  to  the  general  or  special 
instructions  which  he  had  received. 

As  the  good  relations  of  the  two  countries  must  rest  upon  a 
common  regard  for  law  and  humanity,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  cannot  be  expected  to  do  otherwise  than  to  demand 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  z^nth  Germany  239 

that  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  denounce  the  sinking 
of  the  Ancona  as  an  illegal  and  indefensible  act;  that  the  officer 
who  perpetrated  the  deed  be  punished,  and  that  reparation  by 
the  payment  of  an  indemnity  be  made  for  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  who  were  killed  or  injured  by  the  attack  on  the 
vessel 

But  Austria  followed  her  ally,  Germany,  in  temporizing  with 
America.  On  December  15,  191 5,  Austria  asked  for  definite  informa- 
tion concerning  the  American  charges.  President  Wilson  answered 
by  resting  squarely  and  solely  on  the  official  Austrian  report  concerning 
the  sinking  of  the  Ancona. 

In    view    of    these    admitted    circumstances    the 

Government  of  the  United  States  feels  justified  in  holding  that 
the  details  of  the  sinking  of  the  Ancona,  the  weight  and  character 
of  the  additional  testimony  corroborating  the  Admiralty's  report, 
and  the  number  of  Americans  killed  or  injured  are  in  no  way 
essential  matters  of  discussion.  The  culpability  of  the  com- 
mander is  in  any  case  established,  and  the  undisputed  fact  is  that 
citizens  of  the  United  States  were  killed,  injured,  or  put  in 
jeopardy  for  his  lawless  act. 

The  rules  of  international  law  and  the  principles  of  humanity 
which  were  thus  wilfully  violated  by  the  commander  of  the  sub- 
marine have  been  so  long  and  so  universally  recognized  and  are 
so  manifest  from  the  standpoint  of  right  and  justice  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  does  not  feel  called  upon  to 
debate  them  and  does  not  understand  that  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  questions  or  disputes  them. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  therefore  finds  no  other 
course  open  to  it  but  to  hold  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment responsible  for  the  act  of  its  naval  commander  and  to  re- 
new the  definite  but  respectful  demands  made  in  its  communica- 
tion of  the  6th  of  December,  191 5 

On  December  29,  191 5,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  agreed 
to  punish  the  commander  of  the  submarine  and  to  grant  indemnity 
for  the  loss  of  American  lives.  Nevertheless,  Austria  expressly  re- 
served for  itself  the  right  to  keep  open  the  question  of  the  legal 
powers  of  submarines  in  sinking  vessels. 


240  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

The  Question  of  Armed  Merchantmen 

By  January,  1916,  it  was  evident  that  new  aspects  of  the  ques- 
tion of  the  submarine  warfare  of  Germany  would  hinge  upon  the  right 
of  a  merchantman  to  arm  itself  against  submarine  attack.  Early  in 
1916  the  United  States  proposed  to  the  Entente  Allies  that  all  their 
merchant  vessels  be  disarmed  in  order  to  insure  safety  from  sub- 
marine attack,  but  the  Entente  Allies  were  unable  to  agree  to  that 
proposal. 

On  February  12,  1916,  the  Central  Powers  formally  notified  the 
United  States  that  Entente  vessels  would  be  sunk  without  warning  if 
they  were  armed.  The  United  States  nevertheless  took  a  position  that 
merchant  vessels  had  every  right  to  arm  themselves  for  defense  against 
submarine  attacks,  and  the  United  States  Government  refused  to 
advise  American  citizens  not  to  sail  upon  Entente  merchant  ships  armed 
for  defensive  purposes  only.  This  attitude  of  the  United  States  and 
its  further  acquiescence  in  the  entrance  into  and  departure  from 
American  ports  of  armed  merchant  vessels,  although  well  within  the 
sanction  of  international  law,  resulted  in  further  German  hatred  of 
America  and  in  renewed  charges  that  President  Wilson  was  pur- 
suing an  unneutral  course. 

The  "Sussex"  Case 

Germany  immediately  set  about  challenging  the  position  of  the 
United  States  in  sinking  four  British  vessels  transporting  American 
citizens — the  Eagle  Point,  the  Englishman,  the  Manchester  Engineer 
and  the  Sussex.  The  latter  was  a  ferry  across  the  English  Channel, 
and  was  torpedoed,  although  not  sunk,  on  March  24,  1916.  There 
were  some  75  American  citizens  on  board  at  the  time,  and  although 
none  of  them  was  killed  as  a  result  of  the  explosion  of  the  torpedo, 
several  were  injured. 

By  this  time,  America  was  standing  on  its  dignity,  and  refused  to 
make  the  first  representations  to  Germany.  On  April  10,  1916,  the 
German  Government  informed  the  United  States  that  Germany  could 
not  discover  that  any  German  submarine  had  attacked  the  Sussex,  but 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zvith  Germany  241 

that  a  German  submarine  had  torpedoed  a  vessel  of  the  same  appear- 
ance as  the  Sussc.v,  in  the  same  location  and  under  the  same  circum- 
stances as  the  location  and  circumstances  involved  in  the  sinking  of 
the  Sussc.v.  Germany  maintained  that  the  Sussex  itself  had  struck 
an  English  mine,  but  asked  for  any  information  at  the  disposal  of  the 
United  States  which  disproved  the  German  contention ;  and  in  case  of 
a  complete  disagreement  between  the  two  countries  offered  to  leave 
the  dispute  to  a  neutral  commission  to  be  established  according  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907. 

With  respect  to  the  three  other  vessels  attacked,  Germany  claimed 
to  have  no  information  regarding  the  Manchester  Engineer,  and  ex- 
cused the  sinking  of  the  Englishumn  and  the  Eagle  Point  on  the  ground 
that  they  had  attempted  to  escape  capture. 

Feeling  by  this  time  was  rrmning  so  high  in  the  United  States  at 
the  continued  German  disregard  of  American  rights  and  at  the  con- 
tinued German  evasion  of  American  representations  that  President 
Wilson  felt  that  the  seriousness  of  the  occasion  merited  an  address  to 
Congress,  and  through  Congress  to  the  entire  country,  on  the  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Germany.  On  April  16,  1916,  the 
President  summarized  before  Congress  the  results  of  the  previous 
negotiations  between  the  two  countries,  and  solemnly  charged  Ger- 
many with  so  persistent  and  so  open  a  disregard  of  America's  rights 
and  of  America's  protests  that,  unless  Germany  should  render  satis- 
faction in  answer  to  the  American  note  of  the  same  date  on  the  sinking 
of  the  Sussex,  only  one  course  would  remain  open  to  the  United  States. 
The  United  States  would  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany. 

Gentlemen  of  the  Congress;  A  situation  has  arisen  in  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  country  of  which  it  is  my  duty  to  inform 
you  frankly 

In  February  of  the  present  year  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment informed  this  Government  and  the  other  neutral  govern- 
ments of  the  world  that  it  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain  had  armed  all  merchant  vessels  of  British 
ownership  and  had  given  them  secret  orders  to  attack  any  sub- 
marine of  the  enemy  they  might  encounter  upon  the  seas,  and 
that  the  Imperial  German  Government  felt  justified  in  the  cir- 
cumstances   in    treating   all    armed    merchantmen    of    belligerent 


242  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ'ar 

ownership  as  auxiliary  vessels  of  war,  which  it  would  have  the 
right  to  destroy  without  warning. 

The  law  of  nations  has  long  recognized  the  right  of  merchant- 
men to  carry  arms  for  protection,  to  use  them  to  repel  attack, 
though  to  use  them  in  such  circumstances  at  their  own  risk,  but 
the  Imperial  German  Government  claimed  the  right  to  set  these 
understandings  aside  in  circumstances  which  it  deemed  extraor- 
dinary. 

Even  the  terms  in  which  it  announced  its  purpose  thus  still 
further  to  relax  the  restraints  it  had  _previously  expressed  its 
willingness  and  desire  to  put  upon  the  operations  of  its  sub- 
marines carried  the  plain  implication  that  at  least  vessels  which 
were  not  armed  would  still  be  exempt  from  destruction  without 
warning,  and  that  personal  safety  w^ould  be  accorded  their  pas- 
sengers and  crews;  but  even  that  limitation,  if  it  was  ever  prac- 
ticable to  observe  it,  has  in  fact  constituted  no  check  at  all  on 
the  destruction  of  ships  of  every  sort. 

Again  and  again  the  Imperial  German  Government  has  given 
this  Government  its  solemn  assurances  that  at  least  passenger 
ships  would  not  be  thus  dealt  with,  and  yet  it  has  again  and  again 
permitted  its  undersea  commanders  to  disregard  those  assurances 
with  entire  impunity 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  been  very  patient. 
At  every  stage  of  this  distressing  experience  of  tragedy  after 
tragedy  in  which  its  own  citizens  were  involved  it  has  sought  to 
be  restrained  from  any  extreme  course  of  action,  or  of  protest, 
by  a  thoughtful  consideration  of  the  extraordinary  circumstances 
of  this  unprecedented  war,  and  actuated  in  all  that  it  said  or  did 
by  the  sentiments  of  genuine  friendship  which  the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  always  entertained,  and  continue  to  enter- 
tain, toward  the  German  nation. 

It  has,  of  course,  accepted  the  successive  explanations  and  as- 
surances of  the  Imperial  German  Government  as  given  in  entire 
sincerity  and  good  faith,  and  has  hoped,  even  against  hope,  that 
it  would  prove  to  be  possible  for  the  German  Government  so  to 
order  and  control  the  acts  of  its  naval  commanders  as  to  square 
its  policy  with  the  principles  of  humanity  as  embodied  in  the  laws 
of  nations. 

It  has  been  willing  to  wait  until  the  significance  of  the  facts 
became  absolutely  unmistakable  and  susceptible  of  but  one  inter- 
pretation. 

That  point  has  now  unhappily  been  reached.     The  facts  are 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  zvith  Germany  243 

susceptible  of  but  one  interpretation:  The  Imperial  German 
Government  has  been  unable  to  put  any  hmits  or  restraints  upon 
its  warfare  against  either  freight  or  passenger  ships. 

It  has  therefore  become  painfully  evident  that  the  position 
vi^hich  this  Government  took  at  the  very  outset  is  inevitable, 
namely,  that  the  use  of  submarines  for  the  destruction  of  an 
enemy's  commerce  is  of  a  necessity,  because  of  the  character  of 
the  vessels  employed  and  the  methods  of  attack  which  their  em- 
ployment of  course  involves,  incompatible  with  the  principles  of 
humanity,  the  long  established  and  incontrovertible  rights  of 
neutrals  and  the  sacred  immunities  of  non-combatants. 

I  have  deemed  it  my  duty  to  say  to  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment that  if  it  is  still  its  purpose  to  prosecute  relentless  and  in- 
.  discriminate  warfare  against  vessels  of  commerce  by  the  use  of 
submarines,  notwithstanding  the  now  demonstrated  impossibility 
of  conducting  that  warfare  in  accordance  with  what  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  must  consider  the  sacred  and  indis- 
putable rules  of  international  law  and  the  universally  recognized 
dictates  of  humanity,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is 
at  last  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  but  one  course  it  can 
pursue  ;  and  that  unless  the  Imperial  German  Government  should 
now  immediately  declare  and  effect  an  abandonment  of  its  present 
methods  of  warfare  against  passenger  and  freight  vessels,  this 
Government  can  have  no  choice  but  to  sever  diplomatic  relations 

with  the  Government  of  the  German  Empire  altogether 

[The  formal  note  to   Germany  covered  the  same  points  as  were   covered 

in  the  President's  address  to  Congress;  indeed,  in  most  cases  used   the  same' 

language.] 

On  May  15,  1916,  the  German  Government  responded  to  the  Ameri- 
can threat,  which  had  evidently  sobered  Germany  to  some  extent.  At 
least,  Germany  yielded  to  the  American  demand  regarding  the  sinking 
of  merchant  vessels — Germany  agreed  not  to  sink  without  warning 
and  without  due  regard  to  the  lives  and  safety  of  their  crews  and 
passengers  any  merchant  ships,  not  attempting  to  escape  capture, 
whether  armed  or  unarmed,  and  whether  in  the  war  zone  around  the 
British  Isles  or  outside  it. 

Germany  also  admitted  that  a  German  submarine  had  attacked  the 
Sussex,  and  later  agreed  to  pay  an  adequate  indemnity  for  the  injuries 
to  American  citizens  on  the  Sussex  and  to  punish  the  submarine  com- 
mander which  had  attacked  it. 


244  -^  History  of  the  Great  War 

Nevertheless,  the  German  note  of  May  15  fell  far  short  of  furnish- 
ing a  complete  satisfaction  to  the  United  States.  For  in  that  note 
Germany  again  attacked  America's  alleged  tolerance  of  England's 
violation  of  international  law.  Germany  expected  that  in  view  of  her 
concession  to  America's  position,  America  would  demand  similar  con- 
cessions from  England.  And  Germany  in  turn  threatened  the  United 
States  that  "Should  steps  taken  by  the  United  States  not  attain  the 

object  it   (Germany)  desires, the  German  Government 

would  then  be  facing  a  new  situation  in  which  it  must  reserve  to  itself 
complete  freedom  of  action." 

President  Wilson  answered  the  implied  German  threat  promptly. 
On  May  18,  -he  informed  Germany  that  the  United  States  could  not 
and  would  not  admit  that  the  new  policy  of  submarine  warfare 
announced  by  Germany  was  conditioni^l  upon  the  action  of  the  United 
States  toward  England.  He  formally  informed  Germany  that  the 
United  States  expected  the  German  acquiescence  to  the  American 
demands  to  be  absolute,  not  conditional.  By  opposing  no  objection  to 
the  American  note  of  May  8,  191 5,  Germany  tacitly  agreed  to  its 
demands. 

Throughout    the    months    which    have    elapsed 

since  the  Imperial  Government  announced,  on  Februar)'  4,  191 5, 
its  submarine  policy,  now  happily  abandoned,  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  been  constantly  guided  and  restrained 
by  motives  of  friendship  in  its  patient  efforts  to  bring  to  an 
amicable  settlement  the  critical  questions  arising  from  that  policy. 
Accepting  the  Imperial  Government's  declaration  of  its  abandon- 
ment of  the  policy  which  has  so  seriously  menaced  the  good  re- 
lations between  the  two  countries,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  will  rely  upon  a  scrupulous  execution  henceforth  of  the 
now  altered  policy  of  the  Imperial  Government,  such  as  will  re- 
move the  principal  danger  to  an  interruption  of  the  good  relations 
existing  between  the  United  States  and  Germany. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  feels  it  necessary  to 
state  that  it  takes  it  for  granted  that  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment does  not  intend  to  imply  that  the  maintenance  of  its 
newly  announced  policy  is  in  any  way  contingent  upon  the  course 
or  result  of  diplomatic  negotiations  between  the  Government 
of    the    United    States    and    any    other   belligerent    Government, 


Diplomatic  Negotiations  ivith  Germany  245 

notwithstanding  the  fact  that  certain  passages  in  the  Imperial 
Government's  note  of  the  fourth  instant  might  appear  to  be  sus- 
ceptible of  that  construction.  In  order,  however,  to  avoid  any 
possible  misunderstanding,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
notifies  the  Imperial  Government  that  it  cannot  for  a  moment 
entertain,  much  less  discuss,  a  suggestion  that  respect  by  German 
naval  authorities  for  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 
upon  the  high  seas  should  in  any  way  or  in  the  slightest  degree 
be  made  contingent  upon  the  conduct  of  any  other  Government 
affecting  the  rights  of  neutrals  and  noncombatants.  Responsi- 
bility in  such  matters  is  single,  not  joint;  absolute,  not  relative. 

LANSING. 

The  Deutschland  and  the  U-53 

A  striking  realization  of  the  fact  that  modern  science  had  made 
it  impossible  to  localize  the  war  in  Europe  was  brought  to  America 
when,  in  July,  1916,  a  German  submarine,  the  Deutschland,  crossed  the 
Atlantic  and  proceeded  up  Chesapeake  Bay  to  Baltimore.  Every 
American  who  read  of  the  arrival  of  the  Deutschland  could  realize 
that  the  Atlantic  Ocean  might  prove  little  defense  to  the  United 
States  in  case  the  United  States  and  Germany  should  become  em- 
broiled in  war  after  the  conclusion  of  the  struggle  between  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  and  the  Entente  Allies. 

The  Deutschland  officers  claimed  to  have  been  only  sixteen  days 
out  from  Bremen  and  to  have  traveled  only  ninety  miles  of  the  trip 
under  water,  although  one  whole  night  was  spent  motionless  on  the 
bottom  of  the  ocean  because  of  rough  weather.  The  vessel  was 
strictly  a  merchant  ship,  carrying  a  load  of  dye-stuffs  to  the  United 
States,  and  was  not  armed  in  any  fashion.  It  was  315  feet  long,  with 
a  beam  of  thirty  feet.  Its  engines  were  oil-burning  and  it  had  enough 
oil  unused  after  docking  in  Baltimore  to  carry  it  back  to  Germany. 
Of  a  tonnage  of  791,  its  speed  on  the  surface  was  14  knots  and  under 
the  surface  7  knots.  It  was  submersible  to  a  depth  of  300  feet  and 
could  remain  under  the  water  for  four  days.  A  supposed  sister- 
submarine,  the  Bremen,  never  completed  its  predicted  voyage  to 
America,  although  the  Deutschland  returned  for  a  second  trip,  docking 
at   New  London,  Connecticut. 


246  A  History  of  I  he  Great  ]Var 

On  October  7,  IQ16,  a  German  submarine  used  for  offensive  pur- 
poses put  into  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  remaining  only  long  enough 
to  post  some  dispatches  to  Ambassador  von  Bernstorff  and  leaving 
within  the  time  limit  imposed  upon  warships  in  neutral  ports  if  they 
are  to  escape  internment.  After  leaving  Newport,  the  U-^^  sank 
five  merchant  vessels  off  Nantucket — 3  British,  i  Dutch  and  i  Nor- 
wegian. The  sinkings  were  accomplished  outside  the  3-mile  limit 
and  were  in  accordance  with  the  pledges  given  by  Germany  concern- 
ing her  submarine  warfare — that  is  to  say,  the  vessels  were  warned 
before  being  sunk  and  due  provisions  were  taken  for  the  safety  of 
their  passengers  and  crews,  so  that  no  lives  were  lost.  Indeed,  de- 
stroyers of  the  American  navy  stood  by  while  the  vessels  were  sunk, 
and  assisted  in  the  rescue  of  their  passengers  and  crew.  One  of  the 
vessels  sunk  was  a  British  liner  plying  between  New  York  and  Hal- 
ifax, and  transporting  a  number  of  American  citizens;  but  the  United 
States  felt  that  the  circumstances  precluded  any  protest  to  the  Im- 
perial German  Government,  nor  did  the  Entente  Allies  give  any  in- 
dication that  they  felt  that  such  a  protest  was  due. 


PEACfe  Proposals 

As  befitted  the  most  powerful  of  all  neutrals,  the  United  States 
ofifered  services  of  mediation  immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
War.  On  August  5,  1914,  President  Wilson  tendered  his  offices  as 
mediator  to  all  the  nations  which  at  that  time  were  belligerents,  but 
his  offer  was  received  with  merely  formal  acknowledgments. 

For  many  months  afterwards,  the  conflict  raged  too  bitterly  for  any 
offers  of  peace  or  of  mediation  to  be  acceptable,  and  none  of  any 
importance  was  officially  made.  Nevertheless,  it  is  probable  that 
throughout  191 5  and  1916  the  Vatican  was  busily  using  its  influence  in 
the  courts  of  Europe  in  the  direction  of  peace.  Indeed,  on  several 
occasions,  the  Pope  put  out  feelers  for  peace  in  public  utterances. 

By  1916,  the  leaders  of  the  Governments  at  war  had  begun  to  sound 
out  one  another  on  the  question  of  peace.  These  negotiations  were 
not  direct,  but  consisted  of  public  statements  from  offfcials  in  one 
country,  which  were  answered  some  days  later  by  similar  public  state- 
ments from  officials  in  an  enemy  country.  The  German  chancellor  on 
several  occasions  hinted  at  concessions  which  Germany  would  make 
in  order  to  achieve  peace,  but  was  usually  answered  by  statements 
from  the  Entente  Allies  which  gave  no  indication  that  peace  would 
be  acceptable  to  them  until  Germany  had  been  defeated.  Neverthe- 
less, these  indirect  discussions  were  often  concentrated  upon  concrete 
problems  such  as  an  independent  Poland,  the  future  of  Belgium,  and 
the  disposition  of  Constantinople,  and  hence  served  to  clear  the  air 
somewhat  concerning  these  problems. 

At  the  end  of  1916,  therefore,  the  Central  Powers  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  time  was  ripe  for  an  open  peace  offer.  The  motives 
which  actuated  this  step  were  mixed.  In  the  first  place,  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  German  people  was  beginning  to  flag,  and  a  small  minority  group 
of  Socialists  was  openly  clamoring  for  peace,  and  doubtless  it  was 
considered  that  a  rejection  of  a  peace  offer  by  the  Entente  would 

247 


248  A  History  of  the  Great  ]Var 

stimulate  tlie  German  people  to  new  war  efforts.  In  the  second  place, 
pacifists  were  beginning  to  show  enough  strength  in  some  of  the 
countries  of  the  Entente  Allies  for  a  peace  oft'er  to  cause  division  in 
the  ranks  of  those  countries.  In  the  third  place,  Germany  realized 
that  her  cause  was  unpopular  among  most  of  the  neutral  nations  and 
a  peace  offer  might  counteract  that  unpopularity  to  some  extent.  And, 
finally,  it  was  evident  by  this  time  that,  although  Germany  still  held 
the  upper  hand  as  far  as  the  past  was  concerned,  a  decisive  victory 
for  German  arms  seemed  remote  -  and  a  peace  at  this  time  would  repre- 
sent a  peace  dictated  by  a  Germany  at  the  apex  of  her  victories. 

Therefore  on  December  12,  1916  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Tur- 
key and  Bulgaria  dispatched  an  identic  note  to  neutrals  and  to  the 
Pope,  suggesting  that  representatives  of  the  belligerent  countries  meet 
in  order  to  discuss  the  possibilities  of  peace. 

But  the  oft"er  of  the  Central  Powers  met  with  refusal  from  the 
Entente  Allies.  France,  Great  Britain,  Russia  and  Italy  all  announced 
through  their  governments  that  a  peace  with  a  victorious  Germany 
was  impossible. 

Less  than  a  week  later,  however,  the  discussion  of  peace  was 
revived  from  another  quarter.  The  President  of  the  United  States, 
averring  that  this  action  had  long  been  contemplated  by  him,  and  that 
its  propinquity  to  the  offer  of  the  Central  Powers  was  a  mere  coinci- 
dence, suggested  to  the  belligerents  on  December  18,  19 16,  that  each 
of  the  two  opposed  groups  should  definitely  state  the  terms  upon 
which  it  was  willing  to  make  peace,  in  the  hope  that  an  agreement 
from  among  the  conflicting  claims  might  be  patched  up.  The  Presi- 
dent called  attention  to  the  fact  that  all  the  belligerents  claimed  to  be 
fighting  for  the  same  principles  and  for  similar  material  ends.  The 
President  spoke  of  the  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  re-arrange- 
ment of  the  world  which  would  necessarily  follow  the  War,  and 
hinted  at  the  willingness  of  the  United  States  to  enter  into  suitable 
agreements  looking  to  that  end.  Describing  the  serious  danger  to 
civilization  itself  if  the  war  were  to  develop  into  a  long  struggle  of 
attrition,  the  President  suggested  that,  as  the  abstract  professions  of 
the  belligerents  seemed  to  be  identical,  it  might  be  that  their  con- 
crete proposals  would  reveal  that  peace  was  unexpectedly  near. 


Peace  Proposals  249 

The    President   suggests   that  an   early  occasion 

be  sought  to  call  out  from  all  the  nations  now  at  war  such  an 
avowal  of  their  respective  views  as  to  the  terms  upon  which  the 
war  might  be  concluded  and  the  arrangements  which  would  be 
deemed  satisfactory  as  a  guaranty  against  its  renewal  or  the 
kindling  of  any  similar  conflict  in  the  future  as  would  make  it 
possible  frankly  to  compare  them 

In  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  secure  the  future  peace  of  the 
world  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United  States  are  as 
vitally  and  as  directly  interested  as  the  Governments  now  at  war. 
Their  interest,  moreover,  in  the  means  to  be  adopted  to  relieve 
the  smaller  and  weaker  peoples  of  the  world  of  the  peril  of  wrong 
and  violence  is  as  quick  and  ardent  as  that  of  any  other  people  or 
Government.  They  stand  ready,  and  even  eager,  to  co-operate  in 
the  accomplishment  of  these  ends,  when  the  war  is  over,  with 
every  influence  and  resource  at  their  command.  But  the  war 
must  first  be  concluded.  The  terms  upon  which  it  is  to  be  con- 
cluded they  are  not  at  liberty  to  suggest;  but  the  President  does 
feel  that  it  is  his  right  and  his  duty  to  point  out  their  intimate 
interest  in  its  conclusion,  lest  it  should  presently  be  too  late  to 
accomplish  the  greater  things  which  lie  beyond  its  conclusion, 
lest  the  situation  of  neutral  nations,  now  exceedingly  hard  to 
endure,  be  rendered  altogether  intolerable,  and  lest,  more  than 
all,  an  injury  be  done  civilization  itself  which  can  never  be  atoned 
for  or  repaired. 

The  President  therefore  feels  altogether  justified  in  suggesting 
an  immediate  opportunity  for  a  comparison  of  views  as  to  the 
terms  which  must  precede  those  ultimate  arrangements  for  the 
peace  of  the  world,  which  all  desire  and  in  which  the  neutral 
nations  as  well  as  those  at  war  are  ready  to  play  their  full  re- 
sponsible part.  If  the  contest  must  continue  to  proceed  toward 
undefined  ends  by  slow  attrition  until  the  one  group  of  belligerents 
or  the  other  is  exhausted;  if  million  after  million  of  human  lives 
must  continue  to  be  ofifered  up  until  on  the  one  side  or  the  other 
there  are  no  more  to  offer;  if  resentments  must  be  kindled  that 
can  never  cool  and  despairs  engendered  from  which  there  can 
be  no  recovery,  hopes  of  peace  and  of  the  willing  concert  of  free 
peoples  will  be  rendered  vain  and  idle 

The  leaders  of  the  several  belligerents  have,  as  has  been  said, 
stated  those  objects  in  general  terms.  But,  stated  in  general 
terms,  they  seem  the  same  on  both  sides.  Never  yet  have  the 
authoritative  spokesmen  of  either  side  avowed  the  precise  objects 


250  A  History  of  the  Great   Ji^ar 

which  would,  if  attained,  satisfy  them  and  their  peoi)le  tliat  the 
war  had  been  fought  out.  The  world  has  been  left  to  conjecture 
what  definitive  results,  what  actual  exchange  of  guaranties,  what 
political  or  territorial  changes  or  readjustments,  what  stage  of 
military  success,  even,  would  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 

It  may  be  that  peace  is  nearer  than  we  know ;  that  the  terms 
which  the  belligerents  on  the  one  side  and  on  the  other  would 
deem  it  necessary  to  insist  upon  are  not  so  irreconcilable  as  sonic 
have  feared;  that  an  interchange  of  views  would  clear  the  way 
at  least  for  conference  and  make  the  permanent  concord  of  the 
nations  a  hope  of  the  immediate  future,  a  concert  of  nations  im- 
mediately practicable. 

The  President  is  not  proposing  peace ;  he  is  not  even  offering 
mediation.  He  is  merely  proposing  that  soundings  be  taken  in 
order  that  we  may  learn,  the  neutral  nations  with  the  belligerent, 
how  near  the  haven  of  peace  may  be  for  which  all  mankind  longs 
with  an  intense  and  increasing  longing 

The  Central  Powers  received  the  President's  note  with  enthusiasm, 
but  among  the  Entente  Allies,  it  met  with  a  hostile  reception.  It 
was  misinterpreted  into  a  declaration  that  the  real  objects  of  the 
Entente  Allies  and  of  the  Central  Powers  were  identical,  and  naturally 
such  a  declaration  was  resented. 

Germany  replied  to  the  note  on  December  26,  1916.  The  Ger- 
man reply  was  brief  and  in  no  sense  met  the  request  of  the  President 
for  a  definite  statement  of  the  peace  terms  desired  by  Germany.  The 
Imperial  German  Government  stated  merely  that  it  would  cooperate 
with  the  United  States  in  ending  the  War  and  suggested  to  that  end 
a  meeting  of  delegates  from  the  belligerent  countries  in  a  neutral 
place. 

The  Entente  countries  replied  first  to  the  Central  Powers'  peace 
proffer.  On  December  30,  1916,  they  joined  in  rehearsing  the  guilt 
of  the  Central  Powers  for  the  outbreak  of  the  War,  in  denouncing 
the  treatment  of  Belgium,  in  demanding  reparations  and  guarantees 
from  Germany,  in  asserting  that  her  peace  ofifer  was  empty  and 
insincere,  and  therefore  in  refusing  to  consider  it  further. 

The  reply  of  the  Entente  Allies  to  the  peace  note  of  President 
Wilson  was  dispatched  on  January  11,  191 7.  The  Entente  once  more 
asserted  its  belief  that  a  secure,  lasting  and  just  peace  was  impossible 


Peace  Proposals  251 

until  Germany  had  been  defeated.  The  wrongs  of  Belgium,  Armenia, 
Luxemburg,  Servia  and  Syria;  the  German  air-raids  upon  unfortified 
places;  the  loss  of  innocent  lives  caused  by  attacks  of  German  sub- 
marines upon  merchant  craft;  the  barbarous  treatment  inliicted  by 
Germany  upon  prisoners  of  war;  the  deportation  of  civilians  from 
northern  France  and  Belgium ;  the  execution  of  Miss  Cavell  and  Cap- 
tain Fryatt,  these  were  cited  to  prove  that  Germany  would  be  an 
ever-present  threat  against  the  security  of  the  world,  ever  prepared 
to  precipitate  another  world-war  as  she  had  precipitated  the  present 
one,  unless  she  were  once  for  all  time  reduced  to  impotence. 

Nevertheless,  the  Entente  complied  with  the  President's  request 
for  a  definite  statement  of  peace  terms.  Roughly,  the  terms  of  the 
Entente  Allies  included : 

I — The  restoration  and  indemnification  of  Belgium,  Servia  and 
Montenegro. 

2 — The  evacuation  of  and  reparation  for  the  invaded  territories  of 
France,  Russia  and  Roumania. 

3 — The  expulsion  from  Europe  of  Turkey,  with  the  enfranchise- 
ment of  alien  nationalities  under  Turkish  rule. 

4 — The  similar  enfranchisement  of  other  oppressed  nationalities — 
the  Italians  of  'Ttalia  Irredenta ;"  the  Czecho-Slovaks ;  the  South 
Slavs. 

5 — The  reconstruction  of  an  autonomous  I'oland  along  lines  of 
nationality,  but  united  with  Russia. 

6 — The  restoration  of  territory  wrested  by  Germany  from  other 
countries  in  the  past. 

7 — The  reorganization  of  Europe  so  as  to  secure  full  political  and 
economic  rights  to  all  nations,  large  and  small. 

On  the  same  day,  January  11,  1917,  Germany  dispatched  to  the 
United  States  a  note  in  answer  to  the  reply  of  the  Entente  Allies 
(December  30)  to  the  original  German  peace  ofTer  of  December  12, 
1916.  In  this  note,  Germany  denied  the  validity  of  the  charges  laid 
at  her  door,  but  asserted  that  the  war  had  been  caused  by  the  "en- 
circling" policy  of  England  against  Germany,  the  desire  of  France 
for  revenge,  the  ambition  of  Russia  to  obtain  Constantinople,  and 
the   Serbian  instigation  of  the  murder  of  the  heir  apparent  to  the 


252  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Austro-Hungarian  throne.  Germany  moreover  countered  against  the 
AlHes'  charges  by  citing  the  cases  of  Ireland  and  the  Boers,  the  sup- 
pression of  minor  nationahties  by  Russia  and  the  violation  by  the 
Entente  of  the  neutrality  of  Greece.  Germany  also  alleged  barbarous 
treatment  ot  prisoners  by  Russia  and  deportation  of  civilians  from 
Galicia,  Alsace-Lorraine,  Eastern  Prussia,  and  Bukowina,  and  closed 
with  a  defence  of  her  treatment  of  Belgium  as  being  "necessary  in  the 
interests  of  military  safety." 

On  January  17,  1917,  the  Entente  amplified  and  reiterated  its  as- 
sertion that  Germany  must  be  defeated  before  a  secure  world-peace 
could  be  obtained. 

These  answers  to  the  President's  peace  note  of  December  18,  1916 
put  the  finishing  touches  upon  certain  mental  processes  which  had 
long  been  active  in  his  mind.  For  months,  while  war  raged  abroad 
with  unprecedented  destruction  of  the  best  of  civilization,  while 
the  United  States  was  perching  more  and  more  imsteadily  on  a 
pinnacle  of  neutrality,  while  the  very  foundations  of  international  law 
were  being  questioned,  the  President's  mind  had  been  turning  to  the 
world  which  was  to  follow  the  signing  of  peace.  And  the  President 
had  determined  that  that  world  must  be  one  in  which  international 
anarchy  would  be  supplanted  by  international  order  and  super- 
nationalism  or  internationalism  placed  above  nationalism.  His  plan 
was  no  more  nor  less  than  an  organization  of  the  great  nations  of 
the  world  to  prevent  future  wars  and  to  guarantee  justice  among 
nations  as  it  had  been  guaranteed  within  nations.  From  such  a  league 
of  nations,  the  President  had  decided  that  the  United  States  could 
not  and  should  not  remain  aloof ;  and  for  the  better  success  of  such 
a  league  the  President  had  determined  that  the  present  struggle 
should  end  in  a  "peace  without  victory"  which  would  not  weaken 
any  such  international  political  organization  by  enmities  and  rivalries 
inevitable  between  conquered  and  conquerors.  With  this  purpose  in 
mind,  President  Wilson  delivered  to  the  Senate,  on  January  22,  1917, 
an  address  which,  like  the  shot  fired  at  Concord,  rang  around  the 
world : 

T   have   sought  this   opportunity  to  address  you 

because  I  thought  that  I  owed  it  to  you,  as  the  council  associated 


Peace  Proposals  253 

with  me  in  the  final  determination  of  our  international  obliga- 
tions, to  disclose  to  you  without  reserve  the  thought  and  purpose 
that  have  been  taking  form  in  my  mind  in  regard  to  the  duty  of 
our  Government  in  the  days  to  come  when  it  will  be  necessary 
to  lay  afresh  and  upon  a  new  plan  the  foundations  of  peace 
among  the  nations. 

It  is  inconceivable  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  should 
play  no  part  in  that  great  enterprise.  To  take  part  in  such  a  ser- 
vice will  be  the  opportunity  for  which  they  have  sought  to  pre- 
pare themselves  by  the  very  principles  and  purposes  of  their 
polity  and  the  approved  practices  of  their  Government  ever  since 
the  days  when  they  set  up  a  new  nation  in  the  high  and  honourable 
hope  that  it  might  in  all  that  it  was  and  did  show  mankind  the 
way  to  liberty.  They  cannot  in  honour  withhold  the  service  to 
which  they  are  now  about  to  be  challenged.  They  do  not  wish  to 
withhold  it.  But  they  owe  it  to  themselves  and  to  the  other 
nations  of  the  world  to  state  the  conditions  under  which  they 
will  feel  free  to  render  it 

No  covenant  of  co-operative  peace  that  does  not  include  the 
peoples  of  the  New  World  can  suffice  to  keep  the  future  safe 
against  w^ar ;  and  yet  there  is  only  one  sort  of  peace  that  the 
peoples  of  America  could  join  in  guaranteeing.  The  elements  of 
that  peace  must  be  elements  that  engage  the  confidence  and  satisfy 
the  principles  of  the  American  governments,  elements  consistent 
with  their  political  faith  and  with  the  practical  convictions  which 
the  peoples  of  America  have  once  for  all  embraced  and  under- 
taken to  defend 

Fortunately  we  have  received  very  explicit  assurances  on  this 
point.  The  statesmen  of  both  of  the  groups  of  nations  now 
arrayed  against  one  another  have  said,  in  terms  that  could  not  be 
misinterpreted,  that  it  w^as  no  part  of  the  purpose  they  had  in 
mind  to  crush  their  antagonists.  But  the  implications  of  these 
assurances  may  not  be  equally  clear  to  all, — may  not  be  the  same 
on  both  sides  of  the  water.  I  think  it  will  be  serviceable  if  I 
attempt  to  set  forth  what  we  understand  them  to  be. 

They  imply,  first  of  all,  that  it  must  be  a  peace  without  vfc- 
tory.  It  is  not  pleasant  to  say  this.  I  beg  that  I  may  be  per- 
mitted to  put  my  own  interpretation  upon  it  and  that  it  may  be 
understood  that  no  other  interpretation  was  in  my  thought.  I 
am  seeking  only  to  face  realities  and  to  face  them  without  soft 
concealments.  Victory  would  mean  peace  forced  upon  the  loser, 
a   victor's   terms   imposed   upon   the   vanquished.      It   would   be 


254  ^'^  History  of  the  Great   War 

accepted  in  humiliation,  under  duress,  at  an  intolerable  sacrifice, 
and  would  leave  a  sting,  a  resentment,  a  bitter  memory  upon 
which  terms  of  peace  would  rest,  not  permanently,  but  only  as 
upon  quicksand.  Only  a  peace  between  equals  can  last.  Only 
a  peace  the  very  principle  of  which  is  equality  and  a  common 
participation  in  a  common  benefit.  The  right  state  of  mind,  the 
right  feeling  between  nations,  is  as  necessary  for  a  lasting  peace 
as  is  the  just  settlement  of  vexed  questions  of  territory  or  of 
racial  and  national  allegiance 

No  peace  can  last,  or  ought  to  last,  which  does  not  recognize 
and  accept  the  principle  that  governments  derive  all  their  just 
powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  that  no  right  any- 
where exists  to  hand  peoples  about  from  sovereignty  to  sover- 
eignty as  if  they  were  property.  I  take  it  for  granted,  for  in- 
stance, if  I  may  venture  upon  a  single  example,  that  statesmen 
everywhere  are  agreed  that  there  should  be  a  united,  independent, 
and  autonomous  Poland,  and  that  henceforth  inviolable  security 
of  life,  of  worship,  and  of  industrial  and  social  development 
should  be  guaranteed  to  all  peoples  who  have  lived  hitherto  under 
the  power  of  governments  devoted  to  a  faith  and  purpose  hostile 
to  their  own 

So  far  as  practicable,  moreover,  every  great  people  now  strug- 
gling towards  a  full  development  of  its  resources  and  of  its 
powers  should  be  assured  a  direct  outlet  to  the  great  highways  of 
the  sea.  Where  this  cannot  be  done  by  the  cession  of  territory, 
it  can  no  doubt  be  done  by  the  neutralization  of  direct  rights  of 
way  under  the  general  guarantee  which  will  assure  the  peace 
itself.  With  a  right  comity  of  arrangement  no  nation  need  be 
shut  away  from  free  access  to  the  open  paths  of  the  world's  com- 
merce. 

And  the  paths  of  the  sea  must  alike  in  law  and  in  fact  be  free. 
The  freedom  of  the  seas  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  peace,  equality, 
and  co-operation.  No  doubt  a  somewhat  radical  reconsideration 
of  many  of  the  rules  of  international  practice  hitherto  thought 
to  be  established  may  be  necessary  in  order  to  make  the  seas  in- 
deed free  and  common  in  practically  all  circumstances  for  the 
use  of  mankind,  but  the  motive  for  such  changes  is  convincing 
and  compelling.  There  can  be  no  trust  or  intimacy  between  the 
peoples  of  the  world  without  them.  The  free,  constant,  un- 
threatened  intercourse  of  nations  is  an  essential  part  of  the 
process  of  peace  and  of  development.  It  need  not  be  difficult 
either  to  define  or  to  secure  the  freedom  of  the  seas  if  the  govern- 


Peace  Proposals  255 

ments  of  the  world  sincerely  desire  to  come  to  an  agreement  con- 
cerning it. 

It  is  a  problem  closely  connected  with  the  limitation  of  naval 
armaments  and  the  co-operation  of  the  navies  of  the  world  in 
keeping  the  seas  at  once  free  and  safe.  And  the  question  of 
limiting  naval  armaments  opens  the  wider  and  perhaps  more 
difficult  question  of  the  limitation  of  armies  and  of  all  pro- 
grammes of  military  preparation 

The  question  of  armaments,  whether  on  land  or  sea,  is  the 
most  immediately  and  intensely  practical  question  connected  with 
•  the  future  fortunes  of  nations  and  of  mankind 

And  in  holding  out  the  expectation  that  the  people  and  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  will  join  the  other  civilized  nations 
of  the  world  in  guaranteeing  the  permanence  of  peace  upon  such 
terms  as  I  have  named  I  speak  with  the  greater  boldness  and  con- 
fidence because  it  is  clear  to  every  man  who  can  think  that  there 
is  in  this  promise  no  breach  in  either  our  traditions  or  our  policy 
as  a  nation,  but  a  fulfilment,  rather,  of  all  that  we  have  professed 
or  striven  for. 

I  am  proposing,  as  it  were,  that  the  nations  should  with  one 
accord  adopt  the  doctrine  of  President  Monroe  as  the  doctrine 
of  the  world ;  that  no  nation  should  seek  to  extend  its  policy 
over  any  other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every  people  should  be 
free  to  determine  its  own  polity,  its  own  way  of  development, 
unhindered,  unthreatened,  unafraid,  the  little  along  with  the  great 
and  powerful 

These  are  American  principles,  American  policies.  We  could 
stand  for  no  others.  And  they  are  also  the  principles  and  policies 
of  forward-looking  men  and  women  everywhere,  of  every  modern 
nation,  of  every  enlightened  community.  They  are  the  principles 
of  mankind  and  must  prevail. 

The  President's  policy  of  joining  with  the  nations  of  Europe  in 
the  future  maintenance  of  peace  had  not  come  unheralded.  During 
the  preceding  year,  many  of  his  addresses  had  hinted  at  such  a  policy. 
In  that  connection,  his  speech  at  a  banquet  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace,  held  in  Washington,  D.  C,  on  May  27,  1916,  was  a  notable 
forerunner  of  his   Peace  without  Victory  Address. 

The  desire  of  the  whole  world  now  turns  eagerly, 

more  and  more  eagerly,  toward  the  hope  of  peace,  and  there  is  just 
reason  why  we  should  take  our  part  in  counsel  upon  this  great 


256  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

theme.  It  is  right  that  I,  as  spokesman  of  our  Government,  should 
attempt  to  give  expression  to  what  1  beheve  to  be  the  thought 
and  purpose  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  this  vital  matter. 

This  Great  War  that  broke  so  suddenly  upon  the  world  two 
years  ago,  and  which  has  swept  within  its  flame  so  great  a  part 
of  the  civilized  world,  has  afifected  us  very  profoundly,  and  we 
are  not  only  at  liberty,  it  is  perhaps  our  duty,  to  speak  very 
frankly  of  it  and  of  the  great  interests  of  civilization  which  it 
affects. 

With  its  causes  and  its  objects  we  are  not  concerned.  The 
obscure  fountains  from  which  its  stupendous  flood  has  burst  forth 
we  are  not  interested  to  search  for  or  explore.  But  so  great  a 
flood,  spread  far  and  wide  to  every  quarter  of  the  globe,  has  of 
necessity  engulfed  many  a  fair  province  of  right  that  lies  very 
near  to  us.  Our  own  rights  as  a  nation,  the  liberties,  the  priv- 
ileges, and  the  property  of  our  people  have  been  profoundly 
affected. 

We  are  not  mere  disconnected  lookers-on.  The  longer  the 
War  lasts  the  more  deeply  do  we  become  concerned  that  it  should 
be  brought  to  an  end  and  the  world  be  permitted  to  resume  its 
normal  life  and  course  again.  And  when  it  does  come  to  an 
end,  we  shall  be  as  much  concerned  as  the  nations  at  war  to  see 
peace  assume  an  aspect  of  permanence,  give  promise  of  days 
from  which  the  anxiety  of  uncertainty  shall  be  lifted,  bring  some 
assurance  that  peace  and  war  shall  always  hereafter  be  reckoned 
part  of  the  common  interest  of  mankind. 

We  are  participants,  whether  we  would  or  not,  in  the  life  of 
the  world.  The  interests  of  all  nations  are  our  own  also.  We 
are  partners  with  the  rest.  What  affects  mankind  is  inevitably 
our  affair  as  well  as  the  affair  of  the  nations  of  Europe  and  of 
Asia. 

One  observation  on  the  causes  of  the  present  W'ar  we  are  at 
liberty  to  make,  and  to  make  it  may  throw  some  light  forward 
upon  future,  as  well  as  backward  upon  the  past.  It  is  plain  that 
this  War  could  have  come  only  as  it  did,  suddenly  and  out  of 
secret  counsels,  without  warning  to  the  world,  without  discus- 
sion, without  any  of  the  deliberate  movements  of  counsel  with 
which  it  would  seem  natural  to  approach  so  stupendous  a  contest. 
It  is  probable  that  if  it  had  been  foreseen  just  what  would  hap- 
pen, just  what  alliances  would  be  formed,  just  what  forces  ar- 
rayed against  one  another,  those  who  brought  the  great  contest 
on  would  have  been  glad  to  substitute  conference  for  force. 


Photos  by  International  Film  Service 


WOUNDED  IN  THE  LAST  DRIVE 

The  upper  panel  shows  French  and  British  soldiers,  wounded  in  the  very 
last  days  of  actual  hostilities,  waiting  to  be  transported  to  the  rear  of  the 
battle-lines  for  treatment. 


GERMAN    PRISONERS    GIVING    FIRST    AID    TO    WOUNDED   TOMMY 

The  centre  panel  shows  a  wounded  British  soldier  receiving  treatment  from 
a  Red  Cross  doctor.  The  doctor  is  being  assisted  by  several  captured  "Fritzes." 
The  British  soldier  has  been  brought  in  on  a  stretcher  by  German  soldiers 
taken  prisoners  in  the  strviggle  and  pressed  into  service  as  stretcher-bearers. 


WOUNDED  "ANZACS"  TREATED  AT  THE  FRONT 

The  lower  panel  shows  some  wounded  Australian  soldiers  receiving  first- 
aid  treatment  at  an  advanced  dressing  station  situated  just  a  few  paces  back 
of  the  actual  fighting  lines.  The  surgeons  are  working  upon  a  man  with  a 
wounded  leg,  while  others,  whose  injuries  have  been  attended  to,  are  waiting 
to  be  taken  to  base  hospitals  or  rest  quarters.  England's  colonial  troops  bore 
much  of  the  burden  of  the  conflict  against  Germany,  their  nickname,  "Anzncs," 
being  derived  from  the  initial  letters  of  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Africa  and 
Canada. 


Peace  Proposals  257 

If  we  ourselves  had  been  afforded  some  opportunity  to  apprise 
the  belhgerents  of  the  attitude  which  it  would  be  our  dutv  to 
take,  of  the  policies  and  practices  against  which  \vc  would  feci 
bound  to  use  all  our  moral  and  cconoiuic  strength,  and  in  certain 
circumstances  even  our  physical  strength  also,  our  own  contri- 
bution to  the  counsel,  which  might  have  averted  the  struggle, 
would  have  been  considered  worth  weighing  and  regarding. 

And  the  lesson,  which  the  shock  of  being  taken  by  surprise 
in  a  matter  so  deeply  vital  to  all  the  nations  of  the  world  has 
made  poignantly  clear,  is  that  the  peace  of  the  world  must  hence- 
forth depend  upon  a  new  and  more  wholesome  diplomacy.  Only 
when  the  great  nations  of  the  world  have  reached  some  sort  of 
agreement  as  to  what  they  hold  to  be  fundamental  to  their  com- 
mon interest,  and  as  to  some  feasible  method  of  acting  in  con- 
cert when  any  nation  or  group  of  nations  seeks  to  disturb  those 
fundamental  things,  can  we  feel  that  civilization  is  at  last  in  a 
way  ofjustifying  its  existence  and  claiming  to  be  finally  estab- 
lished!^ It  is  clear  that  nations  must  in  the  future  be  governed 
by  the  same  high  code  of  honor  that  we  demand  of  individuals. 
We  must,  indeed,  in  the  very  same  breath  with  which  we  avow 
this  conviction  admit  that  we  have  oitrselves  upon  occasion  in  the 
past  been  oft"enders  against  the  law  of  diplomacy,  which  we  thus 
forecast ;  but  our  conviction  is  not  the  less  clear,  but  rather  the 
more  clear,  on  that  account. 

If  this  War  has  accomplished  nothing  else  for  the  benefit  of 
the  world,  it  has  at  least  disclosed  a  great  moral  necessity  and 
set  forward  the  thinking  of  the  statesmen  of  the  world  by  a  whole 
age.  Repeated  utterances  of  the  leading  statesmen  of  most  of 
the  great  nations  now  engaged  in  war  have  made  it  plain  that 
their  thought  has  come  to  this :  That  the  principle  of  public 
right  must  henceforth  take  precedence  over  the  individual  in- 
terests of  particular  nations  and  that  the  nations  of  the  world 
must  in  some  way  band  themselves  together  to  see  that  right 
prevails  as  against  any  sort  of  selfish  aggression ;  that  henceforth 
alliance  must  not  be  set  up  against  alliance,  understanding  against 
understanding,  but  that  there  must  be  a  common  agreement  for  a 
common  object,  and  that  at  the  heart  of  that  common  object 
must  lie  the  inviolable  rights  of  peoples  and  of  mankind. 

The  nations  of  the  world  have  become  each  other's  neighbors. 

It  is  to  their  interest  that  they  should  understand  each  other.     In 

order  that  they  may  understand  eac!i  other  it  is  imperative  that 

they  should  agree  to  co-operate  in  a  common  cause  and  that  they 

30.9 


25S  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

should  so  act  that  the  guiding  principle  of  that  common  cause 
shall  be  even-handed  and   impartial  justice.  ^_^ 

This  is  undoubtedly  the  thought  of  America.  This  is  what 
we  ourselves  will  say  when  there  comes  proper  occasion  to  say 
it.  In  the  dealings  of  nations  with  one  another  arbitrary  force 
must  be  rejected  and  we  must  move  forward  to  the  thought  of 
the  modern  world,  the  thought  of  which  peace  is  the  very  atmos- 
phere. That  thought  constitutes  a  chief  part  of  the  passionate 
conviction  of  America. 

We  believe  these  fundamental  things: 

First,  that  every  people  has  a  right  to  choose  the  sovereignty 
under  which  they  shall  live.  Like  other  nations,  we  have  our- 
selves no  doubt  once  and  again  offended  against  that  principle 
when  for  a  little  while  controlled  by  selfish  passion,  as  our  franker 
historians  have  been  honorable  enough  to  admit ;  but  it  has  be- 
come more  and  more  our  rule  of  life  and  action. 

Second,  that  the  small  States  of  the  world  have  a  right  to  en- 
joy the  same  respect  for  their  sovereignty  and  for  their  territorial 
integrity  that  great  and  powerful  nations  expect  and  insist  upon. 

And,  third,  that  the  world  has  a  right  to  be  free  from  every 
disturbance  of  its  peace  that  has  its  origin  in  aggression  and  dis- 
regard of  the  rights  of  peoples  and  nations. 

So  sincerely  do  we  believe  in  these  things  that  I  am  sure  that 
I  speak  the  mind  and  wish  of  the  people  of  America  when  I  say 
that  the  United  States  is  willing  to  become  a  partner  in  any 
feasible  association  of  nations  formed  in  order  to  realize  these 
objects  and  make  them  secure  against  violation. 

There  is  nothing  that  the  United  States  wants  for  itself  that 
any  other  nation  has.  We  are  willing,  on  the  contrary,  to  limit 
ourselves  along  with  them  to  a  prescribed  course  of  duty  and 
respect  for  the  rights  of  others,  which  will  check  any  selfish 
passion  of  our  own,  as  it  will  check  any  aggressive  impulse  of 
theirs. 

If  it  should  ever  be  our  privilege  to  suggest  or  initiate  a  move- 
ment for  peace  among  the  nations  now  at  war,  I  am  sure  that 
the  people  of  the  United  States  w^ould  wish  their  Government 
to  move  along  these  lines : 

First — Such  a  settlement  wnth  regard  to  their  own  immediate 
interests  as  the  belligerents  may  agree  upon.  We  have  nothing 
material  of  any  kind  to  ask  for  ourselves,  and  are  quite  aware 
that  we  are  in  no  sense  or  degree  parties  to  the  present  quarrel. 
Our  interest  is  only  in  peace  and  its  future  guarantees. 


Peace  Proposals  259 

Second — A  universal  association  of  the  nations  to  maintain 
the  inviolate  security  of  the  highway  of  the  seas  for  the  com- 
mon and  unhindered  use  of  all  the  nations  of  the  world,  and 
to  prevent  any  war,  begun  either  contrary  to  treaty  covenants 
or  without  warning,  and  full  submission  of  the  causes  to  the 
opinion  of  the  world — a  virtual  guarantee  of  territorial  integrity 
and   political   independence. 

But  I  did  not  come  here,  let  me  repeat,  to  discuss  a  program. 
I  came  only  to  avow  a  creed  and  give  expression  to  the  confi- 
dence I  feel  that  the  world  is  even  now  upon  the  eve  of  a  great 
consummation,  when  some  common  force  will  be  brought  into 
existence  which  shall  safeguard  right  as  the  first  and  most  funda- 
mental interest  of  all  peoples  and  all  Governments,  when  coer- 
cion shall  be  summoned  not  to  the  service  of  political  ambition 
or  selfish  hostility,  but  to  the  service  of  a  common  order,  a  com- 
mon justice,  and  a  common  peace. 

God  grant  that  the  dawn  of  that  day  of  frank  dealing  and  of 
settled  peace,  concord,  and  co-operation  may  be  near  at  hand! 


The  Diplomatic  Break  with  Germany 

The  Imperial  German  Government,  on  February  i,  19 17,  liandeJ 
to  the  United  States  an  official  acknowledgment  of  receipt  of  a 
copy  of  the  Peace  without  Mctory  Address  of  President  Wilson. 
Germany  claimed  that  she  was  willing  to  accept  the  principles  laid 
down  by  the  President — that  she  accepted  the  principle  of  self-govern- 
ment for  all  nations,  and  asked  that  the  principle  be  applied  to  Ire- 
land and  India ;  that  she  would  be  glad  to  forego  secret  alliances  and 
to  cooperate  in  establishing  permanent  peace ;  that  she  always  had 
accepted  and  always  would  accept  the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the 
seas ;  and  that  she  had  never  contemplated  direct  annexation  of  Bel- 
gium. 

Germany  then  proceeded  once  again  to  denounce  England's  methods 
of  utilizing  the  English  control  of  the  seas  and  England's  food  block- 
ade. Germany  had  hoped  to  settle  by  diplomatic  negotiations  the 
disputes  involved;  but  the  rejection  of  Germany's  peace  offer  revealed 
a  determination  on  the  part  of  the  Entente  to  crush  Germany.  Ger- 
many therefore  was  forced  to  a  new  decision.  That  decision  was 
outlined  in  an  accompanying  memorandum. 

The  accompanying  memorandum  described  war  zones  in  the  Atlan- 
tic and  in  the  Alediterranean.  All  sea  traffic  within  those  zones  was 
to  be  attacked  by  Germany  without  warning.  Neutral  ships  would 
approach  the  coasts  of  Germany's  enemies  only  at  their  own  peril. 
American  shipping  would  be  unmolested  in  those  zones  if  but  one 
vessel,  bearing  special  marking  and  carrying  no  contraband  according 
to  the  German  definition  of  the  term,  ran  each  week  to  and  from 
the  port  of  Falmouth.  In  language  no  less  than  in  intent,  and  in  a 
spirit  of  utter  defiance,  Germany  retracted  her  previous  assurances  to 
the  United  States. 

With  this  note  and  its  accompanying  memorandum,  Ambassador 
von   Bernstorfif  submitted  a  second  memorandum,  declaring  that  the 

260 


TJie  Diplomatic  Break  z^'illt  Gcniiaiiy  261 

change  in  the  German  attitude  was  in  accord  with  the  reservations 
made  in  the  German  note  of  JNIay  4,  1916,  which  the  United  States 
had  refused  to  sanction  in  the  reply  to  that  note. 

The  response  of  the  United  States  to  the  breach  of  faith  by  the 
Imperial  German  Government  was  prompt  and  decisive.  On  the 
morning  of  February  3,  191 7,  the  German  ambassador  and  his  stalY 
were  handed  their  passports,  and  all  other  German  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives in  the  United  States  were  ordered  to  leave  the  country.  At 
the  same  time,  all  American  diplomatic  representatives  were  with- 
drawn from  Germany.  On  the  same  afternoon,  the  President  ad- 
dressed Congress,  giving  notice  of  his  dismissal  of  Ambassador  von 
Bernstorfi'. 

After  outlining  the  history  of  the  diplomatic  differences  between  Ger- 
many and  the  United  States  from  the  beginning  of  the  War  and  elabo- 
rating upon  the  new  turn  given  them  by  the  note  received  from  Ger- 
many on  February  i,  President  Wilson  expressed  the  fervent  hope 
that  it  would  still  be  possible  to  avert  war  between  the  two  countries. 
Announcing  that  the  United  States  still  desired  to  remain  at  peace  with 
the  German  people  and  with  the  Government  which  represented  them, 
the  President  declared  that  only  ''overt  acts"  on  the  part  of  Germany 
could  convince  him  that  Germany  would  compel  the  United  States  to 
resort  to  arms.  Nevertheless,  the  President  announced  clearly  that  if 
the  German  Government  should  commit  such  overt  acts,  he  would  feel 
called  upon  to  ask  Congress  for  a  declaration  of  war. 

I  think  that  you  will  agree  with  me  that,  in  view 

of  this  declaration  (of  the  German  Government),  which  suddenly 
and  without  prior  intimation  of  any  kind  deliberately  withdraws 
the  solemn  assurance  given  in  the  Imperial  Government's  note  of 
the  fourth  of  May,  19 16,  this  Government  has  no  alternative  con- 
sistent with  the  dignity  and  honor  of  the  United  States  but  to  take 
the  course  which,  in  its  note  of  the  eighteenth  of  April,  1916.  it 
announced  that  it  would  take  in  the  event  that  the  German  Gov- 
ernment did  not  declare  and  effect  an  abandonment  of  the  methods 
of  submarine  warfare  which  it  was  then  employing  and  to  which 
it  now  purposes  again  to  resort. 

I  have,  therefore,  directed  the  Secretary  of  State  to  announce 
to  His  Excellency  the  German  Ambassador  that  all  diplomatic 


262  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  German  Empire  are 
severed  and  that  the  American  Ambassador  at  Berhn  will  im- 
mediately be  withdrawn  and,  in  accordance  with  this  decision,  to 
hand  to  His  Excellency  his  passports. 

Notwithstanding  this  unexpected  action  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment, this  sudden  and  deeply  deplorable  renunciation  of  its  assur- 
ances, given  this  Government  at  one  of  the  most  critical  moments 
of  tension  in  the  relations  of  the  two  Governments,  I  refuse  to  be- 
lieve that  it  is  the  intention  of  the  German  authorities  to  do  in  fact 
what  they  have  warned  us  they  will  feel  at  liberty  to  do 

Only  actual  overt  acts  on  their  part  can  make  me  believe  it  even 
now. 

If  this  inveterate  confidence  on  my  part  in  the  sobriety  and  pru- 
dent foresight  of  their  purpose  should  unhappily  prove  unfounded  ; 
if  American  ships  and  American  lives  should,  in  fact,  be  sacrificed 
by  their  naval  commanders  in  heedless  contravention  of  the  just 
and  reasonable  understandings  of  international  law  and  the  obvi- 
ous dictates  of  humanity,  I  shall  take  the  liberty  of  coming  again 
before  the  Congress,  to  ask  that  authority  be  given  me  to  use  any 
means  that  may  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  our  seamen  and 
our  people  in  the  prosecution  of  their  peaceful  and  legitimate 
errands  on  the  high  seas.  I  can  do  nothing  less.  I  take  it  for 
granted  that  all  neutral  governments  will  take  the  same  course. 

We  do  not  desire  any  hostile  conflict  with  the  Imperial  German 
Government.  We  are  the  sincere  friends  of  the  German  people 
and  earnestly  desire  to  remain  at  peace  with  the  Government  which 
speaks  for  them. 

We  shall  not  believe  that  they  are  hostile  to  us  unless  and  until 
we  are  obliged  to  believe  it 

Germany  could  not  claim  that  the  action  of  the  United  States  was 
unexpected.  Nor  could  Germany  be  blind  to"  the  fact  that  the  rupture 
in  diplomatic  relations  was  the  prelude  to  war,  if  Germany  persisted 
in  her  course.  For  in  a-message  to  the  German  ambassador  to  Mexico, 
dispatched  on  January  19,  1917,  but  intercepted  by  the  United  States 
and  published  on  February  27,  1917,  the  German  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs  had  predicted  war  between  the  United  States  and  Germany, 
and  had  endeavored  to  align  both  Mexico  and  Japan  against  the 
United  States. 


The  Diplomatic  Break  with  Germany  263 

^  On  the  I  St  of  February  we  intend  to  begin  submarine  warfare 
unrestricted.  In  spite  of  this,  it  is  our  intention  to  endeavor  to 
keep  neutral  the  United  States  of  America. 

If  this  attempt  is  not  successful,  we  propose  an  alliance  on  the 
following  basis  with  Mexico :  That  we  shall  make  war  together 
and  together  make  peace.  We  shall  give  general  financial  support, 
and  it  is  understood  that  Mexico  is  to  reconquer  the  lost  territory 
in  New  Mexico,  Texas,  and  Arizona.  The  details  are  left  to  you 
for  settlement. 

You  are  instructed  to  inform  the  President  of  Mexico  of  the 
above  in  the  greatest  confidence  as  soon  as  it  is  certain  that  there 
will  be  an  outbreak  of  war  with  the  United  States,  and  suggest  that 
the  President  of  Mexico,  on  his  own  initiative,  should  communi- 
cate with  Japan  suggesting  adherence  at  once  to  this  plan.  At 
the  same  time,  offer  to  mediate  between  Germany  and  Japan. 

Please  call  to  the  attention  of  the  President  of  Mexico  that  the 
employment  of  ruthless  submarine  warfare  now  promises  to  com- 
pel England  to  make  peace  in  a  few  months.  ^ 

ZIMMERMANN.   ^ 

Germany,  therefore,  was  staking  her  all  upon  her  submarines. 
Thwarted  in  her  hopes  of  a  decisive  victory  on  the  land,  she  had  de- 
cided to  try  to  cripple  her  enemies  on  the  sea  so  that  they  could  not 
obtain  supplies,  and  so  that  they  would  be  compelled  to  sue  for  peace 
before  the  United  States  would  be  able  to  make  her  unorganized  force 
effective  enough  to  determine  the  final  outcome  of  the  War. 

The  United  States  as  a  whole  rallied  enthusiastically  behind  the 
President  in  his  stand,  and  there  was  no  question  of  Congress's  assent 
to  a  declaration  of  war  whenever  he  should  demand  it.  German  ships 
in  the  ports  of  the  United  States  were  placed  under  United  States 
guard  and  wireless  stations  put  under  Government  control.  Exten- 
sive plans  were  drawn  up  under  the  Council  of  National  Defence  to 
coordinate  the  resources  of  the  land  for  war  purposes.  The  paci- 
fists were  silenced ;  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  promised  its 
unqualified  support ;  the  movement  for  an  advisory  referendum  of  the 
people  to  decide  on  peace  or  war  was  brushed  aside ;  and  the  small 
active  pro-German  element  bowed  before  the  popular  storm. 

Soon  evidence  piled  up  that  Germany  indeed  intended  to  sink  all 
ships  in  the  war  zones  without  warning.    On  February  7,  the  Calif  or- 


264  ^  History  of  the  Crcat   War 

nian,  a  British  liner,  was  sunk  with  the  loss  of  some  forty  lives.  On 
Fehruary  3,  an  American  ship,  the  Housatoiiic,  was  sunk,  but  after 
due  warning  had  been  given  by  the  submarine  and  with  no  loss  of 
life.  Several  other  British  vessels  were  soon  sunk  in  the  Atlantic  and 
an  A'merican  merchant  ship,  the  Lyman  M.  Laiv,  was  sunk  without 
warning  in  the  Mediterranean.  On  February  25,  three  American  lives 
were  lost  when  the  British  Laconia  was  torpedoed. 


Armed  Neutrality 

As  a  result  of  these  sinkings,  the  President  again  addressed  Con- 
gress on  February  26,  1917.  He  stated  that  no  overt  act  which  would 
constitute  a  casus  belli  had  yet  been  committed  by  Germany.  For  in 
the  case  of  the  two  American  vessels  sunk,  the  Lyiiiaii  M.  Laze  and 
the  Hoiisaionic,  reasonable  care  had  been  taken  to  safeguard  the  lives 
of  the  passengers  and  crews.  The  news  of  the  loss  of  American  lives 
on  the  Laconia  had  evidently  not  been  imparted  to  the  President  by 
the  time  he  addressed  Congress.  On  the  other  hand,  the  President 
confessed  gravely  that  there  was  every  indication  that  only  chance  had 
prevented  the  commission  of  the  overt  act  which  would  lead  to  war. 
Therefore  it  seemed  to  the  President  necessary  that  he  should  definitely 
be  given  the  power  to  arm  American  merchant  ships  for  defensive 
purposes,  especially  since  the  owners  of  such  ships  were  keeping  them 
in  port  rattier  than  expose  them  to  defenseless  destruction  and  since 
Germany  could  thus  accomplish  her  purpose  without  actually  attack- 
ing American  shipping. 

The  new  German  submarine  policy  has  now  been 

in  active  execution  for  nearly  four  weeks. 

Its  practical  results  are  not  yet  fully  disclosed.  The  commerce 
of  other  neutral  nations  is  sufifering  severely,  but  not,  perhaps, 
very  much  more  severely  than  it  was  already  suffering  before  the 
first  of  February,  when  the  new  policy  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment was  put  into  operation.  We  have  asked  the  cooperation  of 
the  other  neutral  governments  to  prevent  these  depredations,  but 
so  far  none  of  them  has  thought  it  wise  to  join  us  in  any  common 
course  of  action.  Our  own  commerce  has  suffered,  is  suffering, 
rather  in  apprehension  than  in  fact,  rather  because  so  many  of 
our  ships  are  timidly  keeping  to  their  home  ports  than  because 
American  ships  have  been  sunk 

In  sum,  therefore,  the  situation  we  find  ourselves  in  with  regard 
to  the  actual  conduct  of  the  German  submarine  warfare  against 
commerce  and  its  effects  upon  our  o'/n  ships  and  people  is  sub- 

265 


266  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

stantially  the  same  that  it  was  when  I  addressed  you  on  the  third 
of  February,  except  for  the  tying  up  of  our  shipping  in  our  own 
ports  because  of  the  unwilHngness  of  our  shipowners  to  risk  their 
vessels  at  sea  without  insurance  or  adequate  protection,  and  the 
very  serious  congestion  of  our  commerce  which  has  resuUed,  a 
congestion  which  is  growing  rapidly  more  and  more  serious  every 
day.  This  in  itself  might  presently  accomplish,  in  effect,  what  the 
new  German  submarine  orders  were  meant  to  accomplish,  so  far 
as  we  are  concerned.  We  can  only  say,  therefore,  that  the  overt 
act  which  I  have  ventured  to  hope  the  German  commanders  would 
in  fact  avoid  has  not  occurred. 

But,  while  this  is  happily  true,  it  must  be  admitted  that  there 
have  been  certain  additional  indications  and  expressions  of  pur- 
pose on  the  part  of  the  German  press  and  the  German  authorities 
which  have  increased  rather  than  lessened  the  impression  that,  if 
our  ships  and  our  people  are  spared,  it  will  be  because  of  fortunate 
circumstances  or  because  the  commanders  of  the  German  sub- 
marines which  they  may  happen  to  encounter  exercise  an  un- 
expected discretion  and  restraint  rather  than  because  of  the  in- 
structions under  which  those  commanders  are  acting.  It  would 
be  foolish  to  deny  that  the  situation  is  fraught  with  the  gravest 
possibilities  and  dangers.  No  thoughtful  man  can  fail  to  see  that 
the  necessity  for  definite  action  may  come  at  any  time,  if  we  are 
in  fact,  and  not  in  word  merely,  to  defend  our  elementary  rights 
as  a  neutral  nation.  It  would  be  most  imprudent  to  be  unpre- 
pared  

No  one  doubts  what  it  is  our  duty  to  do.  We  must  defend  our 
commerce  and  the  lives  of  our  people  in  the  midst  of  the  present 
trying  circumstances,  with  discretion  but  with  clear  and  steadfast 
purpose.  Only  the  method  and  the  extent  remain  to  be  chosen, 
upon  the  occasion,  if  occasion  should  indeed  arise.  Since  it  has 
unhappily  proved  impossible  to  safeguard  our  neutral  rights  by 
diplomatic  means  against  the  unwarranted  infringements  they  are 
suffering  at  the  hands  of  Germany,  there  may  be  no  recourse  but 
to  armed  neutrality,  which  we  shall  know  how  to  maintain  and  for 
which  there  is  abundant  American  precedent 

I  believe  that  the  people  will  be  willing  to  trust  me  to  act  with 
restraint,  with  prudence,  and  in  the  true  spirit  of  amity  and  good 
faith  that  they  have  themselves  displayed  throughout  these  trying 
months ;  and  it  is  in  that  belief  that  I  request  that  you  will 
authorize  me  to  supply  our  merchant  ships  with  defensive  arms, 
should  that  become  necessary,  and  with  the  means  of  using  them, 


Armed  Neutrality  267 

and  to  employ  any  other  instrumentalities  or  methods  that  may  be 
necessary  and  adequate  to  protect  our  ships  and  our  people  in 
their  legitimate  and  peaceful  pursuits  on  the  seas.  I  request  also 
that  you  will  grant  me  at  the  same  time,  along  with  the  powers 
I  ask,  a  sufficient  credit  to  enable  me  to  provide  adequate  means 
of  protection  where  they  are  lacking,  including  adequate  insurance 
against  the  present  war  risks 

A  bill  giving  the  President  power  to  adopt  a  policy  of  armed  neu- 
trality was  passed  with  little  opposition  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives on  February  29.  It  then  went  to  the  Senate,  where  debate  upon 
it  was  opened  on  March  i.  The  term  of  Congress  would  expire  on 
March  4,  and  the  twelve  Senators  opposed  to  the  bill  were  enabled  to 
prevent  a  vote  upon  it  by  the  process  of  discussing  it  until  the  term 
of  Congress  expired  at  noon  on  March  4,  under  the  rules  of  the  Senate 
which  forbade  the  limitation  of  discussion. 

The  action  of  these  twelve  opponents  of  the  bill  called  forth  a  wither- 
ing rebuke  from  the  White  House. 

The  termination  of  the  last  session  of  the  Sixty-fourth  Con- 
gress by  constitutional  limitation  discloses  a  situation  unparalleled 
in  the  history  of  the  country,  perhaps  unparalleled  in  the  history 
of  any  modern  government. 

In  the  immediate  presence  of  a  crisis  fraught  with  more  subtle 
and  far-reaching  possibilities  of  national  danger  than  any  other 
the  Government  has  known  within  the  whole  history  of  its  inter- 
national relations,  the  Congress  has  been  unable  to  act  either  to 
safeguard  the  country  or  to  vindicate  the  elementary  rights  of  its 
citizens. 

More  than  five  hundred  of  the  five  hundred  and  thirty-one  mem- 
bers of  the  two  Houses  were  ready  and  anxious  to  act ;  the  House 
of  Representatives  had  acted  by  an  overwhelming  majority;  but 
the  Senate  was  unable  to  act  because  a  little  group  of  eleven  Sen- 
ators had  determined  that  it  should  not. 

The  Senate  has  no  rules  by  which  debate  can  be  limited  or 
brought  to  an  end,  no  rules  by  which  dilatory  tactics  of  any  kind 
can  be  prevented.  A  single  member  can  stand  in  the  way  of  action 
if  he  have  but  the  physical  endurance. 

The  result  in  this  case  is  a  complete  paralysis  alike  of  the  legis- 
lative and  of  the  executive  branches  of  the  Government 

In  the  midst  of  a  crisis  of  extraordinary  peril,  when  only  definite 


2C8  A  Hislury  uf  the  Great  War 

and  decided  action  can  make  the  nation  safe  or  shield  it  from 
war  itself  by  the  aggression  of  others,  action  is  impossible. 

Although  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  nation  and  the  representatives 
of  the  nation  stand  back  of  the  executive  with  unprecedented 
unanimity  and  spirit,  the  impression  made  abroad  will,  of  course, 
be  that  it  is  not  so  and  that  other  governments  may  act  as  they 
please  without  fear  that  this  Government  can  do  anything  at  all. 
We  cannot  explain. 

The  explanation  is  incredible.  The  Senate  of  the  United  States 
is  the  only  legislative  body  in  the  world  which  cannot  act  when 
its  majority  is  ready  for  action.  A  little  group  of  wilful  men. 
representing  no  opinion  but  their  own,  have  rendered  the  great 
Government  of  the  United  States  helpless  and  contemptible. 

The  remedy?  There  is  but  one  remedy.  The  only  remedy  is 
that  the  rules  of  the  Senate  shall  be  so  altered  that  it  can  act.  The 
country  can  be  relied  upon  to  draw  the  moral.  I  believe  the  Sen- 
ate can  be  relied  on  to  supply  the  means  of  action  and  save  the 
country  from  disaster 

The  Senate  continued  in  executive  session  and  revised  its  rules  so 
as  to  provide  for  limitation  upon  discussion  in  such  a  fashion  as  to 
make  impossible  a  repetition  of  the  action  of  a  small  minority  in  balk- 
ing the  will  of  the  majority.  In  the  meantime,  the  President  deter- 
mined to  use  authority  granted  by  an  act  of  1819,  authorizing  the  arm- 
ing of  merchant  ships  against  pirates;  and  thus  the  policy  of  armed 
neutrality  was  put  into  effect. 

On  March  4,  191 7,  Woodrow  Wilson  was  for  the  second  time  in- 
augurated as  President  of  the  United  States  of  America.  His  inaugu- 
ral address  was  short,  and  was  devoted  to  the  existing  crisis  in  the 
relations  with  Germany. 

My  Fellow  Citizens: 

The  four  years  which  have  elapsed  since  last  I  stood  in  this 
place  have  been  crowded  with  counsel  and  action  of  the  most  vital 
interest  and  consequence.  Perhaps  no  equal  period  in  our  history 
has  been  so  fruitful  of  imjjortant  reforms  in  our  economic  and  in- 
dustrial life  or  so  full  of  significant  changes  in  the  spirit  and 
purpose  of  our  political  action.  We  have  sought  very  thoughtfully 
to  set  our  house  in  order,  correct  the  grosser  errors  and  abuses 
of  our  industrial  life,  liberate  and  (juicken  the  processes  of  our 


Armed  Neutrality  269 

national  genius  and  energy,  and  lift  our  politics  to  a  broader  view 
of  the  people's  essential  interests 

Although  we  have  centered  counsel  and  action  with  such  un- 
usual concentration  and  success  upon  the  great  problems  of 
domestic  legislation  to  which  we  addressed  ourselves  four  years 
ago,  other  matters  have  more  and  more  forced  themselves  upon 
our  attention — matters  lying  outside  our  own  life  as  a  nation  and 
over  which  we  had  no  control,  but  which,  despite  our  wish  to 
keep  free  of  them,  have  drawn  us  more  and  more  irresistibly  into 
their  own  current  and  influence. 

It  has  been  impossible  to  avoid  them.  They  have  affected  the 
life  of  the  whole  world.  They  have  shaken  men  everywhere  with 
a  passion  and  an  apprehension  they  never  knew  before.  It  has 
been  hard  to  preserve  calm  counsel  while  the  thought  of  our  own 
people  swayed  this  way  and  that  under  their  influence.  We  are  a 
composite  and  cosmopolitan  people.  We  are  of  the  blood  of  all 
the  nations  that  are  at  war.  The  currents  of  our  thoughts  as  well 
as  the  currents  of  our  trade  run  quickly  at  all  seasons  back  and 
forth  between  us  and  them.  The  war  inevitably  set  its  mark  from 
the  first  alike  upon  our  minds,  our  industries,  our  commerce,  our 
politics  and  our  social  action.  To  be  indififerent  to  it,  or  inde- 
pendent of  it,  was  out  of  the  question 

As  some  of  the  injuries  done  us  have  become  intolerable  we 
have  still  been  clear  that  we  wished  nothing  for  ourselves  that 
we  were  not  ready  to  demand  for  all  mankind — fair  dealing,  jus- 
tice, the  freedom  to  live  and  to  be  at  ease  against  organized  wrong. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  and  with  this  thought  that  we  have  grown 
more  and  more  aware,  more  and  more  certain  that  the  part  we 
wished  to  play  was  the  part  of  those  who  mean  to  vindicate  and 
fortify  peace.  We  have  been  obliged  to  arm  ourselves  to  make 
good  our  claim  to  a  certain  minimum  of  right  and  of  freedom  of 
action.  We  stand  firm  in  armed  neutrality  since  it  seems  that  in 
no  other  way  we  can  demonstrate  what  it  is  we  insist  upon  and 
cannot  forget.  We  may  even  be  drawn  on,  by  circumstances,  not 
by  our  own  purpose  or  desire,  to  a  more  active  assertion  of  our 
rights  as  we  see  them  and  a  more  immediate  association  with  the 
great  struggle  itself.  But  nothing  will  alter  our  thought  or  our 
purpose.  They  are  too  clear  to  be  obscured.  They  are  too  deeply 
rooted  in  the  principles  of  our  national  life  to  be  altered.  We 
desire  neither  conquest  nor  advantage.  We  wish  nothing  that  can 
be  had  only  at  the  cost  of  another  people.    We  always  professed 


270  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

unselfish  purpose  and  we  covet  the  opportunity  to  prove  our  pro- 
fessions are  sincere 

We  are  provincials  no  longer.  The  tragic  events  of  the  thirty 
months  of  vital  turmoil  through  which  we  have  just  passed  have 
made  us  citizens  of  the  world.  There  can  be  no  turning  back. 
Our  own  fortunes  as  a  nation  are  involved  whether  we  would  have 
it  so  or  not. 

And  yet  we  are  not  the  less  Americans  on  that  account.  We 
shall  be  the  more  American  if  we  but  remain  true  to  the  principles 
in  which  we  have  been  bred.  They  are  not  the  principles  of  a 
province  or  of  a  single  continent.  We  have  known  and  boasted 
all  along  that  they  were  the  principles  of  a  liberated  mankind. 
These,  therefore,  are  the  things  we  shall  stand  for,  whether  in 
war  or  in  peace : 

That  all  nations  are  equally  interested  in  the  peace  of  the  world 
and  in  the  political  stability  of  free  peoples,  and  equally  respon- 
sible for  their  maintenance;  that  the  essential  principle  of  peace 
is  the  actual  equality  of  nations  in  all  matters  of  right  or  privilege ; 
that  peace  cannot  securely  or  justly  rest  upon  an  armed  balance  of 
power;  that  governments  derive  all  their  just  powers  from  the 
consent  of  the  governed  and  that  no  other  powers  should  be  sup- 
ported by  the  common  thought,  purpose  or  power  of  the  family 
of  nations ;  that  the  seas  should  be  equally  free  and  safe  for  the  use 
of  all  peoples,  under  rules  set  up  by  common  agreement  and  con- 
sent, and  that,  so  far  as  practicable,  they  should  be  accessible  to 
all  upon  equal  terms ;  that  national  armaments  shall  be  limited  to 
the  necessities  of  national  order  and  domestic  safety ;  that  the 
community  of  interest  and  of  power  upon  which  peace  must  hence- 
forth depend  imposes  upon  each  nation  the  duty  of  seeing  to  it 
that  all  influences  proceeding  from  its  own  citizens  meant  to 
encourage  or  assist  revolution  in  other  states  should  be  sternly  and 
effectually  suppressed  and  prevented. 

I  need  not  argue  these  principles  to  you,  my  fellow  country- 
men; they  are  your  own,  part  and  parcel  of  your  own  thinking 
and  your  own  motives  in  affairs.  They  spring  up  native  amongst 
us.  Upon  this  as  a  platform  of  purpose  and  of  action  we  can 
stand  together.  And  it  is  imperative  that  we  should  stand  to- 
gether. We  are  being  forged  into  a  new  unity  amidst  the  fires 
that  now  blaze  throughout  the  world.  In  their  ardent  heat  we 
shall,  in  God's  providence,  let  us  hope,  be  purged  of  faction  and 
division,  purified  of  the  errant  humors  of  party  and  of  private 
interest,  and  shall  stand  forth  in  the  days  to  come  with  a  new 


Armed  Neutrality  271 

dignity  of  national  pride  and  spirit.  Let  each  man  see  to  it  that 
the  dedication  is  in  his  own  heart,  the  high  purpose  of  the  nation 
in  his  own  mind,  ruler  of  his  own  will  and  desire. 

I  stand  here  and  have  taken  the  high  and  solemn  oath  to  which 
you  have  been  audience  because  the  people  of  the  United  States 
have  chosen  me  for  this  august  delegation  of  power  and  have  by 
their  gracious  judgment  named  me  their  leader  in  affairs. 

I  know  now  what  the  task  means.  I  realize  to  the  full  the  re- 
sponsibility which  it  involves.  I  pray  God  I  may  be  given  the 
wisdom  and  the  prudence  to  do  my  duty  in  the  true  spirit  of  this 
great  people.  I  am  their  servant  and  can  succeed  only  as  they 
sustain  and  guide  me  by  their  confidence  and  their  counsel.  The 
thing  I  shall  count  upon,  the  thing  without  which  neither  counsel 
nor  action  wall  avail,  is  the  unity  of  America — an  America  united 
in  feeling,  in  purpose  and  in  its  vision  of  duty,  of  opportunity  and 
of  service. 

We  are  to  beware  of  all  men  who-  would  turn  the  tasks  and 
the  necessities  of  the  nation  to  their  own  private  profit  or  use 
them  for  the  building  up  of  private  power. 

United  alike  in  the  conception  of  our  duty  and  in  the  high 
resolve  to  perform  it  in  the  face  of  all  men,  let  us  dedicate  our- 
selves to  the  great  task  to  which  we  must  now  set  our  hand.  For 
myself  I  beg  your  tolerance,  your  countenance  and  your  united 
aid. 

The  shadows  that  now  lie  dark  upon  our  path  will  soon  be  dis- 
pelled, and  we  shall  walk  with  the  light  all  about  us  if  we  be  but 
true  to  ourselves — to  ourselves  as  we  have  wished  to  be  known  in 
the  counsels  of  the  world  and  in  the  thought  of  all  those  who  love 
liberty  and  justice  and  the  right  exalted. 

Within  a  few  days  after  the  policy  of  armed  neutrality  had  been 
adopted,  it  proved,  to  use  President  Wilson's  own  language,  "to  be 
impracticable."  On  March  9,  1917,  the  President  therefore  issued  a 
call  for  the  Sixty-Fifth  Congress  to  assemble  in  special  session  on 
April  16.  It  has  been  semi-ofiicially  stated  that  the  President  delayed 
asking  Congress  for  war  until  Count  von  Bernstorff  could  reach  Berlin 
and  plead  in  person  with  the  heads  of  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment to  abandon  measures  which  would  result  in  the  addition  of  the 
United  States  to  the  ranks  of  Germany's  opponents. 

In  the  meantime,  the  continual  sinking  of  Entente  vessels  carrying 


2-J2  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

American  citizens  and  of  American  vessels,  without  warning  and  with 
loss  of  life,  hastened  the  President's  decisions.  On  March  21,  he  set 
forward  by  two  weeks  the  assembling  of  the  special  session  of  the 
Sixty-Fifth  Congress.  On  March  25,  fourteen  companies  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  from  the  eastern  states  were  called  into  the  national  serv- 
ice. States  and  municipalities  feverishly  hastened  war  preparations, 
and  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  United  States  men, 
women  and  children  impatiently  awaited  the  day  on  which  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  would  ask  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
to  declare  that  a  state  of  vi^ar  existed  between  the  United  States  and 
the  German  Empire. 

Congress  assembled  on  the  appointed  day,  April  2,  191 7.  On  the 
evening  of  its  very  day  of  assembly,  President  Wilson  addressed  it. 
At  half  past  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  before  a  joint  session  of  the 
Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  in  the  chamber  of  the  House, 
with  leading  officials  and  private  citizens  looking  down  upon  the  scene 
and  with  the  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  sitting  before  him,  con- 
scious that  he  W'as  leading  a  great  nation  through  a  crisis  unsurpassed 
in  seriousness  by  any  crisis  which  had  confronted  Washington  or  Lin- 
coln, ^Madison  or  McKinley,  Polk  or  Roosevelt,  aware  that  the  future 
well-being  not  only  of  America  but  also  of  the  entire  civilized  world 
hung  upon  the  words  of  the  manuscript  in  his  hands,  reading  in  a 
vibrant  tone  and  interrupted  frequently  by  outburst  of  enthusiastic 
applause,  the  President  of  the  United  States  asked  that  Congress  rec- 
ognize that  the  acts  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  constituted 
acts  of  aggression  against  the  United  States  and  that  therefore  the 
United  States  proclaimed  that  a  state  of  war  existed  between  the  two 
countries. 


(g)  Underwood  &  Underwood 


DESCRIPTION    OF   PICTURES   OX    REVERSE    SIDE 

Upper    Left   Hand   Corner — William    Howard   Taft,   Twenty-Seventh    Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States;  Joint  Chairman,  War  Labor  Board,  April  10,  1918—. 

L'pper   Right   Hand   Corner — Charles   M.    Schwab.    Director-General,   Emer- 
gency Fleet  Corporation,  April   19,   1918-December  8,   1918. 

Center — Herbert    C.    Hoover,    Director,    Belgian    Relief    Commission,    1915- 
1917  :  Food  Administrator  of  the  United  States,  August  10,  1917 — . 

Lower   Left   Hand   Corner — George   Creel,   Chairman,   Committee  on   Public 
Information,  April  14,   1917 — . 

Lower  Right   Hand   Corner — Edward    X.    Hurley,   Chairman,   United    States 
Shipping  Board,  and  President,  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  July  24,  1917 — . 


The  War  Message 

Gentlemen  of  the  Congress  :  I  have  called  the  Congress  into 
extraordinary  session  because  there  are  serious,  very  serious, 
choices  of  policy  to  be  made,  and  made  immediately  which  it  was 
neither  right  nor  constitutionally  permissible  that  I  should  assume 
the  responsibility  of  making. 

On  the  third  of  February  last,  I  officially  laid  before  you  the 
extraordinary  announcement  of  the  Imperial  German  Government 
that  on  and  after  the  first  day  of  February  it  was  its  purpose  to 
put  aside  all  restraints  of  law  or  of  humanity  and  use  its  sub- 
marines to  sink  every  vessel  that  sought  to  approach  either  the 
ports  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  or  the  western  coast  of  Europe 
or  any  of  the  ports  controlled  by  the  enemies  of  Germany  within 
the  Mediterranean.  That  had  seemed  to  be  the  object  of  the 
German  submarine  warfare  earlier  in  the  war;  but  since  April 
of  last  year  the  Imperial  Government  had  somewhat  restrained 
the  commanders  of  its  undersea  craft,  in  conformity  with  its 
promise  then  given  to  us  that  passenger  boats  should  not  be  sunk, 
and  that  due  warning  would  be  given  to  all  other  vessels  which 
its  submarines  might  seek  to  destroy,  when  no  resistance  was 
offered  or  escape  attempted,  and  care  taken  that  their  crews  were 
given  at  least  a  fair  chance  to  save  their  lives  in  their  open  boats. 
The  precautions  taken  were  meager  and*haphazard  enough,  as  was 
proved  in  distressing  instance  after  instance  in  the  progress  of  the 
cruel  and  unmanly  business,  but  a  certain  degree  of  restraint  was 
obser\ed. 

The  new  policy  has  swept  every  restriction  aside.  Vessels  of 
every  kind,  whatever  their  flag,  their  character,  their  cargo,  their 
destination,  their  errand,  have  been  ruthlessly  sent  to  the  bottom 
without  warning  and  without  thought  of  help  or  mercy  for  those 
on  board — the  vessels  of  friendly  neutrals  along  with  those  of 
belligerents.  Even  hospital  ships  and  ships  carrying  relief  to  the 
sorely  bereaved  and  stricken  people  of  Belgium,  though  the  latter 
were  pirovided  with  safe  conduct  through  the  proscribed  areas 
by  the  German  Government  itself,  and  were  distinguished  by  un- 
mistakable marks  of  identity,  have  been  sunk  with  the  same  reck- 
less lack  of  compassion  or  of  principle. 


2/4  A  History  of  the  Great  IVar 

I  was  for  a  little  while  unable  to  believe  that  such  things  would 
in  fact  be  done  by  any  governnijent  that  had  hitherto  subscribed 
to  the  humane  practices  of  civilized  nations.  International  law 
had  its  origin  in  the  attempt  to  set  up  some  law  which  would  be 
respected  and  observed  upon  the  seas,  where  no  nation  had  right 
of  dominion  and  where  lay  the  free  highways  of  the  world.  By 
painful  stage  after  stage  has  that  law  been  built  up,  with  meager 
enough  results,  indeed,  after  all  was  accomplished  that  could  be 
accomplished,  but  always  with  a  clear  view,  at  least,  of  what 
the  heart  and  conscience  of  mankind  demanded. 

This  minimum  of  right  the  German  Government  has  swept  aside 
under  the  plea  of  retaliation  and  necessity,  and  because  it  had  no 
weapons  which  it  could  use  at  sea  except  these  which  it  is  im- 
possible to  employ  as  it  is  employing  them  without  throwing  to 
the  winds  all  scruples  of  humanity  or  of  respect  for  the  under- 
standings that  were  supposed  to  underlie  the  intercourse  of  the 
world. 

I  am  not  now  thinking  of  the  loss  of  property  involved,  im- 
mense and  serious  as  that  is,  but  only  of  the  wanton  and  whole- 
sale destruction  of  the  lives  of  non-combatants,  men,  women  and 
children,  engaged  in  pursuits  which  have  always,  even  in  the 
darkest  period  of  modern  history,  been  deemed  innocent  and 
legitimate.  Property  can  be  paid  for;  the  lives  of  peaceful  and 
innocent  people  cannot  be. 

The  present  German  submarine  warfare  against  commerce  is  a 
warfare  against  mankind.  It  is  a  war  against  all  nations.  Ameri- 
can ships  have  been  sunk,  American  lives  taken  in  ways  which 
it  has  stirred  us  very  deeply  to  learn  of,  but  the  ships  and  people 
of  other  neutral  and  friendly  nations  have  been  sunk  and  over- 
whelmed in  the  waters  in  the  same  way.  There  has  been  no  dis- 
crimination. The  challenge  is  to  all  mankind.  Each  nation  must 
decide  for  itself  how  it  will  meet  it.  The  choice  we  make  for 
ourselves  must  be  made  with  a  moderation  of  counsel  and  a  tem- 
perateness  of  judgment  befitting  our  character  and  our  motives 
as  a  nation. 
L  We  must  put  excited  feeling  away.  Our  motive  will  not  be 
revenge  or  the  victorious  assertion  of  the  physical  might  of  the 
nation,  but  only  the  vindication  of  right,  of  human  right,  of  which 
we  are  only  a  single  champion.   J 

When  I  addressed  the  Congress  on  the  26th  of  February  last,  I 
thought  that  it  would  suffice  to  assert  our  neutral  right  with  arms ; 
our  right  to  use  the  sea  against  unlawful  interference :  our  right 


The  War  Message  275 

to  keep  our  people  safe  against  unlawful  violence.  But  armed 
neutrality,  it  now  appears,  is  impracticable.  Because  submarines 
are  in  effect  outlaws  when  used  as  the  German  submarines  have 
been  used  against  merchant  shipping,  it  is  impossible  to  defend 
ships  against  their  attacks  as  the  law  of  nations  has  assumed  that 
merchantmen  w^ould  defend  themselves  against  privateers  or 
cruisers,  visible  craft  giving  chase  upon  the  open  sea.  It  is  com- 
mon prudence  in  such  circumstances,  grim  necessity  indeed,  to 
endeavor  to  destroy  them  before  they  have  shown  their  own  inten- 
tion.   They  must  be  dealt  with  upon  sight,  if  dealt  with  at  all. 

The  German  Government  denies  the  right  of  neutrals  to  use 
arms  at  all  within  the  areas  of  the  sea  which  it  has  prescribed, 
even  in  the  defense  of  rights  which  no  modern  publicist  has  ever 
before  questioned  their  right  to  defend.  The  intimation  is  con- 
veyed that  the  armed  guards  which  we  have  placed  on  our  mer- 
chant ships  will  be  treated  as  beyond  the  pale  of  law  and  subject 
to  be  dealt  with  as  pirates  would  be.  Armed  neutrality  is  in- 
effectual enough  at  best ;  in  such  circumstances  and  in  the  face 
of  such  pretensions,  it  is  worse  than  ineffectual ;  it  is  likely  only 
to  produce  what  it  was  meant  to  prevent ;  it  is  practically  certain 
to  draw  us  into  the  war  without  either  the  rights  or  the  effective- 
ness of  belligerents. 

(^  There  is  one  choice  we  cannot  make,  we  are  incapable  of  making 
• — we  will  not  choose  the  path  of  submission  and  suffer  the  most 
sacred  rights  of  our  nation  and  our  people  to  be  ignored  or  vio- 
lated. The  wrongs  against  which  we  now  array  ourselves  are  no 
common  wrongs;  they  cut  to  the  very  roots  of  human  life,  j 

With  a  profound  sense  of  the  solemn  and  even  tragical  character 
of  the  step  I  am  taking  and  of  the  grave  responsibilities  which  it 
involves,  but  in  unhesitating  obedience  to  what  I  deem  my  con- 
stitutional duty,  I  advise  that  the  Congress  declare  the  recent 
course  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  to  be,  in  fact,  nothing 
less  than  war  against  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United 
States ;  that  it  formally  accept  the  status  of  belligerent  which  has 
thus  been  thrust  upon,  it;  and  that  it  take  immediate  steps  not 
only  to  put  the  country  in  a  more  thorough  state  of  defense,  but 
also  to  exert  all  its  power  and  employ  all  its  resources  to  bring 
the  Government  of  the  German  Empire  to  terms  and  end  the  war. 

What  this  will  involve  is  clear.  It  will  involve  the  utmost  prac- 
ticable cooperation  in  counsel  and  action  with  the  governments 
now  at  war  with  Germany ;  and,  as  incident  to  that,  the  extension 
to  those  governments  of  the  most  liberal  financial  credits,  in  order 


2/0  ^i  Uisioiy  of  the  Great  War 

that  our  resources  may,  so  far  as  possible,  be  added  to  theirs.  It 
will  involve  the  organization  and  mobilization  of  all  the  material 
resources  of  the  country  to  supply  the  materials  of  war  and  serve 
the  incidental  needs  of  the  nation  in  the  most  abundant  and  yet 
the  most  economical  and  efficient  way  possible.  It  will  involve 
the  immediate  full  equipment  of  the  navy  in  all  respects,  but  par- 
ticularly in  supplying  it  with  the  best  means  of  dealing  with  the 
enemy's  submarines.  It  will  involve  the  immediate  addition  to  the 
armed  forces  of  the  United  States  already  provided  for  by  law 
in  case  of  war  at  least  500.000  men,  who  should,  in  my  opinion, 
be  chosen  upon  the  principle  of  universal  liability  to  service,  and 
also  the  authorization  of  subsequent  additional  increments  of  equal 
force  so  soon  as  they  may  be  needed  and  can  be  handled  in 
training. 

It  will  involve  also,  of  course,  the  granting  of  adequate  credits 
to  the  Government,  sustained,  I  hope,  so  far  as  they  can  equitably 
be  sustained,  by  the  present  generation,  by  well-conceived  taxation. 
I  say  sustained  so  far  as  may  be  equitable  by  taxation  because  it 
seems  to  me  that  it  would  be  most  unwise  to  base  the  credits 
which  will  now  be  necessary  entirely  on  money  borrowed.  It  is 
our  duty,  I  most  respectfully  urge,  to  protect  our  people  so  far  as 
we  may  against  the  very  serious  hardships  and  evils  which  w^ould 
be  likely  to  arise  out  of  the  inflation  which  would  be  produced 
by  vast  loans. 

In  carrying  out  the  measures  by  which  these  things  are  to  be 
accomplished,  we  should  keep  constantly  in  mind  the  wisdom  of 
interfering  as  little  as  possible  in  our  owai  preparation  and  in  the 
equipment  of  our  own  military  forces  with  the  duty — for  it  will 
be  a  very  practical  duty — of  supplying  the  nations  already  at  Avar 
with  Germany  with  the  materials  w'hich  they  can  obtain  only  from 
us  or  by  our  assistance.  They  are  in  the  field,  and  we  should  help 
them  in  every  way  to  be  effective  there. 

I  shall  take  the  liberty  of  suggesting,  through  the  several  execu- 
tive departments  of  the  Government,  for  the  consideration  of  your 
committees,  measures  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  several  ob- 
jects I  have  mentioned.  I  hope  that  it  will  be  your  pleasure  to 
deal  with  them  as  having  been  framed  after  very  careful  thought 
by  the  branch  of  the  Government  upon  which  the  responsibility 
of  conducting  the  war  and  safeguarding  the  nation  \\\\\  most 
directly  fall. 

While  we  do  these  things,  these  deeply  momentous  things,  let  us 
be  very  clear,  and   make  very  clear  to  all  the   world  what  our 


The  War  Message  277 

motives  and  our  objects  are.  My  own  thought  has  not  been  driven 
from  its  habitual  and  normal  course  by  the  unhappy  events  of 
the  last  two  months,  and  I  do  not  believe  that  the  thought  of  the 
nation  has  been  altered  or  clouded  by  them. 

I  have  exactly  the  same  things  in  mind  now  that  I  had  in  mind 
when  I  addressed  the  Senate  on  the  22d  of  January  last ;  the 
same  that  I  had  in  mind  v/hen  I  addressed  the  Congress  on  the 
3d  of  February  and  on  the  26th  of  February.  Our  object  now,  as 
then,  is  to  vindicate  the  principles  of  peace  and  justice  in  the  life 
of  the  world  as  against  selfish  and  autocratic  power  and  to  set  up 
among  the  really  free  and  self-governed  peoples  of  the  world  such 
a  concert  of  purpose  and  of  action  as  will  henceforth  insure  the 
observance  of  those  principles. 

j  Neutrality  is  no  longer  feasible  or  desirable  where  the  peace 
oT  the  world  is  involved  and  the  freedom  of  its  peoples,  and  the 
menace  to  that  peace  and  freedom  lies  in  the  existence  of  auto- 
cratic governments  backed  by  organized  force  which  is  controlled 
wholly  by  their  will,  not  by  the  will  of  their  people.  We  have  seen 
the  last  of  neiitrality  in  such  circumstances.  ____/ 

We  are  at  the  beginning  of  an  age  where  it  will  be  insisted 
that  the  same  standards  of  conduct  and  of  responsibility  for  wrong 
done  shall  be  observed  among  nations  and  their  governments  that 
are  observed  among  the  individual  citizens  of  civilized  states. 

We  have  no  quarrel  with  the  German  people.  We  have  no  feel- 
ing toward  them  but  one  of  sympathy  and  friendship.  It  was  not 
upon  their  impulse  that  their  Government  acted  in  entering  this 
war.    It  was  not  with  their  previous  knowledge  or  approval. 

It  was  a  war  determined  upon  as  wars  used  to  be  determined 
upon  in  the  old,  unhappy  days  when  peoples  were  nowhere  con- 
sulted by  their  rulers  and  wars  were  provoked  and  waged  in  the 
interest  of  dynasties  or  of  little  groups  of  ambitious  men  who 
were  accustomed  to  use  their  fellow-men  as  pawns  and  tools. 

Self -governed  nations  do  not  fill  their  neighbor  states  with 
spies  or  set  the  course  of  intrigue  to  bring  about  some  critical 
posture  of  afifairs  which  will  give  them  an  opportunity  to  strike 
and  make  conquest.  Such  designs  can  be  successfully  worked  out 
only  under  cover  and  where  no  one  has  the  right  to  ask  questions. 

Cunningly  contrived  plans  of  deception  or  aggression,  carried, 
it  may  be.  from  generation  to  generation,  can  be  worked  out  and 
kept  from  the  light  only  within  the  privacy  of  courts  or  behind 
the  carefully  guarded  confidences  of  a  narrow  and  privileged  class. 
They  are  happily  impossible  where  public  opinion  commands  and 


278  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ'ar 

^sists  upon  full  information  concerning  all  the  nation's  aiTairs. 
4i_A  steadfast  concert  for  peace  can  never  be  maintained  except 
by  a  partnership  of  democratic  nations.  No  autocratic  govern- 
ment could  be  trusted  to  keep  faith  within  it  or  observe  its  cove- 
nants. It  must  be  a  league  of  honor,  a  partnership  of  opinion. 
Intrigue  would  eat  its  vitals  away;  the  plottings  of  inner  circles 
who  could  plan  what  they  would  and  render  account  to  no  one 
would  be  a  corruption  seated  at  its  very  heart.  Only  free  peoples 
can  hold  their  purpose  and  their  honor  steady  to  a  common  end 
and  prefer  the  interests  of  mankind  to  any  narrow  interest  of 
their  own.  ~~J 

Does  not  every  American  feel  that  assurance  has  been  added  to 
our  hope  for  the  future  peace  of  the  world  by  the  w^onderful  and 
heartening  things  that  have  been  happening  within  the  last  few 
weeks  in  Russia? 

Russia  was  known  by  those  who  knew  her  best  to  have  been 
always  in  fact  democratic  at  heart,  in  all  the  vital  habits  of  her 
thought,  in  all  the  intimate  relationships  of  her  people  that  spoke 
their  natural  instinct,  their  habitual  attitude  toward  life. 

The  autocracy  that  crowned  the  summit  of  her  political  struc- 
ture, long  as  it  had  stood  and  terrible  as  was  the  reality  of  its 
power,  was  not  in  fact  Russian  in  origin,  character  or  purpose ; 
and  now  it  has  been  shaken  off  and  the  great  generous  Russian 
people  have  been  added  in  all  their  native  majesty  and  might  to 
the  forces  that  are  fighting  for  a  freedom  in  the  world,  for  justice 
and  for  peace.    Here  is  a  fit  partner  for  a  league  of  honor. 

One  of  the  things  that  has  served  to  convince  us  that  the 
Prussian  autocracy  was  not  and  could  never  be  our  friend  is  that 
from  the  very  outset  of  the  present  war  it  has  filled  our  unsus- 
pecting communities  and  even  our  offices  of  government  with 
spies  and  set  criminal  intrigues  everywhere  afoot  against  our 
national  unity  of  council,  our  peace  within  and  without,  our  in- 
dustries and  our  commerce. 

Indeed,  it  is  now  evident  that  its  spies  were  here  even  before  the 
war  began;  and  it  unhappily  is  not  a  matter  of  conjecture,  but  a 
fact  proved  in  our  courts  of  justice,  that  the  intrigues  which  have 
more  than  once  come  perilously  near  to  disturbing  the  peace  and 
dislocating  the  industries  of  the  country  have  been  carried  on  at 
the  instigation,  with  the  support,  and  even  under  the  personal 
direction  of  official  agents  of  the  Imperial  Government  accredited 
to  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

Even  in  checking  these  things  and  trying  to  extirpate  them,  we 


The  War  Message  279 

have  sought  to  put  the  most  generous  interpretation  possible  upon 
them  because  we  knew  that  tlieir  source  lay,  not  in  any  hostile 
feeling  or  purpose  of  the  German  people  toward  us  (who  were, 
no  doubt,  as  ignorant  of  them  as  we  ourselves  were),  but  only  in 
the  selfish  designs  of  a  government  that  did  what  it  pleased  and 
told  its  people  nothing.  But  they  have  played  their  part  in  serving 
to  convince  us  at  last  that  that  government  entertains  no  real 
friendship  for  us  and  means  to  act  against  our  peace  and  security 
at  its  convenience.  That  it  means  to  stir  up  enemies  against  us  at 
our  very  doors,  the  intercepted  note  to  the  German  Minister  at 
Mexico  City  is  eloquent  evidence. 

We  are  accepting  this  challenge  of  hostile  purpose  because  we 
know  that  in  such  a  government,  following  such  methods,  we  can 
never  have  a  friend ;  and  that  in  the  presence  of  its  organized 
power  always  lying  in  w^ait  to  accomplish  we  know  not  what  pur- 
pose, there  can  be  no  assured  security  for  the  democratic  govern- 
ments of  the  world. 

We  are  now  about  to  accept  gauge  of  battle  with  this  natural 
foe  to  liberty  and  shall,  if  necessary,  spend  the  whole  force  of 
the  nation  to  check  and  nullify  its  pretensions  and  end  its  power. 
We  are  glad,  now  that  we  see  the  facts  with  no  veil  of  false  pre- 
tense about  them,  to  fight  thus  for  the  ultimate  peace  of  the  world 
and  for  the  liberation  of  its  peoples,  the  German  peoples  included; 
for  the  rights  of  nations  great  and  small  and  the  privilege  of  men 
everywhere  to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of  obedience.  The 
world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy.  Its  peace  must  be 
planted  upon  the  tested  foundations  of  political  liberty. 
J'^'^We  have  no  selfish  ends  to  ser\'e.  We  desire  no  conquests,  no 
dominion.  We  seek  no  indemnities  for  ourselves,  no  material 
compensations  for  the  sacrifices  we  shall  freely  make.  We  are 
but  one  of  the  champions  of  the  rights  of  mankind.  We  shall  be 
satisfied  when  those  rights  have  been  made  as  secure  as  the  faith 
and  the  freedom  of  the  nations  can  make  them.    ^ — .. 

Just  because  we  fight  without  rancor  and  without  selfish  object, 
seeking  nothing  for  ourselves  but  what  we  shall  wish  to  share 
with  all  free  peoples,  we  shall,  I  feel  confident,  conduct  our  oper- 
ations as  belligerents  without  passion  and  ourselves  observe  with 
proud  punctilio  the  principles  of  right  and  of  fair  play  we  profess 
to  be  fighting  for. 

I  have  said  nothing  of  the  Governments  allied  with  the  Im- 
perial Government  of  Germany  because  they  have  not  made  war 
upon  us  or  challenged  us  to  defend  our  right  and  our  honor.  The 


28o  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Auslro-llungarian  Govcrnnicin  hns.  iivleeii,  avowed  ils  uiKiualiticd 
indorsement  and  acceptance  of  the  reckless  and  lawless  snbtnarine 
warfare  adopted  now  without  disguise  by  the  Imperial  German 
Government,  and  it  has  therefore  not  been  possible  for  this  Gov- 
ernment to  receive  Count  Tarnowski,  the  Ambassador  recently 
accredited  to  this  Government  by  the  Imperial  and  Ivoyal  Govern- 
ment of  Austria-Hungary ;  but  that  Government  has  not  actually 
engaged  in  warfare  against  citizens  of  the  United  States  on  the 
seas,  and  I  take  the  liberty,  for  the  present  at  least,  of  postponing 
a  discussion  of  our  relations  with  the  authorities  at  X'ienna.  We 
enter  this  war  only  where  we  are  clearly  forced  into  it  because 
there  are  no  other  means  of  defending  our  rights. 

It  will  be  all  the  easier  for  us  to  conduct  ourselves  as  belligerents 
in  a  high  spirit  of  right  and  fairness  because  we  act  without  ani- 
mus, not  in  enmity  toward  a  people  nor  with  the  desire  to  bring 
any  injury  or  disadvantage  upon  them,  but  only  in  armed  oppo- 
sition to  an  irresponsible  Government  which  has  thrown  aside 
all  considerations  of  humanity  and  of  right  and  is  running  amuck. 

We  are,  let  me  say  again,  the  sincere  friends  of  the  German 
people,  and  shall  desire  nothing  so  much  as  the  early  re-estab- 
lishment of  intimate  relations  of  mutual  advantage  between  us — 
however  hard  it  may  be  for  them,  for  the  time  being,  to  believe 
that  this  is  spoken  from  our  hearts.  We  have  borne  with  their 
present  Government  through  all  these  bitter  months  because  of 
that  friendship — exercising  a  patience  and  forbearance  which 
would  otherwise  have  been  impossible.  We  shall,  happily,  still 
have  an  opportunity  to  prove  that  friendship  in  our  daily  attitude 
and  actions  toward  the  millions  of  men  and  women  of  German 
birth  and  native  sympathy  wdio  live  among  us  and  share  our  life, 
and  we  shall  be  proud  to  prove  it  toward  all  who  are  in  fact  loyal 
to  their  neighbors  and  to  the  Government  in  the  hour  of  test. 
They  are,  most  of  them,  as  true  and  loyal  Americans  as  if  they 
had  never  knowm  any  other  fealty  or  allegiance.  They  wall  be 
prompt  to  stand  with  us  in  rebuking  and  restraining  the  few  wdio 
may  be  of  a  different  mind  and  purpose. 

If  there  should  be  disloyalty,  it  will  be  dealt  with  with  a  firm 
hand  of  stern  repression;  but  if  it  lifts  its  head  at  all,  it  will  lift 
it  only  here  and  there  and  wdthout  countenance,  except  from  a 
lawless  and  malignant  few^ 

It  is  a  distressing  and  oppressive  duty,  gentlemen  of  the  Con- 
gress, which  I  have  performed  in  thus  addressing  you.  There 
are,  it  may  be,  many  months  of  fiery  trial  and  sacrifice  ahead  of 


The  War  Message  281 

us.  It  is  a  fearful  thing  to  lead  this  great  peaceful  people  into 
war.  into  the  most  terrible  and  disastroiis^of  all  wars,  civilization 
itself  seeming  to  be  in  the  balance.  ButMie  right  is  more  precious 
than  peace,  and  we  shall  fight  for  the  things  which  we  have  always 
carried  nearest  our  hearts — for  democracy,  for  the  right  of  those 
who  submit  to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their  own  governments, 
for  the  rights  and  liberties  of  small  nations,  for  a  universal  domina- 
tion of  right  by  such  a  concert  of  free  peoples  as  shall  bring  peace 
and  safety  to  all  nations  and  make  the  world  itself  at  last  free. 
To  such  a  task  we  can  dedicate  our  lives  and  our  fortunes,  every- 
thing that  we  are  and  everything  that  we  have,  with  the  pride 
of  those  who  know  that  the  day  has  come  when  America  is  priv- 
ileged to  spend  her  blood  and  her  might  for  the  principles  that 
gave  her  birth  and  happiness  and  the  peace  which  she  has  treas- 
ured.   God  helping  her,  she  can  do  no  other.      ~7 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WAR,  APRIL  6,  1917- 
NOVEMBER  11,  1918 

[Note — The  military  and  naval  activities  of  the  United  States  in  the  Great 
War  were  conducted  as  part  of  the  general  military  and  naval  activities  of 
the  Allies,  and  will  be  considered  later  in  a  military  and  naval  history  of  the 
War.] 

By  a  vote  of  86  to  6  in  the  Senate  and  by  a  vote  of  373  to  50  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  the  resolution  of  war  was  passed  on  April  6, 
1917,  and  was  proclaimed  by  the  President  on  the  same  day. 

Whereas  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  in  the  exercise  of 
the  constitutional  authority  vested  in  them  have  resolved,  by 
joint  resolution  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  bear- 
ing date  this  day  "That  the  state  of  war  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Imperial  German  Government  which  has  been  thrust  upon 
the  United  States  is  hereby  formally  declared;"     .... 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  to  all  whom  it  may  concern 
that  a  state  of  war  exists  between  the  United  States  and  the  Im- 
perial German  Government ;  and  I  do  specially  direct  all  officers, 
civil  or  military,  of  the  United  States  that  they  exercise  vigilance 
and  zeal  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  incident  to  such  a  state 
of  war ;  and  I  do,  moreover,  earnestly  appeal  to  all  American  citi- 
zens that  they,  in  loyal  devotion  to  their  country,  dedicated  from 
its  foundation  to  the  principles  of  liberty  and  justice,  uphold  the 
laws  of  the  land,  and  give  undivided  and  willing  support  to  those 
measures  which  may  be  adopted  by  the  constitutional  authorities 
in  prosecuting  the  war  to  a  successful  issue  and  in  obtaining  a 
secure  and  just  peace;     .... 

Austria-Hungary  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  United 
States  on  April  9.  191 7,  and  Turkey  pursued  the  same  course  twelve 
days  later,  although  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  United  States  had 
been  directed  only  at  Germany.  Germany's  other  ally,  Bulgaria,  main- 
tained her  diplomatic  intercourse  with  the  United  States. 

282 


U.  S.  and  the  War,  April  6,  ipiy-November  ii,  ipi8  283 

The  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  Great  War  necessitated 
a  completely  new  orientation  in  America.  Old  and  respected  traditions 
had  to  be  discarded  and  new  and  untried  methods  adopted.  To  this 
end,  the  President  directly  addressed  his  fellow-countrymen  on  April 
16,  1917. 

My  P-ELLOW-COUNTRYMEN  : 

The  entrance  of  our  own  beloved  country  into  the  grim  and 
terrible  war  for  democracy  and  human  rights  which  has  shaken 
the  world,  creates  so  many  problems  of  national  life  and  action 
which  call  for  iinmediate  consideration  and  settlement  that  I  hope 
you  will  permit  me  to  address  to  you  a  few  words  of  earnest  coun- 
sel and  appeal  with  regard  to  them. 

We  are  rapidly  putting  our  navy  upon  an  effective  war  footing 
and  are  about  to  create  and  equip  a  great  army,  but  these  are  the 
simplest  parts  of  the  great  task  to  which  we  have  addressed  our- 
selves  

These,  then,  are  the  things  we  must  do,  and  do  well,  besides 
fighting, — the  things  without  which  mere  fighting  would  be  fruit- 
less : 

We  must  supply  abundant  food  for  ourselves  and  for  our  armies 
and  our  seamen  not  only,  but  also  for  a  large  part  of  the  nations 
with  whom  we  have  now  made  common  cause,  in  whose  support 
and  by  whose  sides  we  shall  be  fighting; 

We  must  supply  ships  by  the  hundreds  out  of  our  shipyards 
to  carry  to  the  other  side  of  the  sea,  submarines  or  no  submarines, 
what  will  every  day  be  needed  there,  and  abundant  materials  out 
of  our  fields  and  our  mines  and  our  factories  with  which  not  only 
to  clothe  and  equip  our  own  forces  on  land  and  sea  but  also  to 
clothe  and  support  our  people  for  whom  the  gallant  fellows  under 
arms  can  no  longer  work,  to  help  clothe  and  equip  the  armies  with 
which  we  are  cooperating  in  Europe,  and  to  keep  the  looms  and 
manufactories  there  in  raw  material 

It  is  evident  to  every  thinking  man  that  our  industries,  on  the 
farms,  in  the  shipyards,  in  the  mines,  in  the  factories,  must  be 
made  more  prolific  and  more  efficient  than  ever  and  that  they 
must  be  more  economically  managed  and  better  adapted  to  the 
particular  requirements  of  our  task  than  they  have  been ;  and 
what  I  want  to  say  is  that  the  men  and  the  women  who  devote  their 
thought  and  their  energy  to  these  things  will  be  serving  the  country 
and  conducting  the  fight  for  peace  and  freedom  just  as  truly  and 


284  A  History  of  the  Croat  iJ'ar 

just  as  effectively  as  the  men  on  the  hattletield  or  m  the  trenches. 
The  industrial  forces  of  the  country,  men  and  women  ahke,  will 
he  a  great  national,  a  great  international,  Service  Army, — a  notable 
and  honored  host  engaged  in  the  service  of  the  nation  and  the 
world,  the  efficient  friends  and  saviors  of  free  men  everywhere. 
Thousands,  nay,  hundreds  of  thousands,  of  men  otherwise  liable 
to  military  service  will  of  right  and  of  necessity  be  excused  from 
that  service  and  assigned  to  the  fundamental,  sustaining  work  of 
the  fields  and  factories  and  mines,  and  they  will  be  as  much  part 
of  the  great  patriotic  forces  of  the  nation  as  the  men  under  fire. 

I  take  the  liberty,  therefore,  of  addressing  this  word  to  the 
farmers  of  the  country  and  to  all  who  work  on  the  farms :  The 
supreme  need  of  our  own  nation  and  of  the  nations  with  which  we 
are  cooperating  is  an  abundance  of  supplies,  and  especially  of 
foodstuffs.  The  importance  of  an  adequate  food  supply,  especially 
for  the  present  year,  is  superlative.  Without  abundant  food,  alike 
for  the  armies  and  the  peoples  now  at  war,  the  whole  great  enter- 
prise upon  which  we  have  embarked  will  break  down  and  fail. 
The  world's  food  reserves  are  low.  Not  only  during  the  present 
emergency  but  for  some  time  after  peace  shall  have  come  both 
our  own  people  and  a  large  proportion  of  the  people  of  Europe 
must  rely  upon  the  harvests  in  America.  Upon  the  farmers  of 
this  country,  therefore,  in  large  measure,  rests  the  fate  of  the  w^ar 
and  the  fate  of  the  nations 

I  particularly  appeal  to  the  farmers  of  the  South  to  plant  abund- 
ant food  stuffs  as  well  as  cotton.  They  can  show  their  patriotism 
in  no  better  or  more  convincing  way  than  by  resisting  the  great 
temptation  of  the  present  price  of  cotton  and  helping,  helping  upon 
a  great  scale,  to  feed  the  nation  and  the  peoples  everywhere  who 
are  fighting  for  their  liberties  and  for  our  own.  The  variety  of 
their  crops  will  be  the  visible  measure  of  their  comprehension  of 
their  national  duty 

This  let  me  say  to  the  middlemen  of  every  sort,  whether  they 
are  handling  our  food  stuffs  or  our  raw  materials  of  manufac- 
ture or  the  products  of  our  mills  and  factories :  The  eyes  of  the 
country  will  be  especially  upon  you.  This  is  your  opportunity  for 
signal  service,  efficient  and  disinterested.  The  country  expects 
you,  as  it  expects  all  others,  to  forego  unusual  profits,  to  organize 
and  expedite  shipments  of  supplies  of  every  kind,  but  especially 
of  food,  with  an  eye  to  the  service  you  are  rendering  and  in  the 
spirit  of  those  who  enlist  in  the  ranks,  for  their  people,  not  for 
themselves 


U.  S.  and  llic  War,  April  6,  nji "/-November  ii,  ujicS  285 

To  the  men  who  run  the  railways  of  the  country,  whether  they 
he  managers  or  operative  employees,  let  me  say  that  the  railways 
are  the  arteries  of  the  nation's  life  and  that  upon  them  rests  the 
immense  responsibility  of  seeing  to  it  that  those  arteries  suffer  no 
obstruction  of  any  kind,  no  inefficiency  or  slackened  power.  To 
the  merchant  let  me  suggest  the  motto,  "Small  profits  and  quick 
service;''  and  to  the  shipbuilder  the  thought  that  the  life  of  the 
war  depends  upon  him.  The  food  and  the  war  supplies  must 
be  carried  across  the  seas  no  matter  how  many  ships  are  sent  to 
the  bottom.  The  places  of  those  that  go  down  must  be  supplied 
and  supplied  at  once.  To  the  miner  let  me  say  that  he  stands 
where  the  farmer  does:  the  work  of  the  world  waits  on  him.  If 
he  slackens  or  fails,  armies  and  statesmen  are  helpless.  He  also 
is  enlisted  in  the  great  Service  Army.  The  manufacturer  does 
not  need  to  be  told,  I  hope,  that  the  nation  looks  to  him  to  speed 
and  perfect  every  process  ;  and  I  want  only  to  remind  his  em- 
ployees that  their  service  is  absolutely  indispensable  and  is  counted 
on  by  every  man  who  loves  the  country  and  its  liberties. 

Let  me  suggest,  also,  that  everyone  who  creates  or  cultivates  a 
garden  helps,  and  helps  greatly,  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  feeding 
of  the  nations;  and  that  every  housewife  who  practices  strict 
economy  puts  herself  in  the  ranks  of  those  who  serve  the  nation. 
This  is  the  time  for  America  to  correct  her  unpardonable  fault  of 
wastefulness  and  extravagance.  Let  every  man  and  every  woman 
assume  the  duty  of  careful,  provident  use  and  expenditure  as  a 
public  duty,  as  a  dictate  of  patriotism  which  no  one  can  now  ex- 
pect ever  to  be  excused  or  forgiven  for  ignoring 

The  supreme  test  of  the  nation  has  come.  We  must  all  speak, 
act,  and  serve  together! 

The  L'nited  States  immediately  took  over  91  German  and  Austrian 
vessels  in  the  waters  of  the  United  States,  thereby  increasing  its  ton- 
nage by  more  than  600,000,  and  acquiring  some  of  the  largest  vessels 
afloat.  Their  crews  were  interned.  Other  Germans  suspected  of  de- 
signs against  the  United  States  were  also  interned,  but  general  intern- 
ment of  alien  enemies  was  avoided  during  the  war,  although  later  cer- 
tain restrictions  regarding  travel  along  waterfronts  and  near  fortifica- 
tions, arsenals  and  similar  places  were  imposed. 

On  April  14,  1917,  Congress  passed  unanimously  a  bill  providing 
for  a  loan  of  $7000.000  for  war  purposes. 


Alien  Enemies 

Under  section  4067  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  vStates, 
an  enemy  alien  is  defined  as  follows :  Any  native,  citizen,  denizen, 
or  subject  of  a  hostile  government  being  a  male  of  the  age  of  four- 
teen years  and  upwards  and  not  actually  naturalized  in  the  United 
States. 

Amplifications  of  the  definition  are  as  follows: 

(a)  Children  of  naturalized  enemies,  even  though  born  in  the  ene- 
my country,  are  not  enemy  aliens  providing  naturalization  of  their 
parents  is  completed  before  the  children  have  reached  maturity. 
Otherwise,  such  children  are  enemy  aliens  until  they  are  naturalized 
themselves. 

(b)  Children  born  in  the  United  States  of  enemy  aliens  residing 
in  the  United  States  are  not  alien  enemies  unless  after  maturity  they 
become  naturalized  in  the  enemy  country. 

(c)  Naturalization  of  enemy  aliens  cannot  be  completed  during 
the  period  of  war  with  the  enemy  country. 

(d)  Children  born  in  an  enemy  country  of  American  citizens  tem- 
porarily residing  in  that  enemy  country  are  not  alien  enemies.  How- 
ever, if  the  residence  of  the  parents  in  the  enemy  country  is  perma- 
nent, the  children  are  alien  enemies  unless  they  have  established  by 
suitable  action  citizenship  in  the  United  States. 

(e)  A  native,  citizen,  denizen  or  subject  of  an  enemy  country 
remains  an  alien  enemy  even  though  he  has  taken  out  his  first  nat- 
uralization papers  or  has  been  naturalized  in  a  country  other  than 
the  United  States. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  war  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Central  Powers,  2,049  alien  enemies  and  war  prisoners  were  con- 
fined in  war  prison  barracks  at  Fort  McPherson,  Ga.,  Fort  Oglethorpe, 
Ga.,  Fort  Douglas,  Utah.    During  the  entire  participation  of  America 

286 


Alien  Enemies  287 

in  the  Great  War,  some  4,000  alien  enemies  were  interned  in  the 
United  States. 

During  the  struggle  of  the  United  States  with  the  Central  Powers, 
Attorney-General  Gregory  estimated  the  number  of  unnaturalized 
male  alien  enemies  upward  of  14  years  of  age  as  follows:  Germans, 
450,000;  Austrians,  600,000;  Hungarians,  400,000.  Estimating  three 
to  a  family,  there  were  accordingly  more  than  4,000,000  persons  in 
the  United  States  during  the  war  who  were  either  male  unnaturalized 
alien  enemies'  or  members  of  the  families  of  such. 

By  act  of  Congress  approved  April  16,  1918,  the  term  "alien  ene- 
mies" was  made  to  include  women  as  well  as  men. 

In  February,  191 8,  all  male  alien  enemies  were  required  to  register 
with  the  government  and  in  June  of  the  same  year,  female  alien  ene- 
mies. 

Among  the  regulations  for  alien  enemies  during  the  war  against 
Germany  were  the  following: 

All   alien  enemies   are   enjoined   to  preserve  the 

peace  towards  the  United  States  and  to  refrain  from  crime 
against  the  public  safety,  and  from  violating  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  States  and  Territories  thereof,  and  to 
refrain  from  actual  hostility  or  giving  information,  aid  or  com- 
fort to  the  enemies  of  the  United  States,  and  to  comply  strictly 
with  the  regulations  which  are  hereby  or  which  may  be  from 
time  to  time  promulgated  by  the  President;  and  so  long  as  they 
shall  conduct  themselves  in  accordance  with  law,  they  shall  be 
undisturbed  in  the  peaceful  pursuit  of  their  lives  and  occupations 
and  be  accorded  the  consideration  due  to  all  peaceful  and  law- 
abiding  persons,  except  so  far  as  restrictions  may  be  necessary 
for  their  own  protection  and  for  the  safety  of  the  United  States; 
and  towards  such  alien  enemies  as  conduct  themselves  in  accord- 
ance with  law,  all  citizens  of  the  United  States  are  enjoined  to 
preserve  the  peace  and  to  treat  them  with  all  such  friendliness  as 
may  be  compatible  with  loyalty  and  allegiance  to  the  United  States. 

And  all  alien  enemies  who  fail  to  conduct  themselves  as  so 
enjoined,  in  addition  to  all  other  penalties  prescribed  by  law,  shall 
be  liable  to  restraint,  or  to  give  security,  or  to  remove  and  depart 
from  the  United  States  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  Sections  four 
thousand  and  sixty-nine  and  four  thousand  and  seventy  of  the 


288  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

Revised  Statutes,  and  as  prescribed  in  the  regulations  duly  promul- 
gated by  the  President ; 

And  pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  nic,  1  (Woodruu  W  il- 
son,  President  of  the  United  States  of  America)  hereby  declare 
and  establish  the  following  regulatiuns,  which  1  tind  necessar}-  in 
the  premises  and  for  the  public  safety: 

(i)   An  alien  enemy  shall  not  have  in  his  possession,  at  any 
"time   or   place,   any    fire-arm,    weapon   or   implement   of   war,   or 
component   part   thereof,   amnumition,   maxim   or   other   silencer, 
*bomb  or  explosive  or  material  used  in  the  manufacture  of  ex- 
plosives ; 

(2)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  have  in  his  possession  at  any  time 
or  place,  or  use  or  operate  any  aircraft  or  wireless  apparatus,  or 
any  form  of  signalling  device,  or  any  form  of  cipher  code,  or 
any  paper,  document  or  book  written  or  printed  in  cipher  or  in 
which  there  may  be  invisible  writing. 

(3)  All  property  found  in  the  possession  of  an  alien  enemy  in 
violation  of  the  foregoing  regulations  shall  be  subject  to  seizure 
by  the  United  States ; 

(4)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  approach  or  be  found  within 
one-half  of  a  mile  of  any  Federal  or  State  fort,  camp,  arsenal, 
aircraft  station,  Government  or  naval  vessel,  navy  yard,  factory, 
or  workshop  for  the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war  or  of  any 
products  for  the  use  of  the  army  or  navy : 

(5)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  write,  print,  or  publish  any  attack 
or  threats  against  the  Government  or  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  or  either  branch  thereof,  or  against  the  measures  or  policy 
of  the  United  §tates,  or  against  the  person  or  property  of  any 
person  in  the  military,  naval,  or  civil  service  of  the  United  States, 
or  of  the  States  or  Territories,  or  of  the  District  of  Columbia, 
or  of  the  municipal  governments  therein; 

(6)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  commit  or  abet  any  hostile  act 
against  the  United  States,  or  give  information,  aid,  or  comfort 
to  its  enemies ; 

(7)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  reside  in  or  continue  to  reside 
in,  to  remain  in,  or  enter  any  locality  which  the  President  may 
from  time  to  time  designate  by  Executive  Order  as  a  prohibited 
area  in  which  residence  by  an  alien  enemy  shall  be  found  by  him 
to  constitute  a  danger  to  the  public  peace  and  safety  of  the  United 
States,  except  by  permit  from  the  President  and  except  under  such 
limitations  or  restrictions  as  the  President  may  prescribe ; 

(8)  An  alien  enemy  whom  the  President  shall  have  reasonable 


TROOPS  AT  CAMP 

The  upper  panel  shows  a  band  of  raw  negro  recruits,  just  arrived  at  camp, 
being  given  their  first  drill  in  the  United  States  Army. 

In  the  oval  central  panel,  a  band  of  recruits  which  has  advanced  in  training 
far  enough  to  be  completely  uniformed,  is  being  given  instructions  by  a  train- 
ing officer  as  it  is  lined  up  for  inspection. 

In  the  two  rectangular  central  panels,  the  centre  of  interest  is  the  army 
"chow."  In  the  left-hand  picture,  doughboys  are  lined  up  to  receive  break- 
fast and  in  the  right-hand,  a  company  resting  in  a  field  during  a  march  is 
discussing  lunch. 

In  the  lower  picture,  a  machine-gun  company  is  receiving  instruction  in 
the  handling  of  the  Lewis  gun 


Alien  Euoiiics  •  289 

cause  to  believe  to  be  aiding  or  about  to  aid  the  enemy,  or  to  be 
at  large  to  the  danger  of  the  public  peace  or  safety  of  the  United 
States,  or  to  have  violated  or  to  be  about  to  violate  any  of  these 
regulations,  shall  remove  to  any  location  designated  by  the  Presi- 
dent by  Executive  Order,  and  shall  not  remove  therefrom  without 
a  permit,  or  shall  depart  from  the  United  States  if  so  required 
by  the  President; 

(9)  No  alien  enemy  shall  depart  from  the  United  States  until 
he  shall  have  received  such  permit  as  the  President  shall  prescribe, 
or  except  under  order  of  a  court,  judge,  or  justice,  under  Sec- 
tions 4069  and  4070  of  the  Revised  Stattites ; 

(10)  No  alien  enemy  shall  land  in  or  enter  the  United  States, 
except  under  such  restrictions  and  at  such  places  as  the  President 
may  prescribe ; 

(11)  If  necessary  to  prevent  violations  of  these  regulations,  all 
alien  enemies  will  be  obliged  to  register; 

(12)  An  alien  enemy  whom  there  may  be  reasonable  cause  to 
believe  to  be  aiding  or  about  to  aid  the  enemy,  or  who  may  be  at 
large  to  the  danger  of  the  public  peace  or  safety,  or  who  violates 
or  attempts  to  violate,  or  of  whom  there  is  reasonable  ground  to 
believe  that  he  is  about  to  violate,  any  regulation  duly  promulgated 
by  the  President,  or  any  criminal  law  of  the  United  States,  or 
of  the  States  or  Territories  thereof,  will  be  subject  to  summary 
arrest  by  the  United  States  Marshal,  or  his  deputy,  or  such  other 
ofificer  as  the  President  shall  designate,  and  to  confinement  in  such 
penitentiary,  prison,  jail,  military  camp,  or  other  place  of  deten- 
tion as  may  be  directed  by  the  President 

(April  6,  1917) 

(13)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  approach  or  be 

found  within  one  hundred  yards  of  any  canal ;  nor  within  one 
hundred  yards  of  any  wharf,  pier  o;-  dock  used  directly  by  or 
by  means  of  lighters  by  any  vessel  or  vessels  of  over  five  hundred 
(500)  tons  gross  engaged  in  foreign  or  domestic  trade  other  than 
fishing;  nor  within  one  hundred  yards  of  any  warehouse,  shed, 
elevator,  railroad  terminal  or  other  terminal,  storage  or  transfer 
facility  adjacent  to  or  operated  in  connection  with  any  stich  wharf, 
pier  or  dock ;  and  wherever  the  distance  between  any  two  of  such 
wharves,  piers  or  docks,  measured  along  the  shore  line  connecting 
them,  is  less  than  eight  hundred  and  eighty  yards,  an  alien  enemy 
shall  not  approach  or  be  found  within  one  hundred  yards  of  such 
shore  line. 
309 


200  A  History  of  ihc  Great   JJ^ar 

(14)  Whenever  the  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States 
deems  it  to  be  necessary,  for  the  pubhc  safety  and  the  protection  of 
transportation,  to  exchule  ahen  enemies  from  the  vicinity  of  any 
warehouse,  elevator  or  railroad  depot,  yard  or  terminal  which  is  not 
located  within  any  prohibited  area  designated  by  this  proclama- 
tion or  the  proclamation  of  April  6th,  19 17,  then  an  alien  enemy 
shall  not  approach  or  be  found  witiiin  such  distance  of  any  such 
warehouse  elevator,  depot,  yard  or  terminal  as  may  be  specified 
by  the  Attorney  General  by  regulation  duly  made  and  declared  by 
him ;  and  the  Attorney  General  is  hereby  authorized  to  fix,  by 
regulations  to  be  made  and  declared  from  time  to  time,  the  area 
surrounding  any  such  warehouse,  elevator,  depot,  yard  or  terminal 
from  which  he  deems  it  necessary,  for  the  public  safety  and  the 
protection  of  transportation,  to  exclude  alien  enemies. 

(15)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not,  except  on  public  ferries,  be 
found  on  any  ocean,  bay,  river  or  other  waters  within  three  miles 
of  the  shore  line  of  the  United  States  or  its  territorial  possessions; 
said  shore  line  for  the  purpose  of  this  proclamation  being  hereby 
defined  as  the  line  of  sea  coast  and  the  shores  of  all  waters  of  the 
United  States  and  its  territorial  possessions  connected  with  the 
high  seas  and  navigable  by  ocean  going  vessels;  nor  on  any  of  the 
Great  Lakes,  their  connecting  waters  or  harbors,  within  the  boun- 
daries of  the  United  States. 

(16)  No  alien  enemy  shall  ascend  into  the  air  in  any  airplane, 
balloon,  airship,  or  flying  machine. 

(17)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  enter  or  be  found  within  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia. 

(18)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  enter  or  be  found  within  the 
Panama  Canal  Zone. 

(19)  All  alien  enemies  are  hereby  required  to  register  at  such 
times  and  places  and  in  such  manner  as  may  be  fixed  by  the 
Attorney  General  of  the  United  States  and  the  Attorney  General 
is  hereby  authorized  and  directed  to  provide,  as  speedily  as  may 
be  practicable,  for  registration  of  all  alien  enemies  and  for  the 
issuance  of  registration  cards  to  alien  enemies  and  to  make  and  de- 
clare such  rules  and  regulations  as  he  may  deem  necessary  for 
affecting  such  registration ;  and  all  alien  enemies  and  all  other  per- 
sons are  hereby  required  to  comply  with  such  rules  and  regulations  ; 
and  the  Attorney  General  in  carrying  out  such  registration  is  here- 
by authorized  to  utilize  such  agents,  agencies,  officers  and  depart- 
ments of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several  states,  territories,  de- 
pendencies and  municipalities  thereof  and  of  the  District  of  Colum- 


Alien  Enemies  291 

bia  as  he  may  select  for  the  purpose,  and  all  such  agents,  agencies, 
officers  and  departments  are  hereby  granted  full  authority  for 
all  acts  done  by  them  in  the  execution  of  this  regulation  when 
acting  by  the  direction  of  the  Attorney  General.  After  the  date 
fixed  by  the  Attorney  General  for  such  registration,  an  alien 
enemy  shall  not  be  found  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States, 
its  territories  or  possessions,  without  having  his  registration  card 
on  his  person. 

(20)  An  alien  enemy  shall  not  change  his  place  of  abode  or  occu- 
pation or  otherwise  travel  or  move  from  place  to  place  without 
full  compliance  with  any  such  regulations  as  the  Attorney  General 
of  the  United  States  may,  from  time  to  time,  make  and  declare; 
and  the  Attorney  General  is  hereby  authorized  to  make  and  de- 
clare, from  time  to  time,  such  regulations  concerning  the  move- 
ments of  alien  enemies  as  he  may  deem  necessary  in  the  premises 
and  for  the  public  safety,  and  to  provide  in  such  regulations  for 
monthly,  weekly  or  other  periodical  report  by  alien  enemies  to 
federal,  state  or  local  authorities ;  and  all  alien  enemies  shall 
report  at  the  times  and  places  and  to  the  authorities  specified  in 

such  regulations 

{November  16,  19 17) 

All  natives,  citizens,  denizens,  or  subjects  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, being  males  of  the  ages  of  14  years  and  upward,  who 
shall  be  within  the  United  States  and  not  actually  naturalized, 
who  fail  to  conduct  themselves  as  so  enjoined,  in  addition  to  all 
other  penalties  prescribed  by  law,  shall  be  liable  to  restraint,  or 
to  give  security,  or  to  remove  and  depart  from  the  United  States 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  Sections  4,069  and  4,070  of  the  Re- 
vised Statutes,  and  as  prescribed  in  regulations  duly  promulgated 
by  the  President; 

And  pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me  I  hereby  declare 
and  establish  the  following  regulations,  which  I  find  necessary  in 
the  premises  and  for  the  public  safety: 

(r)  No  native,  citizen,  denizen,  or  subject  of  Austria-Hungary, 
being  a  male  of  the  age  of  14  years  and  upward,  and  not  actually 
naturalized,  shall  depart  from  the  United  States  until  he  shall 
have  received  such  permit  as  the  President  shall  prescribe,  or  ex- 
cept under  order  of  a  court,  Judge,  or  Justice,  under  Sections 
4,069  and  4,070  of  the  Revised  Statutes; 

(2)   No  such  person  shall  land  in  or  enter  the  United  States, 


292  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

except  under  such  rcslriclioiis  and  at  sucli  places  as  the  President 
may  prescribe ; 

(3j  Every  such  person  of  whom  there  may  be  reasonable  cause 
to  believe  that  he  is  aiding  or  about  to  aid  the  enemy,  or  who 
may  be  at  large  to  the  danger  of  the  public  peace  or  safety,  or 
who  violates  or  attempts  to  violate  or  of  whom  there  is  reason- 
able ground  to  believe  that  he  is  about  to  violate  any  regulation 
duly  promulgated  by  the  President,  or  any  criminal  law  of  the 
United  States,  or  of  the  States  or  Territories  thereof,  will  be  sub- 
ject to  summary  arrest  by  the  United  States  Marshal,  or  his 
deputy,  or  such  other  officers  as  the  President  shall  designate,  and 
to  confinement  in  such  penitentiar}',  prison,  jail,  military  camp, 
or  other  place  of  detention  as  may  be  directed  by  the  Presi- 
dent  

{December  11,  i<pi7) 

All  such  natives,  citizens,  denizens  or  subjects  of 

Germany  or  Austria-Hungary  are  enjoined  to  preserve  the  peace 
towards  the  United  States  and  to  refrain  from  crime  against  the 
public  safety,  and  from  violating  the  laws  of  the  United  St.iies 
and  of  the  States  and  Territories  thereof,  and  to  refrain  from 
actual  hostility  or  giving  information,  aid  or  comfort  10  the 
enemies  of  the  United  States,  and  to  comply  strictly  with  the  regu- 
lations which  are  hereby  or  which  have  been  or  may  be  from  time 
to  time  promulgated  by  the  President ;  and  so  long  as  they  shall 
conduct  themselves  in  accordance  with  law,  they  shall  be  undis- 
turbed in  the  peaceful  pursuit  of  their  lives  and  occupations  and 
be  accorded  the  consideration  due  to  all  peaceful  and  law-abiding 
persons,  except  so  far  as  restrictions  may  be  necessary  for  their 
own  protection  and  for  the  safety  of  the  United  States ;  and 
towards  such  of  said  persons  as  conduct  themselves  in  accordance 
with  law,  all  citizens  of  the  United  States  are  enjoined  to  preserve 
the  peace  and  to  treat  them  with  all  such  friendliness  as  may  be 
compatible  with  loyalty  and  allegiance  to  the  United  States. 

And  all  of  such  natives,  citizens,  denizens  or  subjects  of  Ger- 
many or  Austria-Hungary  who  fail  to  conduct  themselves  as  so 
enjoined,  in  addition  to  all  other  penalties  prescribed  by  law,  shall 
be  liable  to  restraint,  or  to  give  security,  or  to  remove  and  depart 
from  the  United  States  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  sections  four 
thousand  and  sixty-nine  and  four  thousand  and  seventy  of  the 
Revised  Statutes,  and  as  prescribed  in  the  regulations  duly  pro- 
mulgated by  the  President ; 


Alien  Enemies  293 

And  pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me,  I  hereby  declare 
and  proclaim,  as  necessary  in  the  premises  and  for  the  pubHc 
safety,  that  Regulations  i  to  12,  inclusive,  in  the  Proclamation 
issued  by  me  under  date  of  April  6th,  1917,  and  Regulations  13  to 
20,  inclusive,  in  the  Proclamation  issued  by  me  under  date  of 
November  i6th,  1917,  shall  be  and  t-hey  hereby  are,  extended  to 
and  declared  applicable  to  all  natives,  citizens,  denizens  or  sub- 
jects of  Germany,  being  females  of  the  age  of  fourteen  years  and 
upwards,  who  shall  be  within  the  United  States  and  not  actually 
naturalized;  provided,  that  this  extension  of  Regulation  4  of  the 
Proclamation  issued  by  me  under  date  of  April  6th,  1917,  shall 
not  become  effective  until  such  time  as  may  be  fixed  and  declared 
by  the  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States. 

And  pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me,  I  hereby  declare 
and  proclaim,  as  necessary  in  the  premises  and  for  the  public 
safety,  that  Regulations  i  to  3,  inclusive,  in  the  Proclamation 
issued  by  me  under  date  of  December  nth,  1917,  shall  be,  and 
they  are  hereby,  extended  to  and  declared  applicable  to  all  natives, 
citizens,  denizens  or  subjects  of  Austria-Hungary,  being  females 
of  the  age  of  fourteen  years  and  upwards,  who  shall  be  within  the 
United  States  and  not  actually  naturalized 

On  April  16,  1917,  President  Wilson  issued  a  proclamation  calling 
attention  to  the  acts  defined  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States  as  con- 
stituting treason  and  misprision  of  treason,  and  warning  all  persons 
in  the  United  States  of  the  punishments  provided  for  such  acts. 

Whereas,  all  persons  in  the  United  States,  citizens 

as  well  as  aliens,  should  be  informed  of  the  penalties  which  they 
will  incur  for  any  failure  to  bear  true  allegiance  to  the  United 
States ; 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States,  hereby  issue  this  proclamation  to  call  especial  attention  to 
the  following  provisions  of  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the 
United  States : 

Section  3  of  xA.rticle  III  of  the  Constitution  provides,  in  part: 

Treason  against  the  United  States,  shall  consist  only  in  levy- 
ing war  against  them,  or  in  adhering  to  their  Enemies,  giving 
them  Aid  and  Comfort. 
The  Criminal  Code  of  the  United  States  provides: 

Whoever,  owing  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  levies  war 
against  them  or  adheres  to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid  and 


294  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

comfort   within   the   United    States   or  elsewhere,   is  guilty   of 
treason. 

Section  2 

Whoever  is  convicted  of  treason  shall  sufifer  death ;  or,  at 
the  discretion  of  the  court,  shall  be  imprisoned  not  less  than 
five  years  and  fined  not  less  than  ten  thousand  dollars,  to  be 
levied  on  and  collected  out  of  any  or  all  of  his  property,  real 
and  personal,  of  which  he  was  the  owner  at  the  time  of  com- 
mitting such  treason,  any  sale  or  conveyance  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding; and  every  person  so  convicted  of  treason  shall, 
moreover,  be  incapable  of  holding  any  office  under  the  United 
States. 

Section  j 

Whoever,  owing  allegiance  to  the  United  States  and  having 
knowledge  of  the  commission  of  any  treason  against  them,  con- 
ceals and  does  not,  as  soon  as  may  be,  disclose  and  make  known 
the  same  to  the  President  or  to  some  judge  of  the  United  States, 
or  to  the  governor  or  to  some  judge  or  ji:stice  of  a  particular 
State,  is  guilty  of  misprision  of  treason  and  shall  be  imprisoned 
not  more  than  seven  years,  and  fined  not  more  than  one  thousand 
dollars. 

Section  6 

If  two  or  more  persons  in  any  State  or  Territory,  or  in  any 
place  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  conspire 
to  overthrow,  put  down,  or  to  destroy  by  force  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  or  to  levy  war  against  them,  or  to  oppose 
by  force  the  authority  thereof,  or  by  force  to  prevent,  hinder, 
or  delay  the  execution  of  any  law  of  the  United  States,  or  by 
force  to  seize,  take,  or  possess  any  property  of  the  United  States 
contrary  to  the  authority  thereof,  they  shall  each  be  fined  not 
more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  or  imprisoned  not  more  than 
six  years,  or  both. 

The  courts  of  the  United  States  have  stated  the  following  acts 
be  treasonable : 


Alien  Enemies  295 

The  use  or  attempted  use  of  any  force  or  violence  against  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  or  its  mihtary  or  naval  forces; 

The  acquisition,  use,  or  disposal  of  any  property  with  knowledge 
that  it  is  to  be,  or  with  intent  that  it  shall  be,  of  assistance  to  the 
enemy  in  their  hostilities  against  the  United  States; 

The  performance  of  any  act  or  the  publication  of  statements  or 
information  which  will  give  or  supply,  in  any  way,  aid  and  com- 
fort to  the  enemies  of  the  United  States; 

The  direction,  aiding,  counseling,  or  countenancing  of  any  of 
the  foregoing  acts. 

Such  acts  are  held  to  be  treasonable  whether  committed  within 
the  United  States  or  elsewhere;  whether  committed  by  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  or  by  an  alien  domiciled,  or  residing,  in  the 
United  States,  inasmuch  as  resident  aliens,  as  well  as  citizens,  owe 
allegiance  to  the  United  States  and  its  laws. 

Any  such  citizen  or  alien  who  has  knowledge  of  the  commission 
of  such  acts  and  conceals  and  does  not  make  known  the  facts  to 
the  officials  named  in  Section  3  of  the  Penal  Code  is  guilty  of  mis- 
prision of  treason. 

And  I  hereby  proclaim  and  warn  all  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  all  aliens,  owing  allegiance  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  to  abstain  from  committing  any  and  all  acts  which 
would  constitute  a  violation  of  any  of  the  laws  herein  set 
forth;  and  I  further  proclaim  and  warn  all  persons  who  may 
commit  such  acts  that- they  will  be  vigorously  prosecuted  there- 
for  


The  Selective  Draft 

Conscription  for  obtaining  men  for  the  military  forces  of  a  govern- 
ment depends  on  the  general  principle  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  citizen  to 
defend  the  government  whose  protection  he  enjoys.  In  the  United 
States,  the  several  state  constitutions  make  citizens  liable  to  military 
duty,  and  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  (Article  i,  section  8, 
clause  12)  gives  Congress  power  to  raise  armies,  which,  the  courts 
have  held,  includes  the  right  of  conscription.  There  was  some  applica- 
tion of  the-  draft  principle  in  the  early  Colonial  armies  and  in  the 
Revolutionary  Army.  During  the  \\'ar  of  1S12,  the  need  for  troops 
led  to  the  introduction  of  a  bill  in  Congress,  known  as  the  "Draft  of 
1814,"  providing  for  a  draft  from  the  militia,  but  it  failed  to  pass. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  need  of  soldiers  occasioned  the  passage 
of  the  Conscription  Bill,  which  became  law  on  March  3,  1863  (after- 
wards amended  in  February  and  July,,  1864).  This  bill  provided  for 
the  enrollment  of  all  able-bodied  citizens  between  eighteen  and  forty- 
five  years  of  age.  In  default  of  volunteers  to  fill  the  quota  from  a  con  ■ 
gressional  district,  the  deficiency  was  to  be  supplied  by  drafts  from  the 
enrolled  citizens.  Provisions  were  made  for  the  acceptance  of  substi- 
tutes or  commutations  of  $300  each  in  place  of  drafted  individuals. 
Persons  refusing  obedience  were  to  be  considered  as  deserters.  A 
call  for  300.000  troops  was  issued  by  the  President  in  May,  and  the 
application  of  the  draft  created  serious  riots.  It  was  alleged  that  a 
disproportionate  number  of  men  had  been  demanded  from  Democratic 
districts;  these  discrepancies  were  corrected  by  the  War  Department. 
In  October,  1863,  the  President  issued  another  call  for  300,000  men. 
and  a  draft  was  ordered  for  the  following  January  to  supply  any 
deficiences.  Other  drafts  were  subsequently  made.  The  provision 
for  exemption  by  the  payment  of  $300  was  repealed  in  1864.  but  the 
provision  for  substitutes  remained. 

The  operation  of  the  drafts  was  not  satisfactory  in  the  number  of 

296 


TJic  Selective  Draft  297 

men  directly  obtained,  and  desertions  were  frequent  among  such  men 
as  were  drafted,  but  voluntary  enlistments  were  quickened.  It  is 
estimated  that  only  about  20,000  men  were  obtained  by  the  draft  prin- 
ciple for  the  Union  armies  in  the  Civil  War.  The  Confederate  States 
had  very  stringent  conscription  laws,  which  were  rigidly  enforced. 

In  his  War  Message  to  Congress,  President  Wilson  had  ad\ocated 
conscription  as  the  best  method  to  raise  the  huge  armies  needed  by  the 
United  States  in  its  prosecution  of  the  war  across  the  seas  and  on 
May  18,  1917,  a  bill  to  that  effect  became  the  law  of  the  land.  The 
bill  provided  for  the  drafting  of  an  army  of  500,000  men,  between  the 
ages  of  21  and  30,  both  inclusive.  It  also  provided  for  raising  the  reg- 
ular army  and  the  National  Guards  of  the  United  States  to  their  full 
legal  strength,  for  the  incorporation  into  national  service  of  the  Na- 
tional Guards  of  the  several  states,  and  for  a  day  for  general  registra- 
tion for  the  draft.  By  proclamation,  the  President  then  assigned  June 
5.  191 7.  as  the  day  for  registration.  Passages  from  the  President's 
proclamation  are  as  follows : 

And  I  do  further  proclaim  and  give  notice  to  all 

persons  subject  to  registration  in  the  several  States  and  in  the 
District  of  Columbia  in  accordance  with  the  above  law,  that  the 
time  and  place  of  such  registration  shall  be  between  7  A.  M.  and 
7  P.  M.  on  the  fifth  day  of  June,  1917,  at  the  registration  place 
in  the  precinct  wherein  they  have  their  permanent  homes.  Those 
who  shall  have  attained  their  twenty-first  birthday  and  who  shall 
not  have  attained  their  thirty-first  birthday  on  or  before  the  day 
here  named  are  required  to  register,  excepting  only  officers  and 
enlisted  men  of  the  regular  army,  the  navy,  the  Marine  Corps, 
and  the  National  Guard  and  Naval  Militia,  while  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  and  officers  in  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps 
and  enlisted  men  in  the  Enlisted  Reserve  Corps  while  in  active 
service.  In  the  territories  of  Alaska,  Hawaii,  and  Porto  Rico,  a  day 
for  registration  will  be  named  in  a  later  proclamation 

The  Power  against  which  we  are  arrayed  has  sought  to  impose 
its  will  upon  the  world  by  force.  To  this  end  it  has  increased 
armament  until  it  has  changed  the  face  of  war.  In  the  sense  in 
which  we  have  been  wont  to  think  of  armies,  there  are  no  armies 
in  this  struggle,  there  are  entire  nations  armed.  Thus,  the  men 
who  remain  to  till  the  soil  and  man  the  factories  are  no  less  a  part 
of  the  army  that  is  in  France  than  the  men  beneath  the  battle  flags. 


298  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

Tt  must  be  so  with  us.  It  is  not  an  army  that  we  must  shape  and 
train  for  war;  it  is  a  nation 

The  whole  nation  must  be  a  team,  in  which  each  man  shall  play 
the  part  for  which  he  is  best  fitted.  To  this  end,  Congress  has 
provided  that  the  nation  shall  be  organized  for  war  by  selection  ; 
that  each  man  shall  be  classified  for  service  in  the  place  to  which 
it  shall  best  serve  the  general  good  to  call  him. 

The  significance  of  this  cannot  be  overstated.  It  is  a  new  thing 
in  our  history  and  a  landmark  in  our  progress.  It  is  a  new  manner 
of  accepting  and  vitalizing  our  duty  to  give  ourselves  with  thought- 
ful devotion  to  the  common  purpose  of  us  all.  It  is  in  no  sense 
a  conscription  of  the  unwilling;  it  is,  rather,  selection  from  a 
nation  which  has  volunteered  in  mass.  It  is  no  more  a  choosing 
of  those  who  shall  march  with  the  colors  than  it  is  a  selection  of 
those  who  shall  serve  an  equally  necessary  and  devoted  purpose 
in  the  industries  that  lie  behind  the  battle  line. 

The  day  here  named  is  the  time  upon  which  all  shall  present 
themselves  for  assignment  to  their  tasks.  It  is  for  that  reason 
destined  to  be  remembered  as  one  of  the  most  conspicuous 
moments  in  our  history.  It  is  nothing  less  than  the  day  upon 
which  the  manhood  of  the  country  shall  step  forward  in  one  solid 
rank  in  defense  of  the  ideals  to  which  this  nation  is  consecrated. 
It  is  important  to  those  ideals  no  less  than  to  the  pride  of  this 
generation  in  manifesting  its  devotion  to  them,  that  there  be  no 
gaps  in  the  ranks. 

It  is  essential  that  the  day  be  approached  in  thoughtful  appre- 
hension of  its  significance,  and  that  we  accord  to  it  the  honor 
and  the  meaning  that  it  deserves.  Our  industrial  need  prescribes 
that  it  be  not  made  a  technical  holiday,  but  the  stern  sacrifice 
that  is  before  us  urges  that  it  be  carried  in  all  our  hearts  as  a 
great  day  of  patriotic  devotion  and  obligation,  when  the  duty  shall 
lie  upon  every  man,  whether  he  is  himself  to  be  registered  or 
not,  to  see  to  it  that  the  name  of  every  male  person  of  the  desig- 
nated ages  is  written  on  these  lists  of  honor 

Those  exempted  from  the  operation  of  the  draft  were  oflficers  and 
officials  of  the  several  states  and  of  the  Federal  government ;  those 
in  industry  whom  the  President  might  deem  it  wise  to  withhold  from 
military  service ;  ministers  and  theological  students ;  those  belonging 
before  the  announcement  of  the  draft  to  a  well-established  religious 
body  whose  tenets  forbid  participation  in  war ;  and  those  found  upon 


The  Selective  Draft  299 

examination  to  be  physically  or  morally  unfit  for  service.  To  fill  up 
gaps  in  the  National  Guard,  the  number  to  be  drafted  was  finally 
placed  at  687,000. 

Registration  for  the  draft  occurred  in  June,  1917;  and  the  numbers 
were  drawn  by  lot  in  July.  By  December  31,  the  members  of  the  new 
"National  Army"  were  at  cantonments  receiving  instruction. 

On  July  2,  1917,  President  Wilson  made  this  further  analysis  of 
the  principle  of  the  selective  draft: 

Any  system  of  selecting  men  for  military  service, 

whether  voluntary  or  involuntary  in  its  operation,  necessarily 
selects  some  men  to  bear  the  burden  of  danger  and  sacrifice  for 
the  whole  Nation.  The  system  here  provided  places  all  men  of 
military  age  upon  an  even  plane  and  then,  by  a  selection  which 
neither  favors  the  one  nor  penalizes  the  other,  calls  out  the 
requisite  number  for  service. 

The  successful  operation  of  this  law  and  of  these  regulations 
depends  necessarily  upon  the  loyalty,  patriotism,  and  justice  of 
the  members  of  the  board  to  whom  its  operation  is  committed, 
and  I  admonish  all  members  of  every  local*  board  and  of  every 
district  board  of  review  that  their  duty  to  their  country  requires 
an  impartial  and  fearless  performance  of  the  delicate  and  diffi- 
cult duties  intrusted  to  them.  They  should  remember  as  to  each 
individual  case  presented  to  them  that  they  -are  called  upon  to 
adjudicate  the  most  sacred  rights  of  the  individual  and  to  pre- 
serve untarnished  the  honor  of  the  Nation, 

Our  armies  at  the  front  will  be  strengthened  and  sustained  if 
they  be  composed  of  men  free  from  any  sense  of  injustice  in 
their  mode  of  selection,  and  they  will  be  inspired  to  loftier  efforts 
in  behalf  of  a  country  in  which  the  citizens  called  upon  to  per- 
form high  public  functions  perform  them  with  justice,  fearless- 
ness, and  impartiality. 

On  July  9,  1917,  President  Wilson  issued  a  proclamation  calling 
the  National  Guards  of  the  several  states  into  national  service  for 
the  national  defense: 

Whereas,  The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Imperial 
German  Government  are  now  at  war,  and,  having  in  view  the 
consequent  danger  of  aggression  by  a  foreign  enemy  upon  the 


300  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

territory  of  the  United  States  and  the  necessity  for  proper  pro- 
tection against  possible  interference  with  the  execution  of  the 
laws  of  the  Union  by  agents  of  the  enemy,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested 
in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and 
through  the  Governors  of  the  respective  States,  call  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  as  of  and  from  the  dates  herein- 
after respectively  indicated,  all  members  of  the  National  Guard 
and  all  enlisted  members  of  the  National  Guard  Reserve  of  the 
following  States  who  are  not  now  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  except  members  of  staff  corps  and  departments  not  in- 
cluded in  the  personnel  of  tactical  organizations,  and  except  such 
officers  of  the  National  Guard  as  have  been  or  may  be  specifically 
notified  by  my  authority  that  they  will  not  be  affected  by  this 
call,  to  wit: 

On  July  15,  191 7 — New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  West  Vir- 
ginia, Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  Iowa,  North  Dakota, 
South  Dakota,  and  Nebraska. 

On  July  25,  1917 — Maine,  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  Massa- 
chusetts, Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  New  Jersey,  Delaware, 
Maryland,  District  of  Columbia,  \'irginia.  North  Carolina,  South 
Carolina,  Tennessee,  Illinois,  Montana,  Wyoming,  Idaho,  Wash- 
ington, and  Oregon. 

The  members  of  the  National  Guard  of  the  various  States 
affected  by  this  call  will  be  concentrated  at  such  places  as  may 
be  designated  by  the  War  Department. 

II.  And  under  the  authority  conferred  upon  me  by  Clause  II 
of  Section  I  of  the  Act  of  Congress  "to  authorize  the  President 
to  increase  temporarily  the  military  establishment  of  the  United 
States,"  approved  May  18,  191 7,  I  do  hereby  draft  into  the  mili- 
tary service  of  the  United  States,  as  of  and  from  the  fifth  day 
of  August,  nineteen  hundred  and  seventeen,  all  members  of  the 
National  Guard  and  all  enlisted  members  of  the  National  Guard 
Reserve  of  the  following  States,  except  members  of  staff  corps 
and  departments  not  included  in  the  personnel  of  tactical  or- 
ganizations and  except  such  other  officers  of  the  National  Guard 
as  have  been  or  may  be  especially  notified  by  my  authority  that 
they  will  not  be  drafted,  to  wit: 

New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  West  Virginia,  Michigan, 
Wisconsin,  Minnesota.  Iowa,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota,  Ne- 
braska. Maine.  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  Massachusetts,  Rhode 
Island,   Connecticut,    New   Jersey,   Delaware.    Maryland,   District 


The  Selective  Draft  301 

of  Columbia,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Tennes- 
see, Illinois,  Montana,  Wyoming,  Idaho,  Washington,  Oregon, 
Indiana,  Kentucky,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi. 
Arkansas,  Louisiana,  Oklahoma,  Texas,  Missouri,  Kansas,  Colo- 
rado, New  Mexico,  Arizona,  Utah,  and  Califcnna. 

III.  All  persons  hereby  drafted  shall,  on  and  from  the  fifth 
day  of  August,  1917,  stand  discharged  from  the  militia  and,  under 
the  terms  of  Section  II  of  the  Act  of  May  18,  1917,  be  subject 
to  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  the  regular  army,  except 
as  to  promotions,  so  far  as  such  laws  and  reguialions  ;ire  appli- 
cable to  persons  whose  permanent  retention  in  the  military  serv- 
ice on  the  active  or  retired  list  is  not  contemplated  by  law. 

lY.  The  members  of  each  company,  battalion,  regiment, 
brigade,  division  or  other  organization  of  the  National  Guard 
hereby  drafted  into  the  military  service  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  embodied  in  organizations  corresponding  to  those  of  the 
regular  army 

In  November,  1917,  President  Wilson  issued  a  proclamation  an- 
nouncing a  change  of  system  in  the  selective  draft.  Under  the  new 
method  all  registrants  were  to  be  divided  into  five  classes,  which 
would  be  summoned  to  service  in  order,  so  that  demands  would  not 
be  made  upon  members  of  one  class  until  all  members  of  the  preceding 
class  had  been  called  to  the  colors.  The  five  classes  were  defined  as 
follows : 

CLASS  I 

Div. 

A — Single  man  without  dependent  relatives. 

B — ^Married  man,  with  or  without  children,  or  father  of  motherless 
children,  who  has  habitually  failed  to  support  his  family. 

C — Married  man  dependent  on  wife  for  support. 

D — Married  man,  with  or  without  children,  or  father  of  motherless 
children ;  man  not  usefully  engaged,  family  supported  by  in- 
come independent  of  his  labor. 

E — Unskilled  farm  laborer. 

F — Unskilled  industrial  laborer. 

Registrant  by  or  in  respect  of  whom  no  deferred  classification  is 
claimed  or  made. 


302  A  History  of  the  Great  ]Var 

Registrant  who  fails  to  submit  questionnaire  and  in  respect  of  wlioni 

no  deferred  classification  is  claimed  or  made. 
All  registrants  not  included  in  any  other  division  in  this  schedule. 

CLASS  II 

A — Married  man  with  children  or  father  of  motherless  children, 
wdiere  such  wife  or  children  or  such  motherless  children  are 
not  mainly  dependent  upon  his  labor  for  support,  for  the  rea- 
son that  there  are  other  reasonably  certain  sources  of  adequate 
support  (excluding  earnings  or  possible  earnings  from  the 
labor  of  the  wife)  available,  and  that  the  removal  of  the  reg- 
istrant will  not  deprive  such  dependents  of  support. 

B — Married  man,  without  children,  whose  wife,  although  the  registrant 
is  engaged  in  a  useful  occupation,  is  not  mainly  dependent  upon 
his  labor  for  support,  for  the  reason  that  the  wife  is  skilled  in 
some  special  class  of  work  which  she  is  physically  able  to  per- 
form and  in  which  she  is  employed,  or  in  which  there  is  an 
immediate  opening  for  her  under  conditions  that  will  enable 
her  to  support  herself  decently  and  without  suffering  or  hard- 
ship. 

C — Necessary  skilled  farm  laborer  in  necessary  agricultural  enter- 
prise. 

D — Necessary  skilled  industrial  laborer  in  necessary  industrial  enter- 
prise. 

CLASS  III 

A — Man  with  dependent  children  (not  his  own),  but  toward  whom 
he  stands  in  relation  of  parent. 

B — Man  with  dependent  aged  or  infirm  parents. 

C — Maji  with  dependent  helpless  brothers  or  sisters. 

D — County  or  municipal  ofifirer. 

E — Highly  trained  fireman  or  poJiceman,  at  least  three  years  in  serv- 
ice of  municipality. 

F — Necessary  custom  bouse  clerk. 


The  Selective  Draft  303 

G — Necessary  employe  of  United  States  in  transmission  of  the  mails. 

H — Necessary  artificer  or  workman  in  United  States  army  or  arsenal. 

I — Necessary  employe  in  service  of  United  States. 

J — Necessary  assistant,  associate  or  hired  manager  of  necessary  agri- 
cultural   enterprise. 

K — Necessary  highly  specialized  technical  or  mechanical  expert  of 
necessary  industrial  enterprise. 

L — Necessary  assistant  or  associate  manager  of  necessary  industrial 
enterprise. 

CLASS  IV 

A — Man  whose  wife  or  children  are  mainly  dependent  on  his  labor  for 
support. 

B — Mariner  actually  employed  in  sea  service  of  citizen  or  merchant 
in  the  United  States. 

C — Necessary  sole  managing,  controlling  or  directing  head  of  necessary 
agricultural  enterprise. 

D — Necessary  sole  managing,  controlling  or  directing  head  of  neces- 
sary industrial  enterprise, 

CLASS  V 

A — Officer — legislative,  executive  or  judicial — of  the  United  S<"ates 
or  of  state,  territory  or  District  of  Columbia. 

B — Regular  or  duly  ordained  minister  of  religion. 

C — Student  who  on  May  18,  191 7,  was  preparing  for  ministry  in  rec- 
ognized school. 

D — Person  in  military  or  naval  service  of  United  States. 

E — Alien  enemy. 

F — Resident  alien  (not  an  enemy)  who  claims  exemption. 

G — Person  totally  and  permanently  physically  or  mentally  unfit  for 
military  service. 

H — Person  morally  unfit  to  be  a  soldier  of  the  United  States. 

I — Licensed  pilot  actually  employed  in  the  pursuit  of  his  vocation. 

Member  of  well  recognized  religious  sect  or  organization,  organized 


304  -'^  History  of  the  Great  H^ar 

and  existing  on  May  18,  1917,  whose  ihcn  existing  creeds  or 
principles  forbid  its  members  to  participate  in  war  in  any  form 
and  whose  reHgious  convictions  are  against  war  or  participa- 
tion thcEein. 

AHens,  except  enemy  ahens,  were  held  subject  to  the  draft  if  they 
had  taken  out  their  first  papers,  that  is,  their  declaration  of  intention 
to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States.  On  July  31,  1918,  an  agree- 
ment was  reached  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  con- 
cerning the  drafting  of  citizens  of  one  country  residing  in  the  other. 
By  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  the  United  States  was  empowered  to 
apply  the  draft  laws  to  citizens  of  Great  Britain  and  Canada  living 
in  the  United  States,  who  were  between  the  ages  of  20  and  45,  the 
English  draft  limits;  while  Great  Britain  and  Canada  might  apply 
their  draft  law  to  Americans  living  in  those  countries  who  were  from 
21  to  31  years  of  age.  It  was  estimated  that  250,000  persons  in  the 
United  States  were  affected  by  the  British-American  agreement  and 
60,000  more  by  the  Canadian-American  agreement.  It  was  estimated 
also  that  some  55,000  citizens  of  the  United  States  were  affected. 
Similar  arrangements  were  perfected  with  the  governments  of  Italy 
and  France. 

In  a  proclamation  of  August  31,  1918,  President  Wilson  analyzed 
the  principle  represented  in  the  selective  draft,  and  announced  an 
extension  of  the  draft,  as  follows: 

Fifteen  months  ago  the  men  of  the  country  from 

twenty-one  to  thirty  years  of  age  were  registered.  Three  months 
ago,  and  again  this  month,  those  who  have  just  reached  the  age 
of  twenty-one  were  added.  It  now  remains  to  include  all  men 
between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five. 

This  is  not  a  new  policy.  A  century  and  a  quarter  ago  it  was 
deliberately  ordained  by  those  who  were  then  responsible  for  the 
safety  and  defense  of  the  Nation  that  the  duty  of  military  service 
should  rest  upon  all  able-bodied  men  between  the  ages  of  eighteen 
and  forty-five.  We  now  accept  and  fulfill  the  obligation  which 
they  established,  an  obligation  expressed  in  our  national  statutes 
from  that  time  until  now.  We  solemnly  purpose  a  decisive  victory 
of  arms  and  deliberately  devote  the  larger  part  of  the  military 


^Thc  Selective  Draft  305 

man  power  of  the  Nation  to  the  accomplishment  of  that  pin-- 
pose 

By  the  men  of  the  older  group  now  called  upon,  the  opportunity 
now  opened  to  them  will  he  accepted  with  the  calm  resolution  of 
those  who  realize  to  the  full  the  deep  and  solemn  significance  of 
what  they  do.  Having  made  a  place  for  themselves  in  their  re- 
spective communities,  having  assumed  at  home  the  graver  responsi- 
bilities of  life  in  many  spheres,  looking  back  upon  honorable 
records  in  civil  and  industrial  life,  they  will  realize  as  perhaps  no 
others  could  how  entirely  their  own  fortunes  and  the  fortunes 
of  all  whom  they  love  are  put  at  stake  in  this  war  for  right,  and 
will  know  that  the  very  records  they  have  made  render  this  new 
duty  the  commanding  duty  of  their  lives.  They  know  how  surely 
this  is  the  Nation's  war,  how  imperatively  it  demands  the  mobiliza- 
tion and  massing  of  all  our  resources  of  every  kind.  They  will 
regard  this  call  as  the  supreme  call  of  their  day  and  will  answer 
it  accordingly 

All  must  be  registered  in  order  that  the  selection  for  military 
service  may  be  made  intelligently  and  with  full  information.  This 
will  be  our  final  demonstration  of  loyalty,  democracy,  and  the  will 
to  win,  our  solemn  notice  to  all  the  world  that  we  stand  abso- 
lutely together  in  a  common  resolution  and  purpose.  It  is  the  call 
to  duty  to  which  every  true  man  in  the  country  will  respond  with 
pride  and  with  the  consciousness  that  in  doing  so  he  plays  his 
part  in  vindication  of  a  great  cause  at  whose  summons  every  true 
heart  offers  its  supreme  service 

In  the  registration  for  the  draft,  on  September  12,  1918,  of  all  men 
between  the  ages  of  18  and  20,  inclusive,  and  31  and  45,  inclusive, 
exactly  12,966,594  registrations  were  recorded,  exceeding  the  Provost- 
General's  estimate  by  almost  i>^%.  The  above  figures,  however,  do 
not  include  registrations  by  mail,  not  received  by  September  12.  although 
mailed  before  that  date.  Nor  do  they  include  the  registrations  in 
Hawaii,  the  Philippines,  Alaska  and  Porto  Rico,  where  later  dates 
were  to  be  set  for  registration. 

All  in  all,  there  were  four  great  days  of  registration  in  the  United 
States  during  the  European  War,  the  second  and  third  being  of  those 
who  had  attained  the  age  of  21  since  the  previous  day  of  registration. 
The  totals  within  Continental  United  States  were  as  follows : 


3o6  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ^ar 

June    5,    1917 9,586,508 

June  5,  1918 744-865 

August  24.  1918 158,054 

September  12,  1918 12,966,594 

Grand  total   23,456,021 

The  movement  of  the  new  draft  to  the  cantonments,  however,  was 
checked  by  an  outbreak  of  Spanish  influenza  which  swept  the  entire 
country  through  October  and  November,  abating  only  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  latter  month,  and  killing  in  the  camps  more  men  than  had 
died  in  France  directly  as  a  result  of  the  war.  Nevertheless,  by  the 
ending  of  hostilities  on  November  11,  1917,  thousands  of  men  from 
the  draft  which  registered  on  September  12,  1917  were  being  trained 
for  the  army  in  the  national  army  cantonments. 


American  Expeditionary  Force 

On  May  i8,  1917,  the  following  announcement  was  issued  from  the 
White  House: 

The  President  has  directed  an  expeditionary  force  of  approxi- 
mately one  division  of  regular  troops  under  command  of  Major 
General  John  J.  Pershing  to  proceed  to  France  at  as  early  a  date 
as  practicable.  General  Pershing  and  staff  will  precede  the  troops 
abroad.  It  is  requested  that  no  details  or  speculations  with  regard 
to  the  mobilization  of  this  command,  dates  of  departure,  composi- 
tion, or  other  items,  be  carried  by  the  press,  other  than  the  official 
bulletins  given  out  by  the  War  Department  relating  thereto. 

Colonel  Roosevelt's  Offer  of  Volunteers  Declined 

In  the  above  statement,  the  following  clauses  pertained  to  the  de- 
sire of  Colonel  Theodore  Roosevelt  to  recruit  a  force  of  volunteers 
to  fight  abroad. 

I  understand  that  the  section  of  this  act  which  authorizes  the 
creation  of  volunteer  divisions  in  addition  to  the  draft  was  added 
with  a  view  to  providing  an  independent  command  for  Mr.  Roose- 
velt and  giving  the  military  authority  an  opportunity  to  use  his 
fine  vigor  and  enthusiasm  in  recruiting  forces  now  at  the  Western 
front. 

It  would  be  very  agreeable  to  me  to  pay  Mr.  Roosevelt  this  com- 
pliment and  the  Allies  the  compliment  of  sending  to  their  aid  one 
of  our  most  distinguished  public  men,  an  ex-President  who  has 
rendered  many  conspicuous  public  services  and  proved  his  gal- 
lantry in  many  striking  ways.  Politically,  too,  it  would  no  doubt 
have  a  very  fine  effect  and  make  a  profoutid  impression.  But 
this  is  not  the  time  or  the  occasion  for  compliment  or  for  any 
action  not  calculated  to  contribute  to  the  immediate  success  of  the 
war.  The  business  now  in  hand  is  undramatic,  practical,  and  of 
scientific  definiteness  and  precision.  I  shall  act  with  regard  to  it 
at  every  step  and  in  every  particular  under  expert  and  profes- 
sional advice  from  both  sides  of  the  water. 

307 


3o8  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

That  advice  is  that  the  men  most  needed  are  men  of  the  ages 
contemplated  in  the  draft  provision  of  the  present  hih,  not  men 
of  the  age  and  sort  contemplated  in  the  section  which  authorizes 
the  formation  of  volunteer  units,  and  that  for  the  preliminary 
training  of  the  men  who  are  to  be  drafted  we  shall  need  all  of 
our  experienced  officers.  Mr.  Roosevelt  told  me,  when  I  had  the 
pleasure  of  seeing  him  a  few  weeks  ago,  that  he  would  wish  to 
have  associated  with  him  some  of  the  most  effective  officers  of  the 
regular  army.  He  named  many  of  those  whom  he  would  desire 
to  have  designated  for  the  service,  and  they  were  men  who  can- 
not possibly  be  spared  from  the  too  small  force  of  officers  at 
our  command  for  the  much  more  pressing  and  necessary  duty 
of  training  regular  troops  to  be  put  into  the  field  in  France  and 
Belgium  as  fast  as  they  can  be  got  ready. 

The  first  troops  sent  to  Fran.ce  will  be  taken  from  the  present 
forces  of  the  regular  army,  and  will  be  under  the  command  of 
trained  soldiers  only. 

The  responsibility  for  the  successful  conduct  of  our  own  part 
in  this  great  war  rests  upon  me.  I  could  not  escape  it  if  I  would. 
I  am  too  much  interested  in  the  cause  we  are  fighting  for  to  be 
interested  in  anything  but  success.  The  issues  involved  are  too  im- 
mense for  me  to  take  into  consideration  anything  whatever  except 
the  best,  most  effective,  most  immediate  means  of  military  action. 
What  these  means  are  I  know  from  the  mouths  of  men  who  have 
seen  war  as  it  is  now  conducted,  who  have  no  illusions,  and  to 
whom  grini)  matter  is  a  matter  of  business.  I  shall  center  my 
attention  upon  those  means  and  let  everything  else  wait. 

I  should  be  deeply  to  blame  should  I  do  otherwise,  whatever 
the  argument  of  policy,  for  a  personal  gratification  or  advan- 
tage  

When  the  National  Army  of  the  United  States  began  to  form  in 
France,  its  commander-in-chief  sent  it  the  following  message: 

The  White  House,  September  j,  1917. 
To  the  Soldiers  of  the  National  Army: 

You  are  undertakmg  a  great  duty.  The  heart  of  the  whole 
country  is  with  you. 

Everything  that  you  do  will  be  watched  with  the  deepest  in- 
terest and  with  the  deei)est  solicitude,  not  only  by  those  who  are 
near  and  dear  to  you,  but  by  the  whole  Nation  besides.  For  this 
Great   War  draws   us   all   together,   makes   us  all  comrades  and 


The  A.  E.  P.  ^^ 

brothers    as  all  true  An,ericans  felt  themselves  to  be  when  we 
first  made  good  our  national   independence 

The  eyes  of  all  the  world  will  be  upon  you,  because  vou  are 
m  some  speaal  sense  the  soldiers  of  freedom.     Let  it  ie  your 
pnde.  therefore,  to  show  all  men  everywhere  not  only  what  121 
o  d,ers  you  are,  but  also  what  good  n,en  you  are.  keeping  ,C 

r„d?hr';'u:h'  ""■'"  -  ^^-^"^'-^  ^-^ "--  -^  '^'-"  •' ™'»- 

Let  us  set  for  ourselves  a  standard  so  high  that  it  will  be  a 

fau  el  ,V7hV"  '°  "■  ?1"""  '^'  '"  '"'  "P  '"  "  ^"^  •••dd  -  -w 
laurel  to  the  crown  of  America 

eve'i'v  te^""rnd'r°"'""r'^f"  "'"^  ^^^  ''"  ^^^^  l"-'*  ™J 
every  test.    God  keep  and  guide  you ! 


Food  Control 

The  United  States  soon  realized  the  importajice  of  the  conservation 
of  food  in  its  program  for  prosecuting  the  war,  and  on  May  19,  1917, 
the  following  statement  was  issued  from  the  White  House : 

The  objects  sought  to  be  served  by  the  legislation 

asked  for  are :  Full  mquiry  into  the  existing  available  stocks  of 
foodstuffs  and  into  the  costs  and  practices  of  the  various  food 
producing  and  distributing  trades;  the  prevention  of  all  unwar- 
ranted hoarding  of  every  kind  and  of  the  control  of  foodstuffs  by 
persons  who  are  not  in  any  legitimate  sense  producers,  dealers,  or 
traders ;  the  requisitioning  when  necessary  for  the  public  use  of 
food  supplies  and  of  the  equipment  necessary  for  handling  them 
properly ;  the  licensing  of  wholesome  and  legitimate  mixtures  and 
milling  percentages,  and  the  prohibition  of  the  unnecessary  or 
wasteful  use  of  foods. 

Authority  is  asked  also  to  establish  prices,  but  not  in  order  to 
limit  the  profits  of  the  farmers,  but  only  to  guarantee  to  them  when 
necessary  a  minimum  price  which  will  insure  them  a  profit  where 
they  are  asked  to  attempt  new  crops  and  to  secure  the  consumer 
against  extortion  by  breaking  up  corners  and  attempts  at  specula- 
tion, when  they  occur,  by  fixing  temporarily  a  reasonable  price 
at  which  middlemen  must  sell. 

I  have  asked  Mr.  Herbert  Hoover  to  undertake  this  all-import- 
ant task  of  food  administration.  He  has  expressed  his  wilhng- 
ness  to  do  so  on  condition  that  he  is  to  receive  no  payment  for  his 
services  and  that  the  whole  of  the  force  under  him,  exclusive  of 
clerical  assistance,  shall  be  employed,  so  far  as  possible,  upon  the 
same  volunteer  basis.  He  has  expressed  his  confidence  that  this 
difficult  matter  of  food  administration  can  be  successfully  accom- 
plished through  the  voluntary  cooperation  and  direction  of  legiti- 
mate distributors  of  foodstuffs  and  with  the  help  of  the  women 
of  the  country 

It  is  of  vital  interest  and  importance  to  every  man  who  produces 
food  and  to  every  man  who  takes  part  in  its  distribution  that  these 
policies  thus  liberally  administered  should  succeed,  and  succeed 

310 


Food  Control  311 

altogether.  It  is  only  in  that  way  that  we  can  prove  it  to  be  abso- 
lutely unnecessary  to  resort  to  the  rigorous  and  drastic  measures 
which  have  proved  to  be  necessary  in  some  of  the  European 
countries. 

The  main  provisions  of  the  Food  Control  Law,  approved  by  the 
President  on  August  10,  1917,  were  as  follows: 

Section  3  provides  that  no  person  acting  as  an  agent  of  the  United 
States  shall  induce  or  attempt  to  induce  any  person  to  make  a  con- 
tract of  any  kind  or  to  furnish  goods  of  any  kind  to  the  United  States 
if  such  agent  has  any  pecuniary  interest  in  such  contract  or  furnishing 
or  is  connected  with  any  person  or  association  thus  pecuniarily  in- 
terested. Any  such  agent  must,  moreover,  if  such  contract  be  con- 
summated without  his  influence,  make  a  statement  of  the  extent  to 
which  he  is  materially  interested  in  such  contract ;  nor  shall  he  par- 
ticipate in  the  awarding  of  such  contract 

Section  4  forbids  any  person  to  destroy  any  necessaries  for  the 
purpose  of  enhancing  their  price  or  restricting  the  supply;  knowingly 
to  commit  waste  or  to  permit  preventable  deterioration ;  to  hoard  any 
necessities,  as  defined  in  section  6;  to  monopolize  or  to  attempt  to 
monopolize  any  necessities;  to  engage  in  any  discriminatory,  unfair, 
deceptive  or  wasteful  practice  or  to  make  any  unreasonable  charge 
in  connection  with  the  handling  of  necessities;  to  conspire  or  combine 
to  limit  the  facilities  for  handling  necessaries,  to  restrict  their  supply 
or  distribution,  to  limit  their  manufacture  or  production,  or  to  exact 
excessive  prices  for  any  necessaries. 

Section  5  provides  that  no  person  shall  engage  in  the  importation, 
manufacture,  mining,  storage  or  distribution  of  any  necessaries  with- 
out procuring  a  license  therefor,  after  the  President  has  made  public 
announcement  that  such  license  must  be  procured.  The  President 
is  authorized  to  prescribe  regulations  and  details  concerning  this  licens- 
ing system.  The  President  is  further  authorized  to  stop  any  unfair 
practice  by  any  licensee,  and  to  find  what  is  a  just  and  fair  storage 
charge,  commission,  profit  and  practice.  Punishment  by  a  fine  of  not 
more  than  $5,000,  or  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  two  years,  or 
both  are  provided  for  those  violating  the  provisions  of  this  section.  It  is 
expressly  stated,  however,  that  this  section  does  not  apply  to  farmers 


312  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

nor  to  retailers  doing  a  business  of  less  than  $100,000  annually  nor 
to  common  carriers. 

Section  6  provides  punishment  by  fine  of  not  more  than  $5,000  or 
imprisonment  for  not  more  than  two  years,  or  both,  for  wilful  hoard- 
ing, which  is  defined  as  holding  or  contracting  for  any  necessaries 
beyond  reasonable  requirements  for  a  reasonable  time,  whether  for 
private  consumption  or  for  seasonable  business  needs  or  withheld 
from  the  market  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  prices.  The  activities  of 
any  exchange,  however,  as  defined  in  section  13  and  of  farmers,  etc., 
are  not  to  be  defined  as  hoarding. 

Section  7  provides  for  the  seizure  and  sale  of  such  commodities 
found  to  have  been  hoarded. 

Sections  8  and  9  provide  for  the  punishment  of  persons  found  guilty 
of  limiting  output,  destroying  necessaries,  etc. 

Section  10  permits  the  President  to  requisition  foods,  feeds,  fuels 
and  other  supplies  necessary  for  the  common  defense,  to  provide  stor- 
age facilities  for  the  same  and  to  pay  just  compensation  therefor.  If 
such  compensation  be  not  satisfactory  in  amount  to  the  person  to  be 
compensated,  he  shall  be  paid  75%  of  it  and  may  bring  suit  against  the 
United  States  to  recover  the  remainder  of  what  he  shall  conceive  to 
be  due  him.  Requisition  may  not  be  taken,  however,  of  any  foods  or 
seeds  necessary  for  the  consumption  or  use  of  any  individual  and  his 
dependents. 

Section  ii  alithorizes  the  President  to  buy  and  to  sell  at  reasonable 
prices,  for  cash,  wheat,  flour,  meal,  beans  and  potatoes,  such  prices 
not  to  be  lower  than  the  minimum  prices  theretofore  fixed  for  them, 
according  to  section  14. 

Section  12  autliorizes  the  President  to  take  over,  for  Government 
use  or  operation,  whenever  he  finds  it  necessary  for  the  common  de- 
fense, any  factory,  packing  house,  mine,  oil  pipe  line,  or  other  plants, 
or  any  parts  thereof.  The  compensation  provided  for  such  action  fol- 
lows the  procedure  described  in  section  10, 

Section  13  authorizes  the  President  to  prescribe  regulations  for  the 
activities  of  any  exchange,  board  of  trade,  etc.,  in  order  to  prevent 
undue  fluctuation  of  prices,  speculation,  etc.  It  also  authorizes  him 
to  require  the  keeping  of  records,  accounts,  and  the  making  of  state- 


Food  Control  313 

ments  to  disclose  all  the  facts  relating  to  transactions,  not  only  of  the 
above  organizations,  but  also  of  clearing  houses  and  similar  organiza- 
tions. 

Section  14  authorizes  the  President,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  fix  and 
announce  a  reasonable  guaranteed  price  for  wheat,  according  to  the 
different  grades,  to  assure  producers  of  a  reasonable  profit.  The  Gov- 
ernment thereupon  guarantees  that  each  producer  obeying  the  Govern- 
ment regulations  will  receive  not  less  than  the  guaranteed  price  within 
eighteen  months  of  the  period  prescribed  in  such  notice.  The  guaran- 
teed prices  for  the  crop  of  1918  shall  be  based  upon  No.  i  northern 
spring  or  its  equivalent  at  not  less  than  $2.00  a  bushel,  to  be  binding 
until  May  i,  1919.  Wheat  imported  into  the  United  States  shall  be 
taxed,  if  necessary,  sufficiently  to  prevent  its  lowering  of  the  domestic 
price  below  the  standard  fixed.  The  President  is  authorized  also  to 
purchase  and  sell  wheat  whenever  necessary  to  make  the  provisions  of 
this  section  effective. 

Section  15  forbids  the  utilization,  after  thirty  days  of  the  approval 
of  the  act,  of  any  foods  or  food  materials  in  the  production  of  dis- 
distilled  spirits  exclusively  for  other  than  beverage  purposes,  or  for 
the  fortification  of  sweet  vines  as  defined  in  the  revenue  act  approved 
distilled  spirits  exclusively  for  other  than  beverage  purposes,  or  for 
the  fortification  of  sweet  wines  as  defined  in  the  revenue  act  approved 
September  8,  1916.  Nor  shall  any  distilled  spirits  be  imported  into  the 
United  States.  Whenever  the  President  finds  it  necessary,  he  may  also 
limit  or  prohibit  the  use  of  food  or  of  food  materials  in  the  production 
of  malt  or  vinous  liquors  for  beverage  purposes  or  to  limit  the  alco- 
holic content  of  such.  Nothing  in  this  section  permits  the  licensing 
of  the  manufacture  of  any  liquors  where  the  manufacture  of  such  is 
already  prohibited  by  law. 

Section  16  authorizes  the  President  to  commandeer  any  distilled 
spirits,  when  necessary,  for  redistillation,  the  compensation  for  such 
action  to  be  determined  as  above. 

Section  20  provides  that  no  person  employed  under  this  act  shall 
thereby  be  excused  from  the  operations  of  the  draft  law. 

Section  23  defines  the  word  person  as  used  in  the  act  to  include  busi- 
ness, partnerships,  etc. 


314  ^  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

Section  24  provides  that  the  provisions  of  the  act  are  elective  only 
during  the  existing  war  with  Germany. 

Section  25  authorizes  the  President,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  fix  the 
price  of  coal  and  coke,  wherever  and  whenever  sold,  and  to  regulate 
their  production,  transportation,  distribution,  etc.  It  also  authorizes 
him,  in  case  this  plan  be  preferred  in  his  discretion,  to  have  all  coal 
and  coke  sold  to  the  United  States,  through  an  agency  to  be  designated 
by  the  President,  and  thence  to  redistribute  and  sell  them. 

Section  27  authorizes  the  President  to  procure  such  stocks  of  nitrate 
of  soda  and  to  sell  them  at  cost,  for  increasing  agricultural  production, 
as  may  be  necessary. 

The  terms  of  the  Act  define  necessaries  as  foods,  fuels,  feeds,  fuel 
oil  and  natural  gas,  fertilizer  and  fertilizer  ingredients,  and  tools,  uten- 
sils, implements,  machinery  and  equipment  required  for  the  actual 
production  of  foods,  feeds  and  fuel. 

Accordingly,  the  Food  Administration  headed  and  guided  by  Mr. 
Hoover  was  but  a  temporary  branch  of  the  Government,  deriving  its 
powers  through  executive  orders  directly  from  the  President.  The 
administration  itself  was  not  sub-divided  into  a  great  number  of 
bureaus  with  sharply  divided  duties  like  a  permanent  Government 
department;  but  the  entire  food  question  was  treated  as  a  series  of 
problems  and  each  problem  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  individual, 
Mr.  Hoover  having  called  to  his  assistance  men  from  all  parts  of  the 
country  who  were  qualified  to  serve  him. 

Through  the  hotel  and  restaurant  section  of  the  Food  Administra- 
tion, all  public  eating  places  fell  into  a  food  conservation  arrangement 
by  which  no  meat  was  served  on  Tuesdays  (later  Saturday  becoming 
a  day  on  which  no  pork  was  served),  and  Wednesdays  (and  later  Mon- 
days) became  days  on  which  no  wheat  was  served.  There  was  to  be 
one  wheatless  meal  and  one  meatless  meal  per  day.  The  pledge  card 
division  of  the  Administration  achieved  similar  results  in  private 
households  by  getting  pledges  to  this  efifect  from  more  than  two-thirds 
of  the  seventeen  million  households  in  the  country. 

Each  state  had  a  federal  food  administrator  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent, to  attend  to  the  detailed  program  of  the  food  conservation  cam- 
paign within  that  state,  and  there  was  created  a  separate  division  of 


Food  Control  315 

the  United  States  Food  Administration  to  correlate  the  work  of  the 
separate  state  food  administrations.  All  in  all,  therefore,  the  work 
depended  more  on  voluntary  cooperation  than  on  the  food  dictation 
practised  in  Europe. 

On  October  28,  19 17,  and  again  on  January  18,  191 8,  the  President 
of  the  United  States  appealed  to  the  civilians  of  the  United  States 
to  support  the  work  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  by  practicing  sfrict  economy  in  the  use  of  food. 

The  chief  part  of  the  burden  of  finding  food  supplies  for  the 
peoples  associated  with  us  in  war  falls  for  the  present  upon  the 
American  people,  and  the  drain  upon  supplies  on  such  a  scale 
necessarily  affects  the  prices  of  our  necessaries  of  life.  Our 
country,  however,  is  blessed  with  an  abundance  of  foodstuff's, 
and  if  our  people  will  economize  in  their  use  of  food,  providently 
confining  themselves  to  the  quantities  required  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  health  and  strength ;  if  they  will  eliminate  waste ;  and 
if  they  will  make  use  of  those  commodities  of  which  we  have  a 
surplus,  and  thus  free  for  export  a  large  proportion  of  those  re- 
quired by  the  world  now  dependent  upon  us,  we  shall  not  only 
be  able  to  accomplish  our  obligations  to  them,  but  we  shall  ob- 
tain and  establish  reasonable  prices  at  home. 

To  provide  an  adequate  supply  of  food  both  for  our  own  sol- 
diers on  the  other  side  of  the  seas  and  for  the  civil  populations 
and  the  armies  of  the  Allies,  is  one  of  our  first  and  foremost 
obligations;  for,  if  we  are  to  maintain  their  constancy  in  this 
struggle  for  the  independence  of  all  nations,  we  must  first  main- 
tain their  health  and  strength.  The  solution  of  our  food  prob- 
lems, therefore,  is  dependent  upon  the  individual  service  of  every 
man,  woman,  and  child  in  the  United  States. 

The  great  voluntary  effort  in  this  direction  which  has  been 
initiated  and  organized  by  the  Food  Administration  under  my 
direction  offers  an  opportunity  of  service  in  the  War  which  is 
open  to  every  individual  and  by  which  every  individual  may 
serve  both  his  own  people  and  the  peoples  of  the  world.  We 
cannot  accomplish  our  objects  in  this  Great  War  without  sac- 
rifice and  devotion,  and  in  no  direction  can  that  sacrifice  and 
devotion  be  shown  more  than  by  each  home  and  public  eating 
place  in  the  country  pledging  its  support  to  the  Food  Administra- 
tion and  complying  with  its  requests. 


3i6  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Many  causes  have  contributed  to  create  the  necessity  for  a 
more  intensive  effort  on  the  part  of  our  people  to  save  food  in 
order  that  we  may  supply  our  associates  in  the  War  with  the 
sustenance  vitally  necessary  to  them  in  these  days  of  privation 
and  stress.  The  reduced  productivity  of  Europe  because  of  the 
large  diversion  of  man  power  to  the  War,  the  partial  failure  of 
the  harvests,  and  the  elimination  of  the  more  distant  markets 
for  foodstuff's  through  the  destruction  of  shipping  places  the 
burden  of  their  subsistence  very  largely  ori  our  shoulders. 

The  Food  Administration  has  formulated  suggestions  which, 
if  followed,  will  enable  us  to  meet  this  great  responsibility,  with- 
out any  real  inconvenience  on  our  part. 

In  order  that  we  may  reduce  our  consumption  of  w^ieat  and 
wheat  products  by  30  per  cent — a  reduction  imperatively  nec- 
essary to  provide  the  supply  for  overseas — wholesalers,  jobbers 
and  retailers  should  purchase  and  resell  to  their  customers  only 
70  per  cent  of  the  amount  used  in  1917.  All  manufacturers  of 
alimentary  pastes,  biscuits,  crackers,  pastry,  and  breakfast  ce- 
reals should  reduce  their  purchases  and  consumption  of  wheat 
and  wheat  flour  tO'  70  per  cent  of  their  1917  requirements,  and 
all  bakers  of  bread  and  rolls  to  80  per  cent  of  their  current  re- 
quirements. Consumers  should  reduce  their  purchases  of  wheat 
products  for  home  preparation  tO'  at  most  70  per  cent  of  those 
of  last  year,  or  when  buying  bread  should  purchase  mixed  cereal 
breads  from  the  bakers. 

To  provide  sufficient  cereal  food,  homes,  public  eating-places, 
dealers,  and  manufacturers  should  substitute  potatoes,  vegetables, 
corn,  barley,  oats,  and  rice  products,  and  the  mixed  cereal  bread 
and  other  products  of  the  bakers  which  contain  an  admixture  of 
other  cereals. 

In  order  that  consumption  may  be  restricted  to  this  extent, 
Mondays  and  Wednesdays  should  be  observed  as  wheatless  days 
each  week,  and  one  meal  each  day  should  be  observed  as  a  wheat- 
less  meal. 

In  both  homes  and  public  eating-places,  in  order  to  reduce  the 
consumption  of  beef,  pork,  and  sheep  products,  Tuesdays  should 
be  observed  as  meatless  days  in  each  week,  one  meatless  meal 
should  be  observed  in  each  day,  while,  in  addition,  Saturday  in 
each  week  should  further  be  observed  as  a  day  upon  whicli  there 
should  be  no  consumption  of  pork  products. 

A  continued  economy  in  the  use  of  sugar  will  be  necessary 
until  later  in  the  year. 


Food  Control  317 

It  is  imperative  that  all  waste  and  unnecessary  consumption 
of  all  sorts  of  foodstuffs  should  be  rigidly  eliminated. 

The  maintenance  of  the  health  and  strength  of  our  own  peo- 
ple is  vitally  necessary  at  this  time,  and  there  should  be  no  dan- 
gerous restriction  of  the  food  supply;  but  the  elimination  of 
every  sort  of  waste  and  the  substitution  of  other  commodities 
of  which  we  have  more  abundant  supplies  for  those  which  we 
need  to  save  will  in  no  way  impair  the  strength  of  our  people 
find  will  enable  us  to  meet  one  of  the  most  pressing  obligations 
of  the  War. 

I,  therefore,  in  the  national  interest,  take  the  liberty  of  calling 
upon  every  loyal  American  to  take  fully  to  heart  the  suggestions 
which  are  being  circulated  by  the  Food  Administration  and  of 
begging  that  they  be  followed.  I  am  confident  that  the  great  body 
of  our  women,  who  have  labored  so  loyally  in  co-operation  with 
the  Food  Administration  for  the  success  of  food  conservation, 
Avill  strengthen  their  efforts  and  will  take  it  as  a  part  of  their 
burden  in  this  period  of  national  service  to  see  that  the  above 
suggestions  are   observed  throughout   the  land. 

The  following  table  presents  eloquent  testimony  to  the  part  played 
by  the  United  States  in  feeding  Europe  during  the  War.  The  figures 
speak  for  themselves: 

3-yr.  pre-  Fiscal  Year,  Fiscal  Year, 

war  average  1916-17  1917-18 

Beef.  lbs. 186,375,372  405,427,417  565,462,445 

Pork,   lbs 996,230,627  1,498,302,713  1,691,437,435 

Dairy    Products,   lbs..    26,037,790  351,958.336  590,798,274 

Vegetable  Oils,  lbs.  .  .332,430.537  206,708.490  151,029,893 

Grains,  bushels i83.777,33i  395,140.238  349,123,235 

Sugar,   lbs 621,745,507  3,084,390,281  2,149,787,050 

In  connection  with  the  grain  exports  of  1917-18,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  wheat  crop  of  the  year  was  more  than 
200,000,000  bushels  below  the  average. 

Among  the  achievements  of  the  Food  Administration  during  the 
first  year  of  its  existence  may  be  mentioned  the  following:  The  fixing 
of  wheat  prices  had  saved  the  American  people  about  $60,000,000 
monthly.  From  July  i,  1917,  to  March  31,  1918,  80,000,000  bushels 
of  wheat  had  been  shipped  to  our  Allies.     On  May  15,  1917,  when 


3i8  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Mr.  Hoover  was  appointed  Food  Administrator,  the  price  of  flour  at 
Minneapolis  was  $16.75  P^^  barrel,  whereas  one  year  later  it  had  de- 
creased to  $9.80.  On  the  former  date,  the  difference  between  the  price 
paid  the  farmer  for  his  wheat  and  the  wholesale  price  for  flour  was 
$5.68  a  barrel,  whereas  on  the  latter  date  the  difference  had  decreased 
to  about  $0.65. 

Sugar  prices  declined  one  cent  during  19 17,  and  the  margin  between 
the  prices  of  raw  and  refined  sugar  decreased  almost  509^.  Pork 
exports  for  March,  1918,  were  more  than  50%  higher  than  in  any 
month  in  the  preceding  seven  years;  of  beef  products,  more  than  20% 
higher;  of  rye  and  rye  flour,  32%  higher  than  in  the  preceding  year; 
of  barley,  55%  higher;  and  of  oats  and  oatmeal,  3570  higher. 

It  was  estimated  that  10,000,000  signatures  were  obtained  in  the 
house-to-house  campaign  inaugurated  in  November,  1917,  pledging 
cooperation  with  the  Food  Administration.  Efforts  in  the  home  con- 
centrated upon  saving  and  using  substitutes  for  wheat ;  pork,  mutton 
and  beef;  milk;  fats  and  eggs.  The  greater  use  of  corn  and  oat  prod- 
ucts, fish  and  vegetables  was  encouraged. 

In  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1918  (approximately  the  harvest 
year),  the  value  of  all  food  shipments  to  Allied  countries  for  our  and 
their  armies,  the  civilian  population,  the  Belgian  relief  and  the  Red 
Cross  was  $1,400,000,000.  The  shipments  of  meats  and  fats,  includ- 
ing meat  products,  dairy  products,  oils,  etc.,  was  3,011,100,000  pounds, 
as  compared  with  2,166,500.000  pounds  in  the  fiscal  year  1916-17.  In 
the  latter  half  of  the  fiscal  year  1917-18,  the  shipments  were  2,133,- 
100,000  pounds  as  contrasted  with  1,266,500,000  pounds  in  the  latter 
half  of  1916-17. 

In  cereals  and  cereal  products,  the  shipments  were  340,800,000 
cereal  bushels,  as  compared  with  260,000,000  bushels  in  the  fiscal  year 
1916-17.  Of  the  cereal  shipments  in  1917-18,  131,000,000  bushels  were 
wheat,  with  10,000,000  additional  bushels  of  the  191 7  wheat  awaiting 
shipment  to  Allied  ports.  Some  10,000,000  additional  bushels  were 
shipped  to  dependent  neutrals. 

These  figures  must  be  read  in  the  light  of  a  1917  crop  which  in  nu- 
trition value  was  about  8%  below  the  average  nutrition  value  of  the 
crops  of  the  preceding  three  years. 


Early  Activities  of  the  Red  Cross 

The  value  of  the  Red  Cross  was  also  appreciated,  and  the  following 
proclamation  was  issued  on  May  26,  1917: 

Inasmuch  as  our  thoughts  as  a  nation  are  now  turned  in  united 
purpose  toward  the  performance  to  the  utmost  of  the  services  and 
duties  which  we  have  assumed  in  the  cause  of  justice  and  liberty; 

Inasmuch  as  but  a  small  proportion  of  our  people  can  have  the 
opportunity  to  serve  upon  the  actual  field  of  battle,  but  all  men, 
women,  and  children  alike  may  serve  and  serve  effectively  by 
making  it  possible  to  care  properly  for  those  who  do  serve  under 
arms  at  home  and  abroad ; 

And  inasmuch  as  the  American  Red  Cross  is  the  official  recog- 
nized agency  for  voluntary  effort  in  behalf  of  the  armed  forces 
of  the  nation  and  for  the  administration  of  relief, 

Now,  therefore,  by  virtue  of  my  authority  as  President  of  the 
United  States  and  President  of  the  American  Red  Cross,  I,  Wood- 
row  Wilson,  do  hereby  proclaim  the  week  ending  June  25,  1917, 
as  Red  Cross  Week,  during  which  the  people  of  the  United  States 
will  be  called  upon  to  give  generously  and  in  a  spirit  of  patriotic 
sacrifice  for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  this  work  of  national 
need. 

The  following  appeal  to  the  school  children  of  the  United  States 
from  the  President  of  the  Red  Cross  indicated  how  earnestly  the 
young  as  well  as  the  old  assisted  the  Red  Cross  in  its  work  of  relief 
and  succor: 

To  the  School  Children  of  the  United  States: 

September  75,  /pi/. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  is-  also  President  of  the 
American  J^ed  Cross.  It  is  from  these  ofifices  joined  in  one  that 
I  write  you  a  word  of  greeting  at  this  time  when  so  many  of 
you  are  beginning  the  school  year. 

The  American  Red  Cross  has  just  prepared  a  Junior  Mem- 
bership with  School  Activities  in  which  every  pupil  in  the  United 

319 


320  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

States  can  find  a  chance  to  serve  our  country.  The  school  is  the 
natural  center  of  your  life.  Through  it  you  can  best  work  in 
the  great  cause  of  freedom  to  which  we  have  all  pledged  our- 
selves. 

Our  Junior  Red  Cross  will  bring  to  you  opportunities  of  serv- 
ice to  your  community  and  to  other  communities  all  over  the 
world  and  guide  your  service  with  high  and  religious  ideals.  It 
will  teach  you  how  to  save  in  order  that  suffering  children  else- 
where may  have  the  chance  to  live.  It  will  teach  you  how  to 
prepare  some  of  the  supplies  which  wounded  soldiers  and  home- 
less families  lack.  It  will  send  to  you  through  the  Red  Cross 
Bulletins  the  thrilling  stories  of  relief  and  rescue.  And  best  of 
all,  more  perfectly  than  through  any  of  your  other  school  lessons, 
you  will  learn  by  doing  those  kind  things  under  your  teacher's 
direction  to  be  the  future  good  citizens  of  this  great  country 
which  we  all  love. 

And  I  commend  to  all  school  teachers  in  the  country  the  sim- 
ple plan  which  the  American  Red  Cross  has  worked  out  to  pro- 
vide for  your  co-operation,  knowing  as  I  do  that  school  children 
will  give  their  best  service  under  the  direct  guidance  and  instruc- 
tion of  their  teachers.  Is  not  this  perhaps  the  chance  for  which 
you  have  been  looking  to  give  your  time  and  efforts  in  some 
measure  to  meet  our  national  needs? 

When  the  first  Christmas  during  our  struggle  against  Germany 
rolled  around,  President  Wilson  issued  the  following  appeal  for  lo,- 
000,000  members  of  the  Red  Cross,  showing  how  the  spirit  of  the 
Red  Cross  and  the  spirit  of  Christmas  were  identical: 

Ten  million  Americans  are  invited  to  join  the  American  Red 
Cross  during  the  week  ending  with  Christmas  Eve.  The  times 
require  that  every  branch  of  our  great  national  effort  shall  be 
loyally  upheld  and  it  is  peculiarly  fitting  that  at  Christmas  season 
the  Red  Cross  should  be  the  branch  through  which  your  willing- 
ness to  help  is  expressed. 

You  should  join  the  American  Red  Cross  because  it  alone  can 
carry  the  pledges  of  Christmas  good  will  to  those  who  are  bear- 
ing for  us  the  real  burdens  of  the  World  War  both  in  our  Army 
and  Navy  and  in  the  nations  upon  whose  territory  the  issues  of 
the  World  War  are  being  fought  out.  Your  evidence  of  faith 
in  this  work  is  necessary  for  their  heartening  and  cheer. 

You  should  join  the  Red  Cross  because  this  arm  of  the  national 


(c)    Inleriiatloiial    Film    Service 


DESCRIPTION  OF  PICTURES  ON   REVERSE  SIDE 

Upper  Left  Hand  Corner — Bernard  M.  Barnch,  Chairman,  War  Industries 
Board,  March  5,  1918-January   1,   1919. 

Upper  Right  Hand  Corner — A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  Alien  Property  Custodian, 
October  22,  1917-March  4,  1919;  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States,  March 
4,   1919—. 

Center — Harry  A.  Garfield,  Fuel  Administrator,  August  2.5,  1917 — -. 

Lower  Left  Hand  Corner — John  D.  Ryan,  Director,  Aircraft  Production, 
Chairman,    Aircraft    Board,    and    Second    Assistant    Secretary    of    War,    April 

24,  1918-November  30,  1918. 

Lower  Right  Hand  Corner — Walker  D.  Hines,  Assistant  Director-General 
of  Railroads,  February  4,  191S-January  25,  1919,  and  Director-General,  January 

25,  1919—. 


Early  Acthnties  of  the  Red  Cross  321 

service  is  steadfastly  and  efificiently  maintaining  the  overseas  re- 
lief in  every  suffering  land,  administering  our  millions  wisely  and 
well  and  awakening  the  gratitude  of  every  people. 

Our  conscience  will  not  let  us  enjoy  the  Christmas  season  if 
this  pledge  of  support  to  our  cause  and  the  world's  weal  is  left 
unfulfilled.  Red  Cross  membership  is  the  Christmas  spirit  in 
terms  of  action. 

The  Red  Cross  is  "a  confederation  of  societies  in  different  coun- 
tries for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition  of  wounded  soldiers  in  the 
armies,  in  campaigns  on  land  or  sea."  It  carries  on  its  work  under 
the  sign  of  a  red  cross  on  a  .white  ground  used  as  a  flag,  always  with 
the  national  flag,  or  as  an  arm  badge.  By  Article  7  of  the  Geneva  Con- 
vention this  sign  protects-  its  wearers  as  neutral.  The  society  originated 
with  Henri  Dunant  after  the  battle  of  Solferino  in  1859.  Gustave  Moy- 
nier  of  Geneva,  president  of  the  "Society  of  Public  Utility  of  Switzer- 
land," called  a  meeting  "to  consider  the  formation  of  permanent  socie- 
ties for  the  relief  of  wounded  soldiers"  on  February  9,  1863,  which  re- 
sulted in  an  international  meeting  on  the  following  October  26.  and  a 
treaty  between  twelve  European  governments,  assuring  neutrality  and 
protection  to  all  working  under  the  Red  Cross.  This  treaty  was  con- 
cluded at  Geneva,  August  22,  1864.  It  was  adopted  by  Great  Britain, 
February  18,  1865;  Prussia,  June  22,  1865  ;  Turkey,  July  5,  1865;  and 
Russia.  May  22,  1867.  The  United  States  Senate  acceded  to  it,  March 
16,  1882,  and  it  was  proclaimed  by  President  Arthur,  July  26,  1882. 
The  treaty  is  now  generally  observed  by  civilized  governments  of  the 
world. 

The  American  National  Association  of  the  Red  Cross  was  organized 
at  Washington,  D.  C,  May  21,  1881.  Miss  Clara  Barton  was  elected 
first  president.  It  was  reincorporated  April  17,  1893,  for  the  relief  of 
suffering  by  war,  pestilence,  famine,  flood,  fires,  and  other  calamities 
of  sufficient  magnitude  to  be  deemed  national  in  extent. 

On  January  i,  1917,  the  number  of  chapters  was  250  and  the  number 
of  members,  286,400.  The  cash  receipts  for  the  previous  eleven 
months  w^ere  $1,544,245.43  and  the  total  disbursements,  $1,352,100. 
Of  the  receipts,  30%  was  devoted  to  the  European  War  Relief  and 
16%  to  the  Preparedness  Fund. 
310 


322  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ'ar 

With  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  European  War,  the 
Red  Cross  naturally  both  altered  and  broadened  its  organization. 
President  Wilson  placed  in  general  charge  of  its  activities  Mr.  H.  P. 
Davidson,  a  New  York  financier,  who  inaugurated  and  completed  be- 
fore the  beginning  of  the  summer  of  1917  a  campaign  for  contributions 
for  war  purposes  to  the  amount  of  $ioo,ocx),ooo.  On  September  10, 
1917,  Mr.  Davidson  made  public  an  account  of  the  activities  of  the 
Red  Cross  since  the  announcement  of  war  on  April  6,  1917,  as  follows: 

Along  the  route  followed  by  the  troops  the  Red  Cross  has  established 
infirmaries  and  rest  stations,  each  in  charge  of  an  American  trained 
nurse  with  an  American  man  to  assist  her. 

Additional  infirmaries  and  rest  stations  will  be  established  in  the 
near  future,  and  adequate  buildings  are  also  being  erected  wherever 
needed. 

Canteens  are  being  established  by  the  Red  Cross  at  railway  stations 
where  American  soldiers  on  reserve  duty  or  on  leave,  and  those  re- 
turning to  or  from  duty,  may  find  rest  and  refreshment.  Baths,  food, 
games,  and  other  comforts  will  be  made  available  at  these  canteens. 

The  war  council  has  appropriated  $100,000  for  medical  research 
work  in  France. 

To  be  able  to  do  its  work  without  delay,  the  Red  Cross  is  establish- 
ing warehouses  at  dififerent  points  of  importance  in  the  French  theater 
of  war.  An  appropriation  of  $500,000  has  been  voted  to  establish  this 
service  and  provide  its  first  stock  of  supplies. 

In  response  to  a  cable  from  the  commission  in  France,  the  war  coun- 
cil appropriated  $1,500,000  to  purchase  foodstufifs  to  be  sent  to  France. 

It  has  also  appropriated  $1,000,000  for  the  purchase  of  supplies  in 
France,  all  for  use  in  the  hospital  supply  service. 

At  the  military  railroad  stops  the  Red  Cross  is  establishing  shower 
baths,  laundries,  and  mending  and  disinfecting  rooms.  Then  there  will 
be  rest  rooms,  with  books,  writing  materials,  and  games.  Some  of  the 
stations  will  have  dormitories  and  lunch  rooms. 

Near  the  firing  line  the  Red  Cross  is  establishing  field  canteens.  Ex- 
tending the  work  already  begun  by  the  French  Red  Cross,  it  will  pro- 
vide one  of  these  canteens  for  every  corps  of  the  French  Army  and 
as  well  as  later  for  the  American  Army. 


Early  Activities  of  the  Red  Cross  2)2^ 

To  carry  out  these  plans  the  war  council  has  made  appropriations 
of  about  $700,000,  which  will  establish  the  canteens  and  maintain  them 
for  about  three  months. 

A  Red  Cross  transportation  service  through  the  cooperation  of  the 
French,  British,  and  Italian  Governments,  the  United  States  Shipping 
Board,  and  the  leading  steamship  and  railroad  companies  has  been 
established  to  handle  the  vast  quantities  of  medical  and  relief  supplies 
now  being  shipped  almost  daily  to  France,  Belgium,  Serbia,  Russia, 
and  other  belligerent  countries. 

The  Red  Cross  will  have  cargo  space  on  every  steamer  chartered  by 
the  United  States  Shipping  Board.  Army  transports  also  will  carry 
Red  Cross  supplies. 

The  French  railroads  are  overtaxed,  and  their  facilities  must  be 
available  for  the  military  needs  of  the  army.  The  Red  Cross  has 
accordingly  determined  to  develop  its  own  motor  transport  service. 

The  first  unit  of  trucks  has  been  forwarded. 

In  advance  of  the  fighting  forces  the  United  States  sent  to  the 
European  battle  fields  six  base  hospitals  organized  during  the  last  year 
by  the  Red  Cross — ^the  first  United  States  Army  organization  sent  to 
Europe.    These  were  sent  at  the  request  of  the  British  commission. 

More  than  a  dozen  base  hospitals  organized  by  the  American  Red 
Cross  are  now  seeing  active  service  in  France,  and  others  are  rapidly 
being  made  ready  for  foreign  service. 

.  It  is  estimated  that  some  500,000  persons  are  afflicted  with  tuber- 
culosis as  the  direct  result  of  the  war.  Scientific  efiforts  to  control  the 
spread  of  the  malady  are  not  only  of  supreme  concern  to  France  her- 
self, but  they  are  of  great  importance  in  making  France  healthy  for  our 
own  troops. 

All  work  is  being  done  under  the  general  administration  of  the 
French  Government,  and  by  French  people. 

The  American  Red  Cross  has  appropriated  $1,000,000  for  the  relief 
of  sick  and  wounded  French  soldiers  and  their  families. 

The  Red  Cross  plans  to  be  able  to  take  care  temporarily  of  these  re- 
turning populations. 

It  is  not  the  policy  of  the  Red  Cross  to  rebuild  the  villages  of  France, 
but  it  is  our  hope  to  be  able  to  give  a  new  start  in  life  to  a  large  number 


324  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

of  persons  who  have  been  left  destitute  by  the  ravages  of  the  German 
army. 

The  Red  Cross  has  accordingly  appropriated  $40,090  for  a  pro- 
visional experiment  in  this  direction,  the  plans  for  the  experiment  hav- 
ing been  worked  out  in  France  by  Mr.  Homer  Folks. 

Most  of  those  in  charge  for  the  Red  Cross  of  the  work  in  France 
are  giving  their  own  time  and  paying  their  own  expenses. 

The  appropriations  made  for  use  in  Europe  outside  of  France, 
covering  drugs  and  medical  supplies,  relief  funds,  and  expenses,  are 
as  follows : 

For  Russia   $322,780.87 

For  Roumania    247,000.00 

For  Italy   210,000.00 

For   Serbia    222,500.00 

For   England    8,800.00 

For  Armenia    600,000.00 

Other  appropriations    36,000.00 

The  total  appropriations  by  the  war  council  for  Red  Cross  work  in 
Europe  are  as  follows : 

In  France $10,692,601.00 

Outside  of  France   i  .647,080.87 

Grand  total   $12,339,681.87 

Some  of  the  European  appropriations  are  to  cover  a  full  year,  but 
the  greater  part  will  have  been  spent  by  November  of  the  current  year. 

By  November  i,  191 7,  the  Red  Cross  was  prosecuting  in  Europe  the 
following  additional  endeavors : 

Needful  gifts  and  pensions  to  sick  and  wounded  French  soldiers  and 
to  French  families  in  distress. 

Twenty  dispensaries  for  both  resident  civilians  and  for  better  health 
conditions  in  the  war  zones  to  be  occupied  by  the  American  soldiers. 

A  dental  ambulance  and  a  nurses'  service  for  American  soldiers. 

A  distributing  service  supplying  3,423  French  military  hospitals ;  a 


Early  Activities  of  the  Red  Cross  325 

surgical  dressings  service  supplying  2,000  French  hospitals;  and  an 
extensive  service  preparing  for  all  future  American  hospital  needs. 

Ten  canteens  operated  at  the  French  front,  with  provision  for  20 
more.  Similar  canteens  for  soldiers  coming  and  going  in  Paris. 
Twelve  rest  stations  and  a  number  of  recuperation  stations  for  Ameri- 
can soldiers. 

An  artificial  limb  factory  near  Paris,  and  special  plants  for  the 
manufacture  of  splints  and  nitrous  oxide  gas. 

Recreation  in  connection  with  hospitals  and  diet  kitchens ;  a  movable 
hospital  in  four  units  accommodating  1,000  men;  a  casualty  service  for 
gathering  information  regarding  wounded  and  missing. 

A  medical  research  bureau. 

A  children's  refuge  and  hospital  within  the  war  zone;  a  medical 
centre  and  traveling  hospital  in  wrecked  villages,  accommodating  1,200 
children ;  medical  work  along  extensive  lines  for  re-patrie  children 
returned  (about  500  daily)  from  points  within  the  German  lines;  a 
hospital  and  convalescent  home  for  such  children  and  an  ambulance 
service  for  other  re-patries. 

Infant  welfare  stations  in  connection  with  each  dispensary  along  the 
national  lines  planned  by  the  Rockefeller  Foundation. 

Extensive  tuberculosis  endeavors,  including  the  work  previously 
done  along  these  lines  by  volunteer  Americans.  Completion  of  an  un- 
finished tuberculosis  sanitarium  near  Paris,  and  extensions  to  the  bar- 
racks erected  by  the  city  of  Paris.  A  comprehensive  health  centre  in 
a  large  French  Department. 

Elaborate  arrangements  for  helping  refugee  families  during  the 
winter  with  clothing,  beds  and  shelter.  For  this  work,  the  entire  de- 
vastated district  of  France  was  divided  into  six  districts,  with  large 
warehouses  in  each.  In  this  connection,  four  devastated  villages  were 
repaired  so  as  to  permit  families  to  live  in  them  during  the  winter.  A 
number  of  portable  houses  were  also  furnished. 

Barracks  for  training  disabled  soldiers,  and  experimental  agricultural 
stations  for  them. 

Extensive  Belgian  relief  work,  with  preparations  for  helping  all  those 
Belgians  liberated  by  each  change  in  the  battle-line.    Transportation  of 


326  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

many  Belgian  children  into  places  in  I^rance  where  they  might  he  cared 
for. 

By  November  i,  19 17,  15,000  nurses  had  been  enrolled  in  the  Red 
Cross,  many  of  them  volunteering  their  services.  Of  this  number, 
2,000  had  already  been  sent  abroad. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  participation  of  the  United  States  in  the 
European  War,  the  American  Red  Cross  expended  $82,217,943  in  the 
course  of  its  vv^ork.  The  total  receipts  during  that  period  had  been 
$110,134,360,  of  which  $17,401,069  had  been  refunded  to  chapters. 
The  chief  items  of  appropriation  were  as  follows : 

France    $30,936,103 

Reconstruction  and  relief    2,709,740 

Refugees'  relief  and  care 2,867,866 

Tuberculosis   work    2,147,327 

Children  and  infant  mortality 1,149,129 

Recreation  and  welfare  U.  S.  Army 1,145,868 

Canteen  service    1,671,789 

Hospital  supplies,  etc 6,631,613 

Revitalizing,  dental  ambulances,  disinfecting  plants,  etc.  4,263,385 

Miscellaneous    8,349,386 

Italy   $4,588,826 

Military  and  hospital  service    1,248,310 

Civil  Relief 2,718,832 

Miscellaneous    621,684 

Russia  $1,206,906 

Medical  and  ambulance  work   469,359 

Milk  for  babies  and  foodstuffs,  and  miscellaneous  ....       738,548 

Servia   $    894,581 

Roumania    $2,676,369 

Great  Britain   $3,260,23 1 

To  British  Red  Cross   2,146,125 

Supplies  and  miscellaneous   1,114,106 


Early  Activities  of  the  Red  Cross  2>27 

Belgium    $2,086,131 

Canteens  and  hospital  supplies   401,360 

Relief  for  refugees  and  children 1,451,514 

Miscellaneous    233,257 

Armenian  and  Syrian  Relief $2,600,000 

Canadian  Red  Cross  $5oo,ck)0 

Palestine    $390,000 

Poland $200,000 

United  States  Prisoners  in  Germany $361,664 

Personnel  and  Equipment  $201,300 

United  States   $9,723,123 

Army  and  Navy  Base  Hospitals 1 10,000 

Medical  and  hospital  work   568,500 

Sanitary  and  safeguarding  service 428,500 

Camp  service,  comforts  and  convalescent  houses 7,476,150 

Miscellaneous   i)i38)973 

Restricted  as  to  Use  by  Donor  $2,520,410 

Supplies  for  Chapters $15,000,000 

Cash  Advances,  France  and  United  States $4,286,000 

Miscellaneous    $786,300 

In  the  week  beginning  with  May  20,  1918,  the  second  national  cam- 
paign of  the  Red  Cross  for  funds  took  place,  and  netted  approximately 
$150,000,000. 

In  an  address  in  New  York  City  on  May  18,  1918,  President  Wilson 
thus  analyzed  the  significance  of  the  Red  Cross: 

But  behind  all  this  grim  purpose,  my  friends,  lies 

the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  not  only  force,  which  will  be 
demonstrated  to  the  utmost,  but  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate 
character,  and  it  is  that  opportunity  which  we  have  most  con- 


328  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

spicuously  in  the  work  of  the  Red  Cross.  Not  that  our  men  in 
arms  do  not  represent  our  character,  for  they  do,  and  it  is  a  char- 
acter which  those  who  see  and  reaHze  appreciate  and  admire ; 
but  their  duty  is  the  duty  of  force.  The  duty  of  the  Red  Cross 
is  the  duty  of  mercy  and  succor  and  friendship 

Friendship  is  the  only  cement  that  will  ever  hold  the  world 
together.  And  this  intimate  contact  of  the  Red  Cross  with  the 
peoples  who  are  suffering  the  terrors  and  the  deprivations  of  this 
war  is  going  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  instrumentalities  of  friend- 
ship that  the  world  ever  knew.  And  the  centre  of  the  heart  of 
it  all,  if  we  sustain  it  properly,  will  be  this  land  that  we  so  dearly 
love. 

My  friends,  a  great  day  of  duty  has  come,  and  duty  finds  a  man's 
soul  as  no  kind  of  work  can  ever  find  it.  May  I  say  this?  The 
duty  that  faces  us  all  now  is  to  serve  one  another,  and  no  man 
can  afford  to  make  a  fortune  out  of  this  war.  There  are  men 
among  us  who  have  forgotten  that,  if  they  ever  saw  it.  Some  of 
you  are  old  enough — I  am  old  enough — to  remember  men  who 
made  fortunes  out  of  the  Civil  War,  and  you  know  how  they  were 
regarded  by  their  fellow-citizens.  That  was  a  war  to  save  one 
country — this  is  a  war  to  save  the  world.  And  your  relation  to  the 
Red  Cross  is  one  of  the  relations  which  will  relieve  you  of  the 
stigma. 

You  can't  give  anything  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States ;  it  won't  accept  it.  There  is  a  law  of  Congress  against 
accepting  even  services  without  pay.  The  only  thing  that  the 
Government  will  accept  is  a  loan,  and  duties  performed ;  but  it  is 
a  great  deal  better  to  give  than  to  lend  or  to  pay,  and  your  great 
channel  for  giving  is  the  American  Red  Cross 

And  think  what  we  have  here !  We  call  it  the  American  Red 
Cross,  but  it  is  merely  a  branch  of  a  great  international  organiza- 
tion, which  is  recognized  not  only  by  the  statutes  of  each  of  the 
civilized  governments  of  the  world,  but  is  recognized  by  inter- 
national agreement  and  treaty,  as  the  recognized  and  accepted 
instrumentality  of  mercy  and  succor.  And  one  of  the  deepest 
stains  upon  the  reputation  of  the  German  Army  is  that  it  has  not 
respected  the  Red  Cross.  That  goes  to  the  root  of  the  matter. 
They  have  not  respected  the  instrumentality  they  themselves  par- 
ticipated in  setting  up  as  the  thing  which  no  man  was  to  touch 
because  it  was  the  expression  of  common  humanity. 

We  are  members,  by  being  members  of  the  American  Red  Cross, 
of  a  great  fraternity  and  fellowship  which  extends  all  over  the 


Early  Activities  of  the  Red  Cross  329 

world,  and  this  cross  which  these  ladies  bore  here  today  is  an 
emblem  of  Christianity  itself.  It  fills  my  imagination,  ladies  and 
gentlemen,  to  think  of  the  women  all  over  this  country  who  are 
busy  tonight  and  are  busy  every  night  and  every  day  doing  the 
work  of  the  Red  Cross,  busy  with  a  great  eagerness  to  find  out  the 
most  serviceable  thing  to  do,  busy  with  a  forgetfulness  of  the  old 
frivolities  of  their  social  relationships,  ready  to  curtail  the  duties 
of  the  household  in  order  that  they  may  contribute  to  this  common 
work  that  ail  their  hearts  are  engaged  in,  and  in  doing  which  their 
hearts  become  acquainted  with  each  other 

In  the  last  previous  foreign  war  of  the  United  States,  the  Red 
Cross  also  performed  valiant  services.  Its  activities  in  aiding  the 
Cuban  natives  and  in  alleviating  the  sufifering  in  the  Spanish-American 
War  were  thus  discussed  by  President  McKinley: 

On  the  24th  of  December  last   (1897)   I  caused 

to  be  issued  an  appeal  to  the  American  people  inviting  contribu- 
tions in  money  or  in  kind  for  the  succor  of  the  starving  sufiferers 
in  Cuba,  following  this  on  the  8th  of  January  by  a  similar  public 
announcement  of  the  formation  of  a  central  Cuban  relief  com- 
mittee, with  headquarters  in  New  York  City,  composed  of  three 
members  representing  the  American  National  Red  Cross  and  the 
religious  and  business  elements  of  the  community. 

The  efforts  of  that  committee  have  been  untiring  and  have  ac- 
complished much.  Arrangements  for  free  transportation  to  Cuba 
have  greatly  aided  the  charitable  work.  The  president  of  the 
American  Red  Cross  and  representatives  of  other  contributory 
organizations  have  generously  visited  Cuba  and  cooperated  with 
the  consul-general  and  the  local  authorities  to  make  effective  dis- 
tribution of  the  relief  collected  through  the  efforts  of  the  central 
committee.  Nearly  $200,000  in  money  and  supplies  has  already 
reached  the  sufferers,  and  more  is  forthcoming.  The  supplies  are 
admitted  duty  free,  and  transportation  to  the  interior  has  been 
arranged,  so  that  the  relief,  at  first  necessarily  confined  to  Havana 
and  the  larger  cities,  is  now  extended  through  most,  if  not  all, 
of  the  towns  where  suffering  exists. 

Thousands  of  lives  have  already  been  saved.  The  necessity  for 
a  change  in  the  condition  of  the  reconcentrados  is  recognized  by 
the  Spanish  Government.  Within  a  few  days  past  the  orders  of 
General  Weyler  have  been  revoked.  The  reconcentrados,  it  is 
said,  are  to  be  permitted  to  return  to  their  homes  and  aided  to 


330  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

resume  the  self-supporting  pursuits  of  peace.  Public  works  have 
been  ordered  to  give  them  employment  and  a  sum  of  $600,000  has 
been  appropriated  for  their  relief 

By   the   end   of   December  the   mortality  among 

them  (the  Cuban  natives)  had  frightfully  increased.  Conserva- 
tive estimates  from  Spanish  sources  placed  the  deaths  among  these 
distressed  people  at  over  40  per  cent  from  the  time  General 
Weyler's  decree  of  reconcentration  was  enforced.  With  the  acqui- 
escence of  the  Spanish  authorities,  a  scheme  was  adopted  for  relief 
by  charitable  contributions  raised  in  this  country  and  distributed, 
under  the  direction  of  the  consul-general  and  the  several  consuls, 
by  noble  and  earnest  individual  effort  through  the  organized 
agencies  of  the  American  Red  Cross.  Thousands  of  lives  were 
thus  saved,  but  many  thousands  more  were  inaccessible  to  such 
forms  of  aid 

It  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to  mention  in  terms  of 

cordial  appreciation  the  timely  and  useful  work  of  the  American 
National  Red  Cross,  both  in  relief  measures  preparatory  to  the 
campaigns,  in  sanitary  assistance  at  several  of  the  camps  of  as- 
semblage, and  later,  under  the  able  and  experienced  leadership 
of  the  president  of  the  society.  Miss  Clara  Barton,  on  the  fields  of 
battle  and  in  the  hospitals  at  the  front  in  Cuba.  Working  in  con- 
junction with  the  governmental  authorities  and  under  their  sanc- 
tion and  approval,  and  with  the  enthusiastic  cooperation  of  many 
patriotic  women  and  societies  in  the  various  States,  the  Red  Cross 
has  fully  maintained  its  already  high  reputation  for  intense  earnest- 
ness and  ability  to  exercise  the  noble  purposes  of  its  international 
organization,  thus  justifying  the  confidence  and  support  which 
it  has  received  at  the  hands  of  the  American  people.  To  the  mem- 
bers and  ofificers  of  this  society  and  all  who  aided  them  in  their 
philanthropic  work  the  sincere  and  lasting  gratitude  of  the  soldiers 
and  the  public  is  due  and  is  freely  accorded.     .... 


Flag  Day  Address  of  President  Wilson,  1917 

In  connection  with  the  war  against  Germany,  Flag  Day,  June  14, 
held  an  especial  significance  for  America  in  the  year  1917.  Notable 
passages  from  President  Wilson's  address  on  that  occasion  are  as 
follows : 

My  Fellow  Citizens  : 

We  meet  to  celebrate  Flag  Day  because  this  flag  which  we  honor 
and  under  which  we  serve  is  the  emblem  of  our  unity,  our  power, 
our  thought  and  purpose  as  a  Nation.  It  has  no  other  character 
than  that  which  we  give  it  from  generation  to  generation.  The 
choices  are  ours.  It  floats  in  majestic  silence  above  the  hosts 
that  execute  those  choices,  whether  in  peace  or  in  war.  And  yet, 
though  silent,  it  speaks  to  us— speaks  to  us  of  the  past,  of  the  men 
and  women  who  went  before  us  and  of  the  records  they  wrote 
upon  it.  We  celebrate  the  day  of  its  birth;  and  from  its  birth 
until  now  it  has  witnessed  a  great  history,  has  floated  on  high 
the  symbol  of  great  events,  of  a  great  plan  of  life  worked  out  by 
a  great  people.  We  are  about  to  carry  it  into  battle,  to  lift  it 
where  it  will  draw  the  fire  of  our  enemies.  We  are  about  to  bid 
thousands,  hundreds  of  thousands,  it  may  be  millions,  of  our  men, 
the  young,  the  strong,  the  capable  men  of  the  Nation,  to  go  forth 
and  die  beneath  it  on  fields  of  blood  far  away — for  what?  For 
some  unaccustomed  thing?  For  something  for  which  it  has  never 
sought  the  fire  before?  American  armies  were  never  before  sent 
across  the  seas.  Why  are  they  sent  now  ?  For  some  new  purpose, 
for  which  this  great  flag  has  never  been  carried- before,  or  for  some 
old,  familiar  heroic  purpose  for  which  it  has  seen  men,  its  own 
men,  die  on  every  battle  field  upon  which  Americans  have  borne 
arms  since  the  Revolution? 

These  are  questions  which  must  be  answered.  We  are  Ameri- 
cans. We  in  our  turn  serve  America,  and  can  serve  her  with  no 
private  purpose.  We  must  use  her  flag  as  she  has  always  used  it. 
We  are  accountable  at  the  bar  of  history  and  must  plead  in  utter 
frankness  what  purpose  it  is  we  seek  to  serve. 

It  is  plain  enough  how  we  were  forced  into  the  war.     The 

331 


^;^2  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

extraordinary  insults  and  aggressions  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government  left  us  no  self-respecting  choice  but  to  take  up  arms 
in  defense  of  our  rights  as  a  free  j^eople  and  of  our  honor  as  a 
sovereign  government.  The  military  masters  of  Germany  denied 
us  the  right  to  be  neutral.  They  filled  our  unsuspecting  communi- 
ties with  vicious  spies  and  conspirators  and  sought  to  corrupt  the 
opinion  of  our  people  in  their  own  behalf.  When  they  found 
that  they  could  not  do  that,  their  agents  diligently  spread  sedition 
amongst  us  and  sought  to  draw  our  own  citizens  from  their  al- 
legiance— and  some  of  those  agents  were  men  connected  with  the 
official  embassy  of  the  German  Government  itself  here  in  our  own 
Capital.  Tliey  sought  by  violence  to  destroy  our  industries  and 
arrest  our  commerce.  They  tried  to  incite  Mexico  to  take  up 
arms  against  us  and  to  draw  Japan  into>  a  hostile  alliance  with 
her — and  that,  not  by  indirection,  but  by  direct  suggestion  from 
the  foreign  office  in  Berlin.  They  impudently  denied  us  the  use 
of  the  high  seas  and  repeatedly  executed  their  threat  that  they 
would  send  to  their  death  any  of  our  people  who  ventured  to 
approach  the  coasts  of  Europe.  And  many  of  our  own  people 
were  corrupted.  Men  began  to  look  upon  their  own  neighbors 
with  suspicion  and  to  wonder  in  their  hot  resentment  and  surprise 
whether  there  was  any  community  in  which  hostile  intrigue  did 
not  lurk.  What  great  nation  in  such  circumstances  would  not 
have  taken  up  arms?  Much  as  we  had  desired  peace,  it  was 
denied  us,  and  not  of  our  own  choice.  This  flag  under  which 
we  serve  would  have  been  dishonored  had  we  withheld  our 
hand 

The  war  was  begun  by  the  military  masters  of  Germany,  who 
proved  to  be  also  the  masters  of  Austria-Hungary.  These  men 
have  never  regarded  nations  as  peoples,  men,  women,  and  children 
of  like  blood  and  frame  as  themselves,  for  whom  governments 
existed  and  in  whom  governments  had  their  life.  They  have  re- 
garded them  merely  as  serviceable  organizations  which  they  could 
by  force  or  intrigue  bend  or  corrupt  to  their  own  purpose.  They 
have  regarded  the  smaller  States,  in  particular,  and  the  peoples 
who  could  be  overwhelmed  by  force,  as  their  natural  tools  and  in- 
struments of  domination.  Their  purpose  has  long  been 
avowed 

The  facts  are  patent  to  all  the  world,  and  nowhere  are  they 
more  plainly  seen  than  in  the  United  States,  where  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  deal  with  facts  and  not  with  sophistries ;  and  the  great 
fact  that  stands  out  above  all  the  rest  is  that  this  is  a  people's 


Flag  Day  Address,  igij  333 

war,  a  war  for  freedom  and  justice  and  self-government  amongst 
all  the  nations  of  the  world,  a  war  to  make  the  world  safe  for 
the  peoples  who  live  upon  it  and  have  made  it  their  own,  the 
German  people  themselves  included;  and  that  with  us  rests  the 
choice  to  break  through  all  these  hypocrisies  and  patent  cheats  and 
masks  of  brute  force  and  help  set  the  world  free,  or  else  stand 
aside  and  let  it  be  dominated  a  long  age  through  by  sheer  weight 
of  arms  and  the  arbitrary  choices  of  self-constituted  masters,  by 
the  nation  which  can  maintain  the  biggest  armies  and  the  most 
irresistible  armaments — a  power  to  which  the  world  has  afforded 
no  parallel  and  in  the  face  of  which  political  freedom  must  wither 
and  perish. 

For  us  there  is  but  one  choice.  We  have  made  it.  Woe  be  to 
the  man  or  group  of  men  that  seeks  to  stand  in  our  way  in  this 
day  of  high  resolution,  when  every  principle  we  hold  dearest  is  to 
be  vindicated  and  made  secure  for  the  salvation  of  the  nations. 
We  are  ready  to  plead  at  the  bar  of  history,  and  our  flag  shall 
wear  a  new  luster.  Once  more  we  shall  make  good  with  our  lives 
and  fortunes  the  great  faith  to  which  we  were  born,  and  a  new 
glory  shall  shine  in  the  face  of  our  people. 


Liberty  Loans 

The  tenn  "Liberty  Loan"  was  applied  originally  to  the  $5,000,000,000 
of  the  $7,000,000,000  first  war  budget  voted  by  Congress  on  April  14, 
1917,  which  was  to  be  met  outside  of  taxation.  Soon,  however,  the 
term  was  applied  to  the  $2,000,000,000  of  the  $5,000,000,000  which  was 
offered  to  popular  subscription.  The  rate  of  interest  was  3>47c',  with 
the  provision  that  it  would  be  raised  equal  to  any  higher  rate  of  interest 
which  might  be  paid  on  later  loans.  Bearer  bonds  were  offered  in 
amounts  of  $50,  $100,  $500,  and  $1,000;  and  registered  bonds  from 
denominations  of  $100  to  $100,000.  The  bonds  mature  in  30  years 
from  the  date  of  issue,  June  15,  191 7,  but  are  redeemable  in  whole  or 
in  part,  at  the  option  of  the  United  States,  on  or  after  15  years,  at  par 
and  accrued  interest.  Two  per  cent  of  the  amount  of  the  bonds  was 
payable  on  application,  18%  on  June  28,  20%  July  30,  30%  August  15, 
and  30%  August  30.  Interest  is  payable  on  June  15  and  December  15 
of  each  year.  Bonds  are  exempt  from  all  Federal,  State  and  local  taxa- 
tion, excepting  estate  and  inheritance  taxes.  When  subscriptions  were 
closed  on  June  15,  it  was  found  that  the  loan  had  been  largely  over- 
subscribed. 

The  Second  Liberty  Loan  campaign  occupied  most  of  the  month  of 
October,  1917.  The  details  were  much  the  same  as  those  of  the  First 
Loan,  as  described  above;  but  the  rate  of  interest  was  4%,  thus  auto- 
matically making  the  rate  of  interest  for  the  First  Liberty  Bonds  equal 
to  this  rate.  The  minimum  subscription  was  placed  at  $3,000,000,000 ; 
and  it  was  announced  that  half  of  the  subscriptions  between  this  sum 
and  $5,000,000,000  would  also  be  issued.  Total  subscriptions  by  the 
public  amounted  to  $4,617,532,300;  so  that  the  amount  issued  became 
$3,808,766,150. 

The  Third  Liberty  Loan  campaign  was  inaugurated  on  April  6,  1918, 
the  first  anniversary  of  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the 

334 


Liberty  Lomis  335 

European  War.  The  campaign  closed  on  the  following  May  4.  The 
amount  of  the  loan  was  $3,000,000,000  and  oversubscriptions,  and  the 
rate  of  interest  was  4>4%,  to  which  the  bonds  of  the  First  and  Second 
Liberty  Loans  were  as  a  consequence  converted.  The  bonds  were 
issued  to  mature  in  ten  years  from  the  date  of  issue.  Five  per  cent  of 
the  amount  subscribed  for  the  various  bonds  was  due  on  subscription, 
20%  on  the  following  May  28,  35%  on  the  following  July  18,  and  40% 
on  the  following  August  15.  The  lowest  denomination  of  the  bonds  of 
the  Third  Liberty  Loan  was  $50. 

The  bond?  of  the  Third  Liberty  Loan  were  not  convertible  to  any 
higher  rate  of  interest. 

The  total  subscriptions  to  the  Third  Liberty  Loan  were  $4,176,517,- 
550,  an  oversubscription  of  39%-,  every  federal  reserve  district  over- 
subscribing its  quota. 

The  campaign  for  the  Fourth  Liberty  Loan  opened  on  September 
28,  1918,  and  closed  on  October  19,  1918.  The  amount  was  set  at 
$6,000,000,000;  the  rate  of  interest  was  4>4%;  and  the  bonds  will 
mature  on  October  15,  1938,  although  they  may  be  redeemed  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  United  States  at  par  and  accrued  interest  any  time 
after  October  15,  1933. 

In  spite  of  undeniable  evidence  that  the  Central  Powers  were  in  the 
last  stages  of  their  resistance  to  the  Allies  and  that  the  end  of  the  war 
would  probably  be  in  sight  before  the  end  of  the  year,  and  despite  a 
violent  epidemic  of  influenza  which  swept  the  country  from  one  end 
to  another,  disarranging  all  activities  of  the  American  people  and  bring- 
ing sorrow  and  desolation  to  tens  of  thousands  of  American  households, 
the  loan  was  an  unqualified  success.  When  the  books  had  closed,  it 
was  found  that  the  loan  had  been  oversubscribed  more  than  14%,  the 
total  subscriptions  being  above  $6,850,000,000,  making  this  the  largest 
popular  loan  ever  floated  in  the  history  of  the  world.  The  number  of 
subscribers  was  above  21,000,000,  as  compared  with  4,500,000;  9.500,- 
000;  and  18,300,000  in  the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Liberty  Loans 
respectively. 

The  quotas  and  the  subscriptions  of  the  several  Federal  Reserve 
Districts  were  as  follows : 


336  A  History-  of  the  Great  War 

District  Quota  Subscription  P.  C. 

Boston    $    500,000,000  $    632,221,850  126.44 

Richmond    280,000,000  352,688,200  125.0-5 

Philadelphia   500,000,000  598,763.650  1 19.75 

Cleveland    600,000,000  702,059,800  1 17 

Dallas    126,000,000  145,944,450  1 15-82 

Minneapolis    210,000,000  241,028,300  1 15.06 

San  Francisco 402,000,000  459,000,000  Ii4-I7 

St.   Louis    260,000,000  296,388,550  1 13.99 

New  York   1,800,000,000  2,044,778,000  1 13-59 

Atlanta    192,000,000  217,885,200  113-48 

Kansas  City   260,000,000  294,646,450  1 13.32 

Chicago 870,000,000  969,209,000  1 1 1.40 

U.  S.  Treasury 33,329,850  

Total   $6,000,000,000        $6,987,943,300         1 16.45 

The  amount  of  the  war  obligations  of  the  United  States,  at  the  time 
of  the  signing  of  the  armistice  on  November  11,  1918,  was  as  follows: 

Amount  Redeemable 

First  Liberty  Loan $  2,000,000,000  1932- 1947 

Second  Liberty  Loan 3,808,000,000  1927- 1942 

Third  Liberty  Loan 4.176,000,000  1928 

Fourth  Liberty  Loan 6,988,000,000  1933"  1938 

War  Savings  Stamps 879,000,000  1923 

Total    $17,851,000,000 

On  October  12,  1917,  the  President  set  aside  October  24,  1917,  as 
Liberty  Day,  for  the  stimulation  of  the  Second  Liberty  Loan. 

The  Second  Liberty  Loan  gives  the  people  of  the 

United  States  another  opportunity  to  lend  their  funds  to  their 
Government  to  sustain  their  country  at  war.  The  might  of  the 
United  States  is  being  mobilized  and  organized  to  strike  a  mortal 
blow  at  autocracy  in  defense  of  outraged  American  rights  and  of 
the  cause  of  Liberty.  Billions  of  dollars  are  required  to  arm,  feed 
and  clothe  the  brave  men  who  are  going  forth  to  fight  our  country's 


A  FLEET  OF  TRANSPORTS  AT  SEA 

In  the  upper  picture  is  shown  the  formation  adopted  bj-  the  transports 
which  carried  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  to  far-off  shores  to  assist 
materially  in  overcoming  the  armed  force  .of  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment. The  photograph  was  taken  from  one  of  the  scout  airplanes  accom- 
panying the  fleet  as  it  approached  the  seas  where  submarines  were  ex- 
pected. 


SMOKE    SCREENS 

In  the  lower  picture,  the  use  of  smoke  screens  to  foil  submarines  is 
vividly  portrayed.  The  smoke  in  this  picture  was  furnished  by  especially 
prepared  "smoke-boxes,'"  although  in  the  background  may  be  seen  also  the 
columns  of  smoke  poured  out  for  screening  purposes  from  the  funnels  of 
destroyers  accompanying  the  transports.  The  ca'mouflage  device  on  the 
vessel  to  the  extreme  left  is  plainly  visible. 


Liberty  Loans  337 

battles  and  to  assist  the  nations  with  whom  we  are  making  common 
cause  against  a  common  foe.  To  subscribe  to  the  Liberty  Loan 
is  to  perform  a  service  of  patriotism. 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  do  appoint  Wednesday,  the  twenty-fourth  of 
October,  as  Liberty  Day,  and  urge  and  advise  the  people  to  as- 
semble in  their  respective  communities  and  pledge  to  one  another 
and  to  the  Government  that  represents  them  the  fullest  measure 
of  financial  support 

A  similar  proclamation  was  issued  on  April  18,  1918: 

An  enemy  who  has  grossly  abused  the  power  of  organized  gov- 
ernment and  who  seeks  to  dominate  the  world  by  the  might  of 
the  sword,  challenges  the  rights  of  America  and  the  liberty  and 
life  of  all  the  free  nations  of  the  earth.  Our  brave  sons  are  facing 
the  fire  of  battle  in  defense  of  the  honor  and  rights  of  America 
and  the  liberty  of  nations.  To  sustain  them  and  to  assist  our  gal- 
lant associates  in  the  war,  a  generous  and  patriotic  people  have 
been  called  upqn  to  subscribe  to  the  Third  Liberty  Loan. 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  do  appoint  Friday,  the  twenty-sixth  day  of 
April,  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  eighteen,  as  Liberty 
Day 

In  art  address  at  Baltimore,  Md.,  on  April  6,  1918,  the  anniversary 
of  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  Great  War,  the  President 
analyzed  the  significance  of  the  Liberty  Loans  as  follows : 

FcUozi'-cit'wens:  This  is  the  anniversary  of  our  acceptance  of 
Germany's  challenge  to  fight  for  our  right  to  live  and  be  free, 
and  for  the  sacred  rights  of  freemen  everywhere.  The  nation  is 
awake.  There  is  no  need  to  call  to  it.  We  know  what  the  war 
must  cost,  our  utmost  sacrifice,  the  lives  of  our  fittest  men,  and, 
if  need  be,  all  that  we  possess.  The  loan  we  are  met  to  discuss 
is  one  of  the  least  parts  of  what  we  are  called  upon  to  give  and 
to  do,  though  in  itself  imperative.  The  people  of  the  whole  country 
are  alive  to  the  necessity  of  it,  and  are  ready  to  lend  to  the  utmost, 
even  where  it  involves  a  sharp  skimping  and  daily  sacrifice  to  lend 
out  of  meagre  earnings.  They  will  look  with  reprobation  and  con- 
tempt upon  those  who  can  and  will  not,  upon  those  who  demand 
a  higher  rate  of  interest,  upon  those  who  think  of  it  as  a  mere 
commercial  transaction 


338  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

On  May  29,  1918,  President  Wilson  issued  the  following  appeal 
to  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  purchase  War  Savings  Stamps 
and  Thrift  Stamps,  and  to  practice  strict  economy  and  thrift  in  their 
daily  lives : 

This  War  is  one  of  nations — not  of  armies — and  all  of  our 
100,000,000  people  must  be  economically  and  industrially  ad- 
justed to  war  conditions  if  this  Nation  is  to  play  its  full  part 
in  the  conflict.  The  problem  before  us  is  not  primarily  a 
financial  problem,  but  rather  a  problem  of  increased  production 
of  war  essentials,  and  the  saving  of.  the  materials  and  the  labor 
necessary  for  the  support  and  equipment  of  our  army  and  our 
navy.  Thoughtless  exj>enditure  of  money  for  nonessentials  uses 
up  the  labor  of  men,  the  products  of  the  farm,  mines,  and  fac- 
tories, and  overburdens  transportation,  all  of  which  must  be  used 
to  the  utmost  and  at  their  best  for  war  purposes. 

The  great  results  which  we  seek  can  be  obtained  only  by  the 
participation  of  every  member  of  the  nation,  young  and  old,  in  a 
national  concerted  thrift  movement.  I  therefore  urge  that  our 
people  everywhere  pledge  themselves,  as  suggested  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury,  to  the  practice  of  thrift ;  to  serve  the 
Government  to  their  utmost  in  increasing  production  in  all  fields 
necessary  to  the*  winning  of  the  w^ar;  to  conserve  food  and  fuel 
and  useful  materials  of  every  kind ;  to  devote  their  labor  only 
to  the  most  necessary  tasks ;  and  to  buy  only  those  things  which 
are  essential  to  individual  health  and  efficiency ;  and  that  the 
people,  as  evidence  of  their  loyalty,  invest  all  that  they  can  save 
in  biberty  Bonds  and  War  Savings  Stamps. 

The  securities  issued  by  the  Treasury  Department  are  so  many 
of  them  within  the  reach  of  every  one  that  the  door  of  oppor- 
tunity in  this  matter  is  wide  open  to  all  of  us.  To  practice 
thrift  in  peace  times  is  a  virtue  and  brings  great  benefit  to  the 
individual  at  all  times;  with  the  desperate  need  of  the  civilized 
world  today  for  materials  and  labor  with  which  to  end  the  war, 
the  practice  of  individual  thrift  is  a  patriotic  duty  and  a  necessity. 
I  appeal  to  a,ll  who  now  own  either  Liberty  Bonds  or  War 
Savings  Stamps  to  continue  to  practice  economy  and  thrift  and 
to  appeal  to  all  who  do  not  own  Government  securities  to  do 
likewise  and  purchase  them  to  the  extent  of  their  means.  The 
man  who  buys  Qovernment  securities  transfers  the  purchasing 
power  of  his  money  to  the  United  States  Government  until  after 
this  war,  and  to  that  same  degree  does  not  buy  in  competition 
with   the   Government. 


Control  of  Exports,  Prices  and  Fuel 

It  soon  became  necessary  to  establish  control  over  the  exports  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  principles  of  that  control  were  thus  stated  by 
the  President  on  June  26,  1917: 

There  will,  of  course,  be  no  prohibition  of  ex- 
ports. The  normal  course  of  trade  will  be  interfered  with  as 
little  as  possible,  and,  so  far  as  possible,  only  its  abnormal  course 
directed.  The  whole  object  will  be  to  direct  exports  in  such  a  way 
that  they  will  go  first  and  by  preference  where  they  are  most 
needed  and  most  immediately  needed,  and  temporarily  to  with- 
hold them,  if  necessary,  where  they  can  best  be  spared. 

Our  primary  duty  in  the  matter  of  foodstuffs  and  like  neces- 
saries is  to  see  to  it  that  the  peoples  associated  with  us  in  the  war 
get  as  generous  a  proportion  as  possible  of  our  surplus ;  but  it  will 
also  be  our  wish  and  purpose  to  supply  the  neutral  nations  whose 
peoples  depend  upon  us  for  such  supplies  as  nearly  in  proportion  to 
their  need  as  the  amount  to  be  divided  permits. 

There  will  thus  be  little  check  put  upon  the  volume  of  exports, 
and  the  prices  obtained  for  them  will  not  be  affected  by  this 
regulation. 

This  policy  will  be  carried  out,  not  by  prohibitive  regulations, 
therefore,  but  by  a  system  of  licensing  exports  which  will  be  as 
simply  organized  and  administered  as  possible,  so  as  to  constitute 
no  impediment  to  the  normal  flow  of  commerce.  In  brief,  the  free 
play  of  trade  will  not  be  arbitrarily  interfered  with;  it  will  only 
be  intelligently  and  systematically  directed  in  the  light  of  full  in- 
formation with  regard  to  needs  and  market  conditions  throughout 
the  world  and  the  necessities  of  our  people  at  home  and  our  armies 
and  the  armies  of  our  associates  abroad 

Before  many  months  had  elapsed  after  the  declaration  of  war  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Germany,  it  became  evident  that  the  best 
interests  of  this  country  would  be  subserved  by  Government  regula- 
tion of  prices  in  many  fields.  In  an  address  to  his  fellow-country- 
men on  July  II,  1 91 7,  the  President  said: 

339 


340  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

The  Government  is  about  to  attempt  to  determine  the  prices 
at  which  it  will  ask  you  henceforth  to  furnish  various  supplies 
which  are  necessary  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  and  various 
materials  which  will  be  needed  in  the  industries  by  which  the 
war  must  be  sustained.  We  shall,  of  course,  try  to  determine 
them  justly  and  to  the  best  advantage  of  the  nation  as  a 
whole 

A  just  price  must,  of  course,  be  paid  for  everything  the  Govern- 
ment buys.  By  a  just  price  I  mean  a  price  which  will  sustain 
the  industries  concerned  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  provide  a 
living  for  those  who  conduct  them,  enable  them  to  pay  good  wages, 
and  make  possible  the  expansions  of  their  enterprises  which  will 
from  time  to  time  become  necessary  as  the  stupendous  under- 
takings of  this  great  war  develop.  We  could  not  wisely  or  reason- 
ably do  less  than  pay  such  prices.  They  are  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  and  development  of  industry,  and  the  maintenance 
and  development  of  industry  are  necessary  for  the  great  task  we 
have  in  hand 

We  ought  not  to  put  the  acceptance  of  such  prices  on  the  ground 
of  patriotism.  Patriotism  has  nothing  to  do  with  profits  in  a  case 
like  this.  Patriotism  and  profits  ought  never  in  the  present  cir- 
cumstances be  mentioned  together.  It  is  perfectly  proper  to  dis- 
cuss profits  as  a  matter  of  business,  with  a  view  to  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  capital  and  the  efficiency  of  labor  in  these  tragical 
months  when  the  liberty  of  free  men  everywhere  and  of  industry 
itself  trembles  in  the  balance,  but  it  would  be  absurd  to  discuss 
them  as  a  motive  for  helping  to  serve  and  save  our  country. 

Patriotism  leaves  profits  out  of  the  question.  In  these  days  of 
our  supreme  trial,  when  we  are  sending  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
our  young  men  across  the  seas  to  serve  a  great  cause,  no  true  man 
who  stays  behind  to  work  for  them  and  sustain  them  by  his  labor 
will  ask  himself  what  he  is  personally  going  to  make  out  of  that 
labor.  No  true  patriot  will  permit  himself  to  take  toll  of  their 
heroism  in  money  or  seek  to  grow  rich  by  the  shedding  of  their 
blood.  He  will  give  as  freely  and  with  as  unstinted  self-sacrifice 
as  they.  When  they  are  giving  their  lives  will  he  not  give  at  least 
his  money?     .... 

And  there  is  something  more  that  we  must  add  to  our  think- 
ing. The  public  is  now  as  much  part  of  the  Government  as  are  the 
army  and  navy  themselves ;  the  whole  people  in  all  their  activities 
are  now  mobilized  and  in  service  for  the  accomplishment  of  the 
nation's  task  in  this  war;  it  is  in  such  circumstances  impossible 


Control  of  Exports,  Prices  and  Fuel  341 

justly  to  distinguish  between  industrial  purchases  made  by  the 
Government  and  industrial  purchases  made  by  the  managers  of 
individual  industries;  and  it  is  just  as  much  our  duty  to  sustain 
the  industries  of  the  country,  all  the  industries  that  contribute  to 
its  life,  as  it  is  to  sustain  our  forces  in  the  field  and  on  the  sea. 
We  must  make  the  prices  to  the  public  the  same  as  the  prices  to 
the  Government. 

Prices  mean  the  same  thing  everywhere  now.  They  mean  the 
efficiency  or  the  inefficiency  of  the  nation,  whether  it  is  the  Govern- 
ment that  pays  them  or  not.  They  mean  victory  or  defeat.  They 
mean  that  America  will  win  her  place  once  for  all  among  the  fore- 
most free  nations  of  the  world,  or  that  she  will  sink  to  defeat  and 
become  a  second-rate  power  alike  in  thought  and  in  action.  This 
is  a  day  of  her  reckoning  and  every  man  amongst  us  must  per- 
sonally face  that  reckoning  along  with  her.     ,     ,    ,    , 

On  July  9,  1917,  the  Administration  issued  the  following  state- 
ment explaining  its  program  for  the  control  of  exports  during  the 
War: 

In   controlling  by   license   the   export   of   certain 

indispensable  commodities  from  the  United  States,  the  Govern- 
ment has  first  and  chiefly  in  view  the  amelioration  of  the  food 
conditions  which  have  arisen  or  are  likely  to  arise  in  our  own 
country  before  new  crops  are  harvested.  Not  only  is  the  con- 
servation of  our  prime  food  and  fodder  supplies  a  matter  which 
vitally  concerns  our  own  people,  but  the  retention  of  an  adequate 
supply  of  raw  materials  is  essential  to  our  program  of  military 
and  naval  construction  and  the  continuance  of  our  necessary 
domestic  activities.  We  shall  therefore  similarly  safeguard  all 
our  fundamental  supplies. 

It  is  obviously  the  duty  of  the  United  States,  in  liberating  any 
surplus  products  over  and  above  our  own  domestic  needs,  to 
consider  first  the  necessities  of  all  the  nations  engaged  in  war 
against  the  Central  Empires.  As  to  neutral  nations,  however, 
we  also  recognize  our  duty.  The  Government  does  not  wish 
to  hamper  them.  On  the  contrary,  it  wishes  and  intends,  by  all 
fair  and  equitable  means,  to  cooperate  with  them  in  their  difificult 
task  of  adding  from  our  available  surpluses  to  their  own  domes- 
tic supply  and  of  meeting  their  pressing  necessities  or  deficits. 
In  considering  the  deficits  of  food  supplies  the  Government 
means  only  to  fulfill  its  obvious  obligation  to  assure  itself  that 


342  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

neutrals  are  husbanding  their  own  resources  and  tl,iat  our  sup- 
pHes  will  not  become  available,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to 
feed  the  enemy. 

In  a  proclamation  of  August  27,  1917,  the  President  published  two 
lists  of  commodities  placed  under  export  control — the  first  applicable 
to  enemy  countries  and  the  second,  to  all  countries.  His  statement 
explaining  the  proclamation  was  as   follows : 

The  purpose  and  effect  of  this  proclamation  (of  August  27, 
1917,  forbidding  the  exportation  of  certain  commodities)  is  not 
export  prohibition,  but  merely  export  control.  It  is  not  the  inten- 
tion to  interfere  unnecessarily  with  our  foreign  trade ;  but  our 
own  domestic  needs  must  be  adequately  safeguarded  and  there 
is  the  added  duty  of  meeting  the  necessities  of  all  the  nations 
at  war  with  the  Imperial  German  Government.  After  these 
needs  are  met  it  is  our  wish  and  intention  to  minister  to  the 
needs  of  the  neutral  nations  as  far  as  our  resources  permit.  This 
task  will  be  discharged  without  other  than  the  very  proper  quali- 
fication that  the  liberation  of  our  surplus  products  shall  not  be 
made  the  occasion  of  benefit  to  the  enemy,  either  directly  or  in- 
directly. 

The  two  lists  have  been  prepared  in  the  interests  of  facility 
and  expediency.  The  first  list,  applicable  to  the  enemy  and  his 
allies  and  to  the  neutral  countries  of  Europe,  brings  under  con- 
trol practically  all  articles  of  commerce,  while  the  second  list, 
applicable  to  all  the  other  countries  of  the  world,  makes  only  a 
few  additions  to  the  list  of  commodities  controlled  by  the  procla- 
mation of  July  9,  1917.  It  is  obvious  that  a  closer  supervision 
and  control  of  exports  is  necessary  with  respect  to  those  Euro- 
pean neutrals  within  the  sphere  of  hostilities  than  is  required 
for  those  countries  farther  removed. 

The  establishment  of  these  distinctions  will  simplify  the  ad- 
ministrative processes  and  enable  us  to  continue  our  policy  of 
minimizing  the  interruption  of  trade 

After  some  months.  President  Wilson  decided  that  expansion  in 
price-fixing  by  the  Government  was  necessary,  and  stated  in  his  address 
to  Congress  on  December  4,  1917: 

Recent  experience  has  convinced  me  that  the  Con- 
gress must  go  further  in  authorizing  the  Government  to  set  limits 


Control  of  Exports,  Prices  and  Fuel  343 

to  prices.  The  law  of  supply  and  demand,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  has 
been  replaced  by  the  law  of  unrestrained  selfishness.  While  we 
have  eliminated  profiteering  in  several  branches  of  industry,  it  still 
runs  impudently  rampant  in  others.  The  farmers,  for  example, 
complain  with  a  great  deal  of  justice  that,  while  the  regulation 
of  food  prices  restricts  their  incomes,  no  restraints  are  placed 
upon  the  prices  of  most  of  the  things  they  must  themselves  pur- 
chase ;  and  similar  inequities  obtain  on  all  sides 

In  a  statement  issued  on  August  30,  191 7,  President  Wilson  made 
the  following  announcement  about  the  prices  fixed  by  the  Government 
for  wheat : 

The  White  House,  August  so,  1917. 

Section  11  of  the  Food  Act  provides,  among  other  things,  for 
the  purchase  and  sale  of  wheat  and  flour  by  the  government,  and 
appropriates  money  for  that  purpose.  The  purchase  of  wheat  and 
flour  for  our  allies,  and  to  a  considerable  degree  for  neutral  coun- 
tries also,  has  been  placed  under  the  control  of  the  Food  Admin- 
istration. I  have  appointed  a  committee  to  determine  a  fair 
price  to  be  paid  in  government  purchases.  The  price  now  recom- 
mended by  that  committee — $2.20  per  bushel  at  Chicago  for  the 
basic  grade — will  be  rigidly  adhered  to  by  the  Food  Adminis- 
tration. 

It  is  the  hope  and  expectation  of  the  Food  Administration,  and 
my  own  also,  that  this  step  will  at  once  stabilize  and  keep  within 
moderate  bounds  the  price  of  wheat  for  all  transactions  throughout 
the  present  crop  year,  and  in  consequence  the  prices  of  flour  and 
bread  also.  The  Food  Act  has  given  large  powers  for  the  control 
of  storage  and  exchange  operations,  and  these  powers  will  be  fully 
exercised.  An  inevitable  consequence  will  be  that  financial  deal- 
ings cannot  follow  their  usual  course.  Whatever  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  the  ordinary  machinery  of  trade,  it  cannot 
function  well  under  such  disturbed  and  abnormal  conditions  as 
now  exist.  In  its  place,  the  Food  Administration  now  fixes  for  its 
purchases  a  fair  price,  as  recommended  unanimously  by  a  com- 
mittee representative  of  all  interests  and  all  sections,  and  believes 
that  thereby  it  will  eliminate  speculation,  make  possible  the  con- 
duct of  every  operation  in  the  full  light  of  day,  maintain  the 
publicly  stated  price  for  all  and,  through  economies  made  possible 
by  stabilization  and  control,  better  the  position  of  consumers 
also 


344  ^  History  of  the  Great  War 

The  increased  consumption  of  fuel  due  to  the  increased  demand  in 
industry  as  a  result  of  the  European  War  led  to  the  inclusion  of  fuel 
among  the  products  over  which  the  President  was  given  control  in  the 
so-called  Food  Control  Bill.  The  general  powers  granted  under  that 
bill  are  described  under  the  head  of  "Food  Administration,"  but  sep- 
arate provisions  regarding  fuel  in  the  bill  authorize  the  President  to 
requisition  and  take  over  mines  for  use  or  operation  by  the  Government ; 
to  fix  the  price  of  coal  and  coke,  when  sold  by  either  producer  or  dealer; 
and  to  establish  rules  for  their  distribution  and  transportation.  He  is 
further  empowered  to  prescribe  regulations  governing  the  work  of 
employees  in  the  mines,  and  to  require,  if  necessary,  all  producers  to 
sell  only  to  the  United  States  through  an  agency  to  be  designated  by 
the  President. 

To  give  merely  one  example  of  the  difficulties  attending  the  fuel 
problem,  it  might  be  stated  that  whereas  the  railroads  of  the  country 
used  approximately  125,000,000  tons  of  coal  in  191 6,  some  170,000,000 
tons  were  used  by  them  in  191 7.  If  the  same  ratio  was  preserved  in 
all  the  other  forms  of  American  industrial  activity,  our  net  consumption 
of  coal  increased  in  1917  to  635,000,000  tons  from  475,000,000  tons  in 
1916.  The  scarcity  of  labor,  due  to  increasing  wages  in  other  industries 
and  the  draft,  combined  with  the  severest  winter  in  191 7  known  in  the 
recent  history  of  the  Weather  Bureau,  made  the  coal  problem  among 
the  most  serious  met  by  our  Government  in  its  prosecution  of  the  war. 

On  August  21,  1917,  the  President  officially  fixed  coal  prices,  altering 
them  later  on  November  28,  1917. 

The  following  executive  order  was  issued  by  the  President  on 
August  22,,  1917: 

By  virtue  of  the  power  conferred  upon  me  under  the  Act  of 
Congress  approved  August  10,  191 7,  entitled  "An  Act  to  provide 
further  for  the  national  security  and  defense  b}'  encouraging  the 
production,  conserving  the  supply,  and  controlling  the  distribu- 
tion of  food  products  and  fuel,"  and  particularly  for  the  purpose 
of  carrying  into  effect  the  provisions  of  said  Act  relating  to  fuel, 
Harry  A.  Garfield  is  hereby  designated  and  appointed  United 
States  Fuel  Administrator,  to  hold  office  during  the  pleasure  of 
the  President. 

Said   fuel  administrator  shall  supervise,  direct  and  carry  into 


Control  of  Exports,  Prices  and  Fuel  345 

effect  the  provisions  of  said  Act  and  the  powers  and  authority 
therein  given  to  the  President  so  far  as  the  same  apply  to  fuel  as 
set  forth  in  said  Act,  and  to  any  and  all  practices,  procedure  and 
regulations  authorized  under  the  provisions  of  said  Act  applicable 
to  fuel,  including  the  issuance,  regulation  and  revocation  under 
the  name  of  said  United  States  Fuel  Administrator  of  Hcenses 
under  said  Act.  In  this  behalf  he  shall  do  and  perform  such  acts 
and  things  as  may  be  authorized  and  required  of  him  from  time  to 
time  by  direction  of  the  President  and  under  such  rules  and  regu- 
lations as  may  be  prescribed. 

Said  fuel  administrator  shall  also  have  the  authority  to  employ 
such  assistants  and  subordinates,  including  such  counsel  as  may 
from  time  to  time  be  deemed  by  him  necessary  and  to  fix  the  com- 
pensation of  such  assistants,  subordinates  and  counsel 

On  August  9,  1918,  the  following  appeal  for  increased  coal  pro- 
duction was  made  by  President  Wilson  to  all  engaged  in  the  pro- 
duction of  coal : 

The  existing  scarcity  of  coal  is  creating  a  grave  danger — in 
fact,  the  most  serious  which  confronts  us — and  calls  for  prompt 
and  vigorous  action  on  the  part  of  both  operators  and  miners. 
Without  an  adequate  supply,  our  war  program  will  be  retarded ; 
the  effectiveness  of  our  fighting  forces  in  France  will  be  les- 
sened ;  the  lives  of  our  soldiers  will  be  unnecessarily  endangered 
and  their  hardships  increased,  and  there  will  be  much  suffering 
in  many  homes  throughout  the  country  during  the  coming  Winter. 

I  am  well  aware  that  your  ranks  have  been  seriously  depleted 
by  the  draft,  by  voluntary  enlistment,  and  by  the  demands  of 
other  essential  industries.  This  handicap  can  be  overcome,  how- 
ever, and  sufficient  coal  can  be  mined  in  spite  of  it,  if  every  one 
connected  with  the  industry,  from  the  highest  official  to  the 
youngest  boy,  will  give  his  best  work  each  day  for  the  full 
number  of  w^ork  hours. 

The  operators  must  be  zealous  as  never  before  to  bring  about 
the  highest  efficiency  of  management,  to  establish  the  best  pos.^^ible 
working  conditions,  and  to  accord  fair  treatment  to  everybody, 
so  that  the  opportunity  to  work  at  his  best  may  be  accorded 
every  workman. 

The  miners  should  report  for  work  every  day  unless  prevented 
by  unavoidable  causes,  and  should  not  only  stay  in  the  mines  the 
full  time,  but  also  see  to  it  that  they  get  more  coal  than  ever 


346  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

before.  The  other  workers  in  and  about  the  mines  should  work 
as  regularly  and  faithfully,  so  that  the  work  of  the  miner  may 
not  be  retarded  in  any  way.  This  will  be  especially  necessary 
from  this  time  forward,  for  your  numbers  may  be  further  les- 
sened by  the  draft,  which  will  induct  into  the  army  your  fair 
share  of  those  not  essential  to  industry. 

Those  who  are  drafted  but  who  are  essential  will  be  given  de- 
ferred classification,  and  it  is  their  patriotic  duty  to  accept  it. 
And  it  is  the  patriotic  duty  of  their  friends  and  neighbors  to 
hold  them  in  high  regard  for  doing  so. 

The  only  worker  who  deserves  the  condemnation  of  his  com- 
munity is  the  one  who  fails  to  give  4iis  best  in  this  crisis ;  not  the 
one  who  accepts  deferred  classification  and  works  regularly  and 
diligently  to  increase  the  coal  output. 

A  great  task  is  to  be  performed.  The  operators  and  their 
stafifs  alone  cannot  do  it,  nor  can  the  mine  workers  alone  do  it : 
but  both  parties,  working  hand  in  hand,  with  a  grim  determina- 
tion to  rid  the  country  of  its  greatest  obstacle  to  winning  the 
war,  can  do  it. 

It  is  with  full  confidence  that  I  call  upon  you  to  assume  the 
burden  of  producing  an  ample  supply  of  coal.  You  will,  I  am 
sure,  accept  this  burden,  and  will  successfully  carry  it  through, 
and  in  so  doing  you  will  be  performing  a  service  just  as  v/orthy 
as  service  in  the  trenches,  and  will  win  the  applause  and  grati- 
tude of  the  whole  nation. 

The  seriousness  of  the  coal  situation  was  probably  the  determin- 
ing factor  in  the  federalization  of  the  railroads  in  the  country.  But 
the  severe  and  unprecedented  cold  waves  and  snow  storms  of  January, 
1918,  hindered  the  solution  of  the  coal  problem,  industries  shut  down 
because  no  coal  could  be  obtained,  private  homes  remained  unheated, 
sufifering  became  intense,  especially  among  the  poor ;  and  accordingly 
Fuel  Administrator  Garfield  announced  on  January  17,  1918,  that  all 
factories  and  manufacturing  plants  except  those  specifically  mentioned 
as  being  engaged  in  the  production  of  essential  war  materials  would 
remain  closed  from  January  18  to  January  22,  inclusive ;  and  that  on  all 
Mondays  from  January  21  to  March  18,  inclusive,  all  work  except  that 
absolutely  indispensable  to  the  public  health  and  welfare  would  cease. 
The  suddenness  with  which  the  order  came  caused  a  furor  throughout 


Control  of  Exports,  Prices  and  Fuel  347 

the  country,  but  it  was  loyally  and  faithfully  obeyed;  and  the  results, 
especially  those  concerned  with  the  coaling  of  ships,  were  favorable. 

Indeed,  the  order  regarding  "Workless  Mondays"  was  rescinded  for 
Southern  states  after  February  4,  1918,  and  for  the  remainder  of  the 
country  after  February  11,  1918. 

Another  noteworthy  feature  of  the  campaign  for  fuel  conservation 
during  the  war  was  the  elimination  of  unnecessary  lighting,  such  as 
that  of  an  ornamental  or  advertising  nature.  In  addition,  there  was 
organized  a  campaign  for  more  economical  firing,  etc.,  in  both  domestic 
and  industrial  heating  plants. 

Among  the  agencies  used  by  the  Fuel  Administration  were  a  cam- 
paign to  urge  that  rooms  and  houses  be  not  heated  above  68°  Fahren- 
heit and  the  reduction  of  the  supply  of  fuel  whenever  necessary  to  in- 
dustries classed  as  non-essential. 

The  program  of  the  Fuel  Administration  for  1918  called  for 
51,258,029  tons  of  anthracite  coal,  as  compared  with  49,195,706  tons  in 
1916  (the  last  nonnal  year).  By  October  i,  this  program  had  been 
exceeded  by  760,000  tons.  In  19 18,  it  was  estimated  that  600,000,000 
short  tons  of  bituminous  coal  were  delivered,  as  compared  with 
550,000,000  tons  in  1917  and  500,000,000  in  1916.  By  October  i, 
37,000,000  more  tons  had  been  delivered  than  for  the  previous  six- 
month  period  in  1917.    (The  coal  year  begins  on  April  i.) 


The  Pope's  Peace  Proposal  and  Its  Reception 

On  August  15,  1917,  Pope  Benedict  XV  published  a  note  to  the 
belligerents,  urging  that  they  come  to  an  agreement  on  the  fundamental 
issues  upon  which  peace  might  be  arranged.  After  announcing  that 
he  had  ceaselessly  striven  for  peace,  without  favoring  either  group  of 
belligerents,  from  the  very  outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  Pope  described 
the  awful  toll  of  life  and  property  which  the  war  had  taken.  When 
contemplating  the  further  destruction  which  must  ensue  if  the  war 
were  to  continue,  he  felt  it  his  duty  to  make  a  public  appeal  for  peace. 
To  the  Vatican,  the  fundamental  issue  upon  which  peace  might  be  ar- 
ranged was  a  recognition  of  the  moral  force  of  right  above  the  material 
force  of  arms.  Arrangements  for  international  arbitration,  for  the 
freedom  of  the  seas,  for  disarmament,  would  then  be  necessary.  Con- 
cretely, Germany  would  have  to  evacuate  and  guarantee  the  indepen- 
dence of  Belgium,  of  northern  France,  and  of  the  other  invaded  lands 
occupied  by  her,  whereas  on  their  side  the  Entente  Allies  would  be  ex- 
pected to  restore  the  German  colonies.  The  problems  of  the  territory 
disputed  by  Austria  and  Italy,  by  Germany  and  France,  would  be  settled 
by  conciliation,  taking  into  account  the  rights  of  nationality  and  placing 
the  welfare  of  the  world  above  the  welfare  of  any  one  nation.  The 
problems  of  Poland,  of  Armenia,  and  of  the  Balkan  states  must  sim- 
ilarly be  solved. 

President  Wilson  replied  to  the  Pope's  peace  proffer  on  August  27, 
1917.  After  paying  tribute  to  the  high  motives  actuating  His  Holiness, 
the  President  declared  that  all  the  agony  of  the  war  would  have  been 
experienced  in  vain  if  the  world  were  to  revert  but  to  the  status  quo 
ante  bellum,  and  leave  uncrushed  the  power  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government.  Renouncing  all  desire  to  crush  or  to  punish  the  people 
of  Germany,  the  President  declared  openly  that  it  was  impossible  to 
treat  with  Germany  while  its  people  enjoyed  no  control  over  their 
government.     Only  a  peace  based  upon  the  will  of  free  peoples  in- 

348 


Pope's  Peace  Proposal  349 

stead  of  merely  upon  the  words  of  a  faithless  government  could  be 
enduring  and  just,  and  hence  at  that  moment  peace  with  Germany  was 
impossible  in  the  eyes  of  the  United  States. 

Every  heart  that  has  not  been  blinded  and  hard- 
ened by  this  terrible  war  must  be  touched  by  this  moving  appeal 
of  His  Holiness  the  Pope,  must  feel  the  dignity  and  force  of  the 
humane  and  generous  motives  which  prompted  it,  and  must  fer- 
vently wish  that  we  might  take  the  path  of  peace  he  so  persuasively 
points  out.  But  it  would  be  folly  to  take  it  if  it  does  not  in  fact 
lead  to  the  goal  he  proposes.  Our  response  must  be  based  upon 
the  stern  facts  and  upon  nothing  else.  It  is  not  a  mere  cessation 
of  arms  he  desires ;  it  is  a  stable  and  enduring  peace.  This  agony 
must  not  be  gone  through  with  again,  and  it  must  be  a  matter  of 
very  sober  judgment  what  will  insure  us  against  it 

To  deal  with  such  a  power  (as  Germany)  by  way  of  peace  upon 
the  plan  proposed  by  His  Holiness  the  Pope  would,  so  far  as  we 
can  see,  involve  a  recuperation  of  its  strength  and  a  renewal  of 
its  policy ;  would  make  it  necessary  to  create  a  permanent  hostile 
combination  of  nations  against  the  German  people,  who  are  its 
instruments ;  and  would  result  in  abandoning  the  new-born  Russia 
to  the  intrigue,  the  manifold  subtle  interference,  and  the  certain 
counter-revolution  which  would  be  attempted  by  all  the  malign 
influences  to  which  the  German  Government  has  of  late  accus- 
tomed the  world.  Can  peace  be  based  upon  a  restitution  of  its 
power  or  upon  any  word  of  honor  it  could  pledge  in  a  treaty  of 
settlement  and  accommodation?     .... 

The  test,  therefore,  of  every  plan  of  peace  is  this:  Is  it  based 
upon  the  faith  of  all  the  peoples  involved  or  merely  upon  the 
word  of  an  ambitious  and  intriguing  government,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  a  group  of  free  peoples,  on  the  other?  This  is  a  test  which 
goes  to  the  root  of  the  matter;  and  it  is  the  test  which  must  be 
applied 

We  can  not  take  the  word  of  the  present  rulers  of  Germany  as  a 
guarantee  of  anything  that  is  to  endure,  unless  explicitly  supported 
by  such  conclusive  evidence  of  the  will  and  purpose  of  the  Ger- 
man people  themselves  as  the  other  peoples  of  the  world  would 
be  justified  in  accepting.  Without  such  guarantees  treaties  of 
settlement,  agreements  for  disarmament,  covenants  to  set  up  arbi- 
tration in  the  place  of  force,  territorial  adjustments,  reconstitu- 
tions  of  small  nations,  if  made  "'ith  the  German  Government,  no 
man,  no  nation  could  now  depend  on.    We  must  await  some  new 


350  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

evidence  of  the  purposes  of  the  great  peoples  of  the  Central 
Powers.  God  grant  it  may  be  given  soon  and  in  a  way  to  restore 
the  confidence  of  all  peoples  everywhere  in  the  faith  of  nations  and 
the  possibility  of  a  covenanted  peace. 

Germany  replied  to  the  Pope's  peace  offer  on  September  17,  1917. 
The  Kaiser  opened  by  asserting  that  since  he  had  ascended  the  throne 
of  the  German  Empire  his  efforts  had  uniformly  been  directed  toward 
peace  and  that  the  present  war  had  been  forced  upon  Germany.  The 
remainder  of  the  German  reply  was  occupied  chiefly  with  assent  to  the 
Pope's  theoretical  theses  in  favor  of  arbitration,  the  freedom  of  the 
seas  and  disarmament.    The  Austrian  reply  was  similar  to  the  German. 


War  with  Austria 

By  the  end  of  the  year,  the  presence  of  American  troops  in  Europe 
made  inevitable  their  engagement  on  occasion  with  forces  of  the  alhes 
of  Germany.  Up  to  this  time,  President  Wilson  had  evidently  hoped 
that  the  absence  of  an  open  declaration  of  war  upon  Austria  by  the 
United  States  would  be  of  greater  service  in  weakening  the  internal 
unity  of  Austria  than  an  open  declaration  of  war.  But  in  his  annual 
address  to  Congress  on  December  4,  1917,  he  stated  that: 

One  very  embarrassing  obstacle  that  stands  in  our 

way  is  that  we  are  at  war  with  Germany  but  not  with  her  allies. 
I,  therefore,  very  earnestly  recommend  that  the  Congress  imme- 
diately declare  the  United  States  in  a  state  of  war  with  Austria- 
Hungary.  Does  it  seem  strange  to  you  that  this  should  be  the  con- 
clusion of  the  argument  I  have  just  addressed  to  you?  It  is  not. 
It  is  in  fact  the  inevitable  logic  of  what  I  have  said.  Austria- 
Hungary  is  for  the  time  being  not  her  own  mistress  but  simply 
the  vassal  of  the  German  Government. 

We  must  face  the  facts  as  they  are  and  act  upon  them  without 
sentiment  in  this  stern  business.  The  Government  of  Austria  and 
Hungary  is  not  acting  upon  its  own  initiative  or  in  response  to  the 
wishes  and  feelings  of  its  own  peoples,  but  as  the  instrument  of 
another  nation.  We  must  meet  its  force  with  our  own  and 
regard  the  Central  Powers  as  but  one.  The  war  can  be  success- 
fully conducted  in  no  other  way. 

The  same  logic  would  lead  also  to  a  declaration  of  war  against 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria.  They  also  are  the  tools  of  Germany,  but 
they  are  mere  tools  and  do  not  yet  stand  in'  the  direct  path  of 
our  necessary  action.  We  shall  go  wherever  the  necessities  of  this 
war  carry  us,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  we  should  go  only  where 
immediate  and  practical  considerations  lead  us,  and  not  heed  any 
others 

On  December  11,  1917,  therefore,  the  President  was  able  to  announce 
in  a  proclamation : 

351 


352  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Whereas,  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  in  the  exercise  of 
the  constitutional  authority  vested  in  Uiem,  have  resolved,  by  joint 
resolution  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  bearing 
date  of  December  7,  1917,  as  follows: 

"Whereas,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment has  committed  repeated  acts  of  war  against  the  Government 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States  of  America;  therefore,  be  it 

"Resolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  that  a  state  of 
war  is  hereby  declared  to  exist  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment ;  and  that  the  President  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  and 
directed  to  employ  the  entire  naval  and  military  forces  of  the 
United  States  and  the  resources  of  the  Government  to  carry  on 
war  against  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment ;  and  to  bring  the  conflict  to  a  successful  termination  all  the 
resources  of  the  country  are  hereby  pledged  by  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States."     .... 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  to  all  whom  it  may  con- 
cern that  a  state  of  war  exists  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Austro-Hungarian  Government ;  and  I  do 
specially  direct  all  officers,  civil  or  military,  of  the  United  States 
that  they  exercise  vigilance  and  zeal  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties 
incident  to  such  a  state  of  war,  and  I  do,  moreover,  earnestly 
appeal  to  all  American  citizens,  that  they,  in  loyal  devotion  to 
their  country,  dedicated  from  its  foundation  to  the  principles  of 
liberty  and  justice,  uphold  the  laws  of  the  land,  and  give  undivided 
and  willing  support  to  those  measures  which  may  be  adopted  by 
the  constitutional  authorities  in  prosecution  of  the  war  to  a  success- 
ful issue  and  in  obtaining  a  secure  and  just  peace 

Other  striking  passages  in  President  Wilson's  annual  address  to 
Congress  on  December  4,  1917,  were  as  follows: 

I  shall  not  go  back  to  debate  the  causes  of  the 

war.  The  intolerable  wrongs  done  and  planned  against  us  by  the 
sinister  masters  of  Germany  have  long  since  become  too  grossly 
obvious  and  odious  to  every  true  American  to  need  to  be  rehearsed. 
But  I  shall  ask  you  to  consider  again  and  with  a  very  grave  scrutiny 
our  objectives  and  the  measures  by  which  we  mean  to  attain  them ; 
for  the  purpose  of  discussion  here  in  this  place  is  action,  and  our 


Photo3  Supplieil  hy  Intrrnational  Film  Servlre 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  DAMAGED  AIRPLANES 

As  the  upper  panel  indicates,  the  term  "reconstruction"  may  be  applied 
to  the  implements  of  warfare  as  well  as  to  wounded  soldiers  and  disarranged 
economic  processes.  The  scene  shows  an  "airship  hospital"  in  France.  Dam- 
aged planes  are  being  repaired  and  prepared  once  more  for  battle. 


ABOVE  THE  CLOUDS  OVER  PARTS 

The    central    panel    shows    an    airplane    joy-riding    over    Paris    and    photo- 
graphed  from  another  plane  accompanying  it. 


TRACTOR  TOWING  AIRPLANE 

The   lower   panel   shows   a    small   motor   tractor   towing   into    position,   pre- 
paratory to  flight,  a  huge  British  bomliing  plane. 


IVor  zvith  Austria  353 

action  must  move  straight  toward  definite  ends.  Our  object  is, 
of  course,  to  win  the  war;  and  we  shall  not  slacken  or  suffer  our- 
selves to  be  diverted  until  it  is  won.  But  it  is  worth  while  asking 
and  answering  the  question,  When  shall  we  consider  the  war  won  ? 

From  one  point  of  view  it  is  not  necessary  to  broach  this  funda- 
mental matter.  I  do  not  doubt  that  the  American  people  know 
what  the  war  is  about  and  what  sort  of  an  outcome  they  will  re- 
gard as  a  realization  of  their  purpose  in  it. 

As  a  nation  we  are  united  in  spirit  and  intention.  I  pay  little 
heed  to  those  who  tell  me  otherwise.  I  hear  the  voices  of  dissent 
— who  does  not?  I  hear  the  criticism  and  the  clamor  of  the 
noisily  thoughtless  and  troublesome.  I  also  see  men  here  and  there 
fling  themselves  in  impotent  disloyalty  against  the  calm,  indomi- 
table power  of  the  Nation.  I  hear  men  debate  peace  who  under- 
stand neither  its  nature  nor  the  way  in  which  we  may  attain  it 
with  uplifted  eyes  and  unbroken  spirits.  But  I  know  that  none  of 
these  speaks  for  the  Nation.  They  do  not  touch  the  heart  of  any- 
thing. They  may  safely  be  left  to  strut  their  uneasy  hour  and  be 
forgotten. 

But  from  another  point  of  view  I  believe  that  it  is  necessary  to 
say  plainly  what  we  here  at  the  seat  of  action  consider  the  war 
to  be  for  and  what  part  we  mean  to  play  in  the  settlement  of  its 
searching  issues.  We  are  the  spokesmen  of  the  American  people, 
and  they  have  a  right  to  know  whether  their  purpose  is  ours. 
They  desire  peace  by  the  overcoming  of  evil,  by  the  defeat  once 
for  all  of  the  sinister  forces  that  interrupt  peace  and  render  it 
impossible,  and  they  wish  to  know  how  closely  our  thought  nms 
with  theirs  and  what  action  we  propose.  They  are  impatient  with 
those  who  desire  peace  by  any  sort  of  compromise — deeply  and 
indignantly  impatient — but  they  will  be  equally  impatient  with  us 
if  we  do  not  make  it  plain  to  them  what  our  objectives  are  and 
what  we  are  planning  for  in  seeking  to  make  conquest  of  peace 
by  arms. 

I  believe  that  I  speak  for  them  when  I  say  two  things :  First. 
that  this  intolerable  thing  of  which  the  masters  of  Germany  have 
shown  us  the  ugly  face,  this  menace  of  combined  intrigue  and  force 
which  we  now  see  so  clearly  as  the  German  power,  a  thing  without 
conscience  or  honor  or  capacity  for  covenanted  peace,  must  be 
crushed  and,  if  it  be  not  utterly  brought  to  an  end.  at  least  shut 
out  from  the  friendly  intercourse  of  the  nations ;  and  second,  that 
when  this  thing  and  its  power  are  indeed  defeated  and  the  time 
comes  that  we  can  discuss  peace — when  the  German  people  have 

311 


354  ^  History  of  the  Great  War 

spokesmen  whose  word  we  can  believe  and  when  those  spokesmen 
are  ready  in  the  name  of  their  people  to  accept  the  common  judg- 
ment of  the  nations  as  to  what  shall  henceforth  be  the  bases  of 
law  and  of  covenant  for  the  life  of  the  world — we  shall  be  willing 
and  glad  to  pay  the  full  price  for  peace,  and  pay  it  ungrudgingly. 

We  know  what  that  price  will  be.  It  will  be  full,  impartial 
justice — justice  done  at  every  point  and  to  every  nation  that  the 
final  settlement  must  affect,  our  enemies  as  well  as  our  friends. 

You  catch,  with  me,  the  voices  of  humanity  that  are  in  the  air. 
They  grow  daily  more  audible,  more  articulate,  more  persuasive, 
and  they  come  from  the  hearts  of  men  everywhere.  They  insist 
that  the  war  shall  not  end  in  vindictive  action  of  any  kind;  that 
no  nation  or  people  shall  be  robbed  or  punished  because  the  irre- 
sponsible rulers  of  a  single  country  have  themselves  done  deep 
and  abominable  wrong.  It  is  this  thought  that  has  been  expressed 
in  the  formula,  "No  annexations,  no  contributions,  no  punitive 
indemnities." 

Just  because  this  crude  formula  expresses  the  instinctive  judg- 
ment as  to  right  of  plain  men  everywhere,  it  has  been  made 
diligent  use  of  by  the  masters  of  German  intrigue  to  lead  the 
people  of  Russia  astray — and  the  people  of  every  other  country 
their  agents  could  reach — in  order  that  a  premature  peace  might 
be  brought  about  before  autocracy  has  been  taught  its  final  and 
convincing  lesson  and  the  people  of  the  world  put  in  control  of 
their  own  destinies 

Let  there  be  no  misunderstanding.  Our  present  and  immediate 
task  is  to  win  the  war  and  nothing  shall  turn  us  aside  from  it 
until  it  is  accomplished.  Every  power  and  resource  we  possess, 
whether  of  men,  of  money,  or  of  materials,  is  being  devoted  and 
will  continue  to  be  devoted  to  that  purpose  until  it  is  achieved. 
Those  who  desire  to  bring  peace  about  before  that  purpose  is 
achieved  I  counsel  to  carry  their  advice  elsewhere.  We  will  not 
entertain  it.  We  shall  regard  the  war  as  won  only  when  the  Ger- 
man people  say  to  us,  through  properly  accredited  representa- 
tives, that  they  are  ready  to  agree  to  a  settlement  based  upon 
.  justice  and  reparation  of  the  wrongs  their  rulers  have  done.  They 
have  done  a  wrong  to  Belgium  which  must  be  repaired.  They 
have  established  a  power  over  other  lands  and  peoples  than  their 
own — over  the  great  empire  of  Austria-Hungary,  over  hitherto 
free  Balkan  states,  over  Turkey  and  within  Asia — which  must  be 
relinquished. 

Germany's  success  by  skill,  by  industry,  by  knowledge,  by  enter- 


H^ar  mlth  Austria  355 

prise  we  did  not  grudge  or  oppose,  but  admired,  rather.  She  had 
built  up  for  herself  a  real  empire  of  trade  and  influence,  secured 
by  the  peace  of  the  world.  We  were  content  to  abide  by  the  rival- 
ries of  manufacture,  science  and  commerce  that  were  involved  for 
us  in  her  success,  and  stand  or  fall  as  we  had  or  did  not  have  the 
brains  and  the  initiative  to  surpass  her.  But  at  the  moment  when 
she  had  conspicuously  won  her  triumphs  of  peace  she  threw  them 
away,  to  establish  in  their  stead  what  the  world  will  no  longer 
permit  to  be  established,  military  and  political  domination  by  arms, 
by  which  to  oust  where  she  could  not  excel  the  rivals  she  most 
feared  and  hated.  The  peace  we  make  must  remedy  that  wrong. 
It  must  deliver  the  once  fair  lands  and  happy  peoples  of  Belgium 
and  Northern  France  from  the  Prussian  conquest  and  the  Prus- 
sian menace,  but  it  must  deliver  also  the  peoples  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  the  peoples  of  the  Balkans  and  the  peoples  of  Turkey, 
alike  in  Europe  and  Asia,  from  the  impudent  and  alien  dominion 
of  the  Prussian  military  and  commercial  autocracy. 

We  owe  it,  however,  to  ourselves,  to  say  that  we  do  not  wish  in 
any  way  to  impair  or  to  rearrange  the  Austro-Hungarian  Em- 
pire. It  is  no  affair  of  ours  what  they  do  with  their  own  life,  either 
industrially  or  politically.  We  do  not  purpose  or  desire  to  dictate 
to  them  in  any  way.  We  only  desire  to  see  that  their  affairs  are 
left  in  their  own  hands,  in  all  matters,  great  or  small.  We  shall 
hope  to  secure  for  the  peoples  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  and  for  the 
people  of  the  Turkish  Empire  the  right  and  opportunity  to  make 
their  own  lives  safe,  their  own  fortunes  secure  against  oppression 
or  injustice  and  from  the  dictation  of  foreign  courts  or  parties. 

And  our  attitude  and  purpose  with  regard  to  Germany  herself 
are  of  a  like  kind.  We  intend  no  wrong  against  the  German  Em- 
pire, no  interference  with  her  internal  affairs.  We  should  deem 
either  the  one  or  the  other  absolutely  unjustifiable,  absolutely 
contrary  to  the  principles  we  have  professed  to  live  by  and  to  hold 
most  sacred  throughout  our  life  as  a  nation. 

The  people  of  Germany  are  being  told  by  the  men  whom  they 
now  permit  to  deceive  them  and  to  act  as  their  masters  that  they 
are  fighting  for  the  very  life  and  existence  of  their  empire,  a  war 
of  desperate  self-defense  against  deliberate  aggression.  Nothing 
could  be  more  grossly  or  wantonly  false,  and  we  must  seek  by  the 
utmost  openness  and  candor  as  to  our  real  aims  to  convince  them 
of  its  falseness.  We  are  in  fact  fighting  for  their  emancipation 
from  the  fear,  along  with  our  own — from  the  fear  as  well  as 
from  the  fact  of  unjust  attack  by  neighbors  or  rivals  or  schemers 


356  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

after  world  empire.  No  one  is  threatening  the  existence  or  the 
independence  of  the  peaceful  enterprise  of  the  German  Empire. 

The  worst  that  can  happen  to  the  detriment  of  the  German 
people  is  this,  that  if  they  should  still,  after  the  war  is  over,  con- 
tinue to  be  obliged  to  live  under  ambitious  and  intriguing  masters 
interested  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world,  men  or  classes  of 
men  whom  the  other  peoples  of  the  world  could  not  trust,  it  might 
be  impossible  to  admit  them  to  the  partnership  of  nations  which 
must  henceforth  guarantee  the  world's  peace.  That  partnership 
must  be  a  partnership  of  peoples,  not  a  mere  partnership  of  gov- 
ernments. It  might  be  impossible,  also,  in  such  untoward  cir- 
cumstances, to  admit  Germany  to  the  free  economic  intercourse 
which  must  inevitably  spring  out  of  the  other  partnerships  of  a 
real  peace.  But  there  would  be  no  aggression  in  that ;  and  such  a 
situation,  inevitable,  because  of  distrust,  would  in  the  very  nature 
of  things  sooner  or  later  cure  itself,  by  processes  which  would 
assuredly  set  in. 

The  wrongs,  the  very  deep  wrongs,  committed  in  this  war  will 
have  to  be  righted.  That,  of  course.  But  they  cannot  and  must 
not  be  righted  by  the  commission  of  similar  wrongs  against  Ger- 
many and  her  allies.  The  world  will  not  permit  the  commission 
of  similar  wrongs  as  a  means  of  reparation  and  settlement. 
Statesmen  must  by  this  time  have  learned  that  the  opinion  of  the 
world  is  everywhere  wide  awake  and  fully  comprehends  the  issues 
involved.  No  representative  of  any  self-governed  nation  will  dare 
disregard  it  by  attempting  any  such  covenants  of  selfishness  and 
compromise  as  were  entered  into  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  The 
thought  of  the  plain  people  here  and  everywhere  throughout  the 
world,  the  people  who  enjoy  no  privilege  and  have  very  simple 
and  unsophisticated  standards  of  right  and  wrong,  is  the  air  all 
governments  must  henceforth  breathe  if  they  would  live. 

It  is  in  the  full  disclosing  light  of  that  thought  that  all  policies 
must  be  received  and  executed  in  this  midday  hour  of  the  world's 
life.  German  rulers  have  been  able  to  upset  the  peace  of  the  world 
only  because  the  German  people  were  not  suffered  under  their 
tutelage  to  share  the  comradeship  of  the  other  peoples  of  the 
world  either  in  thought  or  in  purpose.  They  were  allowed  to  have 
no  opinion  of  their  own  which  might  be  set  up  as  a  rule  of  con- 
duct for  those  who  exercised  authority  over  them.  But  the  Con- 
gress that  concludes  this  war  will  feel  the  full  strength  of  the 
tides  that  run  now  in  the  hearts  and  consciences  of  free  men  every- 
where.    Its  conclusions  will  run  with  those  tides. 


IVar  zmth  Austria  -i^cy 

All  those  things  have  been  true  from  the  very  beginning  of 
this  stupendous  war;  and  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  if  they  had 
been  made  plain  at  the  very  outset  the  sympathy  and  enthusiasm 
of  the  Russian  people  might  have  been  once  for  all  enlisted  on 
the  side  of  the  Allies,  suspicion  and  distrust  swept  away,  and  a 
real  and  lasting  union  of  purpose  effected.  Had  they  believed 
these  things  at  the  very  moment  of  their  revolution,  and  had  they 
been  confirmed  in  that  belief  since,  the  sad  reverses  which  have 
recently  marked  the  progress  of  their  affairs  towards  an  ordered 
and  stable  government  of  free  men  might  have  been  avoided.  The 
Russian  people  have  been  poisoned  by  the  very  same  falsehoods 
that  have  kept  the  German  people  in  the  dark,  and  the  poison 
has  been  administered  by  the  very  same  hand.  The  only  possible 
antidote  is  the  truth.  It  cannot  be  uttered  too  plainly  or  too 
often 

We  know  that  for  us  this  is  a  war  of  high  prin- 
ciple, debased  by  no  selfish  ambition  of  conquest  or  spoliation; 
because  we  know,  and  all  the  world  knows,  that  we  have  been 
forced  into  it  to  save  the  very  institutions  we  live  under  from 
corruption  and  destruction.  The  purpose  of  the  Central  Powers 
strikes  straight  at  the  very  heart  of  everything  we  believe  in ;  their 
methods  of  warfare  outrage  every  principle  of  humanity  and  of 
knightly  honor;  their  intrigue  has  corrupted  the  very  thought  and 
spirit  of  many  of  our  people ;  their  sinister  and  secret  diplomacy 
has  sought  to  take  our  very  territory  away  from  us  and  disrupt 
the  union  of  the  states.  Our  safety  would  be  at  an  end,  our  honor 
forever  sullied  and  brought  into  contempt,  were  we  to  permit  their 
triumph.  They  are  striking  at  the  very  existence  of  democracy 
and  liberty. 

It  is  because  it  is  for  us  a  war  of  high,  disinterested  purpose, 
in  which  all  the  free  peoples  of  the  world  are  banded  together  for 
the  vindication  of  right,  a  war  for  the  preservation  of  our  nation, 
of  all  that  it  has  held  dear,  of  principle  and  of  purpose,  that 
we  feel  ourselves  doubly  constrained  to  propose  for  its  outcome 
only  that  which  is  righteous  and  of  irreproachable  intention,  for 
our  foes  as  well  as  for  our  friends.  The  cause  being  just  and 
holy,  the  settlement  must  be  of  like  motive  and  equality.  For 
this  we  can  fight,  but  for  nothing  less  noble  or  less  worthy  of 
our  traditions.  For  this  cause  we  entered  the  war  and  for  this 
cause  will  we  battle  until  the  last  gun  is  fired. 

I  have  spoken  plainly  because  this  seems  to  me  the  time  when 
it  is  most  necessary  to  speak  plainly,  in  order  that  all  the  world 


358  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

may  know  that,  even  in  the  heat  and  ardor  of  the  struggle  and 
when  our  whole  thought  is  of  carrying  the  war  through  to  its 
end,  we  have  not  forgotten  any  ideal  or  principle  for  which  the 
name  of  America  has  been  held  in  honor  among  the  nations  and 
for  which  it  has  been  our  glory  to  contend  in  the  great  genera- 
tions that  went  before  us.  A  supreme  moment  of  history  has 
come.  The  eyes  of  the  people  have  been  opened  and  they  see. 
The  hand  of  God  is  laid  upon  the  nations.  We  will  show  them 
favor,  I  devoutly  believe,  only  if  they  rise  to  the  clear  heights  of 
His  own  justice  and  mercy. 


Government  Control  of  Transportation 

Before  the  end  of  the  year  1917,  it  became  necessary  for  the  Gov- 
ernment to  assume  control  of  the  major  transportation  systems  of 
the  United  States.  On  December  26,  1917,  President  Wilson  issued 
a  proclamation  to  that  effect. 

Whereas,  it  is  provided  by  Section  I  of  the  act 

approved  August  29,  1916,  entitled  "An  Act  Making  Appropria- 
tions for  the  Support  of  the  Army  for  the  Fiscal  Year  Ending 
June  30,  1917,  and  for  Other  Purposes,"  as  follows: 

"The  President,  in  time  of  war,  is  empowered,  through  the 
Secretary  of  War,  to  take  possession  and  assume  control  of 
any  system  or  systems  of  transportation,  or  any  part  thereof, 
and  to  utilize  the  same,  to  the  exclusion  as  far  as  may  be 
necessary  of  all  other  traffic  thereon,  for  the  transfer  or 
transportation  of  troops,  war  material  and  equipment,  or  for 
such  other  purposes  connected  with  the  emergency  as  may 
be  needful  or  desirable." 

And,  whereas,  it  has  now  become  necessary  in  the  national  de- 
fense to  take  possession  and  assume  control  of  certain  systems  of 
transportation  and  to  utilize  the  same,  to  the  exclusion  as  far  as 
may  be  necessary  of  other  than  war  traffic  thereon,  for  the  trans- 
portation of  troops,  war  material  and  equipment  therefor,  and  for 
other  needful  and  desirable  purposes  connected  with  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  ; 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States,  under  and  by  virtue  of  the  powers  vested  in  me  by  the 
foregoing  resolutions  and  statute,  and  by  virtue  of  all  other  powers 
thereto  enabling,  do  hereby,  through  Newton  D.  Baker,  Secretary 
of  War,  take  possession  and  assume  control  at  twelve  o'clock 
noon  on  the  twenty-eighth  day  of  December,  191 7,  of  each  and 
every  system  of  transportation  and  the  appurtenances  thereof 
located  wholly  or  in  part  within  the  boundaries  of  the  continental 
United  States  and  consisting  of  railroads,  and  owned  or  controlled 
systems  of  coastwise  and  inland  transportation,  engaged  in  gen- 

359 


360  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

eral  transportation,  whether  operated  by  steam  or  by  electric 
power,  including  also  terminals,  terminal  companies  and  terminal 
associations,  sleeping  and  parlor  cars,  private  cars  and  private 
car  lines,  elevators,  warehouses,  telegraph  and  telephone 
lines,  and  all  other  equipment  and  appurtenances  commonly 
used  upon  or  operated  as  a  part  of  such  rail  or  combined  rail 
and  water  systems  of  transportation — to  the  end  that  such 
systems  of  transportation  be  utilized  for  the  transfer  and  transpor- 
tation of  troops,  war  material  and  equipment  to  the  exclusion  so 
far  as  may  be  necessary  of  all  other  traffic  thereon,  and  that  so 
far  as  such  exclusive  use  be  not  necessary  or  desirable,  such  sys- 
tems of  transportation  be  operated  and  utilized  in  the  performance 
of  such  other  services  as  the  national  interest  may  require  and  of 
the  usual  and  ordinary  business  and  duties  of  common  carriers. 

It  is  hereby  directed  that  the  possession,  control,  operation,  and 
utilization  of  such  transportation  systems  hereby  by  me  under- 
taken shall  be  exercised  by  and  through  William  G.  McAdoo,  who 
is  hereby  appointed  and  designated  Director  General  of  Railroads. 
Said  Director  may  perform  the  duties  imposed  upon  him  so  long, 
and  to  such  extent,  as  he  shall  determine,  through  the  boards  of 
directors,  receivers,  officers,  and  employes  of  said  systems  of 
transportation.  Until  and  except  so  far  as  said  Director  shall 
from  time  to  time  by  general  or  special  orders  otherwise  provide, 
the  board  of  directors,  receivers,  officers,  and  employes  of  the  vari- 
ous transportation  systems  shall  continue  the  operation  thereof  in 
the  usual  and  ordinary  course  of  the  business  of  common  carriers 
in  the  names  of  their  respective  companies. 

Until  and  except  so  far  as  said  Director  shall  from  time  to  time 
otherwise  by  general  or  special  orders  determine,  such  systems  of 
transportation  shall  remain  subject  to  all  existing  statutes  and 
orders  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  and  to  all  statutes 
and  orders  of  regulating  commissions  of  the  various  States  in 
which  said  systems  or  any  part  thereof  may  be  situated.  But 
any  orders,  general  or  special,  hereafter  made  by  said  Director 
shall  have  paramount  authority  and  be  obeyed  as  such. 

Nothing  herein  shall  be  construed  as  now  affecting  the  posses- 
sion, operation,  and  control  of  street  electric  passenger  railways, 
including  railways  commonly  called  interurbans.  whether  such 
railways  be  or  be  not  owned  or  controlled  by  such  railroad  com- 
panies or  systems.  By  subsequent  order  and  proclamation,  if  and- 
when  it  shall  be  found  necessary  or  desirable,  possession,  control, 
or  operation  may  be  taken  of  all  or  any  part  of  such  street  railway 


Government  Control  of  Transportation  361 

systems,  including  subways  and  tunnels,  and  by  subsequent  order 
and  proclamation  possession,  control,  and  operation  in  whole  or 
in  part  may  also  be  relinquished  to  the  owners  thereof  of  any  part 
of  the  railroad  systems  or  rail  and  water  systems,  possession  and 
control  of  which  are  hereby  assumed. 

The  Director  shall,  as  soon  as  may  be  after  having  assumed  such 
possession  and  control,  enter  upon  negotiations  with  the  several 
companies  looking  to  agreements  for  just  and  reasonable  compen- 
sation for  the  possession,  use,  and  control  of  the  respective  prop- 
erties on  the  basis  of  an  annual  guaranteed  compensation  above 
accruing  depreciation  and  the  maintenance  of  their  properties, 
equivalent,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  to  the  average  of  the  net  operat- 
ing income  thereof  for  the  three-year  period  ending  June  30,  191 7, 
the  results  of  such  negotiations  to  be  reported  to  me  for  such  action 
as  may  be  appropriate  and  lawful. 

But  nothing  herein  contained,  expressed  or  implied,  or  here- 
after done  or  suffered  hereunder  shall  be  deemed  in  any  way  to 
impair  the  rights  of  the  stockholders,  bondholders,  creditors,  and 
other  persons  having  interests  in  said  systems  of  transportation  or 
in  the  profits  thereof,  to  receive  just  and  adequate  compensation 
for  the  use  and  control  and  operation  of  their  property  hereby 
assumed. 

Regular  dividends  hitherto  declared,  and  maturing  interest  upon 
bonds,  debentures,  and  other  obligations,  may  be  paid  in  due 
course ;  and  such  regular  dividends  and  interest  may  continue  to 
be  paid  until  and  unless  the  said  Director  shall  from  time  to  time 
otherwise  by  general  or  special  orders  determine.  And,  subject 
to  the  approval  of  the  Director,  the  various  carriers  may  agree 
upon  and  arrange  for  the  renewal  and  extension  of  maturing  obli- 
gations. 

Except  with  the  prior  written  assent  of  said  Director,  no  attach- 
ment by  mesne  process  or  on  execution  shall  be  levied  on  or  against 
any  of  the  property  used  by  any  of  said  transportation  systems  in 
the  conduct  of  their  business  as  common  carriers ;  but  suits  may 
be  brought  b)^  and  against  said  carriers  and  judgments  rendered 
as  hitherto  until  and  except  so  far  as  said  Director  may,  by  general 
or  special  orders,  otherwise  determine. 

From  and  after  twelve  o'clock  on  said  twenty-eighth  day  of 
December.  1917,  all  transportation  systems  included  in  this  order 
and  proclamation  shall  conclusively  be  deemed  within  the  posses- 
sion of  said  Director,  without  further  act  or  notice.     But  for  the 


362  A  History  of  the  Great  JJ\:r 

purposes  of  accounting  said  possession  and  control  shall  date  from 
twelve  o'clock  midnight  on  December  31,  1917 

The  following  explanatory  statement  accompanied  the  above  proc- 
lamation: 

Washington,  D.  C,  December  26,  1917. 

I  have  exercised  the  powers  over  the  transportation  systems  of 
the  country  which  were  granted  me  by  the  act  of  Congress  of 
August,  191 6,  because  it  has  become  imperatively  necessary  for 
me  to  do  so.  This  is  a  war  of  resources  no  less  than  of  men,  per- 
haps even  more  than  of  men,  and  it  is  necessary  for  the  complete 
mobilization  of  our  resources  that  the  transportation  systems  of 
the  country  should  be  organized  and  employed  under  a  single 
authority  and  a  simplified  method  of  coordination,  which  has  not 
proved  possible  under  private  management  and  control. 

The  committee  of  railroad  executives  who  have  been  cooperat- 
ing with  the  government  in  this  all-important  matter  have  done 
the  utmost  that  it  was  possible  for  them  to  do ;  have  done  it  with 
patriotic  zeal  and  with  great  ability ;  but  there  were  dififerences  that 
they  could  neither  escape  nor  neutralize.  Complete  unity  of  ad- 
ministration in  the  present  circumstances  involves  upon  occasion 
and  at  many  points  a  serious  dislocation  of  earnings,  and  the  com- 
mittee was,  of  course,  without  power  or  authority  to  rearrange 
charges  or  effect  proper  compensations  and  adjustments  of  earn- 
ings. 

Several  roads  which  were  willingly  and  wnth  admirable  public 
spirit  accepting  the  orders  of  the  committee  have  already  sufifered 
from  these  circumstances  and  should  not  be  required  to  suffer 
further.  In  mere  fairness  to  them  the  full  authority  of  the  gov- 
ernment must  be  substituted.  The  government  itself  will  thereby 
gain  an  immense  increase  of  efficiency  in  the  conduct  of  the  war 
and  of  the  innumerable  activities  upon  w^hich  its  successful  con- 
duct depends. 

The  public  interest  must  be  first  served  and.  in  addition,  the 
financial  interests  of  the  government  and  the  financial  interests 
of  the  railways  must  be  brought  under  a  common  direction.  The 
financial  operations  of  the  railways  need  not  then  interfere  with 
the  borrowings  of  the  government,  and  they  themselves  can  be 
conducted  at  a  great  advantage 

Investors  in  railway  securities  may  rest  assured 

that  their  rights  and  interests  will  be  as  scrupulously  looked  after 


Govcniiiuvit  Control  of  Transportation  363 

by  the  government  as  they  could  be  by  the  directors  of  the  several 
railway  systems.  Immediately  upon  the  reassembling  of  Con- 
gress I  shall  recommend  that  these  definite  guarantees  be  given: 
First,  of  course,  that  the  railway  properties  will  be  maintained 
during  the  period  of  Federal  control  in  as  good  repair  and  as 
complete  equipment  as  when  taken  over  by  the  government,  and, 
second,  that  the  roads  shall  receive  a  net  operating  income  equal 
in  each  case  to  the  average  net  income  of  the  three  years  preced- 
ing June  30,  1917;  and  I  am  entirely  confident  that  the  Congress 
will  be  disposed  in  this  case,  as  in  others,  to  see  that  justice  is 
done  and  full  security  assured  to  the  owners  and  creditors  of  the 
great  systems  which  the  government  must  now  use  under  its  own 
direction  or  else  sufit'er  serious  embarrassment. 

The  Secretary  of  War  and  I  are  agreed  that,  all  the  circum- 
stances being  taken  into  consideration,  the  best  results  can  be 
obtained  under  the  immediate  executive  direction  of  the  Honor- 
able William  G.  McAdoo,  whose  practical  experience  peculiarly 
fits  him  for  the  service  and  whose  authority  as  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  will  enable  him  to  coordinate  as  no  other  man  could 
the  many  financial  interests  which  will  be  involved  and  which 
might,  unless  systematically  directed,  suffer  very  embarrassing 
entanglements. 

The  government  of  the  United  States  is  the  only  great  govern- 
ment now  engaged  in  the  war  which  has  not  already  assumed 
control  of  this  sort.  It  was  thought  to  be  in  the  spirit  of  American 
institutions  to  attempt  to  do  everything  that  was  necessary  through 
private  management,  and  if  zeal  and  ability  and  patriotic  motive 
could  have  accomplished  the  necessary  unification  of  administra- 
tion it  would  certainly  have  been  accomplished;  but  no  zeal  or 
ability  could  overcome  insuperable  obstacles,  and  I  have  deemed 
it  my  duty  to  recognize  that  fact  in  all  candor  now  that  it  is 
demonstrated  and  to  use  without  reserve  the  great  authority 
reposed  in  me.  A  great  national  necessity  dictated  the  action  and 
I  was  therefore  not  at  liberty  to  abstain  from  it. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

When  Congress  re-assembled  after  the  Christmas  recess  of  1917, 
President  Wilson  addressed  it  on  the  control  assumed  by  the  Gov- 
ernment over  the  railroads.  His  address  of  January  4,  1918,  was 
as  follows: 

I  am  sure  that  I  am  speaking  the  mind  of  all 

thoughtful  Americans  when  I  say  that  it  is  our  duty  as  the  repre- 


364  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

sentatives  of  the  nation  to  do  everything  that  it  is  necessary  to  do 
to  secure  the  complete  mobilization  of  the  whole  resources  of 
America  by  as  rapid  and  effective  means  as  can  be  found.  Trans- 
portation supplies  all  the  arteries  of  mobilization.  Unless  it  be 
under  a  single  and  unified  direction,  the  whole  process  of  the 
nation's  action  is  embarrassed. 

It  was  in  the  true  spirit  of  America,  and  it  was  right,  that  we 
should  first  try  to  effect  the  necessary  unification  under  the  volun- 
tary action  of  those  who  were  in  charge  of  the  great  railway 
properties,  and  we  did  try  it.  The  directors  of  the  railways  re- 
sponded to  the  need  promptly  and  generously.  The  group  of 
railway  executives  who  were  charged  with  the  task  of  actual 
coordination  and  general  direction  performed  their  difficult  duties 
with  patriotic  zeal  and  marked  ability,  as  was  to  have  been  ex- 
pected, and  did,  I  believe,  everything  that  it  was  possible  for  them 
to  do  in  the  circumstances.  If  I  have  taken  the  task  out  of  their 
hands,  it  has  not  been  because  of  any  dereliction  or  failure  on  their 
part,  but  only  because  there  were  some  things  which  the  Govern- 
ment can  do  and  private  management  cannot.  We  shall  contmue 
to  value  most  highly  the  advice  and  assistance  of  these  gentle- 
men, and  I  am  sure  we  shall  not  find  them  withholding  it. 

It  had  become  unmistakably  plain  that  only  under  Government 
administration  can  the  entire  equipment  of  the  several  systems  of 
transportation  be  fully  and  unreservedly  thrown  into  a  common 
service  without  injurious  discrimination  against  particular  proper- 
ties. Only  under  Government  administration  can  absolutely  un- 
restricted and  unembarrassed  common  use  be  made  of  all  tracks, 
terminal  facilities  and  equipment  of  every  kind.  Only  under  that 
authority  can  new  terminals  be  constructed  and  developed  without 
regard  to  the  requirements  or  limitations  of  particular  roads.  But 
under  Government  administration  all  these  things  will  be  possible 
— not  instantly,  but  as  fast  as  practical  difficulties,  which  cannot 
be  merely  conjured  away,  give  way  before  the  new  management. 

The  common  administration  will  be  carried  out  with  as  little  dis- 
turbance of  the  present  operating  organizations  and  personnel  of 
the  railways  as  possible.  Nothing  will  be  altered  or  disturbed 
which  it  is  not  necessary  to  disturb.  We  are  serving  the  public 
interest  and  safeguarding  the  public  safety,  but  we  are  also  regard- 
ful of  the  interest  of  those  by  whom  these  great  properties  are 
owned  and  glad  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  experience  and  trained 
ability  of  those  who  have  been  managing  them.  It  is  necessary 
that  the  transportation  of  troops  and  of  war  materials,  of  food 


Government  Control  of  Transportation  365 

and,  of  fuel,  and  of  everything  that  is  necessary  for  the  full 
mobilization  of  the  energies  and  resources  of  the  country  should 
be  first  considered,  but  it  is  clearly  in  the  public  interest  also  that 
the  ordinary  activities  and  the  normal  industrial  and  commercial 
life  of  the  country  should  be  interfered  with  and  dislocated  as  little 
as  possible,  and  the  public  may  rest  assured  that  the  interest  and 
convenience  of  the  private  shipper  will  be  as  carefully  served  and 
safeguarded  as  it  is  possible  to  serve  and  safeguard  it  in  the 
present  extraordinary  circumstances. 

While  the  present  authority  of  the  Executive  suffices  for  all  pur- 
poses of  administration,  and  while,  of  course,  all  private  interests 
must  for  the  present  give  way  to  the  public  necessity,  it  is,  I  am 
sure  you  will  agree  with  me,  right  and  necessary  that  the  owners 
and  creditors  of  the  railways,  the  holders  of  their  stocks  and  bonds, 
should  receive  from  the  Government  an  unqualified  guarantee  that 
their  properties  will  be  maintained  throughout  the  period  of  Fed- 
eral control  in  as  good  repair  and  as  complete  equipment  as  at 
present,  and  that  the  several  roads  will  receive  under  Federal 
management  such  compensation  as  is  equitable  and  just  alike  to 
their  owners  and  to  the  general  public.  I  would  suggest  the 
average  net  railway  operating  income  of  the  three  years  ending 
June  30,  1917.  I  earnestly  recommend  that  these  guarantees  be 
given  by  appropriate  legislation,  and  given  as  promptly  as  circum- 
stances permit. 

I  need  not  point  out  the  essential  justice  of  such  guarantees 
and  their  great  influence  and  significance  as  elements  in  the  present 
financial  and  industrial  situation  of  the  country.  Indeed,  one  of 
the  strong  arguments  for  assuming  control  of  the  railroads  at 
this  time  is  the  financial  argument.  It  is  necessary  that  the  values 
of  railway  securities  should  be  justly  and  fairly  protected,  and  that 
the  largest  financial  operations  every  year  necessary  in  connection 
with  the  maintenance,  operation,  and  development  of  the  roads 
should,  during  the  period  of  the  war,  be  wisely  related  to  the 
financial  operations  of  the  Government 

It  is  an  obligation  of  public  conscience  and  of  public  honor  that 
the  private  interests  we  disturb  should  be  kept  safe  from  unjust 
injury,  and  it  is  of  the  utmost  consequence  to  the  Government 
itself  that  all  great  financial  operations  should  be  stabilized  and 
coordinated  with  the  financial  operations  of  the  Government.  No 
borrowing  should  run  athwart  the  borrowings  of  the  Federal 
Treasury,  and  no  fundamental  industrial  values  should  anywhere 
be  unnecessarily  impaired.     In  the  hands  of  many  thousands  of 


366  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

small  investors  in  the  country,  as  well  as  in  national  banks,  in 
insurance  companies,  in  savings  banks,  in  trust  companies,  in 
financial  agencies  of  every  kind,  railway  securities,  the  sum  total 
of  which  runs  up  to  some  ten  or  eleven  thousand  millions,  con- 
stitute a  vital  part  of  the  structure  of  credit,  and  the  unquestioned 
solidity  of  that  structure  must  be  maintained. 

The  Secretary  of  War  and  I  easily  agreed  that,  in  view  of  the 
many  complex  interests  which  must  be  safeguarded  and  harmon- 
ized, as  well  as  because  of  his  exceptional  experience  and  ability 
in  this  new  field  of  governmental  action,  the  Honorable  William 
G.  McAdoo  was  the  right  man  to  assume  direct  administrative 
control  of  this  new  executive  task.  At  our  request,  he  consented 
to  assume  the  authority  and  duties  of  organizer  and  director- 
general  of  the  new  railway  administration.  He  has  assumed  those 
duties,  and  his  work  is  in  active  progress. 

It  is  probably  too  much  to  expect  that  even  under  the  unified 
railway  administration  which  will  now  be  possible  sufficient 
economies  can  be  efifected  in  the  operation  of  the  railways  to  make 
it  possible  to  add  to  their  equipment  and  extend  their  operative 
facilities  as  much  as  the  present  extraordinary  demands  upon  their 
use  will  render  desirable,  without  resorting  to  the  national 
Treasury  for  the  funds.  If  it  is  not  possible,  it  will,  of  course,  be 
necessary  to  resort  to  the  Congress  for  grants  of  money  for  that 
purpose.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  will  advise  with  your  com- 
mittees with  regard  to  this  very  practical  aspect  of  the  matter. 
For  the  present,  I  suggest  only  the  guarantees  I  have  indicated 
and  such  appropriations  as  are  necessary  at  the  outset  of  this  task. 

I  take  the  liberty  of  expressing  the  hope  that  the  Congress  may 
grant  these  promptly  and  ungrudgingly.  We  are  dealing  with 
great  matters,  and  will,  I  am  sure,  deal  with  them  greatly. 

A  law  enacted  by  Congress  and  approved  by  the  President  on 
March  21,  1918,  provided  for  the  operation  of  the  railroads  under 
federal  control  and  for  the  compensation  of  their  owners,  etc.  Dur- 
ing the  period  of  federal  control  each  carrier  is  to  receive  annually 
a  sum  equal  to  its  average  annual  operating  income  for  the  three 
years  ending  June  30,  1917.  Any  income  above  that  amount  remains 
the  property  of  the  United  States,  the  figures  to  be  obtained  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce   Commission. 

War  taxes  for  the  period  beginning  with  January  i,  191 8,  and  all 


Govcriuncnt  Control  of  Transportation  367 

taxes  prior  thereto  must  be  paid  by  the  carrier  from  its  own  funds, 
later  taxes  being  paid  out  of  revenues  derived  by  the  Government 
under  federal  control.  The  Government  shall  consider  as  part  of 
the  expenses  of  operation  the  cost  of  maintenance,  repair,  and  de- 
preciation and  the  creation  of  reserves,  etc.,  necessary  to  return  the 
roads  to  the  owners  at  the  end  of  federal  control  in  the  same  con- 
dition as  when  acquired.  Wherever  it  is  apparent  to  the  President 
that  abnormal  conditions  in  1914-7  make  the  above  remuneration 
unfair,  he  may  make  with  the  carriers  concerned  such  other  agree- 
ment as  seems  to  him  just  and  fair. 

Street  and  interurban  electric  lines,  however,  are  excluded  from 
the  provisions  of  the  Act. 

All  claims  for  compensation  not  adjusted  as  provided  above  and 
below  may  be  submitted  to  boards  appointed  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission. 

Dividends  paid  by  carriers  under  federal  control  must  not  be  beyond 
those  paid  in  1914-7,  except  with  the  approval  of  the  President. 

Five  hundred  million  dollars  is  appropriated  for  the  expenses  of 
Government  control.  The  President  may  order  carriers  to  make  im- 
provements, etc.,  to  be  paid  for  from  this  fund. 

The  carriers  may  issue  securities  during  federal  control,  with  the 
approval  of  the  President,  and  the  latter  may,  out  of  the  fund  above- 
mentioned,  buy  such  at  a  price  not  above  par  and  may  sell  them  not 
below  the  cost  thereof.  The  President  may  delegate  the  powers 
granted  him  by  the  Bill,  but  no  Government  official  may  receive  extra 
compensation  for  additional  duties  thus  performed. 

All  carriers  are  subject  to  all  laws  and  suits,  etc.,  as  before  federal 
control,  except  that  no  process,  final  or  mesne,  may  be  filed  against 
a  property  under  federal  control.  The  President  is  given  authority 
over  fares  and  rates,  etc.,  subject,  however,  to  the  veto  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  after  hearing  and  investigation  in  the 
case  of  rates  concerning  which  complaint  has  been  made. 

All  property  and  moneys  derived  from  operation  under  federal 
control  become  the  property  of  the  United  States,  but  in  the  custody 
of  the  same  officers  as  before  federal  control.     Expenditures  follow 


368  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

a  similar  course.  Federal  control  must  end  twenty-one  months  after 
the  end  of  the  war,  but  the  President  may  relinquish  his  authority 
over  all  or  any  of  the  carriers  previously  to  that  time.  Nothing  in 
the  Act  may  be  construed  as  affecting  the  powers  of  the  several  states 
over  the  carriers,  except  where  the  transportation  of  troops  and  war 
materials  or  the  issue  of  stocks  and  bonds  are  concerned;  nor  to  in- 
dicate nor  to  express  the  post-war  attitude  of  the  Government  toward 
the  railroads. 

The  average  net  income  of  the  railroads  for  1914-7  was  the  high- 
est in  the  history  of  the  railroads  of  the  country,  as  indicated  by  the 
following  figures : 

1915   $    728,212,079 

1916   1,043.839,822 

1917   1,069,750.514 

Average    947.267,472 

On  May  26,  1918,  Director-general  of  Railroads  McAdoo  announced 
wage  increases  of  more  than  $300,000,000,  retroactive  to  January  i, 
1918,  and  afifecting  nearly  2,000,000  employees.  The  wages  policy  of 
the  Federal  Administration  was  announced  as  based  on  the  need  for 
a  decent  standard  of  living,  rather  than  on  the  law  of  supply  and 
demand  for  labor ;  on  equal  pay  for  similar  work ;  on  the  eight-hour 
day  as  a  basis  of  wages  computation  in  all  railroad  work ;  on  equal 
pay  for  men  and  women,  and  for  negroes  and  whites  for  identical 
or  similar  work.  A  standing  wage  board  consisting  of  three  repre- 
sentatives of  the  employees  and  three  of  the  employers  was  estab- 
lished to  adjust  problems  in  the  development  of  the  Government's 
wages  policy.  Simultaneously  a  general  increase  of  approximately 
25%  in  both  passenger  and  freight  rates  was  announced,  in  order 
to  meet  these  and  other  increases  in  the  operating  expenses  of  the 
railroads. 

In  connection  with  the  Federal  Railroad  Administration,  the  great 
express  companies  of  the  nation  were  combined  in  one  body  under 
Government  control  in  June,   1918. 

Whereas  the  organizations  for  the  conduct  of  the  express  busi- 
ness over  numerous  systems  of  transportation  which  have  been 


Government  Control  of  Transportation  369 

duly  placed  under  Federal  control,  and  pertaining  to  such  systems 
of  transportation,  have  been  consolidated  into  the  American  Rail- 
way Express  Company  which  has  been  made  the  sole  agent  of  the 
Government  for  conducting  the  express  business,  with  the  result 
that  the  entire  transportation  system  of  said  Express  Company 
has  been  necessarily  in  substance  and  effect  placed  under  Federal 
control,  and 

Whereas  it  is  desirable,  in  order  to  administer  to  the  best 
advantage  the  transportation  business  and  operations  of  the 
American  Railway  Express  System  to  make  it  specifically  clear  by 
this  Proclamation  that  the  President  has  the  possession,  use,  con- 
trol and  operation  of  the  entire  transportation  system  of  the 
American  Railway  Express  Company, 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States,  under  and  by  virtue  of  the  powers  vested  in  me  by  law 
do  hereby,  througl\  Newton  D.  Baker,  Secretary  of  War,  take 
possession,  and  assume  control  at  12  o'clock  noon  on  the  i8th  day 
of  November,  1918,  of  that  certain  system  of  transportation  called 
the  American  Railway  Express  Company  and  all  of  its  appurte- 
nances and  property  of  every  kind  or  nature,  directly  or  indirectly, 
owned,  leased,  chartered,  controlled,  or  used  in  the  conduct  of,  or 
in  connection  with,  its  express  business. 

It  is  hereby  further  directed  that  the  possession,  control,  opera- 
tion and  utilization  of  said  express  transportation  system  hereby 
by  me  undertaken  shall  be  exercised  by  and  through  William  G. 
McAdoo,  heretofore  appointed  Director  General  of  Railroads, 
with  all  the  powers  conferred  upon  him  by  the  said  Proclamations 
of  December  26,  1917,  and  March  29,  1918,  respectively,  together 
with  all  and  singular  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  President  by 
the  Act  of  Congress  entitled,  "An  Act  to  Provide  for  the  Opera- 
tion of  Transportation  Systems  while  under  Federal  Control,  for 
the  Just  Compensation  of  their  Owners,  and  for  Other  Purposes," 
approved  March  21,  1918. 

The  said  Director  General  of  Railroads  may  perform  the  duties 
hereby  imposed  upon  him,  so  long  and  to  such  an  extent  as  he 
shall  determine,  through  the  Board  of  Directors,  officers  and  em- 
ployees of  the  said  American  Railway  Express  Company,  under 
the  contract  already  made,  and  dated  the  twenty-sixth  day  of 
June,  1918.  between  the  said  Director  General  of  Railroads  and 
said  American  Railway  Express  Company,  and  until  and  except 
so  far  as  said  Director  General  shall  from  time  to  time  by  general 
or  special-orders  otherwise  provide,  the  Board  of  Directors,  officers 


3/0  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

and  employees  of  said  Company  sliall  continue  the  operation  there- 
of in  the  usual  and  ordinary  course  under  such  contract. 

From  and  after  12  o'clociv  noon  on  said  i8th  November,  1918, 
the  said  transportation  system  shall  conclusively  be  deemed  within 
tiie  possession  and  control  of  said  Director  General  without 
further  act  or  notice 

The  following^  orders  explain  the  control  exercised  over  the  rail- 
roads during  the  Civil  War: 

War  Department,  May  25,  1862. 
Ordered:  By  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  by  act  of  Congress, 
the  President  takes  military  possession  of  all  the  railroads  in  the 
United  States  from  and  after  this  date  until  further  order,  and 
directs  that  the  respective  railroad  companies,  their  officers  and 
servants,  shall  hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  the  transportation 
of  such  troops  and  munitions  of  war  as  may  be  ordered  by  the 
military  authorities,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  business. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War: 

M.  C.  MEIGS, 
Quartermaster-General. 

War  Department, 
Washington  City,  September  24,1863. 
Ordered  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  That  Major- 
General  Hooker  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  to  take  military 
possession  of  all  railroads,  with  their  cars,  locomotives,  plants, 
and  equipments,  that  may  be  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the 
military  operation  committed  to  his  charge ;  and  all  officers,  agents, 
and  employees  of  said  roads  are  directed  to  render  their  aid  and 
assistance  therein  and  to  respect  and  obey  his  commands,  pursuant 
to  the  act  of  Congress  in  such  case  made  and  provided. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  U'ar. 

Nevertheless,  President  Wilson  expressly  did  not  advocate  a  policy 
of  Government  operation  of  the  railroads  after  the  emergencies  of 
war  had  passed.  In  this  respect,  he  was  but  following  the  traditional 
American  feeling  in  favor  of  private  ownership,  as  well  expressed, 
for  instance,  in  the  Fifth  Annual  Message  of  President  Roosevelt, 
on  December  5,  1905. 

The  question  of  transportation  lies  at  the  root  of 

all  industrial  success,  and  the  revolution  in  transportation  which 


Lrovernment  Control  of  Transportation  371 

has  taken  place  during  the  last  half  century  has  been  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  growth  of  the  new  industrial  conditions. 
Most  emphatically  we  do  not  wish  to  see  the  man  of  great  talents 
refused  the  reward  for  his  talents.  Still  less  do  we  wish  to  see 
him  penalized;  but  we  do  desire  to  see  the  system  of  railroad 
transportation  so  handled  that  the  strong  man  shall  be  given  no 
advantage  over  the  weak  man.  We  wish  to  insure  as  fair  treat- 
ment for  the  small  town  as  for  the  big  city ;  for  the  small  shipper 
as  for  the  big  shipper.  In  the  old  days  the  highway  of  commerce, 
whether  by  water  or  by  a  road  on  land,  was  open  to  all ;  it  belonged 
to  the  public  and  the  traffic  along  it  was  free.  At  present  the  rail- 
way is  this  highway,  and  we  must  do  our  best  to  see  that  it  is 
kept  open  to  all  on  equal  terms.  Unlike  the  old  highway  it  is  a 
very  difficult  and  complex  thing  to  manage,  and  it  is  far  better 
that  it  should  be  managed  by  private  individuals  than  by  the 
Government.  But  it  can  only  be  so  managed  on  condition  that 
justice  is  done  the  public.  It  is  because,  in  my  judgment,  public 
ownership  of  railroads  is  highly  undesirable  and  would  probably 
in  this  country  entail  far-reaching  disaster,  but  I  wish  to  see  such 
supervision  and  regulation  of  them  in  the  interest  of  the  public 
as  will  make  it  evident  that  there  is  no  need  for  public  ownership. 
The  opponents  of  Government  regulation  dwell  upon  the  difficulties 
to  be'  encountered  and  the  intricate  and  involved  nature  of  the 
problem.  Their  contention  is  true.  It  is  a  complicated  and  delicate 
problem,  and  all  kinds  of  difficulties  are  sure  to  arise  in  connection 
with  any  plan  of  solution,  while  no  plan  will  bring  all  the  benefits 
hoped  for  by  its  more  optimistic  adherents.  Moreover,  under  any 
healthy  plan,  the  benefits  will  develop  gradually  and  not  rapidly. 
Finally,  we  must  clearly  understand  that  the  public  servants  who 
are  to  do  this  peculiarly  responsible  and  delicate  work  must  them- 
selves be  of  the  highest  type  both  as  regards  integrity  and  efficiency. 
They  must  be  well  paid,  for  otherwise  able  men  cannot  in  the  long 
run  be  secured ;  and  they  must  possess  a  lofty  probity  which  will 
revolt  as  quickly  at  the  thought  of  pandering  to  any  gust  of 
popular  prejudice  against  rich  men  as  at  the  thought  of  anything 
even  remotely  resembling  subserviency  to  rich  men.  But  while  I 
fully  admit  the  difficulties  in  the  way,  I  do  not  for  a  moment 
admit  that  these  difficulties  warrant  us  in  stopping  in  our  effort 
to  secure  wise  and  just  system.  They  should  have  no  other  effect 
than  to  spur  us  on  to  the  exercise  of  the  resolution,  the  even- 
handed  justice,  and  the  fertility  of  resource,  which  we  like  to  think 
of  as  typically  American,  and  which  will  in  the  end  achieve  good 


372  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

results  in  this  as  in  other  fields  of  activity.  The  task  is  a  great 
one  and  underlies  the  task  of  dealing  with  the  whole  industrial 
problem.  But  the  fact  that  it  is  a  great  problem  does  not  warrant 
us  in  shrinking  from  the  attempt  to  solve  it.  At  present  we  face 
such  utter  lack  of  supervision,  such  freedom  from  the  restraints 
of  law,  that  excellent  men  have  often  been  literally  forced  into 
doing  what  they  deplored  because  otherwise  they  were  left  at  the 
mercy  of  unscrupulous  competitors.  To  rail  at  and  assail  the  men 
who  have  done  as  they  best  could  under  such  conditions  accom- 
plishes little.  What  we  need  to  do  is  to  develop  an  orderly  system, 
and  such  a  system  can  only  come  through  the  gradually  increased 
exercise  of  the  right  of  efficient  Government  control 


Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act 

One  of  the  most  helpful  measures  in  prosecuting  the  war  against 
Germany  was  the  Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act.  This  act,  approved 
by  the  President  on  October  6,  1917,  was  designed,  as  its  name  im- 
plies, to  prevent  commercial  intercourse  with  firms  with  German  in- 
terests, and  thus  to  cripple  to  that  extent  the  commercial  strength 
of  Germany.     The  chief  provisions  of  the  Act  were  as  follows: 

Under  severe  criminal  penalties,  trading  without  a  license  with  a 
person  who  there  is  reason  to  believe  is  an  enemy  or  an  ally  of  enemy 
is  made  unlawful.  "Trade"  is  defined  to  mean  to, pay,  satisfy,  com- 
promise, or  give  security  for  the  payment  of  any  debt  or  obligation; 
to  draw,  accept,  pay,  draw  for  acceptance  or  payment,  or  endorse 
any  negotiable  instrument ;  to  enter  into,  carry  on,  complete  or  per- 
form any  contract,  agreement  or  obligation ;  to  buy,  sell,  loan,  extend 
credit,  trade  in,  deal  with,  exchange,  transmit,  transfer,  assign,  or 
otherwise  receive  or  dispose  of  any  form  of  property;  to  have  any 
form  of  business  communication  or  intercourse  with. 

An  "enemy"  or  "ally  of  enemy"  is  defined  as  a  person  of  any  na- 
tionality residing  within  the  territory  of  or  occupied  by  Germany 
and  any  of  her  allies,  including  even  citizens  of  the  United  States 
who  may  be  thus  situated.  The  term  includes  any  person  doing  busi- 
ness within  such  territory,  wherever  he  reside  or  of  whatever  na- 
tionality he  be.  (The  term  "person"  includes  a  business  or  corpora- 
tion.) The  term  includes  also  every  enemy  government  of  the  United 
States,  and  every  agent  of  such  government,  wherever  located.  Ene- 
my aliens  (q.  v.)  in  the  United  States  are  not  included  in  this  term, 
although  they  may  be  subject  to  internment,  and  the  President  is 
given  power  to  issue  licenses  to  trade  with  the  enemy. 

It  is  similarly  unlawful  to  trade  with  any  person  whatsoever  who 
may  be  acting  as  agent  for  or  for  the  benefit  of  an  enemy  or  ally  of 
enemy. 

373 


374  ^  History  of  the  Great  War 

A  person  who  is  an  enemy  or  ally  of  enemy  may  apply  for  a  license 
to  do  business  within  the  United  States,  and  may  continue  to  do  busi- 
ness until  such  application  is  passed  upon.  An  enemy  alien  in  the 
United  States  need  not  apply  for  such  license  unless  he  falls  under 
the  above  definition  of  an  enemy  or  an  ally  of  the  enemy.  An  enemy 
or  ally  of  enemy  granted  a  license  to  do  business  within  the  United 
States  may  be  traded  with  by  every  one  but  such  enemy  or  ally  of 
enemy  may  not  transmit  outside  the  United  States  any  money  or 
property,  and  may  not  use  such  money  or  property  to  establish  credit 
inside  or  outside  the  United  States  for  or  for  the  benefit  of  an  enemy 
or  ally  of  enemy. 

It  is  made  unlawful  to  take  or  send  outside  of  the  United  States 
any  communication  intended  for  an  enemy  or  ally  of  enemy,  and  also 
to  bring  in  or  take  out  any  form  of  communication  except  by  mail — 
unless  through  license. 

The  War  Trade  Board  succeeds  the  Exports  Administrative  Board 
in  all  the  latter's  functions,  including  complete  control  over  exports, 
under  the  powers  created  in  the  Espionage  Act.  The  War  Trade 
Board  also  licenses  importations,  the  Act  giving  the  President  the 
power  to  prohibit  the  importation  of  any  article  or  to  regulate  its 
importation. 

A  War  Trade  Council  is  created  to  replace  the  Exports  Council 
and  to  act  as  an  advisory  body  in  all  matters  referred  to  it  by  the 
President  of  the  War  Trade  Board.  It  is  composed  of  the  Secre- 
taries of  State,  Treasury,  Agriculture,  Commerce  and  the  Food  Ad- 
ministrator, and  the  Chairman  of  the  United  States  Shipping  Board. 

The  Federal  Trade  Commission  is  empowered  to  carrry  out  vari- 
ous provisions  in  the  Act  relating  to  patents. 

Control  over  foreign  exchange  and  transfers  of  bullion,  etc.,  are 
also  vested  in  the  President  by  the  Act. 

A  Censorship  Board  administers  the  regulations  of  the  President 
concerning  cable,  telegraph  and  mail  communication  between  the 
United  States  and  foreign  countries.  This  Board  is  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  Postmaster-general,  the  Secretaries  of  War  and 
Navy,  the  War  Trade  Board,  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Public  Information. 


Trading  zviih  the  Enemy  Act  375 

Every  paper  printed  in  a  foreign  language  must  furnish  a  trans- 
lation to  the  Postmaster-general  of  all  matter  concerning  the  War 
printed  by  it. 

It  is  made  unlawful  for  any  person  without  a  license  therefor  to 
transport  to  or  from  the  United  States,  or  for  any  vessel  of  the  United 
States  registry  to  transport  anywhere,  any  citizen  of  an  enemy  or 
ally  of  an  enemy  nation. 


Alien  Property  Custodian 

Another  measure  of  prime  importance  to  the  United  States  in 
prosecuting  the  war  against  Germany  was  that  designed  to  take  over 
all  property  in  the  United  States  of  German  ownership.  The  chief 
duties  assigned  the  AHen  Property  Custodian,  A.  Mitchell  Palmer, 
were  as  follows: 

The  word  "enemy"  for  the  purposes  of  the  work  of  the  Alien  Prop- 
erty Custodian  covers  all  persons  within  the  military  or  naval  lines 
of  the  Central  Powers,  and  all  persons  residing  outside  the  United 
States  transacting  business  with  any  one  within  such  military  or  naval 
lines.  A  German  citizen  in  the  United  States  (unless  interested)  is 
not  an  enemy  under  the  Trading-with-the-Enemy  Act,  whereas  an 
American  citizen  in  Germany  may  be  so  considered. 

All  who  hold  enemy  property  or  any  interest  therein,  by  knowledge 
or  by  suspicion,  must  report  on  the  same  through  blanks  furnished 
by  the  Alien  Property  Custodian,  under  penalty  of  not  more  than 
ten  years'  imprisonment  or  a  fine  of  $10,000  or  both. 

The  purpose  of  the  work  of  the  Alien  Property  Custodian  is  to 
make  available  for  war  financing  any  funds  in  the  United  States  be- 
longing to  enemies,  to  prevent  such  funds  being  used  so  as  to  give 
aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy,  and  to  safeguard  property  of  enemies 
for  such  disposition  after  the  war  as  Congress  might  make. 

For  all  property  which  comes  into  his  hands,  the  Custodian  acts 
as  a  common  law  trustee,  depositing  all  money  with  the  Treasurer 
of  the  United  States,  to  be  invested  in  United  States  bonds  or  cer- 
tificates of  indebtedness.  In  the  discretion  of  the  Custodian,  enemy 
property  may  be  used  or  supervised,  without  confiscation.  In  cer- 
tain cases  licenses  are  issued  to  permit  the -property  of  enemies  to 
be  carried  on,  especially  to  enemy  insurance  companies. 

On  May  i,  1918,  the  Alien  Property  Custodian's  trust  accounts 
comprised  $282,067,927,   of   which  $115,824,409   represented   stocks; 

376 


Alien  Property  Custodian  2)11 

$46,016,434,  bonds,  $51,325,434,  accounts  receivable;  $27,965,975, 
cash;  $6,522,279,  mortgages;  $4,267,618,  notes  receivable;  $4,503,142, 
real  estate;  and  $25,612,633,  miscellaneous. 

The  extent  to  v^hich  the  Government  ended  German  ownership  of 
property  in  the  United  States  during  the  war  may  be  seen  from  the 
following  table.  The  figures  extended  to  November  i,  1918,  and 
show  the  different  forms  in  which  capital  invested  by  Germans  in  the 
United  States  for  German  purposes  was  used  to  help  the  United 
States  in  the  prosecution  of  war  against  Germany. 

Cash   Invested  in  Government   Securities $  54,786,444 

Cash    deposited    in    Treasury 4,544,126 

Cash  with  Depositaries 9.546 

Stocks 169,366,860 

Bonds,  other  than  Government 59-365,453 

Mortgages   1 1,720,996 

Notes  Receivable  6,167,032 

Accounts  Receivable   50,648,582 

Real  Estate  7,567,988 

General  business  in  liquidation,  operation,  mdse.,  etc....  89,278,885 
Ships 34,193,690 

Total    $487,649,702 

By  March  i,  1919,  these  figures  had  risen  to  almost  $800,000,000. 


The  Espionage  Law 

One  of  the  features  of  the  prosecution  of  war  against  Germany  by 
the  United  States  was  the  passage  and  enforcement  of  a  bill  designed 
to  prevent  or  to  punish  opposition  by  act  or  word  to  the  country's 
prosecution  of  the  war.  It  was  estimated  that  between  the  passage 
of  the  bill  and  the  signing  of  the  armistice  on  November  ii,  1918, 
some  1,500  or  2,000  persons  had  been  sentenced  to  imprisonment  under 
the  terms  of  the  Espionage  Law.  Infliction  of  the  maximum  sentence 
(twenty  years'  imprisonment)  for  the  offenses  outside  of  espionage 
was  very  common,  and  among  those  convicted  were  many  of  the  lead- 
ers of  radical  political  movements  in  the  United  States.  A  large  num- 
ber of  the  active  leaders  of  the  I.  W.  W.  were  among  those  sentenced, 
and  many  prominent  Socialists  of  both  sexes  also  fell  under  the  pen- 
alties of  the  Law. 

In  March,  1919,  the  attorney-general  under  whom  most  of  the  pros- 
ecutions under  the  Espionage  Law  were  conducted  urged  that  some 
eighty  sentences  imposed  under  the  Law  be  commuted — a  request  with 
which  President  Wilson  immediately  complied.  For  the  majority  of 
cases,  however,  Mr.  Gregory  insisted  that  commutation  of  sentence 
was  undesirable,  and  objected  to  the  classification  of  those  sentenced 
under  the  Espionage  Law  as  "political  prisoners." 

In  the  last  session  of  the  Sixty-fourth  Congress,  a  bill,  commonly 
called  the  Espionage  Bill,  or  Spy  Bill,  was  introduced  to  extend  and 
to  clarify  the  regulations  concerning  espionage  and  treason,  but  the 
Bill,  although  it  passed  the  Senate,  was  not  reported  out  of  the  com- 
mittee in  the  House.  A  similar  bill  was  passed  by  the  Sixty-fifth  Con- 
gress and  was  approved  by  the  President  on  June  15,  1917.  Its  main 
provisions  were  as  follows: 

Title  I — Whoever  obtains  information  respecting  any  place  connected 
with  the  national  defense  with  intent  or  reason  to  believe  that  such 


Espionage  Lazv  379 

information  is  to  be  used  to  the  injury  of  the  United  States,  including 
the  taking  of  photographs  or  blue  prints,  etc.;  or  who  receives  or  agrees 
to  receive  or  stimulates  the  acquisition  of  such  information  for  such 
intent  or  reason;  or  who  permits  the  transmission  of  such  information 
to  any  one  not  entitled  to  receive  it,  through  intent  or  through  gross 
negligence,  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $10,000  or 
by  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  two  years,  or  by  both. 

Whoever,  with  such  intent  or  reason,  transmits  or  assists  in  the  trans- 
mission of  such  information  relating  to  the  national  defense  to  a  for- 
eign government  or  to  any  agent  thereof  shall  be  punished  by  imprison- 
ment of  not  more  than  20  years;  provided  that  whoever  so  acts  in  time 
of  war  shall  be  punished  by  death  or  by  imprisonment  of  not  more 
than  30  years,  and  that  whoever,  with  intent  that  it  shall  be  furnished 
the  enemy,  collects  or  attempts  to  collect  such  information,  in  time  of 
war,  is  punishable  by  death  or  by  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  30 
years. 

Whoever  in  time  of  war  wilfully  makes  false  statements  to  inter- 
fere with  the  operation  of  the  forces  of  the  United  States  or  attempts 
to  cause  insubordination  in  the  forces  of  the  United  States  or  to  ob- 
struct the  recruiting  or  enlistment  service  of  the  United  States,  to  the 
injury  of  the  service  or  of  the  United  States,  is  punishable  by  a  fine 
of  not  more  than  $10,000  or  by  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  20 
years  or  by  both. 

Any  person  who  conspires  to  violate  the  above  provisions  shall  be 
punishable  as  any  person  who  performs  them.  Any  person  concealing 
or  harboring  a  person  who  he  suspects  has  violated  these  provisions 
is  punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $10,000  or  by  imprisonment 
for  not  more  than  two  years  or  by  both. 

Title  II  gives  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  power  over  all  vessels 
in  the  territorial  waters  of  the  United  States  whenever  the  President 
proclaims  that  a  national  emergency  for  this  purpose  exists.  Punish- 
ment is  provided  for  those  who  resist  the  exercise  of  such  power  or 
who  cause  or  permit  the  destruction  or  injury  of  such  vessels  or  per- 
mit them  to  harbor  persons  who  have  committed  offenses  against  the 
United  States. 


380  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Title  III  provides  punishment  for  any  person  who  injures  or  tam- 
pers with  or  places  bombs  on  any  vessel  in  the  territorial  waters  of  the 
United  States  or  any  vessel  of  American  registry  anywhere. 

Title  IV  provides  punishment  for  any  person  who  attempts  to  inter- 
fere with  the  exportation  abroad  of  articles  or  to  injure  such  articles. 

Title  V  gives  the  President  the  right  to  refuse  clearance  and  to 
detain  vessels  during  a  war  in  which  the  United  States  is  a  neutral. 
It  also  provides  for  the  arrest  and  confinement  of  any  person  breaking 
internment  and  for  the  punishment  of  any  person  under  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  United  States  who  shall  aid  or  persuade  any  such  person  to 
break  internment. 

Title  \T  provides  for  the  regulation  of  the  seizure  of  arms  or  am- 
munitions of  war  unlawfully  attempted  to  be  exported  from  the  United 
States. 

Title  \\\  gives  the  President  power  to  proclaim  certain  exports  un- 
lawful, but  only  during  the  war  against  the  Central  Powers. 

Title  VIII  provides  for  the  punishment  of  any  person  who  wilfully 
makes  an  untrue  statement  under  oath,  with  knowledge  of  a  possibility 
that  such  statement  may  influence  the  conduct  of  any  foreign  govern- 
ment or  of  the  United  States,  to  the  injury  of  the  latter;  and  of  any 
person  who  falsely  pretends  to  be  an  official  of  a  foreign  government, 
and  obtains  any  thing  of  value  because  of  such  misrepresentation ;  and 
of  any  person  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  who  car- 
ries out  a  conspiracy,  wherever  made,  to  injure  property,  etc. 

Title  IX  changes  passport  regulations. 

Title  X  provides  for  the  punishment  of  any  person  who  attempts 
to  counterfeit  a  Government  seal  or  uses  a  Government  seal  unlawfully. 

Title  XI  provides  extensive  regulations  concerning  search  warrants 
and  their  applicability. 

Title  XII  refers  to  the  use  of  the  mails.  Any  writmg  or  publica- 
tion of  any  kind  violating  any  of  the  above  provisions  is  declared  to 
be  non-mailable.  No  person,  however,  except  an  employee  of  the  Dead 
Letter  Office  authorized  thereto  or  another  person  v/orking  upon  an 


Espionage  Lazv  381 

authorized  search  warrant,  is  permitted  to  open  a  letter  not  addressed 
to  himself. 

Any  writing  or  publication  containing  any  matter  advocating  treason 
or  resistance  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States  is  declared  non-niailable. 
Whoever  attempts  to  use  the  mails  or  the  Postal  Service  to  mail  mat- 
ter thus  declared  to  be  unmailable  shall  be  fined  not  more  than  $5,000 
or  imprisoned  not  more  than  five  years  or  both. 

Title  XIII  contains  general  provisions  and  definitions  regarding  the 
language  and  jurisdiction  of  the  preceding  articles. 

By  regulations  of  Postmaster-general  Burleson,  made  at  the  di- 
rection of  President  Wilson,  seditious  publication  in  accord  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Espionage  Act  is  defined  as  follows  ; 

Any  matter  advocating  or  urging  treason,  insurrection,  or  forcible 
resistance  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

Any  matter  conveying  false  reports  or  false  statements  intended  to 
interfere  with  the  operation  or  success  of  the  military  or  naval  forces 
of  the  United  States,  or  to  promote  the  success  of  its  enemies. 

Any  matter  intended  to  cause  insubordination,  disloyalty,  mutiny, 
or  refusal  of  duty  in  military  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States. 

Any  matter  intended  to  obstruct  the  recruiting  or  enlistment  serv- 
ice of  the  United  States,  to  the  injury  of  the  service  of  the  United 
States. 

Any  matter  the  circulation  or  the  publication  of  which  involves  the 
violation  of  any  of  the  criminal  provisions  of  the  Espionage  Act. 

By  act  of  Congress  approved  May  16,  1918,  the  penalty  of  twenty 
years'  imprisonment  or  fine  of  $10,000  or  both  was  extended  to  cover 
cases  of  any  one  who  utters,  writes  or  publishes  any  "disloyal,  profane, 
scurrilous  or  abusive  language"  regarding  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, Constitution,  Flag,  military  or  naval  forces,  and  uniform  or  any 
language  intended  to  bring  them  into  contempt  or  disrepute ;  and  of 
any  one  who  shall  urge  the  curtailment  of  the  production  of  any  goods 
of  value  to  the  country  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  with  intent  to 
hinder  such  prosecution ;  and  of  any  one  who  advocates  or  defends 
such  acts,  or  supports  or  favors  the  cause  of  a  country  with  which 


382  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

the  United  States  is  at  war  or  by  word  or  act  opposes  the  cause  of 
the  United  States  in  that  war. 

Moreover,  during  the  war  the  Postmaster-general  "upon  evidence 
satisfactory  to  him"  that  any  person  is  using  the  mails  in  violation 
of  the  provisions  of  the  law  may  declare  that  all  mail  addressed  to 
such  person  is  undeliverable. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  Espionage  Law  many  newspapers,  maga- 
zines, and  other  publications — mostly  of  radical  views — were  barred 
from  the  mails.  President  Wilson's  attitude  in  this  connection  was 
set  forth  in  the  following  letter  to  the  editor  of  one  of  the  magazines 
denied  the  mails : 

The  White  House,  September  18,  K^iy. 
My  Dear  Mr.  Eastman  : 

I  thank  you  very  warmly  for  your  generous  appreciation  of  my 
reply  to  the  Pope,  and  I  wish  that  I  could  agree  with  those  parts 
of  your  letter  which  concern  the  other  matters  we  were  discussing 
when  you  were  down  here.  I  think  that  a  time  for  war  must  be  re- 
garded as  wholly  exceptional  and  that  it  is  legitimate  to  regard 
things  which  w^ould  in  ordinary  circumstances  be  innocent  as  very 
dangerous  to  the  public  welfare.  But  the  line  is  manifestly  ex- 
ceedingly hard  to  draw,  and  I  cannot  say  that  I  have  any  confidence 
that  I  know  how  to  draw  it.  I  can  only  say  that  a  line  must  be 
drawn  and  that  we  are  trying — it  may  be  clumsily,  but  genuinely 
— to  draw  it  without  favor  or  prejudice.  Cordially  and  sincerely 
yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

Conscientious  Objectors 

When  the  draft  law  was  applied  for  raising  forces  in  the  United 
States  adequate  to  cope  with  the  armed  might  of  Germany,  it  was 
found  that  there  were  a  number  of  men  in  the  United  States  who 
refused  to  engage  in  the  war  against  the  Central  Powers.  Altogether 
there  were  some  6,000  of  these  "conscientious  objectors"  to  war.  On 
March  20,  1918,  the  President  issued  the  following  order  prescribing 
certain  forms  of  non-combatant  service  for  such  persons : 

I.  By  virtue  of  authority  contained  in  Section  4  of  the  Act 
approved  May  18,  1917,  entitled,  "An  Act  to  authorize  the  Presi- 


Espionage  Law  383 

dent  to   increase  temporarily   the  military  establishment   of  the 
United  States,"  whereby  it  is  provided — 

"And  nothing  in  this  Act  contained  shall  be  construed  to 
require  or  compel  any  person  to  serve  in  any  of  the  forces 
herein  provided  for  who  is  found  to  be  a  member  of  any  well 
recognized  religious  sect  or  organization  at  present  organized 
and  existing  and  whose  exi'sting  creed  or  principles  forbid 
its  members  to  participate  in  war  in  any  form  and  whose 
religious  convictions  are  against  war  or  participation  therein 
in  accordance  with  the  creed  or  principles  of  said  religious 
organizations;  but  no  person  so  exempted  shall  be  exempted 
from  service  in  any  capacity  that  the  President  shall  declare 
to  be  noncombatant." 

I  hereby  declare  that  the   following  military  service   is  non- 
combatant  service: 

a.  Service  in  the  Medical  Corps  wherever  performed. 
This  includes  service  in  the  sanitary  detachments  attached 
to  combatant  units  at  the  front ;  service  in  the  divisional 
sanitary  trains  composed  of  ambulance  companies  and  field 
hospital  companies,  on  the  line  of  communications,  at  the 
base  in  France,  and  with  the  troops  and  at  hospitals  in  the 
United  States;  also  the  service  of  supply  and  repair  in  the 
Medical  Department. 

b.  Any  service  in  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  in  the  United 
States  may  be  treated  as  noncombatant.     Also,  in  rear  of 

.  zone  of  operations,  service  in  the  following :  Stevedore  com- 
panies, labor  companies,  remount  depots,  veterinary  hos- 
pitals, supply  depots,  bakery  companies,  the  subsistence  serv- 
ice, the  bathing  service,  the  laundry  service,  the  salvage 
service,  the  clothing  renovation  service,  the  shoe  repair  serv- 
ice, the  transportation  repair  service,  and  motor-truck  com- 
panies. 

c.  Any  engineer  service  in  the  United  States  may  be  treated 
as  noncombatant  service.  Also,  in  rear  of  zone  of  opera- 
tions, service  as  follows :  Railroad  building,  operation  and 
repair ;  road  building  and  repair ;  construction  of  rear  line 
fortifications,  auxiliary  defenses,  etc. ;  construction  of  docks, 
wharves,  storehouses  and  of  such  cantonments  as  may  be 
built  by  the  Corps  of  Engineers;  topographical  work;  camou- 
flage ;  map  reproduction ;  supply  depot  service ;  repair  serv- 
ice ;  hydraulic  service ;  and  forestry  service. 


384  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

2.  Persons  ordered  to  report  for  military  service  under  the 
above  Act  who  have  (a)  been  certified  by  their  Local  Boards  to 
be  members  of  a  religious  sect  or  organization  as  defined  in  Sec- 
tion 4  of  said  Act;  or  {h)  who  object  to  participating  in  war 
because  of  conscientious  scruples  but  have  failed  to  receive  cer- 
tificates as  members  of  a  religious  sect  or  organization  from  their 
Local  Board,  will  be  assigned  to  noncombatant  military  service 
as  defined  in  paragraph  i  to  the  extent  that  such  persons  are  able 
to  accept  service  as  aforesaid  without  violation  of  the  religious 
or  other  conscientious  scruples  by  them  in  good  faith  entertained. 
Upon  the  promulgation  of  this  order  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  each 
Division,  Camp,  or  Post  Commander,  through  a  tactful  and 
considerate  officer,  to  present  to  all  such  persons  the  provisions 
hereof  with  adequate  explanation  of  the  character  of  noncom- 
batant service  herein  defined,  and  upon  such  explanations  to  se- 
cure acceptance  of  assignment  to  the  several  kinds  of  noncom- 
batant service  above  enumerated;  and  wherever  any  person  is 
assigned  to  noncombatant  service  by  reason  of  his  religious  or 
conscientious  scruples,  he  shall  be  given  a  certificate  stating  the 
assignment  and  reason  thereof,  and  such  certificate  shall  there- 
after be  respected  as  preventing  the  transfer  of  such  persons  from 
such  noncombatant  to  combatant  service  by  any  Division,  Camp, 
Post,  or  other  Commander  under  whom  said  person  may  there- 
after be  called  to  serve,  but  such  certificate  shall  not  prevent  the 
assignment  of  such  person  to  some  other  form  of  noncombatant 
service  with  his  own  consent.  So  far  as  may  be  found  feasible 
by  each  Division,  Camp,  or  Post  Commander,  future  assignments 
of  such  persons  to  noncombatant  military  service  will  be  re- 
stricted to  the  several  detachments  and  units  of  the  Medical  De- 
partment in  the  absence  of  a  request  for  assignment  to  some 
other  branch  of  noncombatant  service  as  defined  in  paragraph 
I  hereof. 

3.  On  the  first  day  of  April,  and  thereafter  monthly,  each  Divi- 
sion, Camp,  or  Post  Commander  shall  report  to  The  Adjutant 
General  of  the  Army,  for  the  information  of  the  Chief  of  Stafif 
and  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  names  of  all  persons  under  their 
respective  commands  who  profess  religious  or  other  conscientious 
scruples  as  above  described  and  who  have  been  unwilling  to 
accept,  by  reason  of  such  scruples,  assignment  to  noncombatant 
military  service  as  above  defined,  and  as  to  each  such  person  so 
reported  a  brief,  comprehensive  statement  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  objection  to  the  acceptance  of  such  noncombatant  military 


DESCRIPTION    OF    PICTURES   ON    REVERSE    SIDE 

Upper  Left  Hand  Corner — Samuel  Gompers,  President,  American  Federa- 
tion of  Labor,  1882-1894  and  1895 — ;  and  Member,  Advisory  Committee, 
Council  of  National  Defense,  October  11,  1916 — . 

Upper  Right  Hand  Corner — Daniel  Willard,  Chairman,  Advisory  Com- 
mission, Council  of  National  Defense,  March,  1917-November  17,  1917; 
Chairman,  War  Industries  Board,  November  17,  1917-February  28,  1918. 

Center — Frank  P.  Walsh,  Joint  Chairman,  War  Labor  Board,  April  10, 
1918-December  4,   1918. 

Lower  Left  Hand  Corner — Raymond  B.  Fosdick,  Chairman,  United  States 
Army  Committee  on  Training  Camp  Activities,  May  6,  1917 — . 

Lower  Right  Hand  Corner — Vance  McCormick,  Chairman,  War  Trade 
Board,  October  l.S,  1917—. 


Espionage  Lazv  285 

service  entertained.  The  Secretary  of  War  will  from  time  to 
time  classify  the  persons  so  reported  and  give  further  directions 
as  to  the  disposition  of  them.  Pending-  such  directions  from  the 
Secretary  of  War,  all  such  persons  not  accepting  assignment  to 
noncombatant  service  shall  be  segregated  as  far  as  practicable 
and  placed  under  the  command  of  a  specially  qualified  officer  of 
tact  and  judgment,  who  will  be  instructed  to  imi>ose  no  punitive 
hardship  of  any  kind  upon  them,  but  not  to  allow  their  objections 
to  be  made  the  basis  of  any  favor  or  consideration  beyond  exemp- 
tion from  actual  military  service  which  is  not  extended  to  any 
other  soldier  in  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

4.  With  a  view  to  maintaining  discipline,  it  is  pointed  out  that 
the  discretion  of  courts-martial,  so  far  as  any  shall  be  ordered 
to  deal  with  the  cases  of  persons  who  fail  or  refuse  to  comply 
with  lawful  orders  by  reason  of  alleged  religious  or  other  con- 
scientious scruples,  should  be  exercised,  if  feasible,  so  as  to  secure 
uniformity  of  penalties  in  the  imposition  of  sentences  under 
Articles  of  War  64  and  65,  for  the  wilful  disobedience  of  a  lawful 
order  or  command.  It  will  be  recognized  tliat  sentences  imposed 
by  such  courts-martial,  when  not  otherwise  described  by  law, 
shall  prescribe  confinement  in  the  United  States  Disciplinary  Bar- 
racks or  elsewhere  as  the  Secretary  of  War  or  the  reviewing 
authority  may  direct,  but  not  in  a  penitentiary ;  but  this  shall  not 
apply  to  the  cases  of  men  who  desert  either  before  reporting  for 
duty  to  the  military  authorities  or  subsequently  thereto. 

5.  The  Secretary  of  War  will  review  the  sentences  and  find- 
ings of  courts-martial  heretofore  held  of  persons  who  come  within 
any  of  the  classes  herein  described,  and  bring  to  the  attention 
of  the  President  for  remedy,  if  any  be  needed,  sentences  and 
judgments    found   at   variance   with  the   provisions   hereof. 

A  great  number  of  the  conscientious  objectors  accepted  these  forms 
of  non-combatant  service.  Many  others,  however,  declared  that  their 
consciences  would  not  permit  them  to  perform  any  service  under  mil- 
itary control  or  in  military  uniform.  For  these  latter,  a  Federal  board 
of  inquiry  was  then  organized ;  and  all  conscientious  objectors  found 
by  it  to  be  sincere  were  permitted  to  Avork  on  farms  under  private 
direction,  but  still  under  the  surveillance  of  the  War  Department 
and  without  cancelling  their  obligations  for  military  service.  Less  than 
500  conscientious  objectors  refused  both  non-combatant  service  and 
farm  service,  and  were  hence  incarcerated  by  the  time  of  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice  on  November  11,  1918. 
312 


Prayers  for  Victory 

October  30,  1917,  and  ]\Iay  30.  1918,  were  set  apart  by  Presidential 
proclamations  as  days  on  which  the  people  of  the  United  States  wen- 
urged  to  pray  for  victory : 

Whereas,  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  by  a  concurrent 
resolution  adopted  on  the  fourth  day  of  the  present  month  of 
October,  in  view  of  the  entrance  of  our  nation  into  the  vast 
and  awful  war  w^hich  now  afiflicts  the  greater  part  of  the  world, 
has  requested  me  to  set  apart  by  official  proclamation  a  day  upon 
which  our  people  should  be  called  upon  to  offer  concerted  prayer 
to  Almighty  God  for  His  divine  aid  in  the  success  of  our  arms ; 

And,  Whereas,  it  behooves  a  great  free  people,  nurtured  as  we 
have  been  in  the  eternal  principles  of  justice  and  of  right,  a 
nation  which  has  sought  from  the  earliest  days  of  its  existence  to 
be  obedient  to  the  divine  teachings  which  have  inspired  it  in  the 
exercise  of  its  liberties,  to  turn  always  to  the  supreme  Master 
and  cast  themselves  in  faith  at  His  feet,  praying  for  His  aid  and 
succor  in  every  hour  of  trial,  to  the  end  that  the  great  aims  to 
which  our  fathers  dedicated  our  power  as  a  people  may  not  perish 
among  men,  but  be  always  asserted  and  defended  with  fresh  ardor 
and  devotion  and,  through  the  Divine  blessing,  set  at  last  upon 
enduring  foundations  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  free  peoples  of 
the  earth : 

Now,  therefore,  I.  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States,  gladly  responding  to  the  wish  expressed  by  the  Congress, 
do  appoint  October  twenty-eighth,  being  the  last  Sunday  of  the 
present  month,  as  a  day  of  supplication  and  prayer  for  all  the 
people  of  the  nation,  earnestly  exhorting  all  my  countrymen  to 
observe  the  appointed  day,  according  to  their  several  faiths,  in 
solemn  prayer  that  God's  blessing  may  rest  upon  the  high  task 
which  is  laid  upon  us,  to  the  end  that  the  cause  for  which  we 
give  our  lives  and  treasure  may  triumph  and  our  efforts  be 
blessed   with   high   achievement 

Whereas  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  on  the  second  day 
of  April  last,  passed  the  following  resolution : 

386 


Prayers  for  Victory  ^g-, 

"Resolved  by  the  Senate  (the  House  of  Representatives 
concurring),  That,  it  being  a  duty  pecuHarly  incumbent  in  a 
time  of  war  humbly  and  devoutly  to  acknowledge  our  de- 
pendence on  Almighty  God  and  to  implore  His  aid  and 
protection,  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  is 
hereby,  respectfully  requested  to  recommend  a  day  of  public 
humiliation,  prayer,  and  fasting,  to  be  observed  by  the  people 
of  the  United  States  with  religious  solemnity  and  the  offer- 
ing of  fervent  supplications  to  Almighty  God  for  the  safety 
and  welfare  of  our  cause,  His  blessings  on  our  arms,  and 
a  speedy  restoration  of  an  honorable  and  lasting  peace  to 
the   nations   of   the  earth;" 

And  Whereas  it  has  always  been  the  reverent  habit  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  to  turn  in  humble  api>eal  to  Almighty 
God  for  His  guidance  in  the  affairs  of  their  common  life. 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  Thursday,  the  thirtieth 
day  of  May,  a  day  already  freighted  with  sacred  and  stimulating 
memories,  a  day  of  public  humiliation,  prayer,  and  fasting,  and 
do  exhort  my  fellow-citizens  of  all  faiths  and  creeds  to  assemble 
on  that  day  in  their  several  places  of  worship  and  there,  as  well 
as  in  their  homes,  to  pray  Almighty  God  that  He  may  forgive 
our  sins  and  shortcomings  as  a  people  and  purify  our  hearts  to 
see  and  love  the  truth,  to  accept  and  defend  all  things  that  are 
just  and  right,  and  to  purpose  only  those  righteous  acts  and 
judgments  which  are  in  conformity  with  His  will;  beseeching 
Him  that  He  will  give  victory  to  our  armies  as  they  fight  for 
freedom,  wisdom  to  those  who  take  counsel  on  our  behalf  in  these 
days  of  dark  struggle  and  perplexity,  and  steadfastness  to  our 
people  to  make  sacrifice  to  the  utmost  in  support  of  what  is  just 
and  true,  bringing  us  at  last  the  peace  in  which  men's  hearts  can 
be  at  rest  because  it  is  founded  upon  mercy,  justice  and  good 
will 

Sabbath  Obser\^\nce  in  the  Army  and  Navy 

On  January  20,  1918,  President  Wilson  enjoined  upon  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  as  strict  an  observance  of  the 
Sabbath  as  was  compatible  with  their  duties. 

The  President,  commander  in  chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy, 
following  the  reverent  example  of  his  predecessors,  desires  and 


388  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

enjoins  the  orderly  observance  of  the  Sabbath  by  the  officers  and 
men  in  the  mihtary  and  naval  service  of  the  United  States.  The 
importance  for  man  and  beast  of  the  prescribed  weekly  rest,  the 
sacred  rights  of  Christian  soldiers  and  sailors,  a  becoming  defer- 
ence to  the  best  sentiment  of  a  Christian  people,  and  a  due  regard 
for  the  Divine  Will  demand  that  Sunday  labor  in  the  Army  and 
Navy  be  reduced  to  the  measure  of  strict  necessity.  Such  an 
observance  of  Sunday  is  dictated  by  the  best  traditions  of  our 
people  and  by  the  convictions  of  all  who  look  to  Divine  Provi- 
dence for  guidance  and  protection,  and,  in  repeating  in  this  order 
the  language  of  President  Lincoln,  the  President  is  confident  that 
he  is  speaking  alike  to  the  hearts  and  to  the  consciences  of  those 
under  his  authority. 

The  order  of  President  Lincoln,  referred  to  in  the  above  order  of 
President  Wilson,  was  as  follows : 

Executive  Mansion, 
Washington,  November  15,  1862. 
The  President,  Conimander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy, 
desires  and  enjoins  the  orderly  observance  of  the  Sabbath  by 
the  oft^icers  and  men  in  the  military  and  naval  service.  The  im- 
portance for  man  and  beast  of  the  prescribed  weekly  rest,  the 
sacred  rights  of  Christian  soldiers  and  sailors,  a  becoming  defer- 
ence to  the  best  sentiment  of  a  Christian  people,  and  a  due  regard 
for  the  divine  will  demand  that  Sunday  labor  in  the  Army  and 
Navy  be  reduced  to  the  measure  of  strict  necessity. 

The  discipline  and  character  of  the  national  forces  should  not 
suffer  nor  the  cause  they  defend  be  imperiled  by  the  profanation 
of  the  day  or  name  of  the  Most  High.  "At  this  time  of  public 
distress,"  adopting  the  words  of  Washington  in  1776,  "men  may 
find  enough  to  do  in  the  service  of  God  and  their  country  with- 
out abandoning  themselves  to  vice  and  immorality."  The  first 
general  order  issued  by  the  Father  of  his  Country  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  indicates  the  spirit  in  which  our 
institutions  were  founded  and  should  ever  be  defended: 

The  General  hopes  and  trusts  that  every  officer  and  man 
zi'ill  endeavor  to  live  and  act  as  becomes  a  Christian  soldier 
defending  the  dearest  rights  and  liberties  of  his  country. 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 


The  War  and  Public  Education 

The  Great  War  affected  the  processes  of  education  no  less  than 
the  processes  of  all  other  activities  in  the  United  States.  The  new 
national  orientation  necessitated  by  our  participation  in  the  struggle 
against  Germany  is  well  shown  by  the  two  following  letters  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson : 

The  WhiteHouse,  August  2^,  ipi/. 
To  School  Officers: 

The  war  is  bringing  to  the  minds  of  our  people  a  new  appre- 
ciation of  the  problems  of  national  life  and  a  deeper  understand- 
ing of  the  meaning  and  aims  of  democracy.  Matters  which  here- 
tofore have  seemed  commonplace  and  trivial  are  seen  in  a  truer 
light.  The  urgent  demand  for  the  production  and  proper  dis- 
tribution of  food  and  other  national  resources  has  made  us  aware 
of  the  close  dependence  of  individual  on  individual  and  nation 
on  nation.  The  effort  to  keep  up  social  and  industrial  organiza- 
tions in  spite  of  the  withdrawal  of  men  for  the  army  has  revealed 
the  extent  to  which  modern  life  has  become  complex  and  spe- 
cialized. 

These  and  other  lessons  of  the  war  must  be  learned  quickly 
if  we  are  intelligently  and  successfully  to  defend  our  institutions. 
When  the  war  is  over  we  must  apply  the  wisdom  which  we  have 
acquired  in  purging  and  ennobling  the  life  of  the  world. 

In  these  vital  tasks  of  acquiring  a  broader  view  of  human 
possibilities  the  common  school  must  have  a  large  part.  I  urge 
that  teachers  and  other  school  officers  increase  materially  the 
time  and  attention  devoted  to  instruction  bearing  directly  on  the 
prob'ems  of  community  and  national  life. 

Such  a  plea  is  in  no  way  foreign  to  the  spirit  of  American 
public  education  or  of  existing  practices.  Nor  is  it  a  plea  for 
a  temporary  enlargement  of  the  school  program  appropriate  merely 
to  the  period  of  the  war.  It  is  a  plea  for  a  realization  in  public 
education  of  the  new  emphasis  which  the  war  has  given  to  the 
ideals  of  democracy  and  to  the  broader  conceptions  of  national 
life. 


390  A  History  of  the  Great  JVar 

In  order  that  there  may  be  definite  material  at  hand  with  \vh  c'n 
the  schools  may  at  once  expand  their  teaching,  I  have  askcvi 
Mr.  Hoover  and  Commissioner  Claxton  to  organize  the  proper 
agencies  for  the  preparation  and  distribution  of  suitable  lessons 
for  the  elementary  grades  and  for  the  high  school  classes.  Les- 
sons thus  suggested  will  serve  the  double  purpose  of  illustrating 
in  a  concrete  way  what  can  be  undertaken  in  the  schools  and 
of  stimulating  teachers  in  all  parts  of  the  country  to  formulate 
new  and  appropriate  materials  drawn  directly  from  the  communi- 
ties in  which  they  live.  Sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

Tpie  White  House,  July  jt,  iqi8. 
Mv  Dear  Mr.  Secretary: 

I  am  pleased  to  know  that  despite  the  luiusual  burdens  imposed 
upon  our  people  by  the  war  they  have  maintained  their  schools 
and  other  agencies  of  education  so  nearly  at  their  normal  effi- 
ciency. That  this  should  be  continued  throughout  the  war  and 
that,  in  so  far  as  the  draft  law  will  permit,  there  should  be  no 
falling  off  in  attendance  in  elementary  schools,  high  schools  or 
colleges  is  a  matter  of  the  very  greatest  importance,  affecting 
both  our  strength  in  war  and  our  national  welfare  and  efficiency 
when  the  war  is  over.  So  long  as  the  war  continues  there  will 
be  constant  need  of  very  large  niunbers  of  men  and  women  of 
the  highest  and  most  thorough  training  for  war  service  in  many 
lines.  After  the  war  there  will  be  urgent  need  not  only  for 
trained  leadership  in  all  lines  of  industrial,  commercial,  social 
and  civil  life,  but  for  a  very  high  average  of  intelligence  and 
preparation  on  the  part  of  all  the  people.  I  would  therefore  urge 
that  the  people  continue  to  give  generous  support  to  their  schools 
of  all  grades  and  that  the  schools  adjust  themselves  as  wisely  as 
possible  to  the  new  conditions  to  the  end  that  no  boy  or  girl  shall 
have  less  opportunity  for  education  because  of  the  war  and  that 
the  Nation  may  be  strengthened  as  it  can  only  be  through  the 
right  education  of  all  its  people.  I  approve  most  heartily  your 
plans  for  making  through  the  Bureau  of  Education  a  compre- 
hensive campaign  for  the  support  of  the  schools  and  for  the 
maintenance  of  attendance  upon  them,  and  trust  that  you  may 
have  the  cooperation  in  this  work  of  the  American  Council  on 
Education.  Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
Hon.  Eranklin  K.  Lane,   Secretary  of  the  Interior. 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations 

Toward  the  end  of  the  year  1917,  there  arose  in  the  countries  lead- 
ing the  opposition  to  the  Central  Powers  a  strong  movement  for  a 
re-statement  of  the  war  aims  of  the  Entente.  Almost  without  excep- 
tion, the  press,  the  pulpit,  and  other  sources  of  public  leadership 
denounced  the  movement  for  a  re-statement  of  war  aims  as  unneces- 
sary, even  as  calculated  to  play  the  game  of  the  pacifists  and  pro- 
Germans.  But  the  movement  had  found  lodgement  among  the  masses 
of  the  plain  people  in  Europe,  if  not  in  America,  and  finally  it  became 
too  strong  to  be  denied. 

Perhaps  the  strongest  single  factor  making  for  a  re-statement  of 
the  Entente's  war  aims  was  the  presence  of  a  number  of  secret  treaties 
drawn  up  by  the  Allies  during  the  course  of  the  war.  These  secret 
treaties  will  be  discussed  more  fully  later;  here  it  will  suffice  to  say 
that  they  were  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  aims  for  which  the  En- 
tente was  striving  as  those  aims  had  been  expounded  by  President 
Wilson.  In  the  first  place,  the  treaties  were  secret,  and  it  was  only 
through  publication  of  them  by  the  Bolshevist  leaders  of  Russia  after 
the  overthrow  of  Kerenski  in  November,  1917,  that  the  world  knew 
of  them.  They  contained  provisions  for  turning  Constantinople  over 
to  the  Russia  of  the  Tsar,  although  Russian  possession  of  Constanti- 
nople would  almost  inevitably  provoke  another  European  war  sooner 
or  later.  Italy  was  promised  land  along  the  Adriatic  far  outstripping 
the  boundaries  of  Italia  Irredenta  proper,  and  inhabited  almost  en- 
tirely by  South  Slavs.  France  was  not  only  to  regain  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, but  was  also  to  acquire  from  Germany  new  territory  inhabited 
by  Germans  and  thus  to  be  annexed  only  in  violation  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  nationality.  France,  moreover,  was  to  establish  what 
amounted  virtually  to  protectorates  over  certain  sections  of  Asia 
Minor,  as  was  England. 

Indeed,  the  existence  of  these  secret  treaties  was  one  of  the  deter- 

391 


392  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

mining  factors  in  the  downfall  of  Kerenski  and  the  rise  to  power  of 
the  Bolsheviki  in  Russia.  The  developments  in  Russia  will  also  be 
considered  in  a  later  section — here  it  will  suffice  to  say  that  Kerenski's 
opponents  in  Russia  challenged  him  to  publish  the  agreements  into 
which  the  Allies  had  entered.  Kerenski  refused,  but  exerted  strong 
pressure  upon  the  Allies  publicly  to  revise  their  war  aims  so  that  the 
secret  treaties  would  not  remain  in  force.  The  Allies,  however,  were 
deaf  to  Kerenski's  entreaties ;  with  the  result  that  the  Bolshevist  lead- 
ers were  able  finally  to  persuade  the  Russian  people  that  the  ambi- 
tions of  the  Allies  were  imperialistic  and  that  a  Socialist  Russia  there- 
fore had  no  place  in  the  War  on  either  side. 

With  the  accession  to  power  of  the  Bolsheviki  in  November,  1917, 
Russia  immediately  opened  negotiations  with  Germany  at  Brest- 
Litovsk,  negotiations  calculated  by  the  astute  Russian  leaders  to  lead 
not  only  to  peace  between  Russia  and  Germany,  but  even  to  a  general 
peace.  To  that  end,  Trotski  came  down  to  Brest-Litovsk  with  a 
peace  formula  since  become  famous  as  the  Russian  Peace  Formula — 
"No  forcible  annexations,  no  punitive  indemnities,  and  the  right  of 
self-determination  for  all  nationalities."  The  Bolshevist  leaders  were 
under  no  delusions  that  such  a  formula  was  acceptable  to  the  leaders 
of  the  German  government,  but  by  every  conceivable  method  they 
prolonged  the  peace  negotiations  with  the  idea  of  keeping  their  peace 
formula  before  the  world,  and  especially  before  the  people  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary.  The  Bolsheviki  urged  the  Allies  to 
accept  their  peace  formula,  declaring  that  if  the  German  people  real- 
ized that  peace  could  be  had  on  terms  of  no  forcible  annexations,  no 
punitive  indemnities  and  the  self-determination  of  all  nationalities, 
one  of  two  things  would  result.  Either  the  rulers  of  Germany  would 
yield  to  that  formula  or  the  long-desired  German  revolution  would 
break  out.  Of  course,  it  was  hope  of  the  latter  event  which  was  cher- 
ished most  ardently  by  the  Bolsheviki,  for  they  were  playing  for  bigger 
stakes  than  even  the  end  of  the  War — they  were  playing  for  the  out- 
break of  a  social  revolution  in  every  civilized  land  and  the  universal 
establishment  of  the  Socialist  State. 

But  the  Entente,  enfuriated  by  the  withdrawal  of  Russia  from  the 
War,  refused  to  support  the  Bolsheviki  and  declined  to  send  dele- 


Indirect  Peace  Negoti'itiuiis  393 

gates  to  the  Brest-Litovsk  conference.  Consequently,  Russia  was  left 
to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  Imperial  German  Government;  and  after 
Germany  found  that  she  could  not  bring  Russia  to  terms  by  fair 
words,  she  forced  a  humiliating  peace  upon  the  Bolsheviki,  which 
the  Bolsheviki  finally  accepted  rather  than  continue  the  war  against 
Germany.  Both  David  R.  Francis,  United  States  Ambassador  to 
Russia,  and  Colonel  Raymond  Robins,  the  head  of  the  American 
Red  Cross  in  Russia,  have  asserted  that  even  after  the  treaty  of 
Brest-Litovsk,  Lenin  informed  the  Entente  that  Russia  would  con- 
tinue to  oppose  Germany  as  best  she  could  if  the  Entente  would  ren- 
der certain  forms  of  assistance  to  Russia ;  and  that  the  Entente  did 
not  even  reply  to  the  offer. 

The  withdrawal  of  Russia  from  the  War  stimulated  radical  minor- 
ities in  France  and  England  to  support  the  demand  for  a  re-statement 
of  war  aims;  and  the  French  and  Italian  Socialists  and  the  British 
Labor  Party  were  making  political  capital  out  of  the  indefinite  nature 
of  the  aims  announced  as  those  of  the  Entente.  On  November  30, 
191 7,  the  agitation  to  that  end  was  brought  to  a  head  in  England  by 
an  open  demand  from  Lord  Landsdowne  that  the  Allies  re-formulate 
their  peace-terms.  Lord  Landsdowne  was  a  Unionist  peer,  and  a  man 
of  conservative  principles,  with  an  unimpeachable  record  of  having  sup- 
ported the  War  whole-heartedly  and  with  many  years  to  his  credit  of 
honorable  service  to  his  country  in  the  highest  offices.  He  had  been 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  under  the  premierships  of  Lord  Salisbury 
and  of  Mr.  Balfour,  had  been  Viceroy  of  India  and  Governor  General 
of  Canada,  and  had  been  a  minister  without  portfolio  in  the  coalition 
cabinet  of  Mr.  Asquith  during  the  War. 

Lord  Landsdowne  opened  his  letter  on  November  30,  1917  to  the 
Daily  Telegraph  of  London  with  a  solemn  account  of  the  losses  in 
the  War  up  to  that  time,  and  with  an  expression  of  fear  that  all  civil- 
ization itself  might  go  down  to  ruin  if  peace  did  not  soon  appear — 
a  peace  of  which  there  still  seemed  to  be  no  trace  on  the  horizon.  Agree- 
ing that  Germany  must  be  defeated,  he  asserted  that  the  defeat  of 
Germany  was  not  -nough.  The  chief  aim  of  the  Allies,  after  the 
defeat  of  Germany,  must  be  steps  to  make  impossible  a  recurrence 
of  the  War.     Lord  Landsdowne  then  went  into  the  need  for  the  or- 


294  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

ganization  of  a  League  of  Nations,  and  quoted  extensively  from  the 
speech  of  .President  Wilson  in  May,  1917,  before  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace.  He  asserted  that  the  mass  of  the  people  in  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey  were  anxious  for  peace ;  and  that  there- 
fore peace  would  be  brought  immeasurably  nearer  if  the  Allies  were 
to  re-state  their  peace-terms  along  the  following  lines: 

1.  That  we  do  not  desire  the  annihilation  of  Germany  as  a  great 
power. 

2.  That  we  do  not  seek  to  impose  upon  her  people  any  form  of 
government  other  than  that  of  their  own  choice. 

3.  That,  except  as  a  legitimate  war  measure,  we  have  no  desire 
to  deny  to  Germany  her  place  among  the  great  commercial  com- 
munities of  the  world. 

4.  That  we  are  prepared,  when  war  is  over,  to  examine  in  concert 
with  other  powers  a  group  of  international  problems,  some  of  them 
of  recent  origin,  which  are  connected  with  the  question  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas. 

5.  That  we  are  prepared  to  enter  into  an  international  pact  under 
which  ample  opportunities  would  be  afforded  for  the  settlement  of 
international  disputes  by  peaceful  means. 

The  attitude  of  Lord  Landsdowne  stimulated  the  movement  for  in- 
direct discussion  of  peace,  and  at  the  end  of  191 7,  as  at  the  end  of 
1916,  leaders  in  the  belligerent  countries  were  putting  out  feelers 
for  peace.  Perhaps  the  most  striking  of  such  indirect  negotiations 
in  December,  191 7,  was  one  from  Count  Czernin,  of  Austr'a-Hun- 
gary,  tentatively  accepting  in  large  measure  the  peace  formula  of 
Russia  at  Brest-Litovsk.  The  character  of  Count  Czernin's  proposal 
is  discussed  in  Premier  Lloyd-George's  address  below. 


Address  of  Premier  Lloyd-George,  of  Great  Britain, 
ON  January  6.  1918. 

By  the  beginning  of  1918,  the  movement  for  a  re-statement  of  war- 
aims  had  become  too  strong  in  England  for  further  disregard  of  it. 
Accordingly,  on  January  6,  1918,  Premier  Lloyd-George  publicly  re- 


Indiyecl  Peace  Nccjolialioiis  „, 

s.a,ed  England  war-ai„,s  in  an  address  to  Parliament.     Notable  pas- 
sages from  that  address  are  as  follows: 

When  the  Government  invite  organized  labor  in  this  country  to 
asstst  them  to  mamtain  the  might  of  their  armies  in  theZeld 

1  "^TT''  ""  ^""^^  '°  -^^  "«'  -y  misgivngs  and 
doubts  wh,ch  any  of  them  may  have  about  the  purpose    ovWch 
th  s  precous  strength  is  to  be  appl.ed  should  be  defin.tely  cl  a    d 
And  what  ts  true  of  organized  labor  is  equally  true  of  all  ci  W 
m  this  country,  without  rerard  tn  „„^  citizens 

,,.,  v  """""'  regard  to  grade  or  avocation. 

When  men  by  the  million  are  being  called  upon  to  suffer  and 
d  e.  and  vast  populations  are  being  subjected  ?o  sufferings  and 
pn  ations  of  war  on  a  scale  unprecedented  in  the  histo^of  the 

rm;.*mg  t^rsSit' " '""'' '"'  "■""  --  -  --  *He; 

;us,-fy  ^htcontitr'  e^™t;  te  7"'  f  ^  ^  ^^^  '^^'  "" 
agony  Of  the  nation,  and  wrou^!;  :L"lle"t  1  II"  iryt^^ 
dehmtely  not  only  the  principles  for  which  we  arrfigh.inl  ht 
also^the.  definite  and  concrete  application  to  th^.tfrTip'^f 

3.i;x^ra^:  :':-■- -;ir  -'-"—'"-  -^^ 

people  "xi^lir  yT'  ,'  ""■■  °'  '^»""=^'°"  ^^••'■"^'  "'^  German 
people,     riieir  leaders  have  persuaded  them  that  thev  are  fi^ht 

■ng  a  war  of  self-defense  against  a  lea-^ue  of  riva    n^,  n       i 

on  the  destruction  of  Germany.    That  t^  not  so     The    ^r^'ic  "n 

or     isrupt.on  of  Germany  or  the  German  people  ha    n "  r  b    " 

a^war   aim   ,v,th    us    from    the   first   day   of    this   war   to   diis 

The  British  people  have  never  aimed  at  a  break-up  of  the 
German  people  or  the  disintegration  of  their  State  or^oun 
Germany  has  occupied  a  great  position  in  the  world.     It  is  „ot 
our  w.sh  or  intention  to  question  or  destroy  that  position  for  "he 

:i:nr.::ytSL:°  "■™ '-  -''- '- "°-  -<^  -^»- «' 

N-or  did  we  enter  this  war  merely  to  alter  or  destroy  the  ini 
J^na  constitution  of  Germany,  much  as  we  consider  [ha^mm- 
ZlJ^,  '"•°'^'""<=  ™">^"f"<ion  a  dangerous  anachronism  in  the 
wentieth  century.  Our  point  of  view  is  that  the  adoption  of  a 
realh  democratic  constitution  by  Germany  would  be  the  most 
convincing  evidence  that   her  old   spirit  of  military  dominaTS 


396  A  History  of  the  Great  IVar 

has,  indeed,  died  in  this  war  and  would  make  it  much  easier  for 
us  to  conckide  a  broad,  democratic  peace  with  her.  But,  after 
all,  that  is  a  question  for  the  German  people  to  decide. 

We  are  not  fighting  to  destroy  Austria-Hungary  or  to  deprive 
Turkey  of  its  capital  or  the  rich  lands  of  Asia  Minor  and  Thrace 
which  are  predominantly  Turkish. 

It  is  now  more  than  a  year  since  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  then  neutral,  addressed  to  the  belligerents  a  suggestion 
that  each  side  should  state  clearly  the  aims  for  which  they  were 
fighting. 

We  and  our  allies  responded  by  the  note  of  January  10,  1917. 
To  the  President's  appeal  the  Central  Empires  made  no  reply 
and  in  spite  of  many  adjurations,  both  from  their  opponents  and 
from  neutrals,  they  have  maintained  complete  silence  as  to  the 
objects  for  which  they  are  fighting.  Even  on  so  crucial  a  matter 
as  their  intention  with  regard  to  Belgium  they  have  uniformly 
declined  to  give  any  trustworthy  indication. 

On  December  25,  last,  however,  Count  Czernin,  speaking  on 
behalf  of  Austria-Hungary  and  her  allies,  did  make  a  pronounce- 
ment of  a  kind.    It  is,  indeed,  deplorably  vague. 

We  are  told  that  it  is  not  the  intention  of  the  Central  Powers 
to  appropriate  forcibly  any  occupied  territories  or  to  rob  of  its 
independence  any  nation  which  has  lost  its  political  independence 
during  the  war. 

It  is  obvious  that  almost  any  scheme  of  conquest  and  annexa- 
tion could  be  perpetrated  within  the  literal  interpretation  of  such 
a  pledge.  Does  it  mean  that  Belgium,  Servia,  Montenegro,  and 
Roumania  \v\\\  be  as  independent  and  as  free  to  direct  their  own 
destinies  as  Germany  or  any  other  nation?  Or  does  it  mean  that 
all  manner  of  interferences  and  restrictions,  political  and  eco- 
nomic, incompatible  with  the  status  and  dignity  of  free  and  self- 
respecting  people,  are  to  be  imposed?  If  this  is  the  intention,  then 
there  will  be  one  kind  of  independence  for  the  great  nation  and 
an  inferior  kind  of  independence  for  the  small  nation. 

We  must  know  what  is  meant,  for  equality  of  right  among  the 
nations,  small  as  well  as  great,  is  one  of  the  fundamental  issues 
this  country  and  her  allies  are  fighting  to  establish  in  this  war. 

Reparation  for  the  wanton  damage  inflicted  on  Belgian  towns 
and  villages  and  their  inhabitants  is  emphatically  repudiated. 
The  rest  of  the  so-called  ofi'er  of  the  Central  Powers  is  almost 
entirely  a  refusal  of  all  concessions.  All  suggestions  about  the 
autonomy  of  subject  nationalities  are  ruled  out  of  the  peace  terms 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations  397 

altogether.  The  question  whether  any  form  of  self-government 
is  to  be  given  to  the  Arabs,  Armenians  or  Syrians  is  declared 
to  be  entirely  a  matter  for  the  Sublime  Porte.  A  pious  wish  for 
the  protection  of  minorities,  "in  so  far  as  it  is  practically  reahz- 
able,"  is  the  nearest  approach  to  liberty  which  the  Central  states- 
men venture  to  make. 

On  one  point  only  are  they  perfectly  clear  and  definite.  Under 
no  circumstances  will  the  German  demand  for  the  restoration  of 
the  whole  of  Germany's  colonies  be  departed  from.  All  principles 
of  self-determination,  or,  as  our  earlier  phrase  goes,  government 
by  the  consent  of  governed,  here  vanish  into  thin  air. 

It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  any  edifice  of  permanent  peace 
could  be  erected  on  such  a  foundation  as  this.  Mere  lip-service 
to  the  formula  of  no  annexations  and  no  indemnities  or  the  ri^ht 
of  self-determination  is  useless.  Before  any  negotiations  can 
even  be  begun  the  Central  Powers  must  realize  the  essential  facts 
of  the  situation. 

The  days  of  the  treaty  of  Vienna  are  long  past.  We  can  no 
longer  submit  the  future  of  European  civilization  to  the  arbi- 
trary decisions  of  a  few  negotiators,  trying  to  secure  by  chicanery 
or  persuasion  the  interests  of  this  or  that  dynasty  or  nation. 

The  settlement  of  the  new  Europe  must  be  based  on  such 
grounds  of  reason  and  justice  as  will  give  some  promise  of  sta- 
bility. Therefore,  it  is  that  we  feel  that  government  with  the 
consent  of  the  governed  must  be  the  basis  of  any  territorial 
settlement  in  this  war.  For  that  reason  also,  unless  treaties  be 
upheld,  unless  every  nation  is  prepared,  at  whatever  sacrifices, 
to  honor  the  national  signature,  it  is  obvious  that  no  treaty  of 
peace  can  be  worth  the  paper  on  which  it  is  written. 

The  first  requirement,  therefore,  always  put  forward  by  the 
British  Government  and  their  allies,  has  been  the  complete  res- 
toration, political,  territorial,  and  economic,  of  the  independence  of 
Belgium  and  such  reparation  as  can  be  made  for  the  devasta- 
tion of  its  towns  and  provinces. 

This  is  no  demand  for  a  war  indemnity,  such  as  that  imposed 
on  France  by  Germany  in  187 1.  It  is  not  an  attempt  to  shift  the 
cost  of  warlike  operations  from  one  belligerent  to  another,  which 
may  or  may  not  be  defensible.  It  is  no  more  and  no  less  than 
an  insistence  that  before  there  can  be  any  hope  for  stable  peace, 
this  great  breach  of  the  public  law  of  Europe  must  be  repudi- 
ated and  so  far  as  possible  repaired. 

Reparation  means   recognition.     Unless  international  right  is 


398  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

recognized  by  insistence  on  payment  for  injury,  done  in  defiance 
of  its  canons,  it  can  never  be  a  reality. 

Next  comes  the  restoration  of  Servia,  Montenegro,  and  the 
occupied  j)arts  of  France,  Italy,  and  I\oumania.  The  complete 
withdrawal  of  the  allied  (Teutonic)  armies,  and  the  reparation 
for  injustice  done  is  a  fundamental  condition  of  permanent 
peace. 

A\'e  mean  to  stand  by  the  French  democracy  to  the  death  in 
the  demand  they  make  for  a  reconsideration  of  the  great  wrong 
of  1871,  when,  without  any  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  popula- 
tion, two  French  provinces  were  torn  from  the  side  of  France 
and  incorporated  in  the  German  Empire. 

This  sore  has  poisoned  the  peace  of  Europe  for  half  a  century, 
and,  until  it  is  cured,  healthy  conditions  will  not  have  been  re- 
stored. There  can  be  no  better  illustration  of  the  folly  and 
wickedness  of  using  a  transient  military  success  to  violate  national 
right. 

I  will  not  attempt  to  deal  with  the  question  of  the  Russian 
territories,  now  in  German  occupation.  The  Russian  policy  since 
the  revolution  has  passed  so  rapidly  through  so  many  phases  that 
it  is  difficult  to  speak  without  some  suspension  of  judgment  as 
to  what  the  situation  will  be  when  the  final  terms  of  European 
peace  come  to  be  discussed. 

Russia  accepted  war  with  all  its  horrors  because,  true  to  her 
traditional  guardianship  of  the  weaker  communities  of  her  race, 
she  stepped  in  to  protect  Servia  from  a  plot  against  her  inde- 
pendence. It  is  this  honorable  sacrifice  which  not  merely  brought 
Russia  into  the  war,  but  France  as  well. 

France,  true  to  the  conditions  of  her  treaty  with  Russia,  stood 
by  her  ally  in  a  quarrel  which  was  not  her  own.  Her  chivalrous 
respect  for  her  treaty  led  to  the  wanton  invasion  of  Belgium, 
and  the  treaty  obligations  of  Great  Britain  to  that  little  land 
brought  us  into  the  war. 

The  present  rulers  of  Russia  are  now  engaged,  without  any 
reference  to  tlie  countries  whom  Russia  brought  into  the  war, 
in  separate  negotiations  with  their  common  enemy.  I  am  indulg- 
ing in  no  reproaches.  I  am  merely  stating  the  facts  with  a  view 
to  making  it  clear  why  Great  Britain  cannot  be  held  accountable 
for  decisions,  taken  in  her  absence,  and  concerning  which  she 
has  not  been  consulted  or  her  aid  invoked. 

No  one  who  knows  Prussia  and  her  designs  upon  Russia  can 
for  a  moment  doubt  her  ultimate  intention.     Whatever  phrases 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations  399 

she  may  use  to  delude  Russia,  she  does  not  mean  to  surrender 
one  of  the  fair  provinces  or  cities  of  Russia  now  occupied  by 
Iicr  forces.  Under  one  name  or  another  (and  ihc  name  har(ny 
matters},  those  Russian  provinces  will  henceforth  he  in  icalitv  a 
part  of  the  dominions  of  Prussia.  They  will  be  ru.cd  b)  the 
Prussian  sword  in  the  interests  of  the  Prussian  autt)cracy,  and 
the  rest  of  the  people  of  Russia  will  be  partly  enticed  by  sjjecious 
phrases  and  partly  bullied  by  the  threat  of  continued  war  against 
an  impotent  army  into  a  condition  of  complete  economic  and 
ultimate  political  enslavement  to  Germany. 

We  all  deplore  the  prospect.  The  democracy  of  this  country 
means  to  stand  to  the  last  by  the  democracies  of  France  and  ltal\- 
and  all  our  other  allies.  We  shall  be  proud  to  stand  side  by  side 
by  the  new  democracy  of  Russia.  So  will  America  and  so  will 
France  and  Italy.  But  if  the  present  rulers  of  Russia  take  ac- 
tion which  is  independent  of  their  allies,  we  have  no  means  of 
intervening  to  arrest  the  catastrophe  which  is  assuredly  befalling 
their  country.     Russia  can  only  be  saved  by  her  own  people. 

We  believe,  however,  that  an  independent  Poland,  comprising 
all  those  genuinely  Polish  elements  who  desire  to  form  a  part  of 
it,  is  an  urgent  necessity  for  the  stability  of  Western  Europe. 

Similarly,  though  we  agree  with  President  Wilson  that  a  break- 
up of  Austria-Hungary  is  no  part  of  our  war  aims,  we  feel  that 
unless  genuine  self-government  on  true  democratic  principles 
is  granted  to  those  Austro-Hungarian  nationalities  who  have  long 
desired  it,  it  is  impossible  to  hope  for  a  removal  of  those  causes 
of  unrest  in  that  part  of  Europe  which  have  so  long  threatened 
the  general  peace. 

On  the  same  grounds  we  regard  as  vital  the  satisfaction  of  the 
legitimate  claims  of  the  Italians  for  union  with  those  of  their 
own  race  and  tongue.  We  also  mean  to  press  that  justice  be 
done  to  the  men  of  Roumanian,  blood  and  speech  in  their  legiti- 
mate aspirations.  If  these  conditions  are  fulfilled.  Austria-Hun- 
gary would  become  a  power  whose  strength  would  conduce  to  the 
permanent  peace  and  freedom  of  Europe  instead  of  being  merely 
an  instrument  for  the  pernicious  military  autocracy  of  Prussia 
that  uses  the  resources  of  its  allies  for  the  furtherance  of  its  own 
sinister  purposes. 

Outside  of  Europe  we  believe  that  the  same  principles  should  be 
applied.  While  we  do  not  challenge  the  maintenance  of  the  Turkish 
linpire  in  the  homelands  of  the  Turkisli  race  with  its  capital 
at  Constantinople,  the  passage  between  the  Mediterranean  and  the 


400  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

Black  Sea  being  internationalized  and  neutralized,  Arabia,  Ar- 
menia, Mesopotamia,  Syria,  and  Palestine  are,  in  our  judgment, 
entitled  to  a  recognition  of  their  separate  national  conditions. 

What  the  exact  form  of  that  recognition  in  each  particular 
case  should  be  need  not  here  be  discussed  beyond  slating  that 
'  it  would  be  impossible  to  restore  to  their  former  sovereignty  the 
territories  to  which  I  have  already  referred. 

Much  has  been  said  about  the  arrangements  we  have  entered 
into  with  our  allies  on  this  and  on  other  subjects.  I  can  only  say 
that  as  the  new  circumstances,  like  the  Russian  collapse  and  the 
separate  negotiations,  have  changed  the  conditions  under  which 
those  arrangements  were  made,  we  are,  and  always  have  been, 
perfectly  ready  to  discuss  them  with  our  allies. 

With  regard  to  the  German  colonies,  I  have  repeatedly  de- 
clared that  they  are  held  at  the  disposal  of  a  conference  whose, 
decision  must  have  primary  regard  to  the  wishes  and  interests 
of  the  native  inhabitants  of  such  colonies.  Xone  of  those  terri- 
tories are  inhabited  by  Europeans.  The  governing  consideration, 
therefore,  must  be  that  the  inhabitants  should  be  placed  under 
the  control  of  an  administration  acceptable  to  themselves,  one 
of  whose  main  purposes  will  be  to  prevent  their  exploitation  for 
the  benefit  of  European  capitalists  or  Governments. 

The  natives  live  in  their  various  tribal  organizations  under 
chiefs  and  councils  who  are  competent  to  consult  and  speak  for 
their  tribes  and  members  and  thus  to  represent  their  wishes  and 
interests  in  regard  to  their  disposal.  The  general  principle  of 
national  self-determination  is,  therefore,  as  applicable  in  their 
cases  as  in  those  of  the  occupied  European  territories. 

The  German  declaration  that  the  natives  of  the  German  colo- 
nies have  through  their  military  fidelity  in  war  shown  their 
attachment  and  resolve  under  all  circumstances  to  remain  with 
Germany  is  applicable,  not  to  the  German  colonies  genei'ally,  but 
only  to  one  of  them,  and  in  that  case,  German  East  Africa,  the 
German  authorities  secured  the  attachment,  not  of  the  native 
population  as  a  whole,  which  is  and  remains  profoundly  anti- 
German,  but  only  of  a  small  warlike  class,  from  whom  their 
askaris.  or  soldiers, 'were  selected.  These  they  attached  to  them- 
selves by  conferring  on  them  a  highly  privileged  position,  as 
against  the  bulk  of  the  native  population,  which  enabled  these 
askaris  to  assume  a  lordly  and  oppressive  superiority  over  the 
rest  of  the  natives. 

By  this  and  other   m-ans  they   secured   the  attachments  of   a 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations  401 

very  small  and  insignificant  minority,  whose  interests  were  di- 
rectly opposed  to  those  of  the  rest  of  the  poj)uIation  and  for 
whom  they  have  no  right  to  speak.  The  German  treatment  of 
the  native  populations  in  their  colonies  has  been  such  as  amply 
to  justify  their  fear  of  submitting  the  future  of  those  colonies 
to  the  wishes  of  the  natives  themselves. 

Finally,  there  must  be  reparation  for  the  injuries  done  in  viola- 
tion of  international  law.  The  peace  conference  must  not  forget 
our  seamen  and  the  services  they  have  rendered  to  and  the  out- 
rages they  have  suffered  for  the  common  cause  of  freedom. 

One  omission  we  notice  in  the  proposal  of  the  Central  Powers 
which  seems  to  us  especially  regrettable.  It  is  desirable  and 
essential  that  the  settlement  after  this  war  shall  be  one  which 
does  not  in  itself  bear  the  seed  of  future  war.  But  that  is  not 
enough.  However  wisely  and  well  we  may  make  territorial  and 
other  arrangements,  there  will  still  be  many  subjects  of  interna- 
tional controversy.     Some,  indeed,  are  inevitable. 

Economic  conditions  at  the  end  of  the  war  will  be  in  the  highest 
degree  difficult  owing  to  the  diversion  of  human  effort  to  war- 
like pursuits.  There  must  follow  a  world  shortage  of  raw  ma- 
terials, which  will  increase  the  longer  the  war  lasts,  and  it  is 
inevitable  that  those  countries  which  have  control  of  raw  ma- 
terials will  desire  to  help  themselves  and  their  friends  first.  Apart 
from  this,  whatever  settlement  is  made  will  be  suitable  only  to  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  is  made,  and  as  those  circumstances 
change,  changes  in  the  settlement  will  be  called  for. 

So  long  as  the  possibility  of  a  dispute  between  nations  con- 
tinues— that  is  to  say,  so  long  as  men  and  women  are  dominated 
by  impassioned  ambition  and  war  is  the  only  means  of  set- 
tling a  dispute — all  nations  must  live  under  a  burden,  not  only  of 
having  from  time  to  time  to  engage  in  it,  but  of  being  compelled 
to  prepare   for  its  possible  outbreak. 

The  crushing  weight  of  modern  armaments,  the  increasing  evil 
of  compulsory  military  service,  the  vast  waste  of  wealth  and 
effort  involved  in  warlike  preparation — these  are  blots  on  our 
civilization,  of  which  every  thinking  individual  must  be  ashamed. 
For  these  and  other  similar  reasons  we  are  confident  that  a  great 
attempt  must  be  made  to  establish,  by  some  international  organiza- 
tion, an  alternative  to  war  as  a  means  of  settling  international 
disputes. 

After  all,  war  is  a  relic  of  barbarism,  and.  just  as  law  has  suc- 
ceeded  violence   as   a   means   of   settling  disputes   between    indi- 


402  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

viduals,  so  we  believe  that  it  is  destined  ultimately  to  take  the 
place  of  war  in  the  settlement  of  controversies  between  nations. 
If,  then,  we  are  asked  what  we  are  fighting  for,  we  reply,  as 
we  have  often  replied.  We  are  fighting  for  a  just  and  a  lasting 
peace,  and  we  believe  that  before  permanent  peace  can  be  hoped 
for  three  conditions  must  be  fulfilled:  First,  the  sanctity  of  trea- 
ties must  be  re-established  ;  secondly,  a  territorial  settlement  must 
be  secured,  based  on  the  right  of  self-determination  or  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed,  and,  lastly,  we  must  seek,  by  the  creation 
of  some  international  organization,  to  limit  the  burden  of  arn'a- 
ments  and  diminish  the  probability  of  war.  On  these  conditions 
its  peoples  are  prepared  to  make  even  greater  sacrifices  than  those 
they  have  yet  endured. 

"The  Fourteen  Points." 

This  open  discussion  of  the  aims  of  the  war  fitted  in  admirably  with 
President  Wilson's  methods  of  diplomacy.  His  statements  of  the 
principles  involved  in  the  gigantic  conflict  were  at  variance  with  many 
of  the  of^cial  utterances  and  treaties  made  by  our  associates  in  the 
struggle,  and  the  opportunity  was  thus  presented  to  him  to  lift  the 
official  purposes  of  the  Entente  Allies  to  a  higher  plane.  Indeed,  it 
is  possible  that  America  itself  had  been  bringing  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  Entente  leaders   for  a  re-statement  of  war-aims. 

But  President  Wilson  utilized  his  public  utterances  on  the  war  to 
much  greater  purpose  than  mere  re-clarification  of  issues.  He  used 
them  to  speak  to  the  German  people  over  the  heads  of  the  German 
officials,  and  to  create,  as  best  he  could,  discontent  within  the  Ger- 
man and  Austrian  Empires.  He  seized  every  occasion  to  point  out 
to  the  German  people  the  contrast  between  their  cause  and  the  cause 
of  the  Entente,  and  every  such  contrast  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
Central  Powers  was  a  blow  at  German  morale.  Moreover,  the  very 
vagueness  of  many  of  the  war-aims  of  the  Entente  Allies  had  given 
the  German  leaders  the  opportunity  to  beguile  their  people  with  pi'-- 
tures  of  the  dark  future  awaiting  them  unless  they  supported  th: 
German  Government  without  quibble.  The  President  was  determine-! 
that  Germany  must  be  defeated  before  the  war  could  be  brought  t*"^ 
a   close,   but  a   political   offensive   against   Germany   would   prove   of 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations  403 

material  assistance  to  the  military  offensive,  and  Germany  could  be 
weakened  from  within  as  well  as  from  without. 

To  that  end,  President  Wilson  addressed  Congress  on   January  8, 
1 91 7,  as  follows: 

Gentlemen  of  the  Congress: 

Once  more,  as  repeatedly  before,  the  spokesmen  of  the  Central 
Empires  have  indicated  their  desire  to  discuss  the  objects  of  the 
war  and  the  possible  basis  of  a  general  peace.     Parleys  have  been 
HI  progress  at  Brest-Litovsk  between  Russian  representatives  and 
representatives  of  the  Central  Powers,  to  which  the  attention  of 
all  the  belligerents  has  been  invited  for  the  purpose  of  ascertain- 
mg  whether  it  may  be  possible  to  extend  these  parleys   into  a 
general  conference  with  regard  to  terms  of  peace  and  settlement. 
The  Russian  representatives  presented  not  only  a  perfectly  defi- 
nite statement  of  the  principles  upon  which  they  would  be  willing 
to  conclude  peace,  but  also  an  equally  definite  program  for  the 
concrete  application  of  those  principles.     The  representatives  of 
the  Central  Powers,  on  their  part,  presented  an  outline  of  settle- 
ment which,  if  much  less  definite,  seemed  susceptible  of  liberal 
interpretation  until  their  specific  program  of  practical  terms  was 
added.     That  program  proposed  no  concessions  at  all,  either  to 
the  sovereignty  of  Russia  or  to  the  preferences  of  the  population 
with   whose   fortunes   it  dealt,  but  meant,   in  a  word,  that  the 
Central  Empires  were  to  keep  every  foot  of  territory  their  armed 
forces  had  occupied— every  province,  every  city,  every  point  of 
vantage— as  a  permanent  addition  to  their  territories  and  their 
power.     It  is  a  reasonable  conjecture  that  the  general  principles 
of  bJtlement  which  they  at  first  suggested  originated  with  the 
more  liberal  statesmen  of  Germany  and  Austria,  the  men  who 
have  begun  to  feel  the  force  of  their  own  peoples'  thought  and 
purpose,  while  the  concrete  terms  of  actual  settlement  came  from 
the  military  leaders  who  have  no  thought  but  to  keep  what  they 
have  got.     The  negotiations  have  been  broken  off.     The  Russian 
representatives  were  sincere  and  in  earnest.     They  cannot  enter- 
tain such  proposals  of  conquest  and  domination. 

The  whole  incident  is  full  of  significance.  It  is  also  full  of  per- 
plexity. With  whom  are  the  Russian  representatives  dealing? 
For  whom  are  the  representatives  of  the  Central  Empires  speak- 
ing? Are  they  speaking  for  the  majorities  of  their  respective 
Parliaments  or  for  the  minority  parties,  that  military  and  im- 
perialistic minority  which  has  so  far  dominated  their  whole  policy 


404  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

and  controlled  the  aft'airs  of  Turkey  and  of  the  Balkan  States 
which  have  felt  obliged  to  become  their  associates  in  this  war? 
The  Russian  representatives  have  insisted.,  very  justly,  very 
wisely,  and  in  the  true  spirit  of  modern  democracy,  that  the  con- 
ferences they  have  been  holding  with  the  Teutonic  and  Turkish 
statesmen  should  be  held  with  open,  not  closed,  doors,  and  all 
the  world  has  been  audience,  as  was  desired.  To  whom  have  w^e 
been  listening,  then?  To  those  who  speak  the  spirit  and  inten- 
tion of  the  resolutions  of  the  German  Reichstag  of  the  ninth  of 
July  last,  the  spirit  and  intention  of  the  liberal  leaders  and  parties 
of  Germany,  or  to  those  who  resist  and  defy  that  spirit  and 
intention  and  insist  upon  conquest  and  subjugation?  Or  are  we 
listening,  in  fact,  to  both,  unreconciled  and  in  open  and  hopeless 
contradiction?  These  are  very  serious  and  pregnant  questions. 
Upon  the  answer  to  them  depends  the  peace  of  the  world. 

But  whatever  the  results  of  the  parleys  at  Brest-Litovsk,  what- 
ever the  confusions  of  counsel  and  of  purpose  in  the  utterances 
of  the  spokesmen  of  the  Central  Empires,  they  have  again  at- 
tempted to  acquaint  the  world  with  their  objects  in  the  war 
and  have  again  challenged  their  adversaries  to  say  what  their 
objects  are  and  what  sort  of  settlement  they  would  deem  just  and 
satisfactory.  There  is  no  good  reason  why  that  challenge  should 
not  be  responded  to,  and  responded  to  with  the  utmost  candor. 
We  did  not  wait  for  it.  Not  once,  but  again  and  again,  we  have 
laid  our  whole  thought  and  purpose  before  the  world,  not  in 
general  terms  only,  but  each  time  with  sufficient  definition  to  make 
it  clear  what  sort  of  definite  terms  of  settlement  must  necessarily 
spring  out  of  them.  Within  the  last  week  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has 
spoken  with  admirable  candor  and  in  admirable  spirit  for  the 
people  and  Government  of  Great  Britain.  There  is  no  confusion 
of  counsel  among  the  adversaries  of  the  Central  Powers,  no  un- 
certainty of  principle,  no  vagueness  of  detail.  The  only  secrecy 
of  counsel,  the  only  lack  of  fearless  frankness,  the  only  failure 
to  make  definite  statement  of  the  objects  of  the  war,  lie  with 
Germany  and  her  allies.  The  issues  of  life  and  death  hang 
upon  these  definitions.  No  statesman  who  has  the  least  concep- 
tion of  his  responsibility  ought  for  a  moment  to  permit  himself 
to  continue  this  tragical  and  appalling  outpouring  of  blood  and 
treasure  unless  he  is  sure  beyond  a  peradventure  that  the  objects 
of  the  vital  sacrifice  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  very  life  of  society 
and  that  the  people  for  whom  he  speaks  think  them  right  and 
imperative  as  he  does. 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations  405 

There  is,  moreover,  a  voice  calling  for  these  definitions  of 
principle  and  of  purpose  which  is,  it  seems  to  me,  more  thrilling 
and  more  compelling  than  any  of  the  many  moving  voices  with 
which  the  troubled  air  of  the  world  is  filled.  It  is  the  voice  of 
the  Russian  people.  They  are  prostrate  and  all  but  helpless,  it 
would  seem,  before  the  grim  power  of  Germany,  which  has 
hitherto  known  no  relenting  and  no  pity.  Their  power  apparently 
is  shattered.  And  yet  their  soul  is  not  subservient.  They  will 
not  yield  either  in  principle  or  in  action.  Their  conception  of 
what  is  right,  of  what  is  humane  and  honorable  for  them  to 
accept,  has  been  stated  with  a  frankness,  a  largeness  of  view,  a 
generosity  of  spirit,  and  a  universal  human  sympathy  which  must 
challenge  the  admiration  of  every  friend  of  mankind;  and  they 
have  refused  to  compound  their  ideals  or  desert  others  that  they 
themselves  may  be  safe.  They  call  to  us  to  say  what  it  is  that 
we  desire,  in  w^hat,  if  in  anything,  our  purpose  and  our  spirit 
dififer  from  theirs ;  and  I  believe  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  would  wish  me  to  respond  with  utter  simplicity  and  frank- 
ness. Whether  their  present  leaders  believe  it  or  not,  it  is  our 
heartfelt  desire  and  hope  that  some  way  may  be  opened  whereby 
we  may  be  privileged  to  assist  the  people  of  Russia  to  attain  their 
utmost  hope  of  liberty  and  ordered  peace. 

It  will  be  our  wish  and  purpose  that  the  processes  of  peace, 
when  they  are  begun,  shall  be  absolutely  open,  and  that  they  shall 
involve  and  permit  henceforth  no  secret  understandings  of  any 
kind.  The  day  of  conquest  and  aggrandizement  is  gone  by ;  so 
is  also  the  day  of  secret  covenants  entered  into  in  the  interest 
of  particular  governments  and  likely  at  some  unlooked-for  mo- 
ment to  upset  the  peace  of  the  world.  It  is  this  happy  fact. 
now  clear  to  the  view  of  every  public  man  whose  thoughts  do 
not  still  linger  in  an  age  that  is  dead  and  gone,  which  makes  it 
possible  for  every  nation  whose  purposes  are  consistent  with 
justice  and  the  peace  of  the  world  to  avow  now  or  at  any  other 
time  the  objects  it  has  in  view. 

We  entered  this  war  because  violations  of  right  had  occurred 
which  touched  us  to  the  quick  and  made  the  life  of  our  own 
people  impossible  unless  they  were  corrected  and  the  world  se- 
cured once  for  all  against  their  recurrence.  What  w^e  demand 
in  this  war,  therefore,  is  nothing  peculiar  to  ourselves.  It  is 
that  the  world  be  made  fit  and  safe  to  live  in;  and  particularly 
that  it  be  made  safe  for  every  peace-loving  nation  w^hich.  like 
our  own,  wishes  to  live  its  own  life,  determine  its  own  institu- 


4o6  A  History  of  iJic  Great  War 

tions,  be  assured  of  justice  and  fair  dealings  by  tbe  otber  peo- 
ples of  the  world,  as  against  force  and  selfish  aggression.  All 
the  peoples  of  the  world  are  in  effect  partners  in  this  interest, 
and  for  our  own  part  we  see  very  clearly  that  unless  justice  be 
done  to  others  it  will  not  be  done  to  us. 

The  program  of  the  world's  peace,  therefore,  is  our  program, 
and  that  program,  the  only  possible  program,  as  we  see  it,  is  this : 

I.-^Qgen  covenaiits  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after  which 
there  shall  be  no  private  international  understandings  of  any 
kind,  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the 
public  view. 

II. — Absolute  f reed£mi,.jQi_iiavigaiiQa .  upon  the  seas,  outside 
territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war.  except  as  the  seas 
may  be  closed  in  wiiole  or  in  part  by  international  action  for  the 
enforcement  of  international  covenants. 

III. — Thejiemaval,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barriers 
and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions  among 
all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating  them- 
selves   for   its  maintenance. 

IV. — Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national  arnja- 
ments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic 
safety. 

V. — Free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjustment 
of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance  of  the  prin- 
ciple that  in  determining  all  such  questions  of  sovereignty  the 
interests  of  the  population  concerned  must  have  equal  weight 
with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  government  whose  title  is  to 
be   determined. 

\'I. — The  evacuation  of  jtlj^ j^ussian  territory  and  such  a  set- 
tlement of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure  the  best 
and  freest  co-operation  of  the  other  nations  of  the  world  in  ob- 
taining for  her  an  unhampered  and  unembarrassed  opportunity 
for  the  independent  determination  of  her  own  political  develop- 
ment and  national  policy,  and  assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome 
into  the  society  of  free  nations  under  institutions  of  her  own 
choosing;  and,  more  than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every 
kind  that  she  may  need  and  may  herself  desire.  The  treatment 
accorded  Russia  by  her  sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come  will 
be  the  acid  test  of  their  good-will,  of  their  comprehension  of  her 
needs  as  distinguished  from  their  own  interests,  and  of  their 
intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy. 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations  407 

VII. — Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evacu- 
ated  and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the  sovereignty 
which  she  enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free  nations.  No 
other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve  to  restore  confidence 
among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which  they  have  themselves  set 
and  determined  for  the  government  of  their  relations  with  one 
another.  Without  this  healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  valid- 
ity of  international  law  is  forever  impaired. 

VIII. — All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the  invaded 
portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia  in 
1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has  unsettled  the 
peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years,  should  be  righted,  in 
order  that  peace  may  once  more  be  made  secure  in  the  interest 
of  all. 

Ta. — A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be  ef- 
fected along~cIearIy  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

X. — ^The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among  the 
nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should  be  ac- 
corded the   freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  development. 

XI. — Roumania,  Servia,  and  Montenegro  should  be  evacu- 
ated ;  occupied  territory  restored ;  Servia  accorded  free  and  se- 
cure access  to  the  sea ;  and  the  relations  of  the  several  Balkan 
States  to  one  another  determined  by  friendly  counsel  along  his- 
torically established  lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality ;  and  in- 
ternational guarantees  of  the  political  and  economic  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  several  Balkan  States  should  be 
entered  into. 

XII. — The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire 
should  be  .assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other  nationali- 
ties which  are  now  imder  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured  an 
undoubted  security  of  life  and  an  absolutely  unmolested  oppor- 
tunity of  autonomous  development,  and  the  Dardanelles  should 
be  permanently  opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and  com- 
merce of  all  nations  under  international  guarantees. 

XIII. — An  independent  Polish  State  should  be  erected  which 
should  include  the  territorities  inhabited  by  indisputably  Polish 
populations,  which  should  be  assured  a  free  and  secure  access 
to  the  sea,  and  whose  political  and  economic  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  should  be  guaranteed  by  international  cove- 
nant. 


4o8  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

,  XIV. — A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed  under 
specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  ati'ording  mutual  guaran- 
tees of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity  to  gre.i 
and  small  states  alike. 

In  regard  to  these  essential  rectifications  of  wrong  and  asser- 
tions of  right,  we  feel  ourselves  to  be  intimate  partners  of  all 
the  governments  and  peoples  associated  together  against  the 
imperialists.  We  cannot  be  separated  in  interest  or  divided  in 
purpose.     We  stand  together  until  the  end. 

For  such  arrangements  and  covenants  we  are  willing  to  fight 
and  to  continue  to  fight  until  they  are  achieved ;  but  only  because 
we  wish  the  right  to  prevail  and  desire  a  just  and  stable  peace, 
such  as  can  be  secured  only  by  removing  the  chief  provocations 
to  war,  which  this  program  does  remove.  We  have  no  jealousy 
of  German  greatness,  and  there  is  nothing  in  this  program  that 
impairs  it.  We  grudge  her  no  achievement  or  distinction  of 
learning  or  of  pacific  enterprise  such  as  have  made  her  record 
very  bright  and  very  enviable.  We  do  not  wish  to  injure  her 
or  to  block  in  any  way  her  legitimate  influence  or  power.  \\'e 
do  not  wish  to  fight  her  either  with  arms  or  with  hostile  arrange- 
ments of  trade,  if  she  is  willing  to  associate  herself  with  us  and 
the  other  peace-loving  nations  of  the  world  in  covenants  of  jus- 
tice and  law  and  fair  dealing.  We  wish  her  only  to  accept  a 
place  of  equality  among  the  peoples  of  the  world — the  new 
world  in  which  we  now  live — instead  of  a  place  of  mastery. 

Neither  do  we  presume  to  suggest  to  her  any  alteration  or 
modification  of  her  institutions.  But  it  is  necessary,  we  must 
frankly  say,  and  necessary  as  a  preliminary  to  any  intelligent 
dealings  with  her  on  our  part,  that  we  should  know  whom  her 
spokesmen  speak  for  when  they  speak  to  us,  whether  for  the 
Reichstag  majority  or  for  the  military  party  and  the  men  whose 
creed  is  imperial  domination. 

We  have  spoken,  now,  surely,  in  terms  too  concrete  to  admit 
of  any  further  doubt  or  question.  An  evident  principle  runs 
through  the  whole  program  I  have  outlined.  It  is  the  principle 
of  justice  to  all  peoples  and  nationalities,  and  their  right  to  live 
on  equal  terms  of  liberty  and  safety  wtih  one  another,  whether 
they  be  strong  or  weak.  Unless  this  principle  be  made  its  founda- 
tion, no  part  of  the  structure  of  international  justice  can  stand. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  could  act  upon  no  other  prin- 
ciple, and  to  the  vindication  of  this  principle  they  are  ready  to 
devote  their  lives,  their  honor,  and  everything  that  they  possess. 


Indirect  Peace  Negotiations 


409 


The  moral  climax  of  this,  the  culminating  and  final  war  for 
human  liberty,  has  come,  and  they  are  ready  to  put  their  own 
strength,  their  own  highest  purpose,  their  own  integrity  and  de- 
votion to  the  test. 

The  "Fourteen  Points"  proved  too  powerful  for  the  Central  Powers 
to  evade  them.  On  January  24,  both  Count  Czernin,  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  and  Count  von  .Hertling,  the  Ger- 
man chancellor,  replied  to  President  Wilson.  In  the  opening  pas- 
sages of  his  address  to  Congress  of  February  11,  1917,  President 
Wilson  analyzed  very  briefly  these  replies  of  Austria  and  Hungary 
to  his  "fourteen  points."  Striking  passages  from  Count  Czernin's 
answer,  as  reported  by  the  Associated  Press,  are  as  follows : 

I  think  there  is  no  harm  in  stating  that  I  regard  the  recent  proposals 
of  President  Wilson  as  an  appreciable  approach  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
point  of  view,  and  that  to  some  of  them  Austria-Hungary  joyfully  could 
give  her  approval.  But  she  must  first  lay  down  this  principle— that  in 
so  far  as  these  propositions  concern  her  allies,  whether  in  the  case  of 
Germany's  possession  of  Belgium  or  in  the  case  of  Turkey,  Austria-Hun 
gary,  faithful  to  her  engagements  to  fight  to  the  end  in  defense  of  her 
allies,  will  defend  the  possessions  of  her  war  allies  as  she  would  her 
own.  That  is  the  standpoint  of  our  allies,  in  regard  to  which  there  is 
perfect   reciprocity. 

Count  Czernin  proceeded  to  say  that  he  must,  politely  but  categorically, 
refuse  the  suggestions  as  to  the  manner  in  which  Austria  and  Hungary 
should  manage  their  internal  administration,  and  that  there  was  not  a 
more  democratic  parliament  in  the  world  than  the  Austrian  Parliament, 
which,  in  agreement  with  the  other  authorized  constitutional  organiza- 
tions, alone  had  the  right  to  decide  the  internal  affairs  of  Austria. 

Referring  to  President  Wilson's  peace  program.  Count  Czernin  said 
that  he  had  no  objection  to  the  suppression  of  secret  diplomacy,  although 
he  doubted  whether  that  method  was  in  every  case  the  most  practical  or 
rapid  way  to  arrive  at  results.  The  public  discussion  of  diplomatic  treaties 
might,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  economifc  agreements,  he  said,  make 
impossible  the  conclusion  of  such  agreements,  "which  are  nothing  but 
commercial   transactions    and   might    increase    friction   between   States." 

It  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  political  agreements.  If  by  the  suppres- 
sion of  secret  diplomacy  is  meant  that  there  should  no  longer  be  any 
secret  treaties,  I  have  no  objection  to  make  to  the  realization  of  this  idea, 
although  I  do  not  know  how  one  can  execute  and  control  this  realization. 
But  those   are   supplementary   details   which   could  be   discussed. 

Count  Czernin  said"  as  to  the  second  point  in  President  Wilson's  peace 
aims,  freedom  of  the  seas,  the  President  had  responded  to  the  views  of 
all  and  that  he  (Czernin)  absolutely  and  entirely  supported  this  para- 
graph.    Regarding   Paragraph  3  in   President  Wilson's  proposals — the  re- 


4IO  A  History  of  the  Great  IV ar 

moval    of    economic    barriers   and    the    establishment    of    equality    of   trade 
conditions — Count    Czernin    said : 

This  article,  which  pronounces  in  a  formal  manner  hostility  against 
a  future  economic  war,  is  so  just  and  reasonable,  and  its  application  so 
often  has  been  urged  by  us,  that  we  have  nothing  to  add  to  it. 

Count  Czernin  said  that  Article  IV  of  President  Wilson's  proposals, 
which  demanded  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point 
consistent  with  domestic  safety. 

Expresses  in  a  particularly  clear  and  just  manner  the  necessity  of 
bringing  rivalries  in  armament  to  the  limit  already  indicated,  and  there- 
fore I  greet  with  gratitude  any  voice  which  makes  itself  heard  in  the 
sense    of    my   previous    statement. 

On  the   subject   of   Italy,    Serbfa,   Montenegro,   and   Roumania: 

I  refuse  to  place  a  premium  on  the  military  adventures  of  our  ene- 
mies. I  refuse  to  our  enemies,  who  obstinately  persist  in  wishing  to  wage 
war  until  a  final  victory  is  achieved  by  one  side,  concessions  by  which 
the  monarchy  would  permanently  suffer  and  which  would  give  them  an 
infinite  advantage  in  being  able  to  drag  on  the  war  relatively  without 
risk. 

Count  Czernin  invited  President  Wilson  to  use  his  great  influence 
to  make  the  Entente  Allies  declare  on  their  side  the  conditions  on  which 
they  were  ready  to  speak,  and  added : 

I  will  speak  as  freely  and  frankly  as  I  have  done  here  with  President 
Wilson,  and  will  with  all  those  who  would  like  to  speak.  But  naturally 
the  duration  of  the  war  will  not  be  without  its  influence  on  this  situation. 

Italy  is  a  striking  illustration  of  this.  Before  the  war  Italy  had  the 
opportunity  of  realizing  a  great  territorial  expansion  without  firing  a 
shot.  She  refused  this  and  joined  in  the  war.  She  has  lost  hundreds 
of  thousands  in  killed  or  wounded,  and  millions  of  money  in  war  expenses 
and  destroyed  her  riches.  Her  population  is  in  distress  and  misery— all 
this  solely  in  order  to  lose  the  advantage  which  she  would  have  been 
able  to  gain. 

Discussing  Mr.  Wilsori's   views   on   Poland,   Count   Czernin  proceeded : 

We  also  are  supporters  of  an  independent  Polish  State,  which  would 
include  all  territories  and  populations  which  indisputably  are  Polish.  On 
this  point  we  believe  we  should  quickly  come  to  an  understanding  with 
President  Wilson. 

Finally,  in  his  idea  of  a  league  of  peoples  the  President  probably  will 
meet  with  no  opposition  in  the  monarchy. 

We,  therefore,  are  in  agreement  in  the  main.  Our  views  are  identical 
not  only  on  the  broad  principles  regarding  a  new  organization  of  the 
world  after  the  war,  but  also  on  several  concrete  questions,  and  differ- 
ences which  still  exist  do  not  appear  to  me  to  be  so  great  that  a  conversa- 
tion regarding  them  would  not  lead  to  enlightenment  and  a  rapprochement. 

This  situation,  which  doubtless  arises  from  the  fact  that  Austria- 
Hungary  on  the  one  side  and  the  United  States  on  the  other  are  composed 
of  States  whose  interests  are  at  least  at  variance  with  one  another,  tempts 
one  to  ask   if   an   exchange  of   ideas  between  the  two  powers  could  not 


hidircct  Peace  Negotiations  411 

be   the   point   of   departure    for   a   personal   conversation    among   all   States 
which    have    not   yet   joined    in    peace   negotiations. 

The  value  of  the  reply  of  Germany  may  best  be  understood  by 
considering  Count  von  Hertling's  reply  to  the  "Fourteen  I'oints" 
point  by  point: 

I 

We  are  quite  ready  to  accept  this  proposal  and  declare  publicity  of 
negotiations   to   be   a  general   political   principle. 

II 

There  is  here  no  difference  of  opinion.  The  limitation  introduced  by 
Mr.  Wilson  at  the  end,  which  I  need  not  quote  textually,  is  not  intelli- 
gible,  appears   superfluous,   and  would   therefore  best  be   left  out. 

It  would,  however,  be  highly  important  for  the  freedom  of  shipping 
in  future  if  strongly  fortified  naval  bases  on  important  international 
routes,  such  as  England  has  at  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Aden,  Hongkong,  the 
Falkland  Island,  and  many  other  places,  were  removed. 

Ill 
We,  too,  are  in  thorough  accord  with  the  removal  of  economic  barriers 
which    interfere    with    trade    in    superfluous    manner.     We,    too,    condemn 
economic    war,    which    would    inevitably    bear    within    it  causes   of    future 
warlike   complications. 

IV 
As    already    declared   by   us,    the    idea    of    limitation   of   armaments    is 
entirely   discussable.     The   financial  position  of  all   European   States  after 
the  War  might  most  efifectively  promote  a  satisfactory  solution. 

V 
Practical  realization  of  Mr.  Wilson's  principles  in  the  realm  of  reality 
will  encounter  some  diflficulties  in  any  case.  I  believe  that  for  the  pres- 
ent it  may  be  left  for  England,  which  has  the  greatest  colonial  empire, 
to  make  what  she  will  of  this  proposal  of  her  ally.  This  point  of  the 
program  also  will  have  to  be  discussed  in  due  time,  on  the  reconstitu- 
tion  of   the   world's  colonial  possessions. 

vt 

Now  that  the  Entente  has  r-fusf-.d;  within  the  ppiiod  agrted  upon 
by  Russia  and  the  Quadruple  Allia.iee,  to  join  ;in  <^he  n?got'ations,  I 
must  in  the  name  of  the  latter  decline  to  allow  any  subsequent  inter- 
ference. We  are  dealing  there  witli  questions  which  concern  only  Russia 
and   the   four  allied  powers. 

VII 
My  precedessors  in  office  repeatedly  declared  that  at  no  time  did  the 
annexation  of  Belgium  to  Germany  form  a  point  in  the  program  of 
German  policy.  The  Belgian  question  belongs  to  those  questions  the  details 
of  which  are  to  be  settled  by  negotiation  at  the  peace  conference.  So 
long   as    our   opponents   have  unreservedly   taken   the    standpoint   that   the 


412  A  History  of  the  Great  War 

integrity  of  the  Allies'  territory  can  offer  the  only  possible  basis  of 
peace  discussion,  I  must  adhere  to  the  standpoint  hitherto  always  adojjtcd 
and  refuse  the  removal  in  advance  of  the  Belgian  affair  from  the  entire 
discussion. 

VIII 
The  occupied  parts  of  France  are  a  valued  pawn  in  our  hands.  Here, 
too,  forcible  annexation  forms  no  part  of  the  official  German  policy.  The 
conditions  and  methods  of  procedure  of  the  evacuation,  which  must  take 
account  of  Germany's  vital  interest,  are  to  be  agreed  upon  between  Ger- 
many and  France.  I  can  only  again  expressly  accentuate  the  fact  tliat 
there   can   never   be   a   question   of   dismemberment   of    imperial   territory. 

IX,   X,   XI 

The  questions  dealt  with  by  Mr.  Wilson  under  Points  9,  10,  and  1 1 
touch  both  the  Italian  frontier  question  and  questions  of  the  future  de- 
velopment of  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  and  the  future  of  tin- 
Balkan  States;  questions  in  which,  for  the  greater  part,  the  interests  of 
our  ally,  Austria-Hungary,  preponderate.  Where  German  interests  are 
concerned,  we  shall  defend  them  most  energetically.  But  I  may  leave 
the  answer  to  Mr.  Wilson's  proposals  on  these  points  in  the  first  place 
to  the  Austro-Hungarian   Foreign   Minister. 

XII 

The  matters  touched  upon  by  Mr.  Wilson  in  Point  12  concern  our 
loyal,  brave  ally,  Turkey.  I  must  in  nowise  forestall  her  statesmen  in 
their  attitude.  The  integrity  of  Turkey  and  the  safeguarding  of  her 
capital,  which  is  connected  closely  with  the  question  of  the  straits,  a  e 
important  and  vital  interests  of  the  German  Empire,  also.  Our  ally  can 
always  count  upon  our  eneigetic  support  in  this  matter. 

XIII 
The  German  Empire  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  liberated 
Poland  from  the  Czaristic  regime  which  was  crushing  her  national  char- 
acteristics. It  may  thus  be  left  to  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  and 
Poland  to  come  to  an  agreement  on  the  future  constitution  of  this  coun- 
try  We  are  on  the  road  to  this  goal. 

XIV 
If  the  idea  of  a  band  of  ratioiis,  as  suggested  by  President  Wilson, 
proves  on'  closer  examination  really  to  be  conceived  in  a  spirit  of  com- 
plete justice  and  complete  impartiality  toward  all,  then  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernnient  ;is  gladly'  ready,  vhen  all  other  pending  questions  have  been 
settled,  to  begin  the  examination  of  the  basis  of  such  a  band  of  nations. 


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